ATSB failure in Benalla investigation
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Dick,
Its been some time since using a trimble, but the TSO trimble still has a RAIM function, still sends out warning messages.
A very good number of GPS units operate in DR mode when nothing better is available, but appropriate warnings are given to the user.
Its been some time since using a trimble, but the TSO trimble still has a RAIM function, still sends out warning messages.
A very good number of GPS units operate in DR mode when nothing better is available, but appropriate warnings are given to the user.
Dick, I just want to hear from Drivers with experience with this device. There is nothing sinister in that. I haven't flown with one and I am only going by a POH. At least it is better to get information here than sensationalise it in the press.
the aircraft goes below the MDA, the automation will initiate a Low Altitude Alert. At this point the controller is required to issue the alert and restate the MDA - in the case of a non precision approach - for example, a GPS approach.
Last edited by QFF; 13th Aug 2008 at 13:43. Reason: speeling
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I'm with Dick on this one.
Surely the most important aspect of this accident for the ATSB to be looking at is what caused the GPS to generate consistent (but wrong) positions.
The GPS entering some sort of "special mode" would have to have been a focus of theirs. That "special mode", as Dick points out, could well be the "dead reckoning" mode.
In an enroute, high altitude scenario, such a mode could be a somewhat useful thing (for short periods) should the unit be unable to track sufficient satellites for proper position fixing, so one can see why the unit would possess such a feature.
And one way to deprive it of satellites is to disconnect the antenna - or allow the antenna to become disconnected via a fault.
Highly unlikely that the unit would not have given some warning that it has entered DR mode. Was the warning sufficient to alert the pilot? Did the pilot see the warning but not understand it?
Irrespective of what the manual says, the ATSB should have tested whether inadvertent "mode reversion" was a factor in this accident. One cannot expect the manual to explain all possible behaviours in all possible scenarios.
Have to agree with Dick about the Radar warnings too. Note that Dick is not saying that Radar must be installed everywhere - he is simply saying that if it can be used to save lives, why isn't it?
Surely the most important aspect of this accident for the ATSB to be looking at is what caused the GPS to generate consistent (but wrong) positions.
The GPS entering some sort of "special mode" would have to have been a focus of theirs. That "special mode", as Dick points out, could well be the "dead reckoning" mode.
In an enroute, high altitude scenario, such a mode could be a somewhat useful thing (for short periods) should the unit be unable to track sufficient satellites for proper position fixing, so one can see why the unit would possess such a feature.
And one way to deprive it of satellites is to disconnect the antenna - or allow the antenna to become disconnected via a fault.
Highly unlikely that the unit would not have given some warning that it has entered DR mode. Was the warning sufficient to alert the pilot? Did the pilot see the warning but not understand it?
Irrespective of what the manual says, the ATSB should have tested whether inadvertent "mode reversion" was a factor in this accident. One cannot expect the manual to explain all possible behaviours in all possible scenarios.
Have to agree with Dick about the Radar warnings too. Note that Dick is not saying that Radar must be installed everywhere - he is simply saying that if it can be used to save lives, why isn't it?
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Will a TSO C129 GPS Navigator go into Approach Mode with an out of date datacard? Yes it will, it is a feature of the TSO based around a philosophy that it would be better in an emergency to be in the situation of having to fly an approach with an out of data card than to have an otherwise good navigation system that was unusable.
Does the Trimble 2101 go into DR mode when it loses signal? From memory yes, but it's been a while since I used one.
The T2101 was one of the first TSO C129 navigators available. It's pertinent to note there were a number of major software changes during the early deployment. Notable amongst several is that on some versions the RAIM annunciator would be illuminated when RAIM was available and on other versions the RAIM annunciator illuminated when RAIM was not available.
Does the Trimble 2101 go into DR mode when it loses signal? From memory yes, but it's been a while since I used one.
The T2101 was one of the first TSO C129 navigators available. It's pertinent to note there were a number of major software changes during the early deployment. Notable amongst several is that on some versions the RAIM annunciator would be illuminated when RAIM was available and on other versions the RAIM annunciator illuminated when RAIM was not available.
"Have to agree with Dick about the Radar warnings too. Note that Dick is not saying that Radar must be installed everywhere - he is simply saying that if it can be used to save lives, why isn't it?"
