Operational Control at Bankstown

[Frank Arouet]

Yes "empire building" became fashionable when Parkinsons Law was introduced.

$600 million could easily have been spent on a feasibility study into the environmental impact on a regulatory review. Oh, and pot plant's. Not Dick's fault, his motives probably assumed he was dealing with "straight shooters" in the departments.

[Hempy]

Dick we all know what you 'saved' the industry in Australia, no one is questioning it. Perhaps just once, though, you might balance your argument with an account as to what you actually cost the industry as well....

[Jack Ranga]

Frank, no doubts as to Dick's motivation, not saying anything is his fault. But if a statement is made as to 600 million being spent elsewhere on safety I'd like to see where it was spent and on what?

Safety has NOT improved. An argument can be made that standards have dropped significantly, I'm paying a bucket load more to maintain my licences but we've saved 600 million. Shouldn't it be costing me less?

[Old Akro]

The money ‘saved’ in one area of aviation was never spent in another area of aviation.

I like CASA bashing as much as anyone. But this lies at the feet of the politicians. I don't believe CASA gets a vote on where the money goes.

The part that CASA should be accountable for is the efficient use of the money its allocated.

They should be accountable for the amount of money that gets absorbed by career public servants in Canberra feeding the bureaucracy vs those with aviation experience at the front line. In the late seventies or eighties the AOPA used to run campaigns about the number of CASA (then DOT) personnel with aviation industry experience. Its time for that again.

They should also be accountable to demonstrate achieved benefits from the new regulations after all the money that its cost.

[BPA]

The lives of the two young men who died in the Trindad crash in the blue mountains in bad weather could have been saved if the briefing office was still there. The aircaft departed BK on a pretty average weather day heading west via KAT, unfortunately they never made it. If the briefing office was there, the PIC of the Trindad would have been able to talk directly to the met man regarding the low cloud over the blue mountains, the FSO would not have accepting their VFR plan as the conditions on the day were not VFR conditions.

Jump forward to 2013 and the lack of Operational Control was a factor in the diversion and landing below minima of the Virgin and Qantas 737's at Mildura. If Operational Control was still in place, the Operations controllers would have recieved all the updated weather forecasts on AD that started to indicate fog at AD shortly after the aircaft departed BN and SY. The Operations controllers would have past this information to the aircaft via the sector controllers. I'm sure if one of these aircaft would have departed the runway while landing below minima of an RNAV approach then the discussion about Australia's former Operational Control would have come out in the media and the reason it was removed was as a cost saving.

[Fantome]

This thought provoking line of debate is one that can do with a good further airing. Putting a brake on those 'accidents going somewhere to happen' will always be a concern of those who train, oversee and regulate. But as an aside, to say 'all lives are priceless' . . .. . well that is a contentious statement, better not gone into here. (Except to say, any one person's life is likely to be priceless to someone close to that person.)

The SOCs the Senior Operational Controllers, did a brilliant job, by and large,that's for sure. One there was at Mascot, the late Doug Hand. What
a quiet, unassuming wealth of aviation and air safety lore resided in that
man's grey matter. The men who came out of the RAAF after the war and who chose to join 'the department' were of a type and calibre whose passing some of us lament. We, the lot of us, are the poorer for not having their kind around today.

Another worthy of honourable mention is the late Don Charlwood, (author of 'No Moon Tonight'). Don did a power of good for the implementation of
sound air traffic controls in Australia and PNG, at the training level.

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Someone mentioned an old flight plan he still has. I have one amongst the souvenirs filled in by the late Chris Braund. One of the boxes at the bottom has 'MEANS OF CANCELLING SAR'.

Chris crossed out 'radio' and 'telephone' and wrote in instead 'smoke signal'.

he prefixed his signature at the bottom of the form with 'yours sincerely'

(Chris also appended his initials to the Mustang he bought and flew away from Tocumwal for 300 pounds - VH-FCB)

[Old Akro]

The lives of the two young men who died in the Trindad crash in the blue mountains in bad weather could have been saved if the briefing office was still there.

