One big oversight leads to........

[sms777]

I can see only experienced Chieftain drivers can determine where he f@ckd up. The good thing is that he sort of walked away from it thanks to the the airframe built like a Shermann tank.
Jabba, you have a good weekend too and thanks for sharing your thoughts on this important subject.
I do hope you know how to play two-ups

[FGD135]

The wrong stuff

This accident seems to have many wise old pilots scratching their heads. The word "inexperienced" is cropping up in almost every post.

I think this accident had nothing to do with how experienced the pilot was.

I think it was a simple case of the pilot not having "the right stuff".

Not every individual can make a satisfactory pilot.

Those without the right stuff tend to get culled at some early stage of their flying career. For most, it probably comes when the frustration of repeated failure at gaining the PPL/CPL/CIR becomes too much and they just give it all away.

Some, like this individual, manage to defy the odds and get a good deal further - but I would doubt that any make it past the lowest levels of G.A.

So what, exactly, is "the right stuff"? We know it exists because we know that you can't just pluck any individual off the street and expect him to eventually be the captain of an airliner.

Here goes my description of what it is:

A certain attitude, or "mindset" towards your machine, how it works and the environment in which it flies. That attitude manifests itself as curiosity, caution, respect and pessimism - all of which come together to make you prepared for the wide range of contigencies that can arise.

If this pilot had been so prepared, he would have:

1. Been expecting an engine to fail from fuel starvation;
2. Had some idea of what the instrument indications of a failed engine would look like;
3. Realised the significance of the second engine failure;
4. Had an appreciation of the effects of a windmilling propeller;
5. Had better sense regarding undercarriage use during a forced landing;

Note that none of the above are things that require experience. A pilot with nothing but a bare CPL would have turned this incident into a non-event - provided he had the right stuff - and this point was effectively made, most succinctly, by Koizi with this statement:

If a PA31 crashed every time the pilot had to be "reminded" by the engines to change tanks, there would be none left by now.

All of this brings up the issue of the responsibility that instructors and ATOs have for recognising - and taking appropriate action - when a candidate demonstrates that he should really be pursuing a career in I.T., Pharmacy or Dentistry.

Is it impressed upon instructors and ATOs that they will have to, from time to time, seek to "terminate" a candidate's progress?

[Lodown]

Hands up the number of older pilots who, while learning to fly, had an instructor distract you and then surreptitiously select the empty tank or fuel off, and then let time take its course. Hands up all the pilots with 15 years or less experience who have had the same practical thing taught by instructors bent on sticking to a performance/outcome-based syllabus. I'll bet there's a big difference in relative numbers.

[Spotlight]

FGD,,, I agree.

I could count and maybe one day I will, the endorsesments I have conducted. The majority thankfully for 217 operations.

Two hours, the report has it for this fellows training. I tell you what! My signature doesn't come that cheap.

A predictable outcome in some ways.

[YoDawg]

A VERY similar incident took place out of Kalgoorlie a few years back in a 310 or a 402.

Pax on board suffered mightily, I believe, as did the pilot.

Apparently, the fuel on board in the mains was never used.

[Spotlight]

Been plenty more than Kalgoolie Yodawg. It is an ever present probability that if you do not manage your fuel you will have an engine failure, sometimes both.

Have you looked at the photo's of the prang? Well thats what a big mistake looks like. Broken legs I heard at the time. Probably worse I would guess now.

[Mr. Hat]

FGD I read your post and started thinking how i was going to give you a spray but then I found myself agreeing or even being harsher.

One could actually say that someone hasn't got the right stuff if they let an engine stop due to fuel starvation either deliberately or unexpectedly. But I'm not going to say that. It was my personal choice to calculate a buffer which i often refererred to as "mum and the kids".

Others i know chose not to and some suffered the consequences. I must point out though that major airlines felt that they had "the right stuff" perhaps because they had learned a lesson. Who knows?

Back to my original point, a few times in my career when i stuffed something up (no nothing major) i had some loser tell me that I was "no good" and should "give it up" didn't have "the right stuff" ect. I worked out that these people were fu{kwits that needed to put people down to make themselves feel good. They were taking the opportunity whilst i was new to the operation or on type to sink the boot in. Then within a short space of time i had the brain space to overtake them and observe all their mistakes.

I do find it strange that the pilot in question did not try to switch tanks but then again I wasn't there and don't know all the factors and therefore can't comment.

The one thing i remember about the early training in ga was that speed/rote was a focus. Now over time I'm unlearning this as I watch very experienced people do things in the exactly opposite fashion. I think this speed/rote might have been a contributng factor. As my mum often said "more hast less speed".

