Helicopter down in PNG at Kimbe
If the pilot was conducting a post maintenance flight check; [as suggested by gullibell #20] I would suggest a very poor chain of command. In the real world the Chief Pilot would conduct such checks, and for a very good reason. Mentoring is a vital part of gaining experience and I would have thought that the pilot in this case should have been under instruction.
What does the Company Ops manual have to say in regards to post maintenance check flights? Whom should be conducting said checks etc. Fleet captain, fleet manager ? In the company I work for any request for an engineering flight comes in writing with a specific understanding of what is expected and how the flight shall be conducted, and to achieve what outcome. Makes the Insurance company smile!
It is extremely easy to undo a decade of hard work, in five rushed minutes; tends to make clients rather nervous.
What does the Company Ops manual have to say in regards to post maintenance check flights? Whom should be conducting said checks etc. Fleet captain, fleet manager ? In the company I work for any request for an engineering flight comes in writing with a specific understanding of what is expected and how the flight shall be conducted, and to achieve what outcome. Makes the Insurance company smile!
It is extremely easy to undo a decade of hard work, in five rushed minutes; tends to make clients rather nervous.
Yes, a pilot would need a written Company authority to be approved for undertaking post maintenance assessment flights. The maintenance assessment task would need to be briefed in advance with the mechanic, and the flight properly authorized (a pilot or mechanic can normally authorize such flights). There are protocols to be followed, sometimes duplicate inspections are required and recorded, etc, depending on the work undertaken. When operating at a base away from the main maintenance base (as in this instance, the maintenance had been done in Rabaul and the check was being done on the repositioning flight back to Kimbe main base), the pilot is the only pilot at the base. If he doesn't have a Company authority for undertaking maintenance assessment flights they have to fly in another pilot.
In-so-far as the pilot inadvertently shutting down both engines. The shutting down of engines in flight is covered in the normal check and training syllabus for all pilots. At the very least, bringing an engine (or both engines) to idle in flight is always checked and the pilot needs to display competency. For an initial type rating, if not done in the simulator, then shutting an engine down in flight (twin engine helicopter) and restarting it would need to be demonstrated. So, the training pipeline should produce a pilot who is competent at doing all those things. Big mystery to me how they ended up with a pilot at the controls of a single pilot helicopter who unwittingly shut down both engines in flight and didn't know about it. I guess anybody could have a bad day, especially in PNG.
In-so-far as the pilot inadvertently shutting down both engines. The shutting down of engines in flight is covered in the normal check and training syllabus for all pilots. At the very least, bringing an engine (or both engines) to idle in flight is always checked and the pilot needs to display competency. For an initial type rating, if not done in the simulator, then shutting an engine down in flight (twin engine helicopter) and restarting it would need to be demonstrated. So, the training pipeline should produce a pilot who is competent at doing all those things. Big mystery to me how they ended up with a pilot at the controls of a single pilot helicopter who unwittingly shut down both engines in flight and didn't know about it. I guess anybody could have a bad day, especially in PNG.
Last edited by gulliBell; 7th Sep 2019 at 23:49.
The pilot was doing an in-flight maintenance check and inadvertently shut down both engines without realizing it (the engines should have been at idle during the check, not off). When he finally realized the engines had been shut down he ran out of time and altitude to do anything about it before getting wet.
Thread Starter
Join Date: Jun 2018
Location: Port Moresby - The beer is cold at the Aviat and Car Clubs
Posts: 282
Likes: 0
Received 12 Likes
on
10 Posts
11th August 2020 update from AIC
Ballina Limited t/a Niugini Helicopters
P2-HSG
Bell 427
Helicopter impact with water
Kimbe, West New Britain province
Papua New Guinea
11 August 2019
[ii]
About the AIC
The Accident Investigation Commission (AIC) is an independent statutory agency within Papua New Guinea (PNG). The AIC is governed by a Commission and is entirely separate from the judiciary, transport regulators, policy makers and service providers. The AIC's function is to improve safety and public confidence in the aviation mode of transport through excellence in: independent investigation of aviation accidents and other safety occurrences within the aviation system; safety data recording and analysis; and fostering safety awareness, knowledge and action.
The AIC is responsible for investigating accidents and other transport safety matters involving civil aviation in PNG, as well as participating in overseas investigations involving PNG registered aircraft. A primary concern is the safety of commercial transport, with particular regard to fare-paying passenger operations.
The AIC performs its functions in accordance with the provisions of the PNG Civil Aviation Act 2000 (As amended), and the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1951, and in accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
The object of a safety investigation is to identify and reduce safety-related risk. AIC investigations determine and communicate the safety factors related to the transport safety matter being investigated.
It is not a function of the AIC to apportion blame or determine liability. At the same time, an investigation report must include relevant factual material of sufficient weight to support the analysis and findings. At all times the AIC endeavours to balance the use of material that could imply adverse comment with the need to properly explain what happened, and why it happened, in a fair and unbiased manner.
As per the paragraph 6.6 of the International Standards of ICAO Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, if the report cannot be made publicly available within twelve months, the State conducting the investigation shall make an interim statement publicly available on each anniversary of the occurrence, detailing the progress of the investigation and any safety issues raised.
