Heavylift crash
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Whilst I agree with a lot of what you are saying Duck, I do have trouble visualising a 400 seat aircraft crashing into the Owen Stanley's.
Somehow I would imagine its driftdown would be higher than even Mt Victoria.
But your point is still valid.
Somehow I would imagine its driftdown would be higher than even Mt Victoria.
But your point is still valid.
Here's an article from the PNGLoop website about the crash.
Plane crash warning failed: report | PNG Loop | PNG online news and classifieds
"The preliminary report into the Twin Otter crash at Mt Lawes in which four people died has revealed that a warning system did not sound off before impact.
This was revealed by the Air Crash Investigation Commission when it released the report today.
Both pilots of the aircraft and two passengers died in the crash on Sept 20th 2014 just before landing at Jackson Airport in Port Moresby.
The preliminary report was presented by AIC Chief Executive Officer David Inau, technical adviser Peter White, and AIC commissioners.
Inau said from the outset that the preliminary report into aviation occurrences is factual and does not contain analysis, conclusions or recommendations.
The report was made following data downloaded from recording devices on board the aircraft.
It was presented to the media on the flight details of the Twin Otter, named Kilo Sierra Foxtrot, that left Woitape in Goilala on the morning of Sept 20th at 9:16am with two crew and seven passengers on a charter flight.
The weather in Woitape was fine however in Port Moresby it was poor, with low cloud cover and rain.
As it approached Port Moresby, Air Traffic Control cleared the flight crew to descend while maintaining visual separation from the terrain at the same time. This was repeated as they descended.
When the aircraft was within 10 nautical miles of the airport, the pilot contacted the tower and mentioned the Instrument Landing System (ILS) but he did not request a discontinuation of the visual approach and he did not request radar vectors to position the aircraft for the Instrument Landing System.
Responding, the tower did not mention the ILS and repeated the clearance to make a visual approach. The clearance was read back by the pilot and soon afterwards, the aircraft struck Mt Lawes.
The Twin Otter was fiited with an ‘Enhanced Ground Proximity Warninig System’ (EGPWS) and preliminary indications from the cockpit voice recording are that aural warnings which are expected to go off from this equipment did not sound before the impact.
Inau said that a full and thorough investigation into the tragic incident will be conducted. This he said is expected to take months.
He thanked the Australian Transport Safety Bureau for assisting in downloading the information and presenting it to the AIC.
He also paid respects to the lives lost on the tragic morning."
Plane crash warning failed: report | PNG Loop | PNG online news and classifieds
"The preliminary report into the Twin Otter crash at Mt Lawes in which four people died has revealed that a warning system did not sound off before impact.
This was revealed by the Air Crash Investigation Commission when it released the report today.
Both pilots of the aircraft and two passengers died in the crash on Sept 20th 2014 just before landing at Jackson Airport in Port Moresby.
The preliminary report was presented by AIC Chief Executive Officer David Inau, technical adviser Peter White, and AIC commissioners.
Inau said from the outset that the preliminary report into aviation occurrences is factual and does not contain analysis, conclusions or recommendations.
The report was made following data downloaded from recording devices on board the aircraft.
It was presented to the media on the flight details of the Twin Otter, named Kilo Sierra Foxtrot, that left Woitape in Goilala on the morning of Sept 20th at 9:16am with two crew and seven passengers on a charter flight.
The weather in Woitape was fine however in Port Moresby it was poor, with low cloud cover and rain.
As it approached Port Moresby, Air Traffic Control cleared the flight crew to descend while maintaining visual separation from the terrain at the same time. This was repeated as they descended.
When the aircraft was within 10 nautical miles of the airport, the pilot contacted the tower and mentioned the Instrument Landing System (ILS) but he did not request a discontinuation of the visual approach and he did not request radar vectors to position the aircraft for the Instrument Landing System.
Responding, the tower did not mention the ILS and repeated the clearance to make a visual approach. The clearance was read back by the pilot and soon afterwards, the aircraft struck Mt Lawes.
The Twin Otter was fiited with an ‘Enhanced Ground Proximity Warninig System’ (EGPWS) and preliminary indications from the cockpit voice recording are that aural warnings which are expected to go off from this equipment did not sound before the impact.
Inau said that a full and thorough investigation into the tragic incident will be conducted. This he said is expected to take months.
He thanked the Australian Transport Safety Bureau for assisting in downloading the information and presenting it to the AIC.
He also paid respects to the lives lost on the tragic morning."
The report is on the PNG AIC website. For anyone who has flown in PNG for a considerable amount of time would be able to quickly work out what caused this accident from the report.
I knew the Captain reasonably well and I am deeply saddened that his life ended this way. Totally Avoidable - he should have know better! The business of ATC issuing a visual approach clearance to an aircraft when they know fully that the conditions aren't suitable for a visual approach is not reasonable in my opinion. To effectively pass on all responsibility to the PIC when ATC are fully aware that the conditions don't meet the criteria to do a visual approach is not what I would consider as being appropriate given the circumstances. Fair enough the PIC should have rejected the clearance and demanded something more suitable, however to be offered something unworkable given the conditions is not right in my opinion.