Here are a few reasons that make that proposition questionable:
Basically, unless the aircraft is in an airspace, over which the ATC has a control and communication responsibility ... then the proposition is fraught with danger, fuelled by ambiguous responsibilities.
Solutions:
Here are a few reasons that make that proposition questionable:
- Presumably aircraft is on CTAF frequency ... how does ATC talk to him?
- Aircraft is in uncontrolled airspace and could be manouvering for other (unknown to ATC) safety reasons ... eg. traffic, turbulence
Basically, unless the aircraft is in an airspace, over which the ATC has a control and communication responsibility ... then the proposition is fraught with danger, fuelled by ambiguous responsibilities.
Solutions:
- If there's radar coverage, make it a minimum of Class E Airspace ... ATC staff numbers ?????
- OR, put in another class of staff to monitor and communicate with aircraft in Class G airspace in radar coverage... it ain't gunna happen.
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Some interesting reading on the history of Class G, TAAATS, ATC, DTI, and key players.
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committ...ort/report.pdf
Australian Parliamentary Library - Background Paper 10 1997-98
http://www.aph.gov.au/senate/committ...ort/report.pdf
Australian Parliamentary Library - Background Paper 10 1997-98
Thread Starter
Both the ATSB and CASA have read the very thorough report by professional pilot John Chew, which was presented to the Coroner last week. This report shows beyond reasonable doubt that the Trimble unit can go into dead reckoning and fly the complete approach in the dead reckoning mode.
Of course, there are normally warnings – but just as a fault can put the unit into dead reckoning, a fault could remove some or all of the warning messages.
Other GPS units, such as the Garmin, simply freeze when there is a loss of signal in the air – i.e. they do not go into dead reckoning.
Why are both the ATSB and CASA hiding this important finding from the pilot community? Is it once again someone trying to protect the obvious terrible failure of the ATSB final report? After that report came out, the Deputy Director of the ATSB, Alan Stray, said words to the effect, “We will never know what caused the aircraft to get off course.”
The ATSB also failed to do a proper investigation - i.e. simply fly the route and disconnect the antenna to see if, in the prevailing winds, the unit will fly a totally false approach -which it clearly does.
I will today write to the Minister and ask him to see what he can do about getting CASA and the ATSB to announce to the industry the important finding by John Chew. I have a copy of John Chew’s statement, however I don’t believe I can post it on PPRuNe. It is up to the ATSB and CASA to release this statement – they have it as well. We may then prevent another crash in the next few days. Who knows?
Jabawocky, yes, in a Trimble unit the approach mode can be selected with an out of date data card. The only message (after the unit is turned on) is “data card out of date” or something similar.
Of course, there are normally warnings – but just as a fault can put the unit into dead reckoning, a fault could remove some or all of the warning messages.
Other GPS units, such as the Garmin, simply freeze when there is a loss of signal in the air – i.e. they do not go into dead reckoning.
Why are both the ATSB and CASA hiding this important finding from the pilot community? Is it once again someone trying to protect the obvious terrible failure of the ATSB final report? After that report came out, the Deputy Director of the ATSB, Alan Stray, said words to the effect, “We will never know what caused the aircraft to get off course.”
The ATSB also failed to do a proper investigation - i.e. simply fly the route and disconnect the antenna to see if, in the prevailing winds, the unit will fly a totally false approach -which it clearly does.
I will today write to the Minister and ask him to see what he can do about getting CASA and the ATSB to announce to the industry the important finding by John Chew. I have a copy of John Chew’s statement, however I don’t believe I can post it on PPRuNe. It is up to the ATSB and CASA to release this statement – they have it as well. We may then prevent another crash in the next few days. Who knows?
Jabawocky, yes, in a Trimble unit the approach mode can be selected with an out of date data card. The only message (after the unit is turned on) is “data card out of date” or something similar.
Last edited by Dick Smith; 13th Aug 2008 at 22:41.
Thread Starter
Peuce, you state:
This is a factual statement but your mind seems to be completely closed as to better ways of using our radar. For example, in the UK, air traffic control actually “control” IFR aircraft in Class G. The Plymouth tower manned by air traffic controllers sits in Class G airspace. Those who want an IFR service are actually “controlled” by air traffic control – either in the Centre or in the tower.
Now I know this must be almost beyond comprehension to you, because ingrained in the view of Australian controllers and pilots is that in uncontrolled airspace, a controller must never issue an instruction – unless possibly it is an emergency.