[morno]

Interesting read, but not surprisingly, it doesn't tell me much more than what was already known only days after the crash.

How a pilot can see two engines fail, and then effectively sit on your hands and do nothing, is beyond me. Whether you have "the right stuff" or not, wouldn't anyone try just about anything to prevent the plane from crashing!?

Maybe I'm just writing from the perspective of someone who was actually adequately trained, checked and uses common sense when things out of the ordinary occur in flight, .

Mind you, I sometimes question the level of experience of the pilots that the company concerned, constantly put's into their aircraft, even when there wasn't a shortage of experienced pilots. I know that you don't need 10,000hrs and 5 moon landings to fly a Chieftain (although, could have helped in this situation), but it's more the type of flying that you are most likely to do in that Chieftain, which I believe is where you need the experience. That being of course, single pilot, IFR operations.

As I watched an absolute cracker of a storm from the edge of my hangar one morning in North West QLD with my aircraft behind me in the hangar, thinking "**** that's a great storm. I'm glad I made the decision to wait around until it's safe to go", I watched as another aircraft from the same company as the crashed aircraft, took off into the murk, with lightning bolts everywhere for about 50nm's, and only minutes later a bolt hit the runway and created damage! What was even more disturbing, was that someone very close to me, was supposed to have been on that charter, but couldn't make it at the last minute. I now refuse to let them fly on any more charters operated by said company.

Anyway, the point I was trying to make, was perhaps it's a mix of both lack of experience and not having "the right stuff". Any experienced pilot who tell's you that they've never run a tank dry and made the engine splutter only to realise their mistake and change over, end of drama, is bull****ting you. It's experiences like this, that teach you over time, and can re-enforce those initial engine failure checks, that perhaps would have prevented this bloke from crashing.

morno

[FOD_Hazard]

Maybe I'm just writing from the perspective of someone who was actually adequately trained, checked and uses common sense when things out of the ordinary occur in flight

Its probably been said before, but I'll say it again.....common sense just aint that common anymore. Most pilots, no matter how much experience they have under their belt, when faced with a double engine failure would probably go straight for the fuel selector...There are probably a few more out there that wouldn't.

Sad truth is that this is not the first time it has happened but lets hope it is the last time we hear of such an avoidable accident.

but are students shown how to restart an engine in flight or is it deemed unnecessary risk

My instructor attempted to show me a restart during my initial multi training....No matter what we did we couldn't get the prop out of feather so my first landing in a partnavia was an assymetric.

[ReverseFlight]

A few things adopted at the school where I did my initial twin endorsement:

1. Regular instrument scan - left to right, top to bottom. Never leave anything out.

2. No restarts in training. This tended to loosen the engine mount bolts over time and may detach or shear off after repeated cycles. Best left for real emergencies. (However, I don't get to practice restarts.)

3. OEI in the cruise - don't feather straight away after closing the dead throttle. Go through FMOST checks first. At least you've got altitude and speed.

I presume the majority does the same ?

[Dorothy Dixer]

2. No restarts in training. This tended to loosen the engine mount bolts over time and may detach or shear off after repeated cycles. Best left for real emergencies. (However, I don't get to practice restarts.)

Errr.......ok.

[morno]

Riiiiight. So why didn't they just replace the engine mount bolts at regular intervals if they were that worried?

It's because of flying school's like that, that training standards continue to drop.

morno

[FGD135]

Maybe I'm just writing from the perspective of someone who was actually adequately trained, checked and uses common sense when things out of the ordinary occur in flight.

Actually, morno, you're writing and thinking from the perspective of someone who has the right stuff. You've always had it so you don't know any different, and this is the reason for the head scratching.

How do I know you have the RS? Well, from reading your posts, I can see you are a highly experienced pilot. But, to have become highly experienced, you have to have been a pilot for a long time - but you can't be a pilot for a long time unless you have the RS to begin with. Those without the RS get culled - in one way or another - early on in their flying career.

The RS is not something you can be taught. Nor is it something you acquire over time. You either have it or you don't. You, and probably the vast majority of our fellow PPRuners, have it.

To those of us with the RS, we tend to look at either lack of experience or training deficiencies whenever there is an accident or incident. But for this accident, neither of these usual suspects is to blame - hence the inordinate level of head scratching that is evident in this thread.

To better illustrate the significance of RS and how you either have it or you don't, consider the pilot selection and training that is conducted by the air forces of the world.

