Airvan 10
Thread Starter
Airvan 10
Folks,
I note that an Airvan 10 was lost during a test flight in the US. No injuries, both pilots got out on parachutes.
My only reason for even mentioning this is that it is sad that development flying has shifted to the US, thanks to the usual culprit.
This is not "new", the certification of the GA 8 cargo pod, years ago, was done under FAA rules.
The reasons were time and cost, estimates to certify the cargo pod in US were in months and $$ thousands, CASA's "estimates" were indefinite but a minimum of two years, and cost unknown.
As you recall, all those years ago, Gippsland Aeronautics had already lost a prototype, and almost lost a pilot, due to ratbag CASA test requirements --- as I recall, demanding spin recovery testing well beyond the aft C.of G limits.
Tootle pip!!
I note that an Airvan 10 was lost during a test flight in the US. No injuries, both pilots got out on parachutes.
My only reason for even mentioning this is that it is sad that development flying has shifted to the US, thanks to the usual culprit.
This is not "new", the certification of the GA 8 cargo pod, years ago, was done under FAA rules.
The reasons were time and cost, estimates to certify the cargo pod in US were in months and $$ thousands, CASA's "estimates" were indefinite but a minimum of two years, and cost unknown.
As you recall, all those years ago, Gippsland Aeronautics had already lost a prototype, and almost lost a pilot, due to ratbag CASA test requirements --- as I recall, demanding spin recovery testing well beyond the aft C.of G limits.
Tootle pip!!
Moderator
Leaddie - same pilot!
.. perhaps he might make a comment here in due course ? I haven't seen any posts from him in a good while but, one never knows ...
it is sad that development flying has shifted to the US
I have no connection with GippsAero .. but do consider that the work was being done with NTPS which is a leading light in spin testing and other such stuff. I see absolutely nothing strange about the work's being done over there ...
.. perhaps he might make a comment here in due course ? I haven't seen any posts from him in a good while but, one never knows ...
it is sad that development flying has shifted to the US
I have no connection with GippsAero .. but do consider that the work was being done with NTPS which is a leading light in spin testing and other such stuff. I see absolutely nothing strange about the work's being done over there ...
Quote by LeadSled:
"My only reason for even mentioning this is it is sad that development flying has shifted to the US, thanks to the usual culprit."
That's perhaps true but understandable. For GippsAero are now owned by the Indian Mahindra group.
Fortunately Australian test pilot, David Wheatland has been retained by Mahindra. And despite this accident, will hopefully get to fly again.
"My only reason for even mentioning this is it is sad that development flying has shifted to the US, thanks to the usual culprit."
That's perhaps true but understandable. For GippsAero are now owned by the Indian Mahindra group.
Fortunately Australian test pilot, David Wheatland has been retained by Mahindra. And despite this accident, will hopefully get to fly again.
Last edited by gerry111; 9th Jun 2018 at 06:54. Reason: Corrected attribution.
Moderator
Dave must be a fully qualified skydiver by now.
.. he'd certainly be the man to pick as a keynote speaker if your Symposium were on exiting spinning aircraft. 10 to 1 he gets co-opted to present on this at the FTSA annual get together next year ...
.. he'd certainly be the man to pick as a keynote speaker if your Symposium were on exiting spinning aircraft. 10 to 1 he gets co-opted to present on this at the FTSA annual get together next year ...
If memory serves me correctly from all those years ago, when he jumped from the first aircraft it performed it's own self recovery from the spin and flew gracefully into the pine plantation below... from memory that loss almost broke the company as you could quite imagine, being such a small startup comparatively.
Thread Starter
JT,
In part, I was lamenting the loss overseas of work that could and should have been done in Australia, but CASA has made it virtually impossible, practically and commercially. You are undoubtedly familiar with the former head of design (whatever his proper title) at Gippsland, who was "disciplined" by CASA because he disputed their ratbag "requirements" to the degree that he could not do his job. As I recall, Gippsland's loss was Boeing's gain.
The same cast of incompetents played a big part in the problems of Eagle and Seabird, and had a big hand in Jabiru problems over the years --- not to mention "unhelpful" interventions into damage repair approvals, modification/proposed STCs etc.