The AIC has produced this Interim Statement in accordance with its mandate under the Civil Aviation Act 2000 (as amended), in accordance with the requirements of ICAO Annex 13 and the PNG Accident Investigation Commission - Policy and Procedures Manual.
[iii]
Interim Statement
On 11 August 2019, at 11:25 local time (01:25 UTC), a Bell 427 helicopter, registered P2-HSG, owned and operated by Niugini Helicopters, was reported to have impacted a reef 3.1 nm of North West of Buluma township while conducting a VFR ferry flight from Kokopo, East New Britain Province to Kimbe, West New Britain Province.
The AIC was informed at 17:45 local time (07:45 UTC) 11 August 2019, by Papua New Guinea Air Services Limited (ASL) of an accident involving a Bell 427 helicopter, registered P2-HSG, owned and operated by Niugini Helicopters.
The AIC immediately commenced an investigation. Due to volcanic activity in the Bialla area, West New Britain Province, the AIC was unable to get its investigators to the site until the 14th August 2019. The day after the accident, the helicopter wreckage was salvaged and stored at the Operator’s hangar where the investigators conducted the initial examinations.
During the investigation conducted by the AIC, all relevant information regarding the occurrence was gathered and analyzed. It included aircraft operations and maintenance, weather conditions, survival aspects, organisational and human factors, as well as other elements necessary to establish the cause, contributing factors and circumstances in which the occurrence took place.
Currently, the Draft Final Report is being developed by the AIC, to be sent to the involved parties in accordance with ICAO Annex 13 Paragraph 6.3. The AIC will invite them to provide their significant and substantiated comments on the report in accordance with ICAO provisions.
Upon completion of period for comments to the Draft Final Report, the AIC will release the Final Report in accordance with Annex 13 Paragraph 6.5.
Hubert Namani, LLB
Chief Commissioner
11 August 2020
Ballina Limited t/a Niugini Helicopters
P2-HSG
Bell 427
Helicopter impact with water
Kimbe, West New Britain province
Papua New Guinea
11 August 2019
[ii]
About the AIC
The Accident Investigation Commission (AIC) is an independent statutory agency within Papua New Guinea (PNG). The AIC is governed by a Commission and is entirely separate from the judiciary, transport regulators, policy makers and service providers. The AIC's function is to improve safety and public confidence in the aviation mode of transport through excellence in: independent investigation of aviation accidents and other safety occurrences within the aviation system; safety data recording and analysis; and fostering safety awareness, knowledge and action.
The AIC is responsible for investigating accidents and other transport safety matters involving civil aviation in PNG, as well as participating in overseas investigations involving PNG registered aircraft. A primary concern is the safety of commercial transport, with particular regard to fare-paying passenger operations.
The AIC performs its functions in accordance with the provisions of the PNG Civil Aviation Act 2000 (As amended), and the Commissions of Inquiry Act 1951, and in accordance with Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.
The object of a safety investigation is to identify and reduce safety-related risk. AIC investigations determine and communicate the safety factors related to the transport safety matter being investigated.
It is not a function of the AIC to apportion blame or determine liability. At the same time, an investigation report must include relevant factual material of sufficient weight to support the analysis and findings. At all times the AIC endeavours to balance the use of material that could imply adverse comment with the need to properly explain what happened, and why it happened, in a fair and unbiased manner.
As per the paragraph 6.6 of the International Standards of ICAO Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation, if the report cannot be made publicly available within twelve months, the State conducting the investigation shall make an interim statement publicly available on each anniversary of the occurrence, detailing the progress of the investigation and any safety issues raised.
The AIC has produced this Interim Statement in accordance with its mandate under the Civil Aviation Act 2000 (as amended), in accordance with the requirements of ICAO Annex 13 and the PNG Accident Investigation Commission - Policy and Procedures Manual.
[iii]
Interim Statement
On 11 August 2019, at 11:25 local time (01:25 UTC), a Bell 427 helicopter, registered P2-HSG, owned and operated by Niugini Helicopters, was reported to have impacted a reef 3.1 nm of North West of Buluma township while conducting a VFR ferry flight from Kokopo, East New Britain Province to Kimbe, West New Britain Province.
The AIC was informed at 17:45 local time (07:45 UTC) 11 August 2019, by Papua New Guinea Air Services Limited (ASL) of an accident involving a Bell 427 helicopter, registered P2-HSG, owned and operated by Niugini Helicopters.
The AIC immediately commenced an investigation. Due to volcanic activity in the Bialla area, West New Britain Province, the AIC was unable to get its investigators to the site until the 14th August 2019. The day after the accident, the helicopter wreckage was salvaged and stored at the Operator’s hangar where the investigators conducted the initial examinations.
During the investigation conducted by the AIC, all relevant information regarding the occurrence was gathered and analyzed. It included aircraft operations and maintenance, weather conditions, survival aspects, organisational and human factors, as well as other elements necessary to establish the cause, contributing factors and circumstances in which the occurrence took place.
Currently, the Draft Final Report is being developed by the AIC, to be sent to the involved parties in accordance with ICAO Annex 13 Paragraph 6.3. The AIC will invite them to provide their significant and substantiated comments on the report in accordance with ICAO provisions.
Upon completion of period for comments to the Draft Final Report, the AIC will release the Final Report in accordance with Annex 13 Paragraph 6.5.
Hubert Namani, LLB
Chief Commissioner
11 August 2020
