Part 135 amendments
Thread Starter
Part 135 amendments
GA, particularly air charter operators, be aware that Part 135 consultation has now opened. Closes on 2 September. Pop on over to CASA's website and have your say.
It is my personal opinion that this will have the same effect on GA, as Part 61 has had on training schools.
Even from the prelim comments....:
"In 2016, CASA conducted a sector risk profile for this sector. It found that the charter accident rate is eleven times higher than public transport (RPT) based on analysis of data from 2006 to 2013. The average annual cost of accidents and fatalities was estimated to be about $15.3 million. The leading accident category was collision with terrain and a common contributor was ineffective or inadequate monitoring and checking."
Further down the page:
"Part 135 has been extensively consulted throughout its development. Draft regulations were first published in 2003, again in 2009 and most recently in 2012. In 2013 there was additional consultation in relation to air ambulance flights. The current draft has been revised to reduce industry impact and reflect changes in International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards."
It is my personal opinion that this will have the same effect on GA, as Part 61 has had on training schools.
Even from the prelim comments....:
"In 2016, CASA conducted a sector risk profile for this sector. It found that the charter accident rate is eleven times higher than public transport (RPT) based on analysis of data from 2006 to 2013. The average annual cost of accidents and fatalities was estimated to be about $15.3 million. The leading accident category was collision with terrain and a common contributor was ineffective or inadequate monitoring and checking."
Further down the page:
"Part 135 has been extensively consulted throughout its development. Draft regulations were first published in 2003, again in 2009 and most recently in 2012. In 2013 there was additional consultation in relation to air ambulance flights. The current draft has been revised to reduce industry impact and reflect changes in International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards."
The Plan
In the beginning was the plan.
And then came the Assumptions.
And the Assumptions were without form.
And the Plan was without substance.
And darkness was upon the face of the Workers.
And they spoke among themselves, saying,
"It is a crock of ****, and it stinketh."
And the Workers went unto their Supervisors and said,
"It is a pail of dung, and none may abide the odor thereof."
And the Supervisors went unto their Managers, saying,
"It is a container of excrement, and it is very strong,
such that none may abide by it."
And the Managers went unto their Directors, saying,
"It is a vessel of fertilizer, and none may abide its strength."
And the Directors spoke amongst themselves, saying one to another,
"It contains that which aids plant growth, and it is very strong."
And the Directors then went unto the Vice-Presidents, saying unto them,
"It promotes growth, and it is very powerful."
And the Vice-Presidents went unto the President, saying unto him,
"This new plan will actively promote the growth and vigor
of the company, with powerful effects."
And the President Looked upon the Plan, and saw that it was good.
And the Plan became Policy.
GA, particularly air charter operators, be aware that Part 135 consultation has now opened. Closes on 2 September. Pop on over to CASA's website and have your say.
It is my personal opinion that this will have the same effect on GA, as Part 61 has had on training schools.
It is my personal opinion that this will have the same effect on GA, as Part 61 has had on training schools.
Actually, it is worse than Part 61, because, at least with Part 61, if you spend enough money (and you have a medical certificate) you will eventually get the licence, even if you have had to do 5/6 checks where only one was previously required.
There are parts of Part 135 (mostly aerodrome standards) where you have no control, and will not be able to fly, even though, under current rules, you could. Elsewhere, aerodrome "analysis" is going to cost a fortune, and introduction a crippling level of inflexibility.
I refer, particularly, to the requirements to now be imposed on small aircraft, singles like C-172 or 206, and small twins, C-310 etc. and for which to only requirement is an ALA.
As for the RFDS, it seems to me that a massive exemption/concession will be required, or a large part of the RFDS operation curtailed.
The "staff training" requirements are grotesque ----- and a bottomless well of money required.
Needless to say, Part 135 has NOT been subject to risk analysis and cost/benefit justification, as required by the OBPR or whatever it is now called, nor does it comply with current standards for regulation making, just the schoolboy standards of nonsense in the introduction.
What is needed is a huge response, all saying: "Not acceptable in any form", with every submission copied to the Minister, your local member, media outlets and AOPA.
Tootle pip!!
Folks,
Actually, it is worse than Part 61, because, at least with Part 61, if you spend enough money (and you have a medical certificate) you will eventually get the licence, even if you have had to do 5/6 checks where only one was previously required.
