Low altitude mixture cuts in twin training still occuring despite CASA warnings
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take over, lower the nose, mixture rich and the engine fires back to life instantly.
However, instead of restoring the mixture to rich after the student had correctly identified the engine "failure," the instructor purposely left the mixture at idle cut-off and told the student to fly the asymmetric circuit with the propeller windmilling with lots of drag. He told her to assume the prop would not feather.
On final, he told the student to conduct a touch and go on two engines, because after touch down he would place the mixture of the failed engine to rich so the student would have full power available on both engines for the touch and go.
After touch down the instructor placed the failed engine mixture to rich and the student advanced both throttles. The Seneca yawed strongly into the previously "failed" engine and left the strip. The instructor took over control from the student but was unable to control the yaw. The aircraft hit an obstacle in long grass near the strip and caught fire after coming to a stop. Apart from some minor burns to her skin the student was unhurt nor was the instructor. But the instructor felt a bit bloody stupid.
By allowing the propeller of the `failed` engine to windmill all the way around the circuit the injector lines were starved of fuel and when the instructor opened the mixture control to rich after touch-down for the touch and go, there was fuel starvation.
take over, lower the nose, mixture rich and the engine fires back to life instantly?
Well that may have been the plan but it didn't work that time
.
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take over, lower the nose, mixture rich and the engine fires back to life instantly? 
Well that may have been the plan but it didn't work that time
.
Well that may have been the plan but it didn't work that time.
With the prop RPM close to or at zero, placing the mixture to rich will not restart the engine.
Does a Seneca 3 have impulse coupling or starter vibrator ?.
By allowing the propeller of the `failed` engine to windmill all the way around the circuit the injector lines were starved of fuel and when the instructor opened the mixture control to rich after touch-down for the touch and go, there was fuel starvation.
I will not criticise the instructor you have spoken of above, with confidence I can say:
* I would not put myself into that situation, and,
* to date, I have not had a problem conducting multi engine training, using the time old tried and proven methods taught to me.
You are not comparing apples with apples are you, the situation you have described would suggest someone didn't think through the situation.
That accident appears to have more to do with the touch and go than the EFATO training.
The EFATO training was a great success, the continuation of circuit training after delivering the aircraft safely to the runway went poorly.
Also note that at RPMs below 1000 odd you may not be able to feather the prop.
Quote:
take over, lower the nose, mixture rich and the engine fires back to life instantly.
What beautiful confidence.
take over, lower the nose, mixture rich and the engine fires back to life instantly.
What beautiful confidence.
Last edited by Josh Cox; 26th May 2012 at 10:18.
Yes, but carby icing or plug fouling could have provided a similar result by closing the throttle for an equal period of time. A poor exercise that didn't consider the risk vs. training reward.
Both methods can have their downsides in the wrong circumstances. However for me the mixture method is the best way for two main reasons.
The RPM and manifold pressures guage indications realistically match a real engine failure.
The process of opening the throttle to verify the dead engine also acts in the same manner as it would on a real failure.
The student sees and experiences actions that very closely mimic a real failure which cannot happen by closing the throttle.
The situation described above re flying the windmilling prop to the ground then doing a touch and go is very risky by leaving it to the last minute to see if the engine will respond whether or not it's done with the throttle or mixture and is taking a scenario too far IMO.
The RPM and manifold pressures guage indications realistically match a real engine failure.
The process of opening the throttle to verify the dead engine also acts in the same manner as it would on a real failure.
The student sees and experiences actions that very closely mimic a real failure which cannot happen by closing the throttle.
The situation described above re flying the windmilling prop to the ground then doing a touch and go is very risky by leaving it to the last minute to see if the engine will respond whether or not it's done with the throttle or mixture and is taking a scenario too far IMO.
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However, instead of restoring the mixture to rich ... the instructor purposely left the mixture at idle cut-off and told the student to fly the asymmetric circuit with the propeller windmilling....
I think it is probably unreasonable to expect CASA to stop this kind of stupidity. Mixture vs. throttle, yes, CASA can make rules to settle the debate from a legislative point of view. But people, surely you can see that many of these accidents were just plain ignorance and stupidity? Can't legislate against those.
Last edited by Oktas8; 26th May 2012 at 11:49.
