Cirrus Crash near Dubbo

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

Thanks to Mr Ozbusdriver for the link....

From the POH (AFM)... Section 3, page 20 -

"CAPS deployment is expected to result in loss of the airframe
and, depending upon adverse external factors such as high
deployment speed, low altitude, rough terrain or high wind
conditions, may result in severe injury or death to the
occupants. Because of this, CAPS should only be activated
when any other means of handling the emergency would not
protect the occupants from serious injury.
• Caution •
Expected impact in a fully stabilized deployment is equivalent
to a drop from approximately 13 feet.
• Note •
Several possible scenarios in which the activation of the
CAPS would be appropriate are discussed in Section 10 -
Safety Information, of this Handbook. These include:
• Mid-air collision
• Structural failure
• Loss of control
• Landing in inhospitable terrain
• Pilot incapacitation
All pilots should carefully review the information on CAPS.....

'Is expected to result in the loss of the airframe'......'a drop from approx 13 ft'.....

Not to be treated 'lightly' one would suggest...
There are further instructions - not above 133 kts - hence maybe the flaps....
and engine off...etc etc

A bit 'late' now, but the paddock didn't look all that 'gruesome'...

Ah well...he walked away, and that is the object of the exercise....

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

Just found in Section 10...

'Deployment Altitude
No minimum altitude for deployment has been set. This is because the
actual altitude loss during a particular deployment depends upon the
airplane’s airspeed, altitude and attitude at deployment as well as
other environmental factors. In all cases, however, the chances of a
successful deployment increase with altitude. As a guideline, the
demonstrated altitude loss from entry into a one-turn spin until under a
stabilized parachute is 920 feet. Altitude loss from level flight
deployments has been demonstrated at less than 400 feet. With these
numbers in mind it might be useful to keep 2,000 feet AGL in mind as a
cut-off decision altitude. Above 2,000 feet, there would normally be
time to systematically assess and address the aircraft emergency.
Below 2,000 feet, the decision to activate the CAPS has to come
almost immediately in order to maximize the possibility of successful
deployment. At any altitude, once the CAPS is determined to be the
only alternative available for saving the aircraft occupants, deploy the
system without delay.

Cheers

[gaunty]

FSO me old thanks for that

I'll bet most of the folks here dont know that you/we were used to fleigening in areas of the WACs marked with large hachured swathes marked "hypsometric and other information unreliable do not use for navigation" or something like that. Now that I think about it irt is conceivable that cunning old bugger Lang H arranged it to keep the aerial prospectors away, seeing as it covered most of the iron ore prospects.

To put some perspective on the Cirrus thingy try the following:

Open Google Earth

Draw and save a path from Emerald ALA to Dubbo ALA.

Draw and save a path from Gilgandra ALA to a position 7 km 180M.

We do not have any information about the cruise altitude but at this time of the year I'd be up there, elevation of the area around 900-950 feet.

The second one will show you the site paddock/s and then have a look at the terrain under the Emerald Dubbo track towards the site and the possible return to Gilgandra.

Then you may draw an informed personal conclusion about whether you may or may not have pulled the handle.

I say good thinking 99.

As an aside we use Google as part of the risk analysis and preflight planning for new destinations for a good look around, to get a feel for what the terrain looks like and generally what to expect. We then fly all of the available approaches in a full motion sim prior. No surprises is for what we are aiming. It's amazing how we did it with the old faithful hypso's.

What an amazing world we live in, it is even more so from my age perspective coming from the old manual tuned HF with trailing aerials (left on fences all around Australia), manually tuned ADF and so on. I remember actually weeping with joy at the sight of the new, now old KHF950 digital HF.

I think they call it "petite mort" when the GPS was brought into use.

But dont get me started on the box in road.

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

Thanks for that Mr 'G',

A WAC, a ruler and a pencil.....and Oh yes...a Shell road map - it had more details of the roads 'directions and distances' than the ole WAC....
'Ephemeral lakes & rivers'..?? A series of somewhat 'vague' dotted lines...

And thankfully all of the roads of which we speak were dirt / gravel / dust...so we just looked for 'rooster tail' of dust to see where they were...

Funny how we used to arrive at correct destination, 'on time'...usually...

Cheers

[Simon Lockie]

I imagine with 100% certainty that anyone in this situation who did NOT have a BRS chute would not have considered using one. They would have been consumed with the task at hand, and rightly so.

I don't know the area where this happened but I know the area surrounding my field like the proverbial back of my hand. I know that it all looks flat and lovely from 2000 feet (even better from 5000). And I know that my students think the same. However I also know that from 500 feet most of it looks a lot less inviting and from ground level a lot of it looks downright unappealing. Add to that the other environmental concerns.

4 months ago we got to go and recover an aircraft from a paddock after an unsuccessful forced landing that killed both occupants. The PIC was a current pilot with decent hours. In the pressure situation a few things didn't go his way and so he and his mate got killed. It wouldn't have mattered how good the paddock was, they stalled in from 100 feet +or-. I won't go into more detail, suffice to say that dead is dead.

