casa and the National Audit Office - Safety Compliance???
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casa and the National Audit Office - Safety Compliance???
This makes for a good read and what improvements have actually been made between the release of this report in 2002 and 2012.Aviation Safety Compliance Follow-Up Audit
I have extracted just a principle recommendation:
Again - WELL Mr. casa???
I have extracted just a principle recommendation:
Casa and surveillance - Aviation Safety Compliance Follow-up Audit by Australian National Audit Office in 2002.
The objectives of this follow-up audit were to determine, in respect of the issues addressed by the 1999 audit recommendations, whether:
• CASA has made satisfactory progress to improve its aviation safety surveillance and compliance activities; and
• the introduction of new strategies for further improvement is being appropriately managed.
Due to the scale of the changes to CASA’s Aviation Safety Compliance activities since the 1999 audit, the ANAO adopted an issues-based approach and incorporated the 1999 audit recommendations into five main themes: risk identification; surveillance; enforcement; resources; and corporate governance.
As was the case with the 1999 audit, the follow-up audit focused on the surveillance and compliance of organisations that CASA has certified to:
• operate aircraft for prescribed commercial purposes (Air Operator’s Certificates (AOC) operators); and
• maintain, design or distribute aircraft and their components (Certificate of Approval (COA) operators).
The follow-up audit methodology included consultations with a range of key personnel in CASA’s Head Office in Canberra and at its various locations throughout Australia; consultations with the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS); examining comments made by members of the Aviation Safety Forum; and examining documentation held by CASA concerning its surveillance and compliance activities.
Overall conclusions
Overall, CASA has improved its management of aviation safety compliance since the 1999 audit, particularly in areas such as the identification of risks at the operator level; the frequency and coverage of surveillance; and enforcement of the Act. CASA has adequately addressed the majority of the recommendations from the 1999 audit and has partially implemented the remaining relevant recommendations.
Risk identification
CASA has improved its means of identifying and prioritising risks to aviation safety at the operator level. The Safety Trend Indicator (STI) is a useful tool for doing this. It will improve further with the introduction of STI version 2.
Recognising the potential increased risk to safety posed by financially marginal operators, CASA has targeted its financial viability assessment (FVA) process according to the areas of perceived greatest financial risk.
Summary
However, the ANAO considers that CASA has not improved its means of identifying and prioritising risks to aviation safety at the sector or industry level.
Progress with the development and implementation of the Safety Intelligence System (SIS) has been overly protracted. There is much that CASA can do to improve its analysis of aviation safety data to help to identify emerging risk issues and trends; And to apply the results to CASA’s strategic decision-making about where to best allocate its resources to achieve required performance.
The objectives of this follow-up audit were to determine, in respect of the issues addressed by the 1999 audit recommendations, whether:
• CASA has made satisfactory progress to improve its aviation safety surveillance and compliance activities; and
• the introduction of new strategies for further improvement is being appropriately managed.
Due to the scale of the changes to CASA’s Aviation Safety Compliance activities since the 1999 audit, the ANAO adopted an issues-based approach and incorporated the 1999 audit recommendations into five main themes: risk identification; surveillance; enforcement; resources; and corporate governance.
As was the case with the 1999 audit, the follow-up audit focused on the surveillance and compliance of organisations that CASA has certified to:
• operate aircraft for prescribed commercial purposes (Air Operator’s Certificates (AOC) operators); and
• maintain, design or distribute aircraft and their components (Certificate of Approval (COA) operators).
The follow-up audit methodology included consultations with a range of key personnel in CASA’s Head Office in Canberra and at its various locations throughout Australia; consultations with the Department of Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS); examining comments made by members of the Aviation Safety Forum; and examining documentation held by CASA concerning its surveillance and compliance activities.
Overall conclusions
Overall, CASA has improved its management of aviation safety compliance since the 1999 audit, particularly in areas such as the identification of risks at the operator level; the frequency and coverage of surveillance; and enforcement of the Act. CASA has adequately addressed the majority of the recommendations from the 1999 audit and has partially implemented the remaining relevant recommendations.
Risk identification
CASA has improved its means of identifying and prioritising risks to aviation safety at the operator level. The Safety Trend Indicator (STI) is a useful tool for doing this. It will improve further with the introduction of STI version 2.