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From The Lycoming "Flyer" page 49 under the sub heading of National Transportation Safety Board Warning on Simulated Engine-Out Maneuvers
The fatal crash of a light twin in which a flight instructor and an applicant for a multiengine rating were killed prompted the NTSB to issue an urgent warning to all pilots simulating an engine-out condition on multiengine airplanes.
The Board’s investigation revealed that some flight instructors do use the fuel selector or the mixture control to shut down an engine to test a multiengine applicant. Although this is a recommended procedure, the urgent warning was aimed at flight instructors who were using this procedure at altitudes too low for continued safe flight.
The NTSB observed that use of such procedures at traffic pattern altitudes may not permit instructors enough time to overcome possible errors on the part of the applicant.
The recommendation by the NTSB means that all simulated engine-out operation at the lower altitudes should be accomplished by retarding the throttle, and this should be done slowly and carefully to avoid engine damage or failure.
Many flight instructors down through the years used the technique of abruptly cutting an engine with a multiengine candidate to test his emotional reaction and judgment with this extreme technique. Big radial piston engines with short, stubby crankshafts could tolerate the abrupt technique. However,
flat-opposed piston engines with their long crankshafts and attached counterweights could not as readily take the abuse of suddenly snapping a throttle shut, particularly at takeoff or climb power. Use of the latter technique would tend to detune crankshaft counterweights and could possibly result in a nasty engine failure.
Since it was common technique by flight instructors to terminate power abruptly to simulate an engine power loss, we had to protect the engine. As a result, we published in our Engine Operator’s Manual and in Service Bulletin No. 245, the recommendation that if the power was abruptly terminated, it must be accomplished with the mixture control. Of course, this was intended for the higher altitudes where a complete engine shut-down could be conducted safely. The student was to identify the dead engine by retarding that throttle to about 12" MP to simulate zero thrust, or similar to having the prop feathered. At that point, the instructor could immediately return the mixture to an engine-operating condition, and power would be available
if needed.
In our publications, we then explained the reason for using the mixture to abruptly terminate power. By putting the mixture control in idle cutoff position with the throttle in a normal open or operating position, the pilot merely cut off the fuel, but allowed the air to continue to fill the cylinders with resulting normal compression forces that are sufficient to cushion the deceleration of the engine and prevent the detuning of the crankshaft counterweights.
However, any practice of simulated engine-out condition at low altitudes should be best accomplished by a slow retardation of the throttle in accordance with the NTSB recommendation. This careful technique will protect the engine, and at the same time, provide for instant power if it is needed.
The above information from the engine manufacturer is in marked variance to what many in Pprune have written on this thread. Time for those concerned to step back and reflect on their folly?
The fatal crash of a light twin in which a flight instructor and an applicant for a multiengine rating were killed prompted the NTSB to issue an urgent warning to all pilots simulating an engine-out condition on multiengine airplanes.
The Board’s investigation revealed that some flight instructors do use the fuel selector or the mixture control to shut down an engine to test a multiengine applicant. Although this is a recommended procedure, the urgent warning was aimed at flight instructors who were using this procedure at altitudes too low for continued safe flight.
The NTSB observed that use of such procedures at traffic pattern altitudes may not permit instructors enough time to overcome possible errors on the part of the applicant.
The recommendation by the NTSB means that all simulated engine-out operation at the lower altitudes should be accomplished by retarding the throttle, and this should be done slowly and carefully to avoid engine damage or failure.
Many flight instructors down through the years used the technique of abruptly cutting an engine with a multiengine candidate to test his emotional reaction and judgment with this extreme technique. Big radial piston engines with short, stubby crankshafts could tolerate the abrupt technique. However,
flat-opposed piston engines with their long crankshafts and attached counterweights could not as readily take the abuse of suddenly snapping a throttle shut, particularly at takeoff or climb power. Use of the latter technique would tend to detune crankshaft counterweights and could possibly result in a nasty engine failure.
Since it was common technique by flight instructors to terminate power abruptly to simulate an engine power loss, we had to protect the engine. As a result, we published in our Engine Operator’s Manual and in Service Bulletin No. 245, the recommendation that if the power was abruptly terminated, it must be accomplished with the mixture control. Of course, this was intended for the higher altitudes where a complete engine shut-down could be conducted safely. The student was to identify the dead engine by retarding that throttle to about 12" MP to simulate zero thrust, or similar to having the prop feathered. At that point, the instructor could immediately return the mixture to an engine-operating condition, and power would be available
if needed.