As I've said, I know this area well, previously I would've had no qualms executing a forced landing here. After a session of picking up airplane bits in a field, my opinion changed.

We now have a BRS installed in our training aircraft and I would have no hesitation or shame in using it.

[GedStreet]

Thanks to Griffo, we are aware of what the POH says. It therefore appears that the PIC acted in accordance with the POH in terms deployment or in this case non-deployment of the chute. Therefore no suit (in relation to the chute) is available against the pilot. QED that will be CASA and ATSB's finding.

That's the way the establisment looks at it. Maybe under different circumstances, follow the POH and die or use your skills as a pilot, contrary to the POH, and survive - to face the suit.

[Jabawocky]

I bet $50 the ATSB do sweet FA.

Just like a few others, and yet there may be some good info as to why this one had a failed engine.

ATSB will waste heaps on the tragic loss of UXG, but there is nothing to learn there. Go figure.

Mind you failed engines is not exactly their forte either.

[bentleg]

I bet $50 the ATSB do sweet FA

Yep as there were no fatalities in a GA aircraft I agree ATSB will more than likely give it a miss.

The fact that an engine failure could have wider implications wont rank as highly as the publicity that gets generated when there is loss of life, or something equally newsy such as the Norfolk Island ditching.

[Cloud Basher]

I love the quarterbacking of this by people who just going by their responses have likely never flown an SR22.

Anyone who has actually flown a Cirrus and has read the POH and done the training would almost certainly have pulled the chute. The pilot made the right decision, all walked away.

The decision to deploy the chute in a Cirrus IS NOT made when you have an engine failure or any other emergency. You have already made it in your brief and you have mentally reversed it for your flight. Well I know that is what we were taught by very high hour Cirrus pilots. It is similar to the decision in a fast jet fitted with an ejection seat. Below a certain height with (insert emergency X) you eject. In fact I have been on two debriefings where the fast jet pilot was admonished for not ejecting. They decided they would try and save the aircraft rather than eject and in both instances they did. But the learning point from it was you should have ejected. Funnily enough, as much as fighter pilots have ego's they don't appear to be anywhere near as large as some the GA pilots here who categorically say "I would have landed it". In any other aircraft but a Cirrus of course you would try that. But in a Cirrus you have other options. Therefore those comments say absolutely nothing about safety and EVERYTHING about your ego and how cool you will look to your mates if you pull it off.

The decision height we brief is 1500ft agl. It appears this pilot had reached a similar height and made the decision. He states he was looking for an airfield but when he reached a height he pulled the chute. Anyone who has landed a Cirrus on grass or other non-sealed surfaces knows they can be a handful for two reasons, the closely spatted wheels that quite easily jam with grass and the non steerable nose wheel. These two factors alone on an aircraft of this weight can make it interesting. Also anyone who has read other Cirrus accidents where the chute was not deployed and learned from them would see the aircraft doesn't do well in off airfield landings. I would take an educated guess and say this pilot knew all of this and made his decision.

With this decision height, your eyesight must be awesome to be able to tell the condition of the ground and if it is suitable for a forced landing. Even knowing the general condition of the ground, unless you are the cocky that owns that land you would not know the specific condition of the ground. Thus why wouldn't you pull the chute.

1600fpm descent rate is eminently survivable, the aircraft is designed for it. I go back to the first point in the training. You have already made the decision prior engine start. If the engine stops, and no airfields in gliding range, pull the chute by 1500AGL.

I do find it interesting that so many people actually care about whether you can use the aircraft again. It is not a priceless relic like a Mustang or Spitfire or V tailed Bonanza. It is a friggen Cirrus. Who gives a stuff!

This outcome was as good as you could possibly hope for with an engine failure.

To answer a few questions raised and points made.

1. the guy who posted about his mate who regularly lands on a 300m grass strip has underestimated the length or failed to mention this is only possible with a significant headwind and the aircraft must be nowhere near gross. On sealed strips with about 10kts on the nose I can get it down and stopped in less than 300m but without the headwind and heavy braking your mate must be THE best Cirrus pilot in the world! And then to get it back out of 300m he must have balls of steel. On a sealed strip with no wind 2 up and half fuel takes me about 350m. At gross that goes to almost 500m. I think this guy should run lectures on the Cirrus because he can obviously get it to perform better than any other Cirrus pilot I know or have heard about.

2. They can and have been rebuilt after a chute deployment. This decision is purely an insurance company decision.

3. I was at a brief on new vs old aircraft and the figure of 50% of those cost of a new Cessna was mentioned as being the manufacturers insurance overhead on that airframe for 25 years.

Before people cain me, I regularly fly aerobatics, fly taildraggers, regularly fly west of Bourke to short dirt strips (not in a Cirrus - last trip was to Eromanga two weeks ago!) and semi-regularly land in paddocks with suitable aircraft with suitable undercarriage. I for one cannot fault this pilots decision making and would likely have done exactly the same myself.