There are parts of Part 135 (mostly aerodrome standards) where you have no control, and will not be able to fly, even though, under current rules, you could. Elsewhere, aerodrome "analysis" is going to cost a fortune, and introduction a crippling level of inflexibility.
I refer, particularly, to the requirements to now be imposed on small aircraft, singles like C-172 or 206, and small twins, C-310 etc. and for which to only requirement is an ALA.
As for the RFDS, it seems to me that a massive exemption/concession will be required, or a large part of the RFDS operation curtailed.
The "staff training" requirements are grotesque ----- and a bottomless well of money required.
Needless to say, Part 135 has NOT been subject to risk analysis and cost/benefit justification, as required by the OBPR or whatever it is now called, nor does it comply with current standards for regulation making, just the schoolboy standards of nonsense in the introduction.
What is needed is a huge response, all saying: "Not acceptable in any form", with every submission copied to the Minister, your local member, media outlets and AOPA.
Tootle pip!!
Actually, it is worse than Part 61, because, at least with Part 61, if you spend enough money (and you have a medical certificate) you will eventually get the licence, even if you have had to do 5/6 checks where only one was previously required.
There are parts of Part 135 (mostly aerodrome standards) where you have no control, and will not be able to fly, even though, under current rules, you could. Elsewhere, aerodrome "analysis" is going to cost a fortune, and introduction a crippling level of inflexibility.
I refer, particularly, to the requirements to now be imposed on small aircraft, singles like C-172 or 206, and small twins, C-310 etc. and for which to only requirement is an ALA.
As for the RFDS, it seems to me that a massive exemption/concession will be required, or a large part of the RFDS operation curtailed.
The "staff training" requirements are grotesque ----- and a bottomless well of money required.
Needless to say, Part 135 has NOT been subject to risk analysis and cost/benefit justification, as required by the OBPR or whatever it is now called, nor does it comply with current standards for regulation making, just the schoolboy standards of nonsense in the introduction.
What is needed is a huge response, all saying: "Not acceptable in any form", with every submission copied to the Minister, your local member, media outlets and AOPA.
Tootle pip!!
As for staff training requirements Pilots require an operator proficiency check and 12 monthly recurring proficiency checks + supervised line operations before acting as PIC - no smoking guns here.
The Technical Working Group (Which I was not involved in - but made up of aircraft operators) have done a lot to make this workable and apart from the usual editing stuff ups I am yet to find any deal breakers for small operators. I am all for a good CASA bash when the time is right, we asked fro the reg reform program to be over faster - we got an accelerated timeline, we asked for more industry input - we got technical working groups to review each piece of Legislation. Maybe instead of going off half cocked with unconsidered "not acceptable in any form" campaigns we should consider giving the result of this process the constructive criticism it deserves. I'm not saying it cant be improved, but a lot of people put a lot of work into setting up the TWG so industry could have its say before this came out, maybe we should give the TWG the respect it deserves by at least reading and understanding this before we attack it.
For those who have not been involved in the TWG process I suggest you get involved - the one I participated in was the most refreshing and productive interaction with CASA I have had in 20 years.
I am reading what is on the CASA web site.
Re. aerodromes, it might look tame enough, but do you understand how they are interpreted for larger aircraft, and how they will be interpreted (and intended to be interpreted) in Part 135. I used "aerodrome standards" in a generic sense, so let's call it "the aerodrome and environs minimum conditions, including obstacles, to operate a commercial Part 135 operation appropriate to the aircraft to be operated". It will all be "in the detail" that will be required in an exposition before it is "accepted" by CASA. All Part 135 does is lay the basis for such new bureaucratic demands ---- that do not apply to smaller aircraft now!
Don't forget, ERSA ONLY contains about a quarter of the airstrips used regularly in Australia, the AOAP Aerodrome guide and similar are much more comprehensive.
As for training, I an not referring "only" to "pilot" training, but the fact that everyone that does anything around an aeroplane has to be "trained" in compliance with the manual or exposition.
No more saying to the passenger in your C206 --" hand me your suitcase" ----- that will inevitably violate the exposition OH&S requirement for training and checking in the safe handling of baggage and cargo. And don't for one minute think it is my imaginatitis, I can name at least one FOI who rails about the "huge gaps" in "regulation". He is looking forward to having dictatorial control of anybody within co-ee of an aircraft, including "enforcing" training and checking all "ground staff". Never underestimate how small minded,petty and vindictive some people can be.
