Aviation Hall of Doom - next volume
Thread Starter
Aviation Hall of Doom - next volume
More years in the aviation hall of doom (sorry, Dick)
CASA AvMed was a problem over fifty years ago and on the evidence I’m reading here from a very experienced colleague, it has not improved with age.
I did my pilot training at Bankstown.
Did a medical certificate, flew the PPL course, never asked for one of those the newfangled Restricted PPLs, got my PPL,
continued straight on with my CPL training, did the flight test with one of the good ex RAAF WWII test officers and passed.
THEN I learned I needed a commercial pilot medical so I went and did that and waited, and waited, and…. Nil comms.
I started haunting the Regional Office at Waverton and the excellent colourful clerk did his best to get some answers from AvMed in Melbourne without success.
I rang the Director of AvMed who told me that whilst each of my eyes worked perfectly well, they did not work together
– I did not have binocular vision, and therefore according to him I would not be able to judge height to land an aircraft.
Why not says me? Well he says, your eyes work like rangefinders and it is the angle between the eyes that gives you distance perception!
Following his logic I asked would that mean that to judge height I would need one eye above the other?
Perhaps my youthful diplomacy (???) was not appreciated however the conversation ended when I pointed out I had a PPL and had passed the CPL flight test so DCA Examiners of Airmen judged that I could land an aircraft and if I did not have a CPL licence number by closing time Friday, I would be in his office Monday morning to take him flying in a Twin Commanche and we would see who was right.
The colourful clerk at Waverton rang me on Friday afternoon with my licence number, thanks N.
Pure luck that I passed the CPL Flight Test before doing my CPL medical or maybe I would have lost that argument.
That Doc did wonders in the RAAF and his contribution to both aviation and road safety has long been recognised but I am sure Dr Arthur Pape would confirm that his views on colour blindness and licencing was then and still is an ongoing concern to us all.
CASA AvMed was a problem over fifty years ago and on the evidence I’m reading here from a very experienced colleague, it has not improved with age.
I did my pilot training at Bankstown.
Did a medical certificate, flew the PPL course, never asked for one of those the newfangled Restricted PPLs, got my PPL,
continued straight on with my CPL training, did the flight test with one of the good ex RAAF WWII test officers and passed.
THEN I learned I needed a commercial pilot medical so I went and did that and waited, and waited, and…. Nil comms.
I started haunting the Regional Office at Waverton and the excellent colourful clerk did his best to get some answers from AvMed in Melbourne without success.
I rang the Director of AvMed who told me that whilst each of my eyes worked perfectly well, they did not work together
– I did not have binocular vision, and therefore according to him I would not be able to judge height to land an aircraft.
Why not says me? Well he says, your eyes work like rangefinders and it is the angle between the eyes that gives you distance perception!
Following his logic I asked would that mean that to judge height I would need one eye above the other?
Perhaps my youthful diplomacy (???) was not appreciated however the conversation ended when I pointed out I had a PPL and had passed the CPL flight test so DCA Examiners of Airmen judged that I could land an aircraft and if I did not have a CPL licence number by closing time Friday, I would be in his office Monday morning to take him flying in a Twin Commanche and we would see who was right.
The colourful clerk at Waverton rang me on Friday afternoon with my licence number, thanks N.
Pure luck that I passed the CPL Flight Test before doing my CPL medical or maybe I would have lost that argument.
That Doc did wonders in the RAAF and his contribution to both aviation and road safety has long been recognised but I am sure Dr Arthur Pape would confirm that his views on colour blindness and licencing was then and still is an ongoing concern to us all.
Thread Starter
Aviation Hall of Doom - next volume Chapter Two
Consultation with industry – Airservices style (And CASA is no different)
Some of the older readers will remember when Australia moved from having IATA codes starting with A (ASSY, APPH etc) to those starting with Y (YSSY etc).
Airservices held a big consultation meeting in their huge HQ building in Canberra inviting all of the industry groups to attend.
Industry had one request of Airservices; that they use the US system of naming places so that the IATA code and the ICAO code were the same except for the Y prefix. KLAX = LAX etc so Sydney would by YSYD/SYD, YBNE/BNE, Gladstone YGLT/GLT not GLA etc etc.
Every member of industry was united in that request: Qantas, Ansett, Regionals, AOPA, SAAA, GFA, no dissent, every single delegate supported that view.
Everyone was going to have to change their computer coding, flight planning etc etc so let’s do it once and do it so it works for all of us – a very rare united voice from all of industry.