And preventing CASR 21 from working the way it was originally intended and planned ----- which would have given us "consensus" standards up to 750 kg AUW and the Light Sport Aircraft category to 750 kg fifteen years before US/FAA and the ASTM standards --as just another example of the dead hand of CASA.
The GA8 only got its certification at all, after huge pressure "from elsewhere" was brought on John Anderson, at the time, otherwise there would be no GA8.
It beats me how ANYBODY can defend the actions of CASA (and its predecessors), in any way, shape or form, over the years.
Tootle pip!!
In part, I was lamenting the loss overseas of work that could and should have been done in Australia, but CASA has made it virtually impossible, practically and commercially. You are undoubtedly familiar with the former head of design (whatever his proper title) at Gippsland, who was "disciplined" by CASA because he disputed their ratbag "requirements" to the degree that he could not do his job. As I recall, Gippsland's loss was Boeing's gain.
The same cast of incompetents played a big part in the problems of Eagle and Seabird, and had a big hand in Jabiru problems over the years --- not to mention "unhelpful" interventions into damage repair approvals, modification/proposed STCs etc.
And preventing CASR 21 from working the way it was originally intended and planned ----- which would have given us "consensus" standards up to 750 kg AUW and the Light Sport Aircraft category to 750 kg fifteen years before US/FAA and the ASTM standards --as just another example of the dead hand of CASA.
The GA8 only got its certification at all, after huge pressure "from elsewhere" was brought on John Anderson, at the time, otherwise there would be no GA8.
It beats me how ANYBODY can defend the actions of CASA (and its predecessors), in any way, shape or form, over the years.
Tootle pip!!
I can't see CASA facilitating, assisting or promoting innovation in aviation design and development in Australia. CASA has always maintained the bland philosophy that the Civil Aviation Act directs them to be solely a regulator, with no mandate to promote aviation in any manner, contrary to the FAA's obligations.
Any regulator will impose maximum regulation to achieve it's aim. Designing and building new aircraft types in Australia would only complicate and compromise their regulatory function.
In my almost 50 years involvement in aviation, there has never been a darker hour for aviation in Australia.
Any regulator will impose maximum regulation to achieve it's aim. Designing and building new aircraft types in Australia would only complicate and compromise their regulatory function.
In my almost 50 years involvement in aviation, there has never been a darker hour for aviation in Australia.
Torrres and all....How true..."there naver has been a darker hour for aviation in Oz.
Got a letter back this week from the new Minister for Transport etc, DPM, M McCormack MP in relation to my ref re criminal evil dooers as protected, and still in the CAsA employ. No mention of that.
He thinks...or is advised,.. that all is right with the aviation world in Oz, the sky is blue, the land is flat, ASRR has been fully attended to (really !!) and CAsA has changed its ways.
Caused me to recall the ditty..Quickly quickly I feel sickly...Too late , bring the mop..!!
The darkness decends further by the day.
Got a letter back this week from the new Minister for Transport etc, DPM, M McCormack MP in relation to my ref re criminal evil dooers as protected, and still in the CAsA employ. No mention of that.
He thinks...or is advised,.. that all is right with the aviation world in Oz, the sky is blue, the land is flat, ASRR has been fully attended to (really !!) and CAsA has changed its ways.
Caused me to recall the ditty..Quickly quickly I feel sickly...Too late , bring the mop..!!
The darkness decends further by the day.
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I hope nobody minds an older thread being dredged up just to post some NTSB info relevant to the thread, the Preliminary report from back in June 2018. It's actually a useful description of the events and not just "the plane was seen to crash". For reference, the accident was on 4 June 2018.
==============================================
On June 4, 2018, about 1152 Pacific daylight time (PDT), a turbine-powered, Australian registered, GippsAero GA10 airplane, VH-XMH, was destroyed after it impacted terrain following an unrecoverable spin during a flight test near Mojave, California. The United States certificated Airline Transport Pilot, and Australian certificated Commercial Pilot, sustained minor injuries after both successfully bailed out of the airplane. The airplane was registered to and operated by GippsAero as a visual flight rules test flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.715 Special Flight Authorization when the accident occurred. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and company flight following procedures were in effect.