Tootle pip!!
PS: I have been in this business for a long time, including being on the CASA SCC and various subcommittees from start to finish, I am well aware of the processes, and why they are so deliberately misguided by CASA, and why CASA refuses to comply with Australian Government guidelines for risk based and cost/benefit justified secondary legislation.
In 2016, CASA conducted a sector risk profile for this sector. It found that the charter accident rate is eleven times higher than public transport (RPT) based on analysis of data from 2006 to 2013. The average annual cost of accidents and fatalities was estimated to be about $15.3 million. The leading accident category was collision with terrain and a common contributor was ineffective or inadequate monitoring and checking.
That would certainly simplify the classification of operations scheme and make aviation ‘safer’.
You and I both know a former senior CASA executive, a former Assistant Director, no less, who wanted to do exactly that, decreeing that the minimum standard for "commercial passenger operations" (or some combination of words to that effect) for ALL aircraft would be the same as applied to RPT, claiming this was required by the Seaview Royal Commission.
For (approximately) anything over 5700 kg, and some other aircraft, that is pretty much what is in Part 135, with "concessions" for aircraft under 5700 kg. not making much difference.
Among many things, I am quite taken (in a legal liability versus practicality) by the definition of forced landing areas. 135.025.
As expected, the field is wide open for each and every FOI to push their pet wheelbarrows via "the exposition", if anything it is worse than the present situation.
Tootle pip!!
In 2016, CASA conducted a sector risk profile for this sector. It found that the charter accident rate is eleven times higher than public transport (RPT) based on analysis of data from 2006 to 2013. The average annual cost of accidents and fatalities was estimated to be about $15.3 million. The leading accident category was collision with terrain and a common contributor was ineffective or inadequate monitoring and checking.
Making that assumption, the next question should be: What, if anything, can be done to causally and cost-effectively reduce the number of accidents and fatalities in the ‘charter sector’?
I can tell you what the answer is not. The answer is not an ever-more complex regulatory regime with ever-more interactions with an opinionated regulator.
All those accidents and incidents occurred during the never-ending story of the regulatory ‘reform’ program, during which the ‘charter sector’ had the ‘benefit’ of the wonderful regulatory mosaic that CASA continues to defend and reinforce.
For all the increasing complexity, for all the cost, for all the destruction it continues to leave in its wake, the regulatory ‘reform’ program and CASA’s administration of it still spits out pilots who don’t understand the implications of what’s written on a f*cking maintenance release, even assuming they bother reading it.
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The safest the aviation industry can become is when no planes are allowed to fly at all. How is it in an organisation the size of CASA there isn't a single competent person in risk identification, assessment and control. Every business operates with a particular risk appetite and the field of aviation is already is the safest in the passenger transport/logistics industries. That's not to say it cant be improved further - I'm all for that. But there becomes a tipping point where significant resources (time & cost) become required for very little return - otherwise known as the 80/20 rule.
In summary, regulating the sh*t out of the industry is not the most efficient way of improving safety.
In summary, regulating the sh*t out of the industry is not the most efficient way of improving safety.
Thread Starter
From the preliminary comments:
"In 2016, CASA conducted a sector risk profile for this sector. It found that the charter accident rate is eleven times higher than public transport (RPT) based on analysis of data from 2006 to 2013. The average annual cost of accidents and fatalities was estimated to be about $15.3 million. The leading accident category was collision with terrain and a common contributor was ineffective or inadequate monitoring and checking."
I present to you that this data is fundamentally flawed.
From memory, I would be markedly surprised that the charter accident rate was 11 times higher than RPT, and I would be extremely surprised if more paying passengers were killed than air crew. It was my understanding that 2017 was the worst year for a considerable length of time for fatalities (I think, 23 in total), and even then, it seemed to be split 50 / 50 between passengers and air crew.
And yes, in my opinion, the Authorities rate the lives of air crew less than the lives of paying passengers. If not, why is SE IFR or SE NVFR available for freight (a commercial operation) or private operations but not available for fare paying passengers.? If it's safe, let a commercial operator do it for money. If it is proven to be unsafe, ban it altogether. Don't have a bet each way.
"In 2016, CASA conducted a sector risk profile for this sector. It found that the charter accident rate is eleven times higher than public transport (RPT) based on analysis of data from 2006 to 2013. The average annual cost of accidents and fatalities was estimated to be about $15.3 million. The leading accident category was collision with terrain and a common contributor was ineffective or inadequate monitoring and checking."