PNG ASL and Hevilift need to look seriously at how effective their Safety Management Systems are as a result of this accident, obviously they didn't achieve their desired outcome in this case.
I knew the Captain reasonably well and I am deeply saddened that his life ended this way. Totally Avoidable - he should have know better! The business of ATC issuing a visual approach clearance to an aircraft when they know fully that the conditions aren't suitable for a visual approach is not reasonable in my opinion. To effectively pass on all responsibility to the PIC when ATC are fully aware that the conditions don't meet the criteria to do a visual approach is not what I would consider as being appropriate given the circumstances. Fair enough the PIC should have rejected the clearance and demanded something more suitable, however to be offered something unworkable given the conditions is not right in my opinion.
PNG ASL and Hevilift need to look seriously at how effective their Safety Management Systems are as a result of this accident, obviously they didn't achieve their desired outcome in this case.
Last edited by Duck Pilot; 22nd Oct 2014 at 20:51.
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Duck,I think you meant to say "Totally Avoidable" ,anyway that's the way I would read it..I flew extensively In PNG over 40 years ago ..long before the invention of GPWS let alone EGPWS systems, it seems to me and in fact I have been told that some Pilots are in the habit of disabling the system,to avoid nuisance warnings when operating into some of the more ....shall we say...."Sporting" Airstrips ...One cannot help but wonder if this was the Habit of the accident crew....particularly the Capt. If so ....... Well ...it's just a theory.
Typo error, thanks Hugh and you are correct about pilots disabling GPWS equipment to avoid hearing the warnings. I'm sure it would be a breach of any companies SOPs to do so, not to mention the regulations.
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Thinking latteraly ,SOPs if they are Indeed written for this type of equipment should perhaps reflect the unique nature of PNG bush flying. It seems the undesirability of nuisance warnings should be acknowledged,and a procedure that formalises the deactivation of GPWS under strict conditions be promalgated.
Wether or not this proves to be part of the causal chain in this accident only a full investigation will determine. The essential reality is that lessons be learned.
CFIT events are always perplexing,and here it seems none more so than in this accident.
Wether or not this proves to be part of the causal chain in this accident only a full investigation will determine. The essential reality is that lessons be learned.
CFIT events are always perplexing,and here it seems none more so than in this accident.
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DynaBolt the names have been released, most knew within a few hours who were the pilots, nothing secret squirrel there. Actually on a Facebook specific site there was a memorial post for the National FO.
Guess out of respect. Something missing in a lot of people these days.
Guess out of respect. Something missing in a lot of people these days.
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What the f..k difference would SMS make?????
Why not simply read understand and operate BY THE RULES.
How many lives have been lost with people either operating outside the parameters set out in flight manuals and/or disregarding the rules.
I am not inferring this occurred in the above mentioned flight. Just had a guts full of all this SMS Quality whatever you want to call it industry. Rant over.
Why not simply read understand and operate BY THE RULES.
How many lives have been lost with people either operating outside the parameters set out in flight manuals and/or disregarding the rules.
I am not inferring this occurred in the above mentioned flight. Just had a guts full of all this SMS Quality whatever you want to call it industry. Rant over.
It's all very well to say that pilots should operate by the rules, but when you have people with a commercial interest getting into the act with instructions to pilots to trip warning breakers so as not to upset passengers (who can hear EGPWS) or worse, interfering via maintenance so that the equipment conveniently becomes unserviceable, what to do?
This has happened in PNG in the past. I had more than one argument over this very thing a few years ago and quit rather than be complicit in allowing it.
Not just EGPWS but such basic requirements as current GPS data bases and TAWS does not get updated. A bit like those infamous last words from the Mexicans just before they drilled in ("shut up Gringo") one classic argument I recall, the guy said - in defence of GPS data bases over 10 years out of date - "the mountains don't move".
Not saying that this caused this particular accident, but such is the culture in that part of the world.
This has happened in PNG in the past. I had more than one argument over this very thing a few years ago and quit rather than be complicit in allowing it.
Not just EGPWS but such basic requirements as current GPS data bases and TAWS does not get updated. A bit like those infamous last words from the Mexicans just before they drilled in ("shut up Gringo") one classic argument I recall, the guy said - in defence of GPS data bases over 10 years out of date - "the mountains don't move".
Not saying that this caused this particular accident, but such is the culture in that part of the world.
SMS, CRM and all the rest of it?
Its the way of the world now, just need to make sure it's not an all smoke and mirrors system that has only been implemented to appease the regulator and some clients, and has absolutely no resemblance of what's going on outside the office.
This accident has all the hallmarks of a classic CFIT that should have never happened....
This accident has all the hallmarks of a classic CFIT that should have never happened....