With no explanation whatsoever, AsA just went ahead and ignored all of us. History; learn from it.
That is why none of the never ending consultation meetings has ever produced an industry acceptable set of regulations.
AsA and CASA simply do as they please despite all the money industry expends in trying to add some expertise to the discussion.
Their idea of consultation is nothing but pretence to satisfy their parliamentary "overlords" whom they also ignore so far as they can.
Some of the older readers will remember when Australia moved from having IATA codes starting with A (ASSY, APPH etc) to those starting with Y (YSSY etc).
Airservices held a big consultation meeting in their huge HQ building in Canberra inviting all of the industry groups to attend.
Industry had one request of Airservices; that they use the US system of naming places so that the IATA code and the ICAO code were the same except for the Y prefix. KLAX = LAX etc so Sydney would by YSYD/SYD, YBNE/BNE, Gladstone YGLT/GLT not GLA etc etc.
Every member of industry was united in that request: Qantas, Ansett, Regionals, AOPA, SAAA, GFA, no dissent, every single delegate supported that view.
Everyone was going to have to change their computer coding, flight planning etc etc so let’s do it once and do it so it works for all of us – a very rare united voice from all of industry.
With no explanation whatsoever, AsA just went ahead and ignored all of us. History; learn from it.
That is why none of the never ending consultation meetings has ever produced an industry acceptable set of regulations.
AsA and CASA simply do as they please despite all the money industry expends in trying to add some expertise to the discussion.
Their idea of consultation is nothing but pretence to satisfy their parliamentary "overlords" whom they also ignore so far as they can.
As a person who remembers ASSY etc, I object strongly to the label "older".
As a participant in countless Technical Working Groups, however, your analysis of industry "consultation" is spot on.
AirCervixes and the RAAF recently held "industry consultation" on the extension of the fighter combat training area currently 8500-FL600 (NOTAM) located west of Scone starting about Merriwa and extending out to Coonamble. The consultation was held in Brisbane and Sydney and nobody there objected to the fighter training area DOUBLING IN SIZE.
The conveniently forgot to consult with any of the operators in the area affected (yes, I rand every single HOO within 100nm of the new Restricted area).
Multiple Citations, 3 Conquests, 2 KingAirs, a Phenom, 3 PC12s, 2 TBMs, 5 flying schools, 5 Ag operators. Not one of us consulted, but the seminars/Info sessions held in Sydney raised nary an objection.
As a participant in countless Technical Working Groups, however, your analysis of industry "consultation" is spot on.
AirCervixes and the RAAF recently held "industry consultation" on the extension of the fighter combat training area currently 8500-FL600 (NOTAM) located west of Scone starting about Merriwa and extending out to Coonamble. The consultation was held in Brisbane and Sydney and nobody there objected to the fighter training area DOUBLING IN SIZE.
The conveniently forgot to consult with any of the operators in the area affected (yes, I rand every single HOO within 100nm of the new Restricted area).
Multiple Citations, 3 Conquests, 2 KingAirs, a Phenom, 3 PC12s, 2 TBMs, 5 flying schools, 5 Ag operators. Not one of us consulted, but the seminars/Info sessions held in Sydney raised nary an objection.
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It really is sad ! Back at the time that the location codes changed from A to Y, the RAPACs and NAPAC were in full swing with regular meetings around the country and in Canberra and it should have been tabled in those forums. The proposal for the use of the ICAO codes was at a slightly different time. The change from A to Y in fact, was done behind closed doors by just two people in Airservices (or whateve it was called back then) and by the time we got to know about it the proposal had been submitted to ICAO and it was then too late to change. The funniest part of that saga was a letter written then by AOPA President Peter Patroni (RIP) to the then manager responsible - every word in that letter started with "Y"..
One of the problems we have had for some time is that many officers in ASA and CASA do not have the experience necessary to do their job and this applies to some of the senior managers who make these very poor decisions. The Peter Principle I believe it is called. You might wonder why this is so? I suggest it is because the potential applicants with the necessary CDF to do these manager jobs do not even apply because they don't want to be part of such poorly managed organisations. All the good ones I know have pulled the pin in about a year or less.
One of the problems we have had for some time is that many officers in ASA and CASA do not have the experience necessary to do their job and this applies to some of the senior managers who make these very poor decisions. The Peter Principle I believe it is called. You might wonder why this is so? I suggest it is because the potential applicants with the necessary CDF to do these manager jobs do not even apply because they don't want to be part of such poorly managed organisations. All the good ones I know have pulled the pin in about a year or less.