It just so happens that the British regulations (although not ICAO compliant) actually lead to greater safety. We are a sovereign country and we can do the same thing ourselves – even though I would not recommend it. I would put in Class E airspace.
How can Class E at, say, Benalla, increase the number of ATC staff required? You would be lucky to get one IFR aircraft at Benalla in a day, so there would be no separation required. You may be amazed, but in Class E airspace the pilot remains on the Class E frequency until visual. This is because no one else can be in the cloud at the same time without a clearance. This maximises the use of radar.
Fortunately there are many more young Aussie controllers coming along with a broader view, and they are asking sensible questions, such as, “If other countries can provide a control service for IFR aircraft where they have radar, why can’t we in Australia?” The answer is that indeed we can, we just need to have open minds and be prepared to copy the success of others.
Basically, unless the aircraft is in an airspace, over which the ATC has a control and communication responsibility ... then the proposition is fraught with danger, fuelled by ambiguous responsibilities.
Now I know this must be almost beyond comprehension to you, because ingrained in the view of Australian controllers and pilots is that in uncontrolled airspace, a controller must never issue an instruction – unless possibly it is an emergency.
It just so happens that the British regulations (although not ICAO compliant) actually lead to greater safety. We are a sovereign country and we can do the same thing ourselves – even though I would not recommend it. I would put in Class E airspace.
How can Class E at, say, Benalla, increase the number of ATC staff required? You would be lucky to get one IFR aircraft at Benalla in a day, so there would be no separation required. You may be amazed, but in Class E airspace the pilot remains on the Class E frequency until visual. This is because no one else can be in the cloud at the same time without a clearance. This maximises the use of radar.
Fortunately there are many more young Aussie controllers coming along with a broader view, and they are asking sensible questions, such as, “If other countries can provide a control service for IFR aircraft where they have radar, why can’t we in Australia?” The answer is that indeed we can, we just need to have open minds and be prepared to copy the success of others.
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Regarding the number of controllers, that piece of airspace is divided into two when necessary, ie, when traffic warrants. Where Benalla is located is in the HUM/OVN/DOK sectors. Those sectors provided arrivals/departures/sequencing for Melbourne, Canberra and Albury. They also look after the often busy Wagga Wagga. DOK sector has Mangalore in it, which is now becoming a very busy training establishment with many IFR movements per day. The following aerodromes are located in that airspace and have greater than or equal to the IFR traffic on Benalla, with published instrument approaches (off the top of my head):
Mangalore, Mansfield, Corryong, Albury, Shepparton, Benalla, Wangaratta, Corowa, Wagga Wagga, Tumut, Yarrawonga, Mount Hotham, Mount Beauty and Canberra (at night).
The range set on the screen to cover these sectors is around 400NM, which has to take in Canberra and Melbourne.
Given the staffing at the moment, they are often combined onto the one position which also takes the SNO/YAS/JVS sectors, with the following IFR capable aerodromes:
Latrobe Valley, West Sale, East Sale, Great Lakes, Bairnsdale, Orbost, Malacoota, Merimbula, Moruya, Nowra, Cooma, Polo Flat, Goulburn and Cootamundra.
The range they would be operating takes in Sydney to Melbourne. In addition to providing class A, C, E and G services, they separate crossing trans-Tasman traffic with north and southbound traffic to/from Tasmania, liaise with Esat Sale and Nowra for clearances in restricted areas, and are responsible for IFR movements below A090 into and out of Sydney to the south and east.
In all, there are about 100 separate instrument approaches in that airspace. That's a lot to keep tabs on, let alone monitor to (almost) the ground. Most of those aerodromes don't have radar coverage to the deck.
I think we would need more controllers.
Cheers,
NFR.
Mangalore, Mansfield, Corryong, Albury, Shepparton, Benalla, Wangaratta, Corowa, Wagga Wagga, Tumut, Yarrawonga, Mount Hotham, Mount Beauty and Canberra (at night).
The range set on the screen to cover these sectors is around 400NM, which has to take in Canberra and Melbourne.
Given the staffing at the moment, they are often combined onto the one position which also takes the SNO/YAS/JVS sectors, with the following IFR capable aerodromes:
Latrobe Valley, West Sale, East Sale, Great Lakes, Bairnsdale, Orbost, Malacoota, Merimbula, Moruya, Nowra, Cooma, Polo Flat, Goulburn and Cootamundra.