At the bottom of the ARFOR is a phone number for elaborative briefing. I typically ring it 1-2 times per year when I'm uncertain about weather. My experience is that the guys are outstandingly good. They won't tell you to go or not to go, but in my experience they give very good guidance on the weather you can expect that is augmented with local radar and they can get pilot reports from the controllers. Just because there is not a guy standing at a desk, doesn't mean you can't get the service.

My criticism is that the availability of in-flight weather service is not nearly as good. We had an instance recently where we critically required information on weather at alternates and frankly, got better detail from the iPad than the area controller.

The Mildura incident in my opinion was a failure of available weather observation - not the communication mechanism to get it to the pilot. I believe this is a BoM issue. But I maintain that that argument misses the big picture. We have less airports with ILS than Malaysia and about the same number as Thailand. If we invested properly in first world infrastructure then the Mildura incident would have been a non event.

If you go to the ATSB website you can search using a number of filters. They are a bit clunky, but it kind of works. I searched completed, final reports for accidents with fatalities over the last 5 years and got 71 results. About 17 of those are assistance to overseas agencies - leaving 54 in Australia - or 10 per year. About half of these are choppers. About half are AG / mustering (rotary & fixed wing). If saving lives was really our first priority we'd put more effort here.

I counted only 3 VMC-IMC accidents and 2 NVMC / disorientation accidents. There are 3 where better VHF coverage / radar / ELT might have made a difference by speeding up the search. There were (surprisingly) 3 mid-air collisions - although 2 were at stations where there was probably little anyone else might have done.

[Fantome]

But of course an accurate summation of fatalities in the last five years
cannot be derived from ATSB sources alone, since a number of crashes
are not the subject of ATSB investigation.

Also there will be a number for which ATSB final reports are not yet out.

[Old Akro]

Fantome

Couldn't agree more. And sometimes the neat ATSB conclusion hides other failures. And the search engine is not very good and doesn't deliver the same search results each time. But its an interesting snapshot. It's Lockhart River, Pelair, Canley Vale, Hemplel etc that stick in our mind. But if we really wanted to save lives we'd revisit the job we are doing with choppers.

[sunnySA]

Dick says

If I remember correctly, whenever I went into the briefing office at Bankstown there were Flight Service Officers and also, I think, someone from the MET Department and also the "Operational Controller” who used to check the additions on your flight plan and a few other things and then put a big stamp on it. Can someone advise if the Operational Controller only checked plans that were going into controlled airspace or did the Operational Controller check all plans?

I understand the Government doing Operational Control came in after the Kyeema crash into Mount Dandenong where the pilot had put wrong time intervals on the flight plan and descended too late. Of course, Operational Control by the CAA was abolished, saving the industry (I understand) about $30 million a year. I’m glad I was involved in that.

Makes me query what was presented to the CAA Board if the then Chairman now clearly demonstrates ignorance and makes unsubstantiated claims.

Mr Google says (in relation to crash of the Kyeema)

By public demand a Royal Commission into the cause of the disaster was established, and the Australian Federal Government appointed an Air Accident Investigation Committee under the Chairmanship of Colonel T. Murdoch DSO, VCE with the public equiry commencing on 30 October 1938. Because of the crash, regulations were passed which require flight checking officers to monitor the flights of aeroplanes and advise on such things as position, weather, and alternate landing options.

ABC News says (in relation to crash of the Kyeema)

"The responsibility for civil aviation was taken out of hands of the Department of Defence where it had been a poor relation," he said.

"A new Department of Civil Aviation as a separate portfolio was created. And also the accident gave birth to what became Australia's system of air traffic control."

As Fujii highlights,

There was never any Operational Control at Bankstown nor any of the other Secondary Airports as they were called. Operations Control was located at the capital city primary airport (SY, ML, AD etc.) where the Senior Operations Controller was located. The Briefing Office at the secondary airports was typically staffed by an FSO and an ATC briefing officer. The ATC would most likely have endorsements for the BO and the tower and work both on a rotating roster.