I recall the A > Y code proposal being presented at a Victorian RAPAC, the reason given was Australia was running out of location codes (the "A" was shared with PNG and possibly some islands), and with electronic flight planning systems coming in including NAIPS & TAAATS there was a need for more and unique codes.
The reason only the first letter changed was given as simplicity i.e.AMML becomes YMML and the following existing three letter suffix location code remained unchanged, with no need to change NAVAID IDs etc. which in itself would have been quite an exercise.
The reason only the first letter changed was given as simplicity i.e.AMML becomes YMML and the following existing three letter suffix location code remained unchanged, with no need to change NAVAID IDs etc. which in itself would have been quite an exercise.
Now.... Just WHERE did I put that definition of 'Consultation' by Commissioner G Smith in the IRC.....Waaay back THEN - in that FS Union (CPSU) case....?? (FS v AsA)
'Ang on......'Ere 'Tis......
What is Consultation? A commonly recognised definition is that consultation involves "more than a mere exchange of information. For consultation to be effective the participants must be contributing to the decision-making process not only in appearance, but in fact." (Commissioner Smith, Australian Industrial Relations Commission. 12 March, 1991.)
There Ya go.....
Cheeerrrsss.....(Snoopy)......
(So....Wot's changed...?)
.
'Ang on......'Ere 'Tis......
What is Consultation? A commonly recognised definition is that consultation involves "more than a mere exchange of information. For consultation to be effective the participants must be contributing to the decision-making process not only in appearance, but in fact." (Commissioner Smith, Australian Industrial Relations Commission. 12 March, 1991.)
There Ya go.....
Cheeerrrsss.....(Snoopy)......
(So....Wot's changed...?)
.
Thread Starter
Aviation Hall of Doom - next volume Chapter Three
From the Australian Feb 11th
Aircraft are regularly disappearing from radars on approach to Queensland’s busy Rockhampton and Mackay airports, with air traffic controllers blaming “not-fit-for-purpose” radars and warning of “compromised safety”.
The Weekend Australian has obtained detailed radar coverage logs, revealing 221 incidents of aircraft dropping off radars on *approach to the two airports from July 27, 2022 to January 26, 2023. These logs show aircraft disappearing from radars usually for moments or minutes, but sometimes longer, with comments such as “did not return at all”, “never *returned”, and “leaving surveillance coverage intermittently”.
Pilots have been warned to *expect delays and airspace restrictions to work around the problem, which controllers say is due to a radar system “not fit for purpose” and needing urgent improvement.
Controllers say the approach by aircraft to Rockhampton and Mackay was previously handled by the local air traffic control tower. However, due to increased traffic, the Civil Aviation Safety Authority directed Airservices Australia to provide a stand-alone radar approach service.
The problem, controllers say, is that Airservices has baulked at the cost of installing a new Terminal Approach Radar, or TAR system, tailor-made for tracking arriving aircraft.
“A TAR has a specific scan rate that makes it suitable for use for approach – the (en route) radar being used for Mackay and Rockhampton approach is not a TAR, therefore they are having *issues,” said an experienced controller, speaking on condition of anonymity. Radar tracks will drop out for periods of time while making an approach to Mackay or Rockhampton, making them temporarily invisible to the controller.
“We see an approach service being provided with a radar not fit for purpose … This is what happens when you don’t put the required time, money and resources into providing an adequate approach service – safety is compromised.”
One controller described the situation was “not as safe as it should be” and said that at the very least improvements should be made by installing more ground signal stations – known as ADS-B sites – in the area to address the black spots. The ADS-B system uses equipment on board aircraft to broadcast its precise location to ground stations, which relay them to air traffic control.
An Airservices Australia spokeswoman said there was no threat to public safety but that radar and ADS-B improvements in the area were planned.
“Claims of any safety threat to the travelling public at Rockhampton and Mackay airports are irresponsible and inaccurate,” the spokeswoman said. “No aircraft safety incidents have occurred.
“Our technical experts developed a solution to the issues raised during this (radar gap log) program that increases radar coverage and will be implemented within the next three months.
“An additional surveillance safety measure, ADS-B, will be implemented at both Rockhampton and Mackay in the first half of 2024, once the required safety assessments have been completed and approved.”
Sources said Airservices had issued official Notices to Airmen warning of “delays and restrictions” due to radar issues, covering areas within 20NM of Rockhampton, below 6000ft, and northwest of Mackay, also below 6000ft.