Recognising the potential increased risk to safety posed by financially marginal operators, CASA has targeted its financial viability assessment (FVA) process according to the areas of perceived greatest financial risk.
Summary
However, the ANAO considers that CASA has not improved its means of identifying and prioritising risks to aviation safety at the sector or industry level.
Progress with the development and implementation of the Safety Intelligence System (SIS) has been overly protracted. There is much that CASA can do to improve its analysis of aviation safety data to help to identify emerging risk issues and trends; And to apply the results to CASA’s strategic decision-making about where to best allocate its resources to achieve required performance.
Again - WELL Mr. casa???
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ANAO, ANAL, CASA?
However, the ANAO considers that CASA has not improved its means of identifying and prioritising risks to aviation safety at the sector or industry level.
Progress with the development and implementation of the Safety Intelligence System (SIS) has been overly protracted. There is much that CASA can do to improve its analysis of aviation safety data to help to identify emerging risk issues and trends; And to apply the results to CASA’s strategic decision-making about where to best allocate its resources to achieve required performance.
Progress with the development and implementation of the Safety Intelligence System (SIS) has been overly protracted. There is much that CASA can do to improve its analysis of aviation safety data to help to identify emerging risk issues and trends; And to apply the results to CASA’s strategic decision-making about where to best allocate its resources to achieve required performance.
I would like to have a look at this (SIS). Can anybody provide a link to it, or evidence that it even exists? Most likely whatever it was it would have been shelved once the ANAO left the building. Then down the track when they get pinged again out it comes, rebadged with a new name!
CASA has improved its means of identifying and prioritising risks to aviation safety at the operator level. The Safety Trend Indicator (STI) is a useful tool for doing this. It will improve further with the introduction of STI version 2.
Maybe Senator X can request a thorough and comprehensive review of STI and SIS? Or at least request some historical data produced by these systems along with statistical proof they work? Have these systems been risk analysed as an effective regulatory tool - surely they would have, and the results maintained on file for compliance and accountabity purposes? Certainly an 'operator would be expected to do so??
And speaking of spin (aka pony poo), I really enjoyed the government response to recomendation 10 of the senate inquiry last year:
Recommendation 10
The committee recommends that the Minister for Infrastructure
and Transport provide a report to Parliament every six months outlining the progress of the Civil Aviation Safety Authority's (CASA) regulatory reforms and specifying reform priorities, consultative processes and implementation targets
for the following 12-month period.
Response
The Government does not support this recommendation.
The Government notes that progress with the regulatory reform
program is already reported to Parliament through various forums
including CASA's annual report, briefing and information provided at Senate Estimates hearings and through CASA's regular meetings with industry stakeholders. Regulatory reform activities, including consultation undertaken, are detailed on the CASA website and in the Explanatory Statements and Instruments registered
on the Federal Regsiter of Legislative Instruments.
I rest my case. The Minister does not want to be personally involved nor share in any 'accountabilty' for this mob of ratbags, and the ratbags likewise do not want to share or accept any accountabilty.
This picture describes the lot of them:
TICK TOCK
Last edited by gobbledock; 4th Apr 2012 at 02:52.
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Given that the shambles that CASA appears to have become has occurred over the lifetimes of several parliaments of differing persuasions I don't expect anything of significance to change or, despite the attempts by Sen. Xenophon, anything will be raised in this parliament.
In other words, both sides of politics have aviation skeletons in their closet.
Gobbledock, please understand the first duty of any public servant is to protect their minister from ever having to take personal responsibility for anything that may occur on their watch. However, the responsibility for allowing this situation to be case rests entirely on the public for we haven't demanded any personal responsibility from our ministers for years. We blindly accept the current situation rather than attempting to do anything about it.
In other words, both sides of politics have aviation skeletons in their closet.
Gobbledock, please understand the first duty of any public servant is to protect their minister from ever having to take personal responsibility for anything that may occur on their watch. However, the responsibility for allowing this situation to be case rests entirely on the public for we haven't demanded any personal responsibility from our ministers for years. We blindly accept the current situation rather than attempting to do anything about it.