Both BO staff members could accept plans, however, only the ATC could accept IFR plans and give them Operational Approval. Although the ATC member approved the IFR plan, when the plan arrived in the Operational Control Centre, it was again checked and a paper strip was filled in and displayed for the Senior Operations Controller to monitor for the duration of the flight or leaving the FIR.

I'd add that many of the FSO staff who worked in the various Briefing Offices at the Secondary Airports were pilots (PPL or CPL).


Perhaps Dick would like to give some examples how this reported $600m "saving" has led to a safer system, that is, where has the money been spent. Dick, specifically, what did you do with the money that you "saved".

[Fantome]

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HUGH . .. . WHISTLING DIXIE -

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jNtMpPFM7M0

[peuce]

My reply to Dick...each time he resurrects this argument is that:

1. The removal of OCA/BO/FSOs has resulted in a decrease in the general discipline of the GA community...especially from new pilots entering the system. A generalisation I know, but I believe that would be a widely help belief.
2. The removal of Full Reporting has resulted in the "disappearance" of a large portion of GA. They are still there, but where, flying to what standard, how efficiently and how many have been lost, caught out by weather or suffered a mechanical issue...and just got away with it...and we've never heard about it? Just because you can't see it, doesn't mean it's not there.

Is that really good value for our $600m?

[CaptainMidnight]

The lives of the two young men who died in the Trindad crash in the blue mountains in bad weather could have been saved if the briefing office was still there. The aircaft departed BK on a pretty average weather day heading west via KAT, unfortunately they never made it. If the briefing office was there, the PIC of the Trindad would have been able to talk directly to the met man regarding the low cloud over the blue mountains, the FSO would not have accepting their VFR plan as the conditions on the day were not VFR conditions.

I was once told a story about a Flight Service Officer briefer at Essendon who finally tore up a young and inexperienced VFR pilot's flight plan, after repeatedly trying to convince him not to "go and have a look" on a real bad (forecast and pilot report actuals) Winter day ......

[Creampuff]

I like CASA bashing as much as anyone. But this lies at the feet of the politicians.

I agree.

My reference to bloated leaches on the body politic was not to CASA. It was to the major political parties and their camp-followers.

[mostlytossas]

Yes I remember the old FSU's too and while they could and did refuse to accept a VFR flight plan at times this still did not prevent you from departing if you were sure the weather was good enough or you was silly enough too, depending on your point of view/circumstance at the time. You simply departed no SAR no details. ( simular to todays flight note in so far as you got someone else to look out for you not the system).
And while some pilots were indeed silly to depart, some FS officers were overly cautious and not accepting your flight plan was more to do with protecting their backside ( in case you did go missing) than basing their decision on factual weather rather than a forecast. I remember one day in Bankstown having just that happen to me as he was adamant that the weather was non VMC at Bowral even though the wx system had passed through the area and you could almost see Bowral from the ramp. I flew home to Cootamundra in sunshine no sar no details that day.
While the old system had some advantages at times,at the end of the day the pilot in command has to make the go/ no go call themselves and be trained well enough to make the right one.

[RAC/OPS]

Can someone advise if the Operational Controller only checked plans that were going into controlled airspace or did the Operational Controller check all plans?

So you got rid of them without fully knowing what they did?

[Old Akro]

Just a reality check on a few points.

1. It should be an instructor, ATO, or a mentor with whom you have a relationship that you seek go/nogo advice. Not an FSO. I agree that many were very good. But it simply wasn't their role.
2. The FSO / briefing structure was created in an era without: fax machines, mobile phones, smart phones, internet, personal computers, tablets, iPads. This was an era when face to face was nearly the only option.
3. It was also an era when the weather maps were hand drawn. The available sources of weather were the map in the local newspaper or a met briefing guy. Full stop. A forecast meant 24 hours ahead if you were lucky, not 4 days or 7 days. Now you can get weather radar, predictive MSL charts, satellite images. You can get it from a number of different providers and have it delivered by fax, internet, smartphone app or an old fashioned phone briefing. You can get it overlaid on AvPlan (& Ozrunways?) or Jeppesen flitedeck or some glass instrument panels.
4. While there were some regional met observers, there was not the network of AWIS that there is now. Its pretty easy to call up a number enroute with your mobile connected via bluetooth to your noise cancelling headsets to get a picture of how weather is progressing on the ground. The sadness is that it happens by the public phone network rather than the AsA radio network.
5. It was an era without transponders, or PLB's or spot trackers. VHF radios were unclear and we didn't use headsets. Typically we had only 1 VHF not 2 as is common now.