Controllers say when the radar drops out, they must use other ways to separate aircraft, including directing planes to different altitudes and denying smaller aircraft access to controlled airspace. Such measures had caused delays.
Dozens of safety risk reports had been made about the radar gaps.
However, it is understood at least one shift manager had been asked to stop submitting them.
The log was started to try to provide a better understanding of areas of greatest concern.
That is the report - some history to come!!!!!!!!!!!!!
Just declare it a TRA. Job done!
Thread Starter
The History and The Problem
In the 1980’s, ATC became aware of an increasing number of Air Safety Incidents on the Queensland coast and asked ATSB / BASI for a computer search of all incidents in the area. The records were then analysed by ATCs to see if the provision of radar would have either precluded or aided in the resolution of these incidents.
The result was absolutely clear; radar would have been of great assistance. A series of documented case studies were prepared for management recommending a radar chain be established to cover the Coast and enabling local radar approach services for Cairns (Townsville was a military problem).
On 18th May 1985 Australia came very close indeed to having its first jet transport hull loss.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications.../aair198503821
Boeing 727 VH-TBO was required to report to CNS tower commencing approach; it did, but what the pilot was NOT required to do was to state the track he was flying – but he did do so. ATC was NOT required to check that track – but they did! The ATC realised the aircraft was on descent into the high country South of CNS and instructed the B727 to climb immediately then they would sort out what went wrong. Remember – no radar – no ability to “see” the problem.
The 727 was flying a Coolangatta VOR approach not a Cairns approach. Very, Very lucky outcome.
That was the final straw for the ATC analysis and what we would now call a safety case for provision of radar.
The then First Assistant Secretary, Airways Division (and Engineer) simply directed all copies of the request for radar be recalled and shredded as in his view as an Engineer, ATC did not need radar.
Fortunately, somebody, somewhere sent a copy of the reports to the Cairns Post.
Natasha Bita wrote a major article and lo and behold, Airservices started the process to buy some radar gear.
That is history.
The article in the Australian above shows the exact same sequence of events; ATC reporting increased risk and the organisation not responding in a timely manner.
Worse, AsA has watched forty years of increasing traffic without recognising its own infrastructure needs to continually evolve also.
However that is only a minor quibble – we know AsA and CASA do not learn.
The most important point is that the Airservices Act 1995 gives AsA complete control over what services it does or does not provide:
(3) Subject to subsection (5), subsection 9(1) and section 16, the extent to which AA providesservices and facilities is subject to AA's discretion.
As a consequence, Australia is the only country in the developed world that has Public Transport aircraft operating under the Instrument Flight Rules at night and in cloud in conditions under which it is physically impossible for pilots to separate their aircraft from others and yet AsA chooses not to provide an Air Traffic Control Service.
Mangalore should have been a lesson but nothing has changed!
Allowing AsA to decide what services to provide is akin to allowing the Electrical Trades Union to decide what kind of power supply and what kind of grid the country needs – oooops maybe that is as bad analogy in today’s world.
The point is that Air Traffic Controllers are the technical providers of a service – they should have no role in deciding what service is to be provided – that is beyond their training and skill set (and I are one! - I am also an IFR qualified pilot.)
The level of service at the least ought to be dictated by the safety regulator in the same way as they dictate the loads aircraft wings have to carry. ICAO nominates classes of Airspace and expects each nation to choose the appropriate classes to ensure safety.
Australia, alone in the developed world does not provide ATC separation to all IFR operations.
It should. (And radar helps do this but is not a necessary tool to do so).
The result was absolutely clear; radar would have been of great assistance. A series of documented case studies were prepared for management recommending a radar chain be established to cover the Coast and enabling local radar approach services for Cairns (Townsville was a military problem).
On 18th May 1985 Australia came very close indeed to having its first jet transport hull loss.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/publications.../aair198503821
Boeing 727 VH-TBO was required to report to CNS tower commencing approach; it did, but what the pilot was NOT required to do was to state the track he was flying – but he did do so. ATC was NOT required to check that track – but they did! The ATC realised the aircraft was on descent into the high country South of CNS and instructed the B727 to climb immediately then they would sort out what went wrong. Remember – no radar – no ability to “see” the problem.
The 727 was flying a Coolangatta VOR approach not a Cairns approach. Very, Very lucky outcome.
That was the final straw for the ATC analysis and what we would now call a safety case for provision of radar.
The then First Assistant Secretary, Airways Division (and Engineer) simply directed all copies of the request for radar be recalled and shredded as in his view as an Engineer, ATC did not need radar.