The range they would be operating takes in Sydney to Melbourne. In addition to providing class A, C, E and G services, they separate crossing trans-Tasman traffic with north and southbound traffic to/from Tasmania, liaise with Esat Sale and Nowra for clearances in restricted areas, and are responsible for IFR movements below A090 into and out of Sydney to the south and east.
In all, there are about 100 separate instrument approaches in that airspace. That's a lot to keep tabs on, let alone monitor to (almost) the ground. Most of those aerodromes don't have radar coverage to the deck.
I think we would need more controllers.
Cheers,
NFR.
I would like to get hold of a copy of John's statement. I personally know him. I know he would accurately report on all possibilities, However, I would want to read his words!
I am pretty sure John would state that for any failure, it would also produce a warning message. If it were possible to revert to DR there are warnings for this( prompt for GS and position). If the aerial failed, there is a specific warning for this, If RAIM was lost there is a specific warning for each mode.
If it were possible to revert to the DR DEMO mode, according to the POH all features are replicated except for APR mode to be armed. Going by this scenario you would have to have the aerial failure and loss of RAIM without getting a warning message at any time? On top of the non standard flight and non standard route request, That is a lot of holes to line up!
For the message light to fail? How many more fail modes are we going to add to get the scenario we want? The more failures, whilst possible, increase in improbability. The same scenario also works with the wrong approach selected with no warnings and no failures. It is also quite possible that the pilot may not have armed the GPS with this approach. It could have just as easily been input by the person sitting next to the pilot whilst under supervision. What if, what if, what if, Even for John, he would only put down what MIGHT have happened, what was possible. Nobody will ever know what did happen.
The one question that must be answered no matter what scenario is envisaged- Why did the pilot descend below the FAF height of 2295ft without the GPS arming APR 2nm before the FAF? No mode supports arming APR unless 2nm from FAF and RAIM availability. No Aerial No RAIM NO APR mode. If no warning device why did pilot descend below the FAF.
Dick, your accusations, whilst trying to absolve the pilot, creates more and more problems that still must be answered.
I am pretty sure John would state that for any failure, it would also produce a warning message. If it were possible to revert to DR there are warnings for this( prompt for GS and position). If the aerial failed, there is a specific warning for this, If RAIM was lost there is a specific warning for each mode.
If it were possible to revert to the DR DEMO mode, according to the POH all features are replicated except for APR mode to be armed. Going by this scenario you would have to have the aerial failure and loss of RAIM without getting a warning message at any time? On top of the non standard flight and non standard route request, That is a lot of holes to line up!
For the message light to fail? How many more fail modes are we going to add to get the scenario we want? The more failures, whilst possible, increase in improbability. The same scenario also works with the wrong approach selected with no warnings and no failures. It is also quite possible that the pilot may not have armed the GPS with this approach. It could have just as easily been input by the person sitting next to the pilot whilst under supervision. What if, what if, what if, Even for John, he would only put down what MIGHT have happened, what was possible. Nobody will ever know what did happen.
The one question that must be answered no matter what scenario is envisaged- Why did the pilot descend below the FAF height of 2295ft without the GPS arming APR 2nm before the FAF? No mode supports arming APR unless 2nm from FAF and RAIM availability. No Aerial No RAIM NO APR mode. If no warning device why did pilot descend below the FAF.
Dick, your accusations, whilst trying to absolve the pilot, creates more and more problems that still must be answered.
DICK,
I don't care what the airspace is designated ... G, K, T or Z .... if you want Controllers to control aircraft in it, then you need:
+ Controllers
+ Clear responsibilities
+ Appropriate Facilities
The facts are the facts ....
As an aside, if "...we are lucky to get one IFR into Benalla a day ... ", then by making it controlled airspace, are we really allocating the resources where they will do the most good ?
I don't care what the airspace is designated ... G, K, T or Z .... if you want Controllers to control aircraft in it, then you need:
+ Controllers
+ Clear responsibilities
+ Appropriate Facilities
The facts are the facts ....
As an aside, if "...we are lucky to get one IFR into Benalla a day ... ", then by making it controlled airspace, are we really allocating the resources where they will do the most good ?
Last edited by peuce; 14th Aug 2008 at 00:31.