In our publications, we then explained the reason for using the mixture to abruptly terminate power. By putting the mixture control in idle cutoff position with the throttle in a normal open or operating position, the pilot merely cut off the fuel, but allowed the air to continue to fill the cylinders with resulting normal compression forces that are sufficient to cushion the deceleration of the engine and prevent the detuning of the crankshaft counterweights.
However, any practice of simulated engine-out condition at low altitudes should be best accomplished by a slow retardation of the throttle in accordance with the NTSB recommendation. This careful technique will protect the engine, and at the same time, provide for instant power if it is needed.
The above information from the engine manufacturer is in marked variance to what many in Pprune have written on this thread. Time for those concerned to step back and reflect on their folly?
Last edited by Tee Emm; 26th May 2012 at 13:28.
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That's great Tee Emm,
And I am certain there are other manufacturers "recommending" mixture cuts, exactly like Lycoming still does, their recommendation is exactly that, a recommendation and this piece of literature is written by a Lawyer after someone killed themselves.
If it was such a big issue, as opposed to the response to an accident, they would have used the word "MUST" and changed all flight manuals to reflect this change.
Slowly retarding the throttle does not give the desired yaw rate or engine indications.
The next step would be to prohibit EFATO training......
So its not about the engines, mixture cuts are better for the engines, its just poor instructors level of training perhaps ?.
Mixture cuts safer yet again.
Slow retardation of the throttle is IMO not a realistic training environment.
This mixture versus throttle is a personal preference, until CASA mandates one or the other, it will remain a personal preference.
Those that enjoy getting on their soap boxes and proclaiming that throttle cuts are safer, legal, better for the aircraft engine etc etc need to understand that it is not a black and white issue. Throttle cut are: not a legal requirement, it's not better for the engine and many, myself included do not feel mixture cuts are a safety issue ( its managed risk ).
I have had ATO's turn fuel taps off during instrument renewals, and I'm still here to talk about it, it was again, managed risk.
Every aircraft flying involves a very complex managed risk profile, pilot experience, pilot training, pilot SOPs, well designed aircraft, well trained engineers maintaining with quality controlled spares, airspace to suit risk, appropriately designed airports with fire services etc etc.
The complete flyer is here: http://www.lycoming.com/support/tips...Operations.pdf
If you're worried about pilots killing themselves during EFATO training, petition to have it banned, but be aware there will be other consequences, possibly far worse than the one you are trying to protect against.
Safe aviation is an industry where aircraft are concreted to the ground, anything else is an aviation industry with managed risk.
This is a part of the reason pilots are so under valued, the general public has been programmed to believe that aviation is safe and we are just bus drivers.
Driving our buses which take the form of a pressurised aluminium tube, several miles above the ground, secured to two wings with very strong titanium bolts, with several thousand litres of flammable liquid in the wings, being pulled/pushed along by two or more very very hot fires in an environment so harsh that both the outside temperature and air density would not sustain human life...............doesn't sound so "safe" now.
And I am certain there are other manufacturers "recommending" mixture cuts, exactly like Lycoming still does, their recommendation is exactly that, a recommendation and this piece of literature is written by a Lawyer after someone killed themselves.
If it was such a big issue, as opposed to the response to an accident, they would have used the word "MUST" and changed all flight manuals to reflect this change.
Slowly retarding the throttle does not give the desired yaw rate or engine indications.
The recommendation by the NTSB means that all simulated engine-out operation at the lower altitudes should be accomplished by retarding the throttle, and this should be done slowly and carefully to avoid engine damage or failure.
As a result, we published in our Engine Operator’s Manual and in Service Bulletin No. 245, the recommendation that if the power was abruptly terminated, it must be accomplished with the mixture control. Of course, this was intended for the higher altitudes where a complete engine shut-down could be conducted safely.
By putting the mixture control in idle cutoff position with the throttle in a normal open or operating position, the pilot merely cut off the fuel, but allowed the air to continue to fill the cylinders with resulting normal compression forces that are sufficient to cushion the deceleration of the engine and prevent the detuning of the crankshaft counterweights.
However, any practice of simulated engine-out condition at low altitudes should be best accomplished by a slow retardation of the throttle in accordance with the NTSB recommendation. This careful technique will protect the engine, and at the same time, provide for instant power if it is needed.