Fortunately, somebody, somewhere sent a copy of the reports to the Cairns Post.
Natasha Bita wrote a major article and lo and behold, Airservices started the process to buy some radar gear.
That is history.
The article in the Australian above shows the exact same sequence of events; ATC reporting increased risk and the organisation not responding in a timely manner.
Worse, AsA has watched forty years of increasing traffic without recognising its own infrastructure needs to continually evolve also.
However that is only a minor quibble – we know AsA and CASA do not learn.
The most important point is that the Airservices Act 1995 gives AsA complete control over what services it does or does not provide:
(3) Subject to subsection (5), subsection 9(1) and section 16, the extent to which AA providesservices and facilities is subject to AA's discretion.
As a consequence, Australia is the only country in the developed world that has Public Transport aircraft operating under the Instrument Flight Rules at night and in cloud in conditions under which it is physically impossible for pilots to separate their aircraft from others and yet AsA chooses not to provide an Air Traffic Control Service.
Mangalore should have been a lesson but nothing has changed!
Allowing AsA to decide what services to provide is akin to allowing the Electrical Trades Union to decide what kind of power supply and what kind of grid the country needs – oooops maybe that is as bad analogy in today’s world.
The point is that Air Traffic Controllers are the technical providers of a service – they should have no role in deciding what service is to be provided – that is beyond their training and skill set (and I are one! - I am also an IFR qualified pilot.)
The level of service at the least ought to be dictated by the safety regulator in the same way as they dictate the loads aircraft wings have to carry. ICAO nominates classes of Airspace and expects each nation to choose the appropriate classes to ensure safety.
Australia, alone in the developed world does not provide ATC separation to all IFR operations.
It should. (And radar helps do this but is not a necessary tool to do so).
Thread Starter
Well OK but the subjects have been different.
Maybe next time I shall tell some truths about radar acquisition, and how do you say it??
pots-de-vin et tromperie
Maybe next time I shall tell some truths about radar acquisition, and how do you say it??
pots-de-vin et tromperie
Was it not the case that a particular RADAR 'deal' at the time was linked to the RAAF 'Mirage' acquisition......n'est-ce-pas..?
(Like...You cannot have one without the other..!)
(Like...You cannot have one without the other..!)
What is Consultation? A commonly recognised definition is that consultation involves "more than a mere exchange of information. For consultation to be effective the participants must be contributing to the decision-making process not only in appearance, but in fact." (Commissioner Smith, Australian Industrial Relations Commission. 12 March, 1991.)
Thread Starter
Selected to replace the Avon Sabre as the RAAF's fighter aircraft in 1960, the Mirage entered service in 1965....
But I have no trouble believing you!
Funny isn't it that Bushmaster vehicles are made here in Australia - by our "favourite" radar maker - yet it is us that ship them to Ukraine, not the French.
in that it failed to consult with Cairns TCU
On SAFRA - When conceived, Airservices claimed to have the staff to run it (remember it was doggo hours only) but they did not. They employed some retired guys to do it, but they soon got tired of constant night shifts. There was no need to provide the service but it was a vanity project arising from the National Party Minister's desire for Approach Services to Regional Airports (that's what SAFRA stands for). I think Airservices wanted to be able to say it was there even though it was always closed and reverted to TIBA. However with all the TIBAs the CASA ATM inspectors pursued the lack of staff issue so the Cairns TCU plan was born after the unit moved to Brisbane. Once again staffing was the problem, overcome by Airservices driving roster changes that were detrimental to the staff.
The upshot was a desrisory fine of $70,000, to be paid to Civil Air. My question for the Labor Minister:
"Madam, you are responsible for this Commonwealth Government entity that blatently (Fair Work's assessment) ignored the requirements of Commonwealth law. Are you going to allow the senior management perpetrators in Airservices to get away scotfree?" If so, clearly they are doing your bidding so you are as culpable as they.
The upshot was a desrisory fine of $70,000, to be paid to Civil Air. My question for the Labor Minister:
"Madam, you are responsible for this Commonwealth Government entity that blatently (Fair Work's assessment) ignored the requirements of Commonwealth law. Are you going to allow the senior management perpetrators in Airservices to get away scotfree?" If so, clearly they are doing your bidding so you are as culpable as they.
My apologies Bloggs - I should have re-read the directive. I withdraw the words "but it was a vanity project arising from the National Party Minister's desire for Approach Services to Regional Airports"
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