Thread Starter
Ozbusdriver, in no way am I trying to absolve the pilot of anything. I’m simply stating that the ATSB got it wrong. That is, they stated clearly in their final report that the only way the GPS would fly on dead reckoning in that situation would be to enter the information manually. This is wrong.
In practice, the GPS will fly the route if it goes into dead reckoning for any reason – and in fact fly that exact route if the wind is in the right direction. No proper certified GPS should be able to do such a thing. The Trimble GPS should follow the flight manual details – i.e. require manual inputs.
Surely if a trained 747 pilot can take off at Tenerife without a clearance, any human being can do anything. We are not infallible.We can miss warning messages or they can fail.
Have a look on my website here. I have posted John Chew’s statement.
Peuce, I agree regarding controllers’ clear responsibilities and appropriate facilities – I always have. However you seem to have an incredible misunderstanding. You state:
Most certainly, because we may be able to stop a controlled flight into terrain accident. The last one killed 6 people there. You seem to think that IFR services are only related to collision protection between aircraft. In fact, there would be at least 5 times as many collisions with the ground compared to collisions between aircraft. If we can use air traffic control and radar to help prevent this, we should.
In practice, the GPS will fly the route if it goes into dead reckoning for any reason – and in fact fly that exact route if the wind is in the right direction. No proper certified GPS should be able to do such a thing. The Trimble GPS should follow the flight manual details – i.e. require manual inputs.
Surely if a trained 747 pilot can take off at Tenerife without a clearance, any human being can do anything. We are not infallible.We can miss warning messages or they can fail.
Have a look on my website here. I have posted John Chew’s statement.
Peuce, I agree regarding controllers’ clear responsibilities and appropriate facilities – I always have. However you seem to have an incredible misunderstanding. You state:
As an aside, if "...we are lucky to get one IFR into Benalla a day ... ", then by making it controlled airspace, are we really allocating the resources where they will do the most good ?
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My understanding, open to correction, is that radar does NOT go to ground level at BLA.
A TSO 146 NAV seems a more appropriate solution for aircraft in Class G?
In fact, there would be at least 5 times as many collisions with the ground compared to collisions between aircraft. If we can use air traffic control and radar to help prevent this, we should.
Dick,
If the UK controllers are 'controlling' aircraft in class g, then it is not class G, it is a heath-robinson construction.
The only way control is exerted is by issue of clearances. Acharacteristic of class G is that clearances are not issued.
Perhaps you meant to say something else, perhaps that controllers issued advisories or somesuch? In any case it is not standard ICAO, or, dare I say it, standard FAA.
If the UK controllers are 'controlling' aircraft in class g, then it is not class G, it is a heath-robinson construction.
The only way control is exerted is by issue of clearances. Acharacteristic of class G is that clearances are not issued.
Perhaps you meant to say something else, perhaps that controllers issued advisories or somesuch? In any case it is not standard ICAO, or, dare I say it, standard FAA.
Thread Starter
For over 15 years stubborn people have been claiming that because radar does not go to ground level everywhere, we cannot then use it anywhere in an enroute environment to reduce controlled flight into terrain accidents.
Nothing could be further from the truth. In the case of the Benalla accident, the aircraft was below the lowest safe altitude when 25 miles away from the aerodrome. If the MSAW alarm had been activated and the pilot was told, there is a good chance everyone would be alive today.
Others have constantly claimed that better equipment in the aircraft is “a more appropriate solution for aircraft in Class G” rather than understanding the obvious. That is, a good TSO 146 nav, plus the extra added protection of a radar MSAW will be even safer.
Around the world, pilots have had the best navigation equipment possible, but with one error of descending slightly early, everyone dies. Look at the Flight Safety International documentation of CFIT accidents. They make it quite clear that radar and air traffic control is one of the best mitigators.
Nothing could be further from the truth. In the case of the Benalla accident, the aircraft was below the lowest safe altitude when 25 miles away from the aerodrome. If the MSAW alarm had been activated and the pilot was told, there is a good chance everyone would be alive today.
Others have constantly claimed that better equipment in the aircraft is “a more appropriate solution for aircraft in Class G” rather than understanding the obvious. That is, a good TSO 146 nav, plus the extra added protection of a radar MSAW will be even safer.