They spend substantial sums in assessing, selecting and training their pilots. The training is top notch, granted, but without the candidate having the RS to begin with, the training would be a waste of time.

Those pilots are highly inexperienced and the flying is far more demanding than a one hour day VMC sector in a PA31, but when they are finally let loose on their multi-million dollar jet fighters, the air force is able to rest assured the outcome will be satisfactory.

[ReverseFlight]

Further to Dorothy Dixer's post, apart from no restarts in my training, I was also told not to practice feathering it in flight either. Is this to avoid what FOD_Hazard experienced (unable to unfeather in flight) or is there something else I don't know about ? I am begining to doubt what I have been taught ... any advice is appreciated.

[Deepsea Racing Prawn]

Hey FGD135...this ones for you buddy.

YouTube - New Kids On The Block - You've Got It (The Right Stuff)

[YoDawg]

My instructor attempted to show me a restart during my initial multi training....No matter what we did we couldn't get the prop out of feather so my first landing in a partnavia was an assymetric.

I can't quite see the point in shutting down a piston engine just for practice at re-starting it. Has anyone in normal day to day operations ever had to RE-START a piston engine? We've all been caught out looking the wrong way when the fuel-flow guage begins to flicker, following which comes an embarrassing (if not alone) period of engine-surging, yawing, odd noises and red faced plucking at the fuel cock. In my own experience, the engine never fails to produce power for more than a maximum of maybe 10 seconds and never once stops wind-milling. Thus a "re-start" was never required.

I experienced a couple of engine failures which left me in no doubt that the engine would never operate again in its current state. Thus a "re-start" was never required in those cases, either.

In a bit over 6000 hours on pistons I never once had cause to attempt a re-start of an engine. Farting around shutting down a donk and feathering it is a nice demonstration that the world will not necessarily end following an engine failure. But without two pilots on board, it can start to get a little awkward keeping it neat and tidy for someone unfamiliar with the process of then unfeathering and re-starting the engine.

Spin training - yes I can see a real use for this. Practice in shutting down for the sake of re-starting a donk in a piston twin is, in my opinion, a waste of time. But I'm open to argument there, I guess.

I did lots of dumb things in GA and I suppose I was lucky not to have ended in an accident. Or was I? At a glance, and this is pure speculation based on experience with the PA31, systems knowledge (particularly with regard to the fuel system) may've prevented the reported flight from ending with a hull-loss.

Being interested enough to have a good standard of systems knowledge and applying the knowledge accurately and in a timely fashion when required is a part of The afore-mentioned Right Stuff** (imho).




** aka Airmanship

[Dog One]

Endorsed a lot of people over the years on PA31's and other twins. The engine mounting bolt issue is a new one to me. One could deuce that rough running from a cylinder failure would also cause the bolts to loosen? The only caution I can remember was stalling the aircraft, due to the extended crankshafts flexing.

People moving up from light twins in which they did their initial IRT's needed an attitude change when moving onto PA31 and C402 aircraft. System knowledge was very important.

One of the traits that had to be handled was on the asymmetric circuit, most of the light twins had electric undercarriages, so the training was gear down turning final, and unless a CB popped, the gear worked. In a PA31, the gear is hydraulic, driven by two engine driven pumps. Have an engine failure, you only have one pump, and it takes a lot longer to get the gear down. (you can bet that the remaining pump is a bit sick). I always trained people in the circuit to do everything in the normal spot whether normal or assymetric, except for the final flap extension. This way, other than a higher power setting on the live engine, the single pilot had time and altitude to handle a slow gear extension, traffic, and passengers and fly a normal approach.

[maui]

I was led to believe the principal argument against full feathering, was the rapid cooling that followed once you cut off the bang juice. As an occasional thing, not a big deal, but in a training situation, frequent shut-downs/rapid cooldowns, can produce problems.
Consequently I would only ever give one feathered approach and landing per endorsement.

BTW. With more than 40 years in the industry, I have never heard of FMOST. Can someone decode it for me. Must have been hiding under a cabbage all this time. I assume it is some cyber-gen version of some other mnemonic.

Maui

[Stationair8]

Sounds like another quick endorsement by some ace with little or no ICUS for the low time pilot.

[CharlieLimaX-Ray]

Hopefully the pilot made a recovery from his injuries.

Not the first Navajo to be run out of fuel in that part of the world, a coulpe from the memory bank:

PA-31/310 VH-UFO destroyed near Archerfield in 1993 due to loss of power,

PA-31/310 VH-??? a certain operater from Archerfield that was run out of fuel enroute on a rig pig crew transfer.