This mixture versus throttle is a personal preference, until CASA mandates one or the other, it will remain a personal preference.
Those that enjoy getting on their soap boxes and proclaiming that throttle cuts are safer, legal, better for the aircraft engine etc etc need to understand that it is not a black and white issue. Throttle cut are: not a legal requirement, it's not better for the engine and many, myself included do not feel mixture cuts are a safety issue ( its managed risk ).
I have had ATO's turn fuel taps off during instrument renewals, and I'm still here to talk about it, it was again, managed risk.
Every aircraft flying involves a very complex managed risk profile, pilot experience, pilot training, pilot SOPs, well designed aircraft, well trained engineers maintaining with quality controlled spares, airspace to suit risk, appropriately designed airports with fire services etc etc.
The complete flyer is here: http://www.lycoming.com/support/tips...Operations.pdf
If you're worried about pilots killing themselves during EFATO training, petition to have it banned, but be aware there will be other consequences, possibly far worse than the one you are trying to protect against.
Safe aviation is an industry where aircraft are concreted to the ground, anything else is an aviation industry with managed risk.
This is a part of the reason pilots are so under valued, the general public has been programmed to believe that aviation is safe and we are just bus drivers.
Driving our buses which take the form of a pressurised aluminium tube, several miles above the ground, secured to two wings with very strong titanium bolts, with several thousand litres of flammable liquid in the wings, being pulled/pushed along by two or more very very hot fires in an environment so harsh that both the outside temperature and air density would not sustain human life...............doesn't sound so "safe" now.
Last edited by Josh Cox; 27th May 2012 at 22:19.
And I am certain there are other manufacturers "recommending" mixture cuts, exactly like Lycoming still does,
Lycoming, no
Of course, this was intended for the higher altitudes where a complete engine shut-down could be conducted safely.
Slow retardation of the throttle is IMO not a realistic training environment.
Using the mixture provides a better confirmation that the student is identifying the correct engine (they have to play with the throttles and the wrong selection is immediately obvious), but why not do this at 2 or 3 thousand feet, where there's enough height to counter an actual failure?
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MIHC,
Luckily only two, both were inflight and happened with plenty of warning or altitude.
But this is not what we are discussing, we are discussing whether it is unsafe to do mixture cuts during EFATO training, I do not believe it is ( and this is from actual experience ) and its has not been outlawed.
No argument. This is a situation a well trained and experienced META pilot should be able to recover on any given days training, if not, they do not deserve to be there.
Why do EFATO training on take off at all ?. The answer to that question is obvious, its one of the highest risk scenarios that could happen, and it is globally accepted that it needs to be trained and practiced.
So the issue is not mixture versus throttle, it close to the ground versus not close to the ground.
Use the throttle and have an unrealistic training scenario, perhaps less risk, depends on the cut of the instructor ( if it is unrealistic training, why do it at all ? )
Use the mixture and have a realistic training scenario, managed risk with a well trained and competent instructor.
Quite obviously a good proportion of the industry, as many have said above, myself included, the CASA FOIs I flown with, do mixture cuts on take off / at low level, all managed risk.
As to your proof talk statement, even the lycoming flyer does not mandate a requirement over the Service Bulletin 245.
SB 245 recommends mixture cuts as it is safer and better for the engine.
The flyer recommends "slow" throttle cuts because some numpty killed himself.
Do you see the difference ?.
IMHO the issue really comes down to the training and competency of the current batch of META instructors.
Have you actually ever had an engine failure?
But this is not what we are discussing, we are discussing whether it is unsafe to do mixture cuts during EFATO training, I do not believe it is ( and this is from actual experience ) and its has not been outlawed.
Using the mixture provides a better confirmation that the student is identifying the correct engine (they have to play with the throttles and the wrong selection is immediately obvious)
but why not do this at 2 or 3 thousand feet, where there's enough height to counter an actual failure?
So the issue is not mixture versus throttle, it close to the ground versus not close to the ground.
Use the throttle and have an unrealistic training scenario, perhaps less risk, depends on the cut of the instructor ( if it is unrealistic training, why do it at all ? )
Use the mixture and have a realistic training scenario, managed risk with a well trained and competent instructor.