Around the world, pilots have had the best navigation equipment possible, but with one error of descending slightly early, everyone dies. Look at the Flight Safety International documentation of CFIT accidents. They make it quite clear that radar and air traffic control is one of the best mitigators.
Thread Starter
40years, no I didn’t mean to say something else. As I said, in the UK there are large amounts of uncontrolled Class G airspace, where the controllers will actually “control” IFR aircraft.
My suggestion is that you ring the head of the Office of Airspace Regulation at CASA, Mr Peter Cromarty (on 02 6217 1408) and ask him. He will verify that even though it is not ICAO compliant, it is the British way of handling IFR aircraft in such airspace.
My suggestion is that you ring the head of the Office of Airspace Regulation at CASA, Mr Peter Cromarty (on 02 6217 1408) and ask him. He will verify that even though it is not ICAO compliant, it is the British way of handling IFR aircraft in such airspace.
Dick
I have followed the Benalla crash from day one with some interest, as it happened the day after I escaped from Tumut after being stuck there for 3 days in atrocious weather.
I cannot explain to myself how, or why it happened! Likewise I was surprised that ATC didn't say something because in my part of the world (NQ) they have on a number of occassions when I have done something they weren't expecting - like have an AP get a dose of the wanders.
None-the-less, are the circumstances of this accident now a little historical?
Those of us who fly in areas well away from radar coverage need to put systems in place to maximise our safety. My answer to that in my Bonanza is to have T129 G430 with terrain warning - which I have recently upgraded to TSO145/146a, which has the terrain warning incorporated anyway. In addition, I carry a Garmin 496 which also has terrain warning.
The cost of equiping an aircraft with these systems is relatively small when taken in the context of the cost of acquiring a suitable aircraft and operating in the IFR environment.
When the Benalla accident occurred, my Bonanza didn't have a TSO'd GPS - just a Garmin III Pilot on the dash, but it is now equipped as above.
As I have indicated in here previously I flew the LHR approach in IMC the day after the Metro accident, and if fact had a conversation with the rescue chopper that was hovering over the accident site at the time. At that time my 30 yr old Bonanza was fitted with the terrain warning system mod to its G430. Unfortunately the aircraft flying RPT was not so well equipped.
I think a bigger danger to my health these days is a mid-air collision - vividly illustrated to me recently.
I think the biggest enhancement of aviation safety in this country would be the availability of vertical navigation at remote locations - ie WAAS, and affordable enhanced traffic avoidance. I fitted a PCAS system to the Bo after my recent close call, but the jury is still out on how effective that is.
Dr
I have followed the Benalla crash from day one with some interest, as it happened the day after I escaped from Tumut after being stuck there for 3 days in atrocious weather.
I cannot explain to myself how, or why it happened! Likewise I was surprised that ATC didn't say something because in my part of the world (NQ) they have on a number of occassions when I have done something they weren't expecting - like have an AP get a dose of the wanders.
None-the-less, are the circumstances of this accident now a little historical?
Those of us who fly in areas well away from radar coverage need to put systems in place to maximise our safety. My answer to that in my Bonanza is to have T129 G430 with terrain warning - which I have recently upgraded to TSO145/146a, which has the terrain warning incorporated anyway. In addition, I carry a Garmin 496 which also has terrain warning.
The cost of equiping an aircraft with these systems is relatively small when taken in the context of the cost of acquiring a suitable aircraft and operating in the IFR environment.
When the Benalla accident occurred, my Bonanza didn't have a TSO'd GPS - just a Garmin III Pilot on the dash, but it is now equipped as above.
As I have indicated in here previously I flew the LHR approach in IMC the day after the Metro accident, and if fact had a conversation with the rescue chopper that was hovering over the accident site at the time. At that time my 30 yr old Bonanza was fitted with the terrain warning system mod to its G430. Unfortunately the aircraft flying RPT was not so well equipped.
I think a bigger danger to my health these days is a mid-air collision - vividly illustrated to me recently.
I think the biggest enhancement of aviation safety in this country would be the availability of vertical navigation at remote locations - ie WAAS, and affordable enhanced traffic avoidance. I fitted a PCAS system to the Bo after my recent close call, but the jury is still out on how effective that is.
Dr
Thread Starter
By the way, in the USA ATC's will separate IFR aircraft when in radar covered class G. It's only in Australia that ATC's are not allowed to do this and are specifically trained just to give a traffic information service.