The flight originated at the Mojave Air and Space Port (KMHV), Mojave, California, about 1105 PDT.The purpose of the flight was to evaluate the spin characteristics of the GippsAreo GA10 airplane with a belly-mounted cargo pod installed. Additionally, the accident airplane was equipped with an anti-spin parachute to be used if an unrecoverable spin was encountered, and both pilots wore emergency parachutes. A chase airplane was used to follow and monitor the progress of the flight test. According to the flight test pilot, the accident flight was the ninth flight that he participated in during the one-turn spin evaluations of the GA-10 fitted with the cargo pod. He said that after departure, a stall series was completed prior to any spin entries, with stall characteristics normal and benign.
The pilot reported that the first spin entry was initiated with wings level, power on, with flaps set to a landing configuration, which was followed by left rudder and right aileron inputs. The pilot said that the spin recovery took longer than expected, and the decision was made to repeat the test. The next spin entry produced very similar results, with the recovery at one additional spin turn. The accident flight spin entry was flown in the same configuration as the first two spins, except that the entry was from a 30° bank left turn. The pilot reported that the airplane entered a normal spin, and after one spin turn, he applied flight control inputs for the spin recovery; however, the airplane settled into a fully developed spin.The pilot said that after the airplane attained three full spin turns, he heard the chase airplane personnel call "three turns" which was a predetermined flight test safety limit. The pilot reported that he then moved the control yoke full forward with full opposite rudder and right aileron in an attempt to arrest the spin, but to no avail. He said that the control yoke was then returned to neutral, then full forward and full right rudder.
Around 10,000 ft msl, the pilot heard the chase airplane personnel call "chute, chute, chute" instructing the flight test crew to deploy the emergency anti-spin parachute. The pilot said that when the anti-spin parachute deployment lever was pulled aft, the anti-spin parachute did not deploy, even after repeated attempts. At about 8,500 ft msl, which was 500 ft. above the briefed minimum bailout altitude, both pilots bailed out.
The closest weather reporting facility was KMHV, about 9 miles north of the accident site. At 1200, a METAR from KMHV was reporting, in part: wind from 300° at 15 knots, gusting 20 knots; visibility, 10 statute miles; clouds and sky condition, clear; temperature, 93° F; dew point 39° F; altimeter, 29.91 inches of mercury.
==============================================
On June 4, 2018, about 1152 Pacific daylight time (PDT), a turbine-powered, Australian registered, GippsAero GA10 airplane, VH-XMH, was destroyed after it impacted terrain following an unrecoverable spin during a flight test near Mojave, California. The United States certificated Airline Transport Pilot, and Australian certificated Commercial Pilot, sustained minor injuries after both successfully bailed out of the airplane. The airplane was registered to and operated by GippsAero as a visual flight rules test flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.715 Special Flight Authorization when the accident occurred. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and company flight following procedures were in effect.
The flight originated at the Mojave Air and Space Port (KMHV), Mojave, California, about 1105 PDT.The purpose of the flight was to evaluate the spin characteristics of the GippsAreo GA10 airplane with a belly-mounted cargo pod installed. Additionally, the accident airplane was equipped with an anti-spin parachute to be used if an unrecoverable spin was encountered, and both pilots wore emergency parachutes. A chase airplane was used to follow and monitor the progress of the flight test. According to the flight test pilot, the accident flight was the ninth flight that he participated in during the one-turn spin evaluations of the GA-10 fitted with the cargo pod. He said that after departure, a stall series was completed prior to any spin entries, with stall characteristics normal and benign.
The pilot reported that the first spin entry was initiated with wings level, power on, with flaps set to a landing configuration, which was followed by left rudder and right aileron inputs. The pilot said that the spin recovery took longer than expected, and the decision was made to repeat the test. The next spin entry produced very similar results, with the recovery at one additional spin turn. The accident flight spin entry was flown in the same configuration as the first two spins, except that the entry was from a 30° bank left turn. The pilot reported that the airplane entered a normal spin, and after one spin turn, he applied flight control inputs for the spin recovery; however, the airplane settled into a fully developed spin.The pilot said that after the airplane attained three full spin turns, he heard the chase airplane personnel call "three turns" which was a predetermined flight test safety limit. The pilot reported that he then moved the control yoke full forward with full opposite rudder and right aileron in an attempt to arrest the spin, but to no avail. He said that the control yoke was then returned to neutral, then full forward and full right rudder.