The topic of the thread being low altitude failures, please elaborate who still does this? Proof talks, "I'm certain" walks.
As to your proof talk statement, even the lycoming flyer does not mandate a requirement over the Service Bulletin 245.
SB 245 recommends mixture cuts as it is safer and better for the engine.
The flyer recommends "slow" throttle cuts because some numpty killed himself.
Do you see the difference ?.
IMHO the issue really comes down to the training and competency of the current batch of META instructors.
Last edited by Josh Cox; 27th May 2012 at 00:28.
MIHC said: but why not do this at 2 or 3 thousand feet, where there's enough height to counter an actual failure?
People are sick of friends and family being needlessly injured or killed in these so called required low level training accidents!
Soon it will be outlawed in aircraft with 10 or more pax, or greater than 8,618 KG MTOW, so I think you'll find it will also eventually be outlawed or with severe regulation control for anything under 8,618kg. Synthetic Trainer manufacturers are about to experience a mini-boom.
Civil Aviation Safety Authority - NFRM 1007OS
Finally Oz aviation industry may be dragged kicking and screaming to worldwide best practice in the use of simulators/STDs for all EPs and checks other than LOFT and some approved upper level EPs.
Good pick up by the way Tee Emm!
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If you're worried about pilots killing themselves during EFATO training, petition to have it banned, but be aware there will be other consequences, possibly far worse than the one you are trying to protect against.
Going back to "Up in the Air's" post. Generally I agree with the statement to follow the POH. However, it should be noted that they vary a lot. I think if you look at a training twin like (say) the Travelair POH it is completely different on this subject.
One of the deficiencies of this debate is that it hasn't acknowledged that there are different types of twin engine engine failure training.
At one level, recurrent training is about re-inforcing the checks and establishing the mechanical routine required in an engine failure. Simulators can do this pretty well and should be part of the strategy.
Statistically, the most likely scenario is an engine shutdown in flight. But in this instance there is plenty of time and its not so critical. You can pull out the POH checklists. This is where you need the feathering exercises. It proves that the aeroplane will continue to fly very happily on one engine.
The two most critical situations are engine failure in an instrument procedure towards the MDA involving a missed approach and engine failure after take-off.
Engine failure after take-off (or indeed go around) is critical because if you don't act swiftly, decisively and precisely then some twins won't climb on a single engine. Its also a high workload situation where the pilot is most likely to mis-diagnose the failed engine. I'd suggest that the new multi-pilot's first experience of this ranks with the first solo as a memorable experience. This cannot be replicated in a simulator. But proving that if you get everything right you can climb for a circuit at 150 fpm is a very big lesson.
EFATO may be an exercise which carries risk, but so do many other things. The issue is how one manages the risk. I would argue that an EFATO exercise that requires the pilot to go through the checks feather the engine (ie the instructor set zero thrust) and establish a climb is an exercise best done at a country airport with flat terrain. If the objective is to identify the dead engine and do the checks before the instructor restores the engine, then the circumstances in which this is done is less important.
I'm part of the school that still thinks stall / spin training is important. Ditto, I think the experience of a simulated EFATO at low altitude done once is indelibly etched in the memory and an important part of multi training.
But, after the first experience the check rides are about re-inforcement of the correct routine. Every time I do a sim flight I fail an engine on myself. I'm going to hit any instructor who pulls one of my turbo engines at full power on first take-off and like most turbo engine owners we avoid circuits. But pulling an engine toward MDA in an instrument approach after the engine has been at low power for a while is much kinder on the engines and still lets you do the climb transition in the go-around at 1,000 ft or more above the ground.
One of the deficiencies of this debate is that it hasn't acknowledged that there are different types of twin engine engine failure training.
At one level, recurrent training is about re-inforcing the checks and establishing the mechanical routine required in an engine failure. Simulators can do this pretty well and should be part of the strategy.
Statistically, the most likely scenario is an engine shutdown in flight. But in this instance there is plenty of time and its not so critical. You can pull out the POH checklists. This is where you need the feathering exercises. It proves that the aeroplane will continue to fly very happily on one engine.
The two most critical situations are engine failure in an instrument procedure towards the MDA involving a missed approach and engine failure after take-off.