I did my unrestricted pilot licence navs at Essendon airport soon after it was opened to GA and loved climbing the worn wooden steps of the briefing office following in the footsteps of past generations of DC3 captains. I liked the whole process of dealing with the FSO & the met guy. Of them getting "clay paper" copies of notams and stapling them to the flight plan, then stamping it with the big round red clock stamp. It made a young 1st year engineering student feel important. I liked the satisfaction of flying full reporting and getting the waypoints within 2 minutes. I liked marking up maps and doing calculations with the circular slide rule.

But its gone. And frankly, I think its safer now. Every other industry has restructured and reduced cost through the introduction of technology. So should CASA & AsA. My biggest gripe would be that the cost cutting that CASA & AsA has done has been primarily at the front line, not the bloated back office - and especially not in Canberra.

[triadic]

A thread that brings back some memories !!

1) Operational Control still exists - it is (and always has been) provided by the pilot in command and assisted depending on the operation/operator by a dispatcher. In the days of OPC it was the SOC that had the responsibility for directing Operational info to IFR ops in CTA. He could, if the circumstances warranted extend OPC to aircraft OCTA including VFR if he thought the flight was in some form of danger - such as making the VFR land or take an alternative route. In the early days of NVFR there were occasions where the SOC got involved in VFR ops at night operating below what was considered the LSALT for the area, however the route LSAs were not always the same as those calculated for NVFR ops which lead to some interesting on air 'discussions'!! There were some anomalies in the system and the one that comes to mind is the VFR operation in CTA where the SOC would not be aware of the flight and the responsibility for providing terminal and enroute data was with the FSU for the arrival port. Unless coordinated correctly it was possible for such a flight not to be directed with any Operational info. I recall one such case where the flight left CTA and only to be told on first contact with FS that the TAF had changed requiring an ALTN

2) The previous post on climbing the steps at EN BO brings back some memories also. In the mid '70's there was one ATCO who conducted the briefings etc and he always double checked the pilots arithmetic with some amusing days when some of the regulars would make errors just to find if he would find them!! For some years the FSO there was downstairs and would type the plans up etc. Close to the end of the BO, he was moved upstairs to the rear of the BO, but played no part in pilot briefing unless the ATCO was out of the room. The met man was there for a time, and usually only in the mornings. Later on you could speak to the Met man at Tulla and they would fax any specific info across (first time I saw a fax in fact!)


It was a cost we could certainly do without, but I don't believe the training since has made up for it and as has been said previously the loss of the Briefing Officers was a very big hole in the total pilot/industry education process. There are still many including instructors and check captains that don't know what they don't know and it shows with many of the end products.

As has been said before..."A pilot passing a CPL test today would not have passed a PPL test in the '70's" Sadly this is mostly true. CASA, sadly don't have enough corporate history/experience now to realise this sad fact and do something about it. Changing the licencing requirements is not the fix!

[sunnySA]

Perhaps Dick would like to give some examples how this reported $600m "saving" has led to a safer system, that is, where has the money been spent. Dick, specifically, what did you do with the money that you "saved".

Perhaps Dick doesn't have any examples of how this reported $600m "saving" has led to a safer system.

[Wizofoz]

...And in regards to the guys in the Trinidad- as well as a few other accidents where people survived the impact but died waiting for rescue- full reporting would have led to a MUCH quicker S and R effort, and almost certainly saved lives.