A successful forced landing involves knowing the wind, weather surface condition slope (all those good things we learnt about in training), but just as importantly pilot skills and in this case the capabilities of the aircraft. In this aircraft you have an extra option, just like a twin gives you options. When and how to use that option comes down to training. It appears this pilot followed his training and achieved a successful outcome. That is all I hope for, for the rest of my flying life.

To those saying otherwise I would suggest if flying a Cirrus you should revisit your aircraft specific training.

Cheers
CB

[ForkTailedDrKiller]

It is not a priceless relic like a Mustang or Spitfire or V tailed Bonanza.

..........

[Capn Bloggs]

It is not a priceless relic like a ... V tailed Bonanza.

Flown by relics?

[Ex FSO GRIFFO]

RE - "Mind you failed engines is not exactly their forte either. "

For those who may have forgotten, or who simply may not know.....

Pelican's Perch: The Whyalla Report -- Junk Science?

Very Interesting......

[Jabawocky]

Griffo, that is a great link....but there is more to it than that.

See this bit in JD's article, he was writing about something that was a hunch, and later found to be correct.

I get the impression that the broken crankshaft was found (but not by the ATSB), and the "investigation" focused on that almost to the exclusion of the hole in the piston on cylinder #6 on the right engine. One question that occurs immediately is about the magneto timing. That should have been checked on both engines, and reported. It might have had a major bearing on the accident, as a mistimed engine could have greatly accelerated detonation, pre-ignition, and contributed to the fatigue in the crankshaft. (Later information indicates the timing was checked and found normal - but not reported.)

When the timing was found to be correct, that was because at the last maintenance check it was "adjusted". Nobody recorded what it was before or after, but it was adjusted.

Now the company had flight records of tis engine with EGT and CHT data from the basic instruments, from before the overhaul, after the installation, and after the last service work. If you had shown me the data I would have spotted it. That simple.

ATSB......Nope! They focussed on all sorts of stuff. Sure the crank had a flaw, but it may well have flown on a few hundred more hours, maybe TBO even...(probably not but you get the idea) but the significant difference in timing error nod doubt accelerated the failure to a nasty coincidental consequence.

And when you learn about a heap of other complicit events that were never reported........ Ohh they would get sarcs, gobbledock and kharon all excited

[Stikybeke]

This'll be good......

Stiky

[Jabawocky]

Sticky, What will be?

[OZBUSDRIVER]

OK, this is getting a little kinky. Jaba, methinks you forgot a comma.

[Brian Abraham]

From Avweb

First 'Successful' Australian Cirrus Chute Pull Ends Well

Australia recorded its first "successful" Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS) Nov. 21, according to the Australian Transportation Safety Board, and pilot John Nixon's cellphone self-portraiture told the story pretty well. After the engine on the SR22 G3 he and a friend were flying lost oil pressure and seized near Gilgandra, New South Wales, Nixon told the Daily Liberal that he first looked for an airstrip or country road to set down on but as he ran out of options he decided to pull the chute. "Adrenalin kicked in and I automatically did what was needed," Nixon, a private pilot with about 1,950 hours, told the newspaper. "We were on the ground less than a minute after the oil gauge indicated the problem." It was third time a Cirrus pilot has pulled the chute in Australia but the other incidents didn't work out so well.

In February of 2009 the chute on a Cirrus failed to extract and the pilot made a forced landing instead with minor injuries to the pilot and passenger. In December of 2009 a pilot was seriously injured in a low-level (441-foot) deployment of the chute. However, things went more or less according to plan in last Wednesday's incident. The aircraft settled hard enough to collapse the gear and Nixon got a black eye by kneeing himself in the impact. He said he and his passenger got out of the plane immediately in case it caught fire but soon went back to retrieve his cellphone. He called air traffic control to let them know about the situation and then snapped a few pictures of the scene. Nixon's was the 39th recorded deployment of the Cirrus Airframe Parachute System (CAPS). Number 38 happened Nov. 16 near Holbrook, Ariz. An oil pressure issue also preceded that event. The aircraft ended up on its back and the pilot and lone occupant suffered minor injuries.

Interesting that No 38 & 39 were the result of oil pressure issues. Some endemic problem?

[Ultralights]

something doesnt smell right, cruising at 5000ft, oil pressure indicates a problem... on the ground under the chute in under 1 minute from first indication of oil issue.....

whats the Cirrus's rate of descent in a glide?

[VH-XXX]

Can't you add up Ultralights?

5,000ft altitude - 950 elevation @ 1,600fpm = 1 minute.

Easy!



I suspect the 1 minute figure is somewhat poetic licence.

[Stikybeke]

Sorry Jabba,

On reflection I think was starting to exhibit the early signs of a thread drift however I thank you for bringing me back on line...I do that sometimes...

Stiky