Around 10,000 ft msl, the pilot heard the chase airplane personnel call "chute, chute, chute" instructing the flight test crew to deploy the emergency anti-spin parachute. The pilot said that when the anti-spin parachute deployment lever was pulled aft, the anti-spin parachute did not deploy, even after repeated attempts. At about 8,500 ft msl, which was 500 ft. above the briefed minimum bailout altitude, both pilots bailed out.
The closest weather reporting facility was KMHV, about 9 miles north of the accident site. At 1200, a METAR from KMHV was reporting, in part: wind from 300° at 15 knots, gusting 20 knots; visibility, 10 statute miles; clouds and sky condition, clear; temperature, 93° F; dew point 39° F; altimeter, 29.91 inches of mercury.
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I hope nobody minds an older thread being dredged up just to post some NTSB info relevant to the thread, the Preliminary report from back in June 2018. It's actually a useful description of the events and not just "the plane was seen to crash". For reference, the accident was on 4 June 2018.
==============================================
On June 4, 2018, about 1152 Pacific daylight time (PDT), a turbine-powered, Australian registered, GippsAero GA10 airplane, VH-XMH, was destroyed after it impacted terrain following an unrecoverable spin during a flight test near Mojave, California. The United States certificated Airline Transport Pilot, and Australian certificated Commercial Pilot, sustained minor injuries after both successfully bailed out of the airplane. The airplane was registered to and operated by GippsAero as a visual flight rules test flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.715 Special Flight Authorization when the accident occurred. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and company flight following procedures were in effect.
The flight originated at the Mojave Air and Space Port (KMHV), Mojave, California, about 1105 PDT.The purpose of the flight was to evaluate the spin characteristics of the GippsAreo GA10 airplane with a belly-mounted cargo pod installed. Additionally, the accident airplane was equipped with an anti-spin parachute to be used if an unrecoverable spin was encountered, and both pilots wore emergency parachutes. A chase airplane was used to follow and monitor the progress of the flight test. According to the flight test pilot, the accident flight was the ninth flight that he participated in during the one-turn spin evaluations of the GA-10 fitted with the cargo pod. He said that after departure, a stall series was completed prior to any spin entries, with stall characteristics normal and benign.
The pilot reported that the first spin entry was initiated with wings level, power on, with flaps set to a landing configuration, which was followed by left rudder and right aileron inputs. The pilot said that the spin recovery took longer than expected, and the decision was made to repeat the test. The next spin entry produced very similar results, with the recovery at one additional spin turn. The accident flight spin entry was flown in the same configuration as the first two spins, except that the entry was from a 30° bank left turn. The pilot reported that the airplane entered a normal spin, and after one spin turn, he applied flight control inputs for the spin recovery; however, the airplane settled into a fully developed spin.The pilot said that after the airplane attained three full spin turns, he heard the chase airplane personnel call "three turns" which was a predetermined flight test safety limit. The pilot reported that he then moved the control yoke full forward with full opposite rudder and right aileron in an attempt to arrest the spin, but to no avail. He said that the control yoke was then returned to neutral, then full forward and full right rudder.
Around 10,000 ft msl, the pilot heard the chase airplane personnel call "chute, chute, chute" instructing the flight test crew to deploy the emergency anti-spin parachute. The pilot said that when the anti-spin parachute deployment lever was pulled aft, the anti-spin parachute did not deploy, even after repeated attempts. At about 8,500 ft msl, which was 500 ft. above the briefed minimum bailout altitude, both pilots bailed out.
The closest weather reporting facility was KMHV, about 9 miles north of the accident site. At 1200, a METAR from KMHV was reporting, in part: wind from 300° at 15 knots, gusting 20 knots; visibility, 10 statute miles; clouds and sky condition, clear; temperature, 93° F; dew point 39° F; altimeter, 29.91 inches of mercury.