Engine failure after take-off (or indeed go around) is critical because if you don't act swiftly, decisively and precisely then some twins won't climb on a single engine. Its also a high workload situation where the pilot is most likely to mis-diagnose the failed engine. I'd suggest that the new multi-pilot's first experience of this ranks with the first solo as a memorable experience. This cannot be replicated in a simulator. But proving that if you get everything right you can climb for a circuit at 150 fpm is a very big lesson.
EFATO may be an exercise which carries risk, but so do many other things. The issue is how one manages the risk. I would argue that an EFATO exercise that requires the pilot to go through the checks feather the engine (ie the instructor set zero thrust) and establish a climb is an exercise best done at a country airport with flat terrain. If the objective is to identify the dead engine and do the checks before the instructor restores the engine, then the circumstances in which this is done is less important.
I'm part of the school that still thinks stall / spin training is important. Ditto, I think the experience of a simulated EFATO at low altitude done once is indelibly etched in the memory and an important part of multi training.
But, after the first experience the check rides are about re-inforcement of the correct routine. Every time I do a sim flight I fail an engine on myself. I'm going to hit any instructor who pulls one of my turbo engines at full power on first take-off and like most turbo engine owners we avoid circuits. But pulling an engine toward MDA in an instrument approach after the engine has been at low power for a while is much kinder on the engines and still lets you do the climb transition in the go-around at 1,000 ft or more above the ground.
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Use the mixture and have a realistic training scenario, managed risk with a well trained and competent instructor.
So now about this "realistic training scenario, managed risk with a well trained and competent instructor"?
Last edited by sheppey; 27th May 2012 at 00:50.
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The instructor involved with the Duchess practice engine failure (mixture cut) fatal crash was quite experienced with over 30,000 hours and the Boeing 767 Air Canada captain in the left seat of that Duchess undergoing the instrument rating renewal was less experienced with only 16,000 hours...
How do you know it was a mixture cut ?, by my recollection the ATSB didn't know, how is it you know ?.
Investigation: 200300224 - Beech Aircraft Corp 76, VH-JWX
Either way you wont find me doing that at night ( mixture or throttle ).
I'm part of the school that still thinks stall / spin training is important. Ditto, I think the experience of a simulated EFATO at low altitude done once is indelibly etched in the memory and an important part of multi training.
Last edited by Josh Cox; 27th May 2012 at 01:13.
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Was that at Camden at night or in really bad weather, do we know whether he used the throttle or mixture on this occasion ?.
The instructor involved with the Duchess practice engine failure (mixture cut) fatal crash was quite experienced with over 30,000 hours and the Boeing 767 Air Canada captain in the left seat of that Duchess undergoing the instrument rating renewal was less experienced with only 16,000 hours...
So now about this "realistic training scenario, managed risk with a well trained and competent instructor"?
So now about this "realistic training scenario, managed risk with a well trained and competent instructor"?
COMMENT 1.2
Some respondents proposed adding wording to allow training and checking to occur in the aircraft provided the exercise had been conducted by all pilots in a simulator in the preceding 12 months.
CASA Response
CASA is firmly of the view that where a qualified STD is available for aircraft of this size, this should be used for all training and checking activities. The ATSB has reported that the training captain of the aircraft involved in an accident in Darwin in March 2010 had undergone training and checking in a flight simulator, however the actions by the training captain in simulating an engine failure in the actual aircraft during the accident flight was not consistent with the training received during the simulator course. This suggests that doing one session of training and one check per year in an STD (with the subsequent session/check in an actual aircraft) does not satisfactorily address the risk of conducting non-normal exercises in an actual aircraft.
Some respondents proposed adding wording to allow training and checking to occur in the aircraft provided the exercise had been conducted by all pilots in a simulator in the preceding 12 months.
CASA Response
CASA is firmly of the view that where a qualified STD is available for aircraft of this size, this should be used for all training and checking activities. The ATSB has reported that the training captain of the aircraft involved in an accident in Darwin in March 2010 had undergone training and checking in a flight simulator, however the actions by the training captain in simulating an engine failure in the actual aircraft during the accident flight was not consistent with the training received during the simulator course. This suggests that doing one session of training and one check per year in an STD (with the subsequent session/check in an actual aircraft) does not satisfactorily address the risk of conducting non-normal exercises in an actual aircraft.