I present to you that this data is fundamentally flawed.
From memory, I would be markedly surprised that the charter accident rate was 11 times higher than RPT, and I would be extremely surprised if more paying passengers were killed than air crew. It was my understanding that 2017 was the worst year for a considerable length of time for fatalities (I think, 23 in total), and even then, it seemed to be split 50 / 50 between passengers and air crew.
And yes, in my opinion, the Authorities rate the lives of air crew less than the lives of paying passengers. If not, why is SE IFR or SE NVFR available for freight (a commercial operation) or private operations but not available for fare paying passengers.? If it's safe, let a commercial operator do it for money. If it is proven to be unsafe, ban it altogether. Don't have a bet each way.
The word "safety" in the name of CASA is about the political safety of the Government and Minister of the day, it's not about the safety of the travelling public except indirectly as it affects the electoral fortunes of the Government. It of course is not about the safety of industry participants. This what is implied by CASA's "customer focus" - the customer is the Government.
Taken in that Sir Humphreyesque sense, the regulations are perfectly logical; everything is forbidden unless its compulsory, in which case almost every accident (barring acts of God) by definition has resulted from the wilful, criminal, activity of an industry participant, therefore the Government of the day is safe except perhaps from the charge that they have not been strict enough.
I learnt about this approach to safety the hard way in my first job after graduating - working for Exxon. They gave me miles of manuals prescribing how to run an oil terminal and truck fleet, but they didn't provide the money and staff to comply. If anything happened, your head was on the block, so you crossed your finger and waited for your biannual promotion when you handed the problems to the next sucker. When the Longford gas plan disaster happened, what did Exxon do/ They blamed the dead operators for 'not following procedures".
Taken in that Sir Humphreyesque sense, the regulations are perfectly logical; everything is forbidden unless its compulsory, in which case almost every accident (barring acts of God) by definition has resulted from the wilful, criminal, activity of an industry participant, therefore the Government of the day is safe except perhaps from the charge that they have not been strict enough.
I learnt about this approach to safety the hard way in my first job after graduating - working for Exxon. They gave me miles of manuals prescribing how to run an oil terminal and truck fleet, but they didn't provide the money and staff to comply. If anything happened, your head was on the block, so you crossed your finger and waited for your biannual promotion when you handed the problems to the next sucker. When the Longford gas plan disaster happened, what did Exxon do/ They blamed the dead operators for 'not following procedures".
There is no such thing as "safe" and "unsafe", just probabilities, which require risk management.
"Safe" is an emotive but undefinable and dimensionless word, "safe" is about perception. We all perceive we are safe drivers, what we really mean is that we accept that our standard of driving, and road conditions, produce a risk of travel that is acceptable to us ---- but maybe not someone else.
It is trite to say it, but: "If you can't measure it, you can't manage it", you can measure risk, you can't measure "safe".
All the basic principles of risk management are well enough know to those who need to know, we long had AS/NZ standards for Risk Management, we now use the relevant ISO standards, including throughout government ---- EXCEPT CASA.
If risk based regulatory development policy was followed by CASA, the "rules" would look very different, and be a fraction of the size.
I have previously written of an exercise we conducted, within CASA, some years ago, attacking a pile of maintenance "rules". We applied the then Productivity Commission/ Office of Best Practice Regulation processes. The result was "dramatic" (even traumatic, if you worked for CASA) we theoretically eliminated some 70-80% of the "rules" as not requiring legislation, but lesser action, such as "training and education".
Tootle pip!!
PS: Needless to say, the result didn't surprise me.
CASA resolutely refuses to even consider, let alone abide by, Australian Government policy (and it is largely bi-partisan, CASA cause Labor as much problem as conservative governments) on regulatory development.
The "current" excuse is S9A of the Act.
Have all the stats regarding the 11x worse accident rate and annual cost estimate for , been published.?
$15 mil is chicken feed these days in the legal scheme of things and there are also all the costs resulting from deaths and injuries.
Seems way to small..how/where idd CAsA pluck it from
Do tell
$15 mil is chicken feed these days in the legal scheme of things and there are also all the costs resulting from deaths and injuries.
Seems way to small..how/where idd CAsA pluck it from
Do tell