==============================================
On June 4, 2018, about 1152 Pacific daylight time (PDT), a turbine-powered, Australian registered, GippsAero GA10 airplane, VH-XMH, was destroyed after it impacted terrain following an unrecoverable spin during a flight test near Mojave, California. The United States certificated Airline Transport Pilot, and Australian certificated Commercial Pilot, sustained minor injuries after both successfully bailed out of the airplane. The airplane was registered to and operated by GippsAero as a visual flight rules test flight under the provisions of 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91.715 Special Flight Authorization when the accident occurred. Visual meteorological conditions prevailed, and company flight following procedures were in effect.
The flight originated at the Mojave Air and Space Port (KMHV), Mojave, California, about 1105 PDT.The purpose of the flight was to evaluate the spin characteristics of the GippsAreo GA10 airplane with a belly-mounted cargo pod installed. Additionally, the accident airplane was equipped with an anti-spin parachute to be used if an unrecoverable spin was encountered, and both pilots wore emergency parachutes. A chase airplane was used to follow and monitor the progress of the flight test. According to the flight test pilot, the accident flight was the ninth flight that he participated in during the one-turn spin evaluations of the GA-10 fitted with the cargo pod. He said that after departure, a stall series was completed prior to any spin entries, with stall characteristics normal and benign.
The pilot reported that the first spin entry was initiated with wings level, power on, with flaps set to a landing configuration, which was followed by left rudder and right aileron inputs. The pilot said that the spin recovery took longer than expected, and the decision was made to repeat the test. The next spin entry produced very similar results, with the recovery at one additional spin turn. The accident flight spin entry was flown in the same configuration as the first two spins, except that the entry was from a 30° bank left turn. The pilot reported that the airplane entered a normal spin, and after one spin turn, he applied flight control inputs for the spin recovery; however, the airplane settled into a fully developed spin.The pilot said that after the airplane attained three full spin turns, he heard the chase airplane personnel call "three turns" which was a predetermined flight test safety limit. The pilot reported that he then moved the control yoke full forward with full opposite rudder and right aileron in an attempt to arrest the spin, but to no avail. He said that the control yoke was then returned to neutral, then full forward and full right rudder.
Around 10,000 ft msl, the pilot heard the chase airplane personnel call "chute, chute, chute" instructing the flight test crew to deploy the emergency anti-spin parachute. The pilot said that when the anti-spin parachute deployment lever was pulled aft, the anti-spin parachute did not deploy, even after repeated attempts. At about 8,500 ft msl, which was 500 ft. above the briefed minimum bailout altitude, both pilots bailed out.
The closest weather reporting facility was KMHV, about 9 miles north of the accident site. At 1200, a METAR from KMHV was reporting, in part: wind from 300° at 15 knots, gusting 20 knots; visibility, 10 statute miles; clouds and sky condition, clear; temperature, 93° F; dew point 39° F; altimeter, 29.91 inches of mercury.
Dave would be good example of a test pilot. Great feel for an aircraft!
I did Dave's De Havilland DHA-3 Drover endorsement, (VH-ADN) on 13th Aug 1989 at Latrobe Valley..
He would make a worthy candidate for a 'gong' of some sort for his commitment to the Airvan project.
I did Dave's De Havilland DHA-3 Drover endorsement, (VH-ADN) on 13th Aug 1989 at Latrobe Valley..
He would make a worthy candidate for a 'gong' of some sort for his commitment to the Airvan project.
I always think of the tradgedy that Australia can't get it's aviation manufacturing act together, when a third world nation like Brazil can produce a reasonably simple, but hugely successful aircraft like the Bandeirante, and go on to leverage that into jet airliners...now the third largest producer of civil aircraft, after Boeing and Airbus.
Australia needs a third world Aviation Authority!
Australia needs a third world Aviation Authority!
Moderator
The first Bandits in the late 70s were financed by the Banko de Brasil (owned by the Federal Government of Brazil) at 5% interest when world interest rates were double that.