COMMENT 3
One respondent believes that mandating simulator training for check and training captains but not for recurrent line pilot training recognises that, check and training captains who are simulator recurrent in recovery from non-normal exercises in a simulator can be expected to handle non-normal exercises in the aircraft better than pilots undertaking an initial endorsement. The respondent believes the safety risk case is very strong to support the above.
CASA Response
CASA is firmly of the view that where a qualified STD is available, this should be used for conversion training. The ATSB has reported that the training captain of the aircraft involved in an accident in Darwin in March 2010 had undergone training and checking in a flight simulator, however the actions by the training captain in simulating an engine failure in the actual aircraft during the accident flight was not consistent with the training received during the simulator course.
Contrary to the respondent’s view, this suggests that having only training and checking captains undergo simulator training does not satisfactorily address the risk of conducting non-normal exercises in an actual aircraft.
Last edited by Sarcs; 27th May 2012 at 01:12.
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Night or IMC don't preclude asymmetric training. I have done it where it was considered acceptable. The key was to increase safety margins according to risk. E.g. No EF below MSA in some cases.
By day or night, it is unacceptable to leave the student or candidate in control if things don't go to plan. Aircraft doesn't climb? Take control. Drills incorrect? Take control. Many of the accidents listed here occurred after the student made errors. Continuing in order to 'prove a point' is high risk but is associated with inexperienced instructors.
By day or night, it is unacceptable to leave the student or candidate in control if things don't go to plan. Aircraft doesn't climb? Take control. Drills incorrect? Take control. Many of the accidents listed here occurred after the student made errors. Continuing in order to 'prove a point' is high risk but is associated with inexperienced instructors.
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Surviving pilot told ATSB investigators the mixture was cut
That said, is it relevant in this accident ?, mixture or throttle, would the outcome have been different either way with any certainty ?.
Throttle cut or mixture cut is irrelevant to this accident. The ATSB laid the blame at the feet of the ATO for initiating the exercise "when a safe outcome could not be assured"
The ATSB quote a CASA guideline not to do asymmetric below 1500ft after dark.
Further, I would suggest that it was not conducted "just after dark" since the ATSB say they did not take off from Bankstown until 16 min after last light. They then flew to Woollongong then Cambden. So it was properly dark. And anyway, dark is dark. Its a binary state after last light.
Its a bit unusual for a 16,000 hour ATPL to be getting an initial issue MECIR. One wonders if the ATO overestimated the candidates experience in these circumstances - especially since this was the first and only flight the ATO had with the pilot under test. Which is another risk management warning flag the ATO ignored.
This accident is about poor practices by the ATO, not mixture cuts, throttle cuts or even really asymmetrics. It has no more logic than cutting power on a single in the same circumstances. Its about not clearly understanding how to achieve the training objective in a low risk manner.
The ATSB quote a CASA guideline not to do asymmetric below 1500ft after dark.
Further, I would suggest that it was not conducted "just after dark" since the ATSB say they did not take off from Bankstown until 16 min after last light. They then flew to Woollongong then Cambden. So it was properly dark. And anyway, dark is dark. Its a binary state after last light.
Its a bit unusual for a 16,000 hour ATPL to be getting an initial issue MECIR. One wonders if the ATO overestimated the candidates experience in these circumstances - especially since this was the first and only flight the ATO had with the pilot under test. Which is another risk management warning flag the ATO ignored.
This accident is about poor practices by the ATO, not mixture cuts, throttle cuts or even really asymmetrics. It has no more logic than cutting power on a single in the same circumstances. Its about not clearly understanding how to achieve the training objective in a low risk manner.
Night or IMC don't preclude asymmetric training. I have done it where it was considered acceptable.
A large body of well informed opinion would totally disagree with that statement. One large and very long standing Australian operator bars any engine shutdown ( and that would include mixture cuts), except in VMC, daylight, min. 3000 AGL.
As for asymmetric training ---- zero thrust only --- and the training manual mandatory requirements meant that night operations were severely limited. On pistons (a la FAA) "slowly retard the throttle".
All risk assessment based (although those were not the words used when the policy was established in the 1940s) with the assessment that night training hugely increased the risk --- hence the very tight night limitations.
Not surprisingly, this same operator was an early adopter, a pioneer even, of flight simulation --- long before a mandate for their use.
We kill more people asymmetric training than as a result of actual engine failures, but it is clear that the message is lost on "the survivors".
Tootle pip!!