Not everyone flying the Beech is GPS rated and therefore fly the NDB/DME Bravo at AP using good old raw data NDB/RMI.

And since I have been flying into AP reguarly (9mths now) I have not had or heard of anyone recieving EGPWS warnings.

S2K

Well if nobody is getting EGPWS warnings, nobody is getting close to terrain...

flyingkiwi

My point is that many approaches around the world are designed with terrain in close proximity, but are perfectly safe if given due respect. AP falls into this category.

Looking at the approach plate, you would need to be about 30 degrees off track to be in danger. Yes, there might be an initial error in picking up the inbound, but the approach axis takes this into account, and as you continue the approach, the error decreases. Or are you saying you could be 30 degrees off track with an "on-track" indication, at about three miles from the threshold?

I think we'll just have to agree to differ on this...

When these aircraft crash the authorities spend big dollars investigating and cleaning up. The system is rubbish - do a paper audit and charge the operator heaps. It would be more beneficial for the authorities to provide financial assistance to light twin operators so they can fit TAWS A.

This accident is just another CFIT and they happen to every category of aircraft.

Good idea, but at around NZ$50K an aircraft, I doubt it will happen anytime soon.

S2K

It's true that the majority are not GPS approach rated, however there is nothing to stop them superimposing a GPS pointer to suppliment the ADF pointer - many do this, it's perfectly legal and good practice IMO. Of course if there were significant differences in ADF and GPS tracking information, the approach would need to be discontinued.

MOR

I think that the types of aircraft with old ADF equipment that are likely to be more affected by any preculiarities, are unlikely to be GPWS equiped. I don't know if you've noticed, but many ADFs in 30+ year old light aircraft leave a lot to be desired in the traking stakes. This is just an observation, and certainly not a commentry on the recent tragic events - like every one else, I will wait for the report.

Agreed my crackpipe comments were excessive but the comparisons he gave were mind numbing and throwing up a paragraph like that after telling me to grow up is a bit rich. STATISTICALLY I am afraid, for the number of sectors flown, SPIFR is waaaaaaaaaaaaay more dangerous than any other ATO operation except maybe Ag work.

Really? People are dead, we're nearly having one of these SPIFR acciednts every year. You'd be happy to stand up at Steve's funeral and make such a pathetic analogy, or call up any of the relatives of any of the victims of the SPIFR crash in CHC recently and make the same comment. There is a huge difference in the level of safety between SPIFR and the multicrew operation that any of the link or domestic services in NZ operate. Don't even try to group the two together.

The risk management that you talk about is precisely my arguement. There is too much risk from a variety of factors, the easiest of which we can change is reducing the workload by increasing the crew and the level of safety systems on the aircraft. At the moment the SPIFR aircraft being operated have none. And, in comparison to Australia we're way slow at introducing GPS.

You are asking a lot of an individual in a very unforgiving environment in SPIFR and if nothing changes, and it's been like this for 30 years, the accidents will continue. So you can bleat about the apparent attacks on Christian (of which there are none) and you can sit and wait for the TAIC report but so far CAA has been totally ineffective.

Yep, in the last 20 years there has been one multicrew scheduled C-FIT accident, the Dash-8 and there's been over 15 SPIFR crashes. Are you trying to tell me in some twisted way that makes it alright. I wonder if some in the flying community just expect the odd SPIFR aircraft to spear in, let's face it, it happens way too often when every other mode of transport has been utilising technology in getting safer over the past decades.

Cloud Cutter

You are obviously correct, but my point remains that even with old equipment, it is unlikely that your ADF needle is going to be saying that you are on track, with no flags, when in fact you are more than 30 degrees off-track - particularly when you are 3-4 miles from the station. Coastal refraction simply doesn't do that. If you are getting those sorts of errors, it is more likely to be the airborne equipment than the NDB. If that is the case - get it fixed! There is no reason for any ADF equipment to produce those kinds of errors, which in any case would be outside the certification limits of the equipment. Even the 1950's Cherokee I learned in, with the ancient combi ADF, didn't do that.

stillalbatross

Wow... but... you are quite right.

MOR

We will agree to disagree,

Just one thing, i know in our glass planes we have flags for adf failures but most non EFIS aircrafts adf's dont have them....

Nuff said.

Steve...RIP.

Stillalbatross

One Dash 8 crash in twenty years. How many were saved by GPWS in that time? The 15 SPIFR accident aircraft did not have the benefit of GPWS. If they did the result would have been different. SPIFR is not the issue!

The technology is here and it is time the CAA made it mandatory for all Air Transport IFR aircraft. Operators who can't afford TAWS because of capital resources should be shut down. The cost of wiping aircraft and people out is very high.

"You'd be happy to stand up at Steve's funeral and make such a pathetic analogy, or call up any of the relatives of any of the victims of the SPIFR crash in CHC recently and make the same comment"



Albatross.....I find this comment you have made grotesque, you have NO idea of my personality, my experience, or my relationship with Steve Brown and his family. Im afraid an idividual like you is not worth wasting my breath on. I cant believe people like you even exist.......I hope you rot, you sicken me:mad:

Far Canard

But isn't that the whole point? SPIFR as we know it is defined by rules that allow low levels of equipment in the very aircraft that need more - hence the single pilot is faced with a more complex and dangerous task.

If TAWS A, EGPWS, fully coupled autopilots etc were mandatory on SPIFR aircraft, the accident rate would drop, but then so too would the number of SPIFR flights as most of the operators would be out of business.

That may, of course, be a good thing.

MOR,
To take the SPIFR operations to the level of absurdity that the current CAA accept as safe, one only has to look at the Part 91 operations that are allowed to exist.

Part 91, when it used to be called Private Operations, the requirement was that the operator owned the aircraft, flew it himself, and carried his own goods. No flying for hire or reward.

However, under part 91 in this day and age, if an operator can prove that there is no value added to his freight then it is open slather, no requirement for an approved chief pilot, no recurrent training of any sort required, no flight time limitations, not even a Company Ops Manual. The operator is under no obligation to display any knowledge of the CAA act, or any knowledge of regulations. The aircraft has no requirement to be even fitted with an auto pilot let alone a serviceable unit. Unwitting Pax are carried either as "staff" or "contractors".
However as there is no requirement for the operator to hold anything in the way of a Civil Aviation Document, as required by the CAA Act, other than the certificate of registration of the aircraft, how can he be prosecuted for not complying with the rules and regulations when there is no requirement for him to show any knowledge of same.

This in an operation that flies some 1200hrs per annum, carries in excess of 200 tons of high value freight, and has never been audited, to the best of my knowledge in some 6 years of operations.

It has the CAA's blessing obviously, or is it a question of not making waves until forced to, such as in the Christchurch debacle.

Prospector

Yeah I did that trip out to the CI once. It was the most unsafe operation I have ever seen and it scared the crap out of me, wondering how I was going to get out if we had to ditch (this was before the crew hatch was fitted to the old girl).

It just re-inforces my contention earlier in the thread that the CAA are not there for our safety.