Radar coverage at Avalon
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OK Dick
You have taken one part of my reply only the delay. I am happy to provide the service and agree that there would be few is any pilots that would intentionally mix in IMC.
However the real issue is AsA going to provide the equipment and staff, if so at what expense. Just as importantly where are they going to find the staff?
Now the affordable safety issue raises it head. Reading else where I see what you say about affordable safety and let me tell you this will cost the industry MORE. How much more I have no idea, however the real question must be is the industry prepared to pay???
So the way I see it is all that has to be done is find the staff, create the new sectors necessary for it to work effectively, convince AsA, CASA, and then the industry that this is what is needed.
Good luck
.
You have taken one part of my reply only the delay. I am happy to provide the service and agree that there would be few is any pilots that would intentionally mix in IMC.
However the real issue is AsA going to provide the equipment and staff, if so at what expense. Just as importantly where are they going to find the staff?
Now the affordable safety issue raises it head. Reading else where I see what you say about affordable safety and let me tell you this will cost the industry MORE. How much more I have no idea, however the real question must be is the industry prepared to pay???
So the way I see it is all that has to be done is find the staff, create the new sectors necessary for it to work effectively, convince AsA, CASA, and then the industry that this is what is needed.
Good luck
.
Thread Starter
I for one would be prepared to pay – especially when it is my family (including children and grandchildren) in the airliner. Perhaps I’m being selfish.
Others have said on this site that providing a Class E separation service is no more expensive than providing traffic information. Some have claimed it is even less expensive.
I don’t believe for a second that we should put Class E to ground level at every IFR approach in Australia. That would be a misallocation of resources. However at places like Proserpine, Port Macquarie or Ballina (which have a few mountains and hills around but have reasonable radar coverage) I would like to see the service.
I find that I receive a superb service out of Sydney and enroute, but when I really need it – that is, at the approach at an airport in mountainous areas – I am told, “Radar service terminated” and then I’m in ‘do it yourself’ airspace.
I have flown in many countries around the world and I haven’t seen our particular system used in any of these countries.
Others have said on this site that providing a Class E separation service is no more expensive than providing traffic information. Some have claimed it is even less expensive.
I don’t believe for a second that we should put Class E to ground level at every IFR approach in Australia. That would be a misallocation of resources. However at places like Proserpine, Port Macquarie or Ballina (which have a few mountains and hills around but have reasonable radar coverage) I would like to see the service.
I find that I receive a superb service out of Sydney and enroute, but when I really need it – that is, at the approach at an airport in mountainous areas – I am told, “Radar service terminated” and then I’m in ‘do it yourself’ airspace.
I have flown in many countries around the world and I haven’t seen our particular system used in any of these countries.
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...................Dick getting back to yr original Q. I have launched out of AV many times & have heard ATC mention to another A/C (perhaps inbound) that an A/C possibly XYZ appears to ge getting airborne at AV off rwy 18 for Eg.(that being me) & I have been at or about 200 ft AGL. Obviously I was Mode C compliant & not just a primary paint as you are enquiring about but it gives you an indication that ML radar have pretty good 'eye's down there at AV.
Would be nice also if MIA had radar coverage to near ground level where there are lots of diff operators slipping in & out with weather on or about the minima.
Capt Wally :-)
Would be nice also if MIA had radar coverage to near ground level where there are lots of diff operators slipping in & out with weather on or about the minima.
Capt Wally :-)
Thread Starter
Capt Wally, thanks for your advice. Yes, I did realise that the secondary surveillance radar coverage is very close to the ground. That is because the SSR radar is on a mountain top.
However I understand the primary radar is at Tullamarine Airport. Can anyone confirm this? I have recently been told that the primary radar coverage at Avalon can only be relied on at about 1,000 feet or higher. Can someone confirm this?
I also believe it is extraordinary that Airservices Australia and CASA can somehow claim that remote mounted radar units can replace local air traffic control. I always understood that historically most collisions around the world have taken place on the runway or close to the airport at less than 2,000 feet. You would think that this is where you would want air traffic controllers with good eyesight.
It is interesting that at a place like Sydney Airport we don’t just use the very good primary radar coverage at the airport. We actually have a tower – with people in that tower. Then again, maybe we could do away with that!
However I understand the primary radar is at Tullamarine Airport. Can anyone confirm this? I have recently been told that the primary radar coverage at Avalon can only be relied on at about 1,000 feet or higher. Can someone confirm this?
I also believe it is extraordinary that Airservices Australia and CASA can somehow claim that remote mounted radar units can replace local air traffic control. I always understood that historically most collisions around the world have taken place on the runway or close to the airport at less than 2,000 feet. You would think that this is where you would want air traffic controllers with good eyesight.
It is interesting that at a place like Sydney Airport we don’t just use the very good primary radar coverage at the airport. We actually have a tower – with people in that tower. Then again, maybe we could do away with that!
Thread Starter
Important, important, important
It is obvious if you look at the Civil Aviation Safety Authority’s website, under the Office of Airspace Regulation, that one of the reasons they are supporting the continued operation of Avalon Airport without manning the tower is that they believe there is radar coverage at low levels.
It is well known that there is no transponder requirement.
I am quickly starting to believe that there had never been a survey on what level the primary coverage reliably goes down to regarding a paint on a small aircraft. Can anyone enlighten us here?
Or is it true that the Office of Airspace Regulation has simply accepted what they have been told and have not asked for any supporting evidence regarding radar coverage?
I was once performing an instrument approach at Avalon and at 1,000 feet I nearly collided with a small aircraft. I asked the radar controller if this aircraft was shown on their screen and they said no.
Please don’t let this matter die. Does anyone have any evidence of the existence of a simple chart which shows the lowest level of the reliable primary radar coverage for small aircraft at the airport?
It is well known that there is no transponder requirement.
I am quickly starting to believe that there had never been a survey on what level the primary coverage reliably goes down to regarding a paint on a small aircraft. Can anyone enlighten us here?
Or is it true that the Office of Airspace Regulation has simply accepted what they have been told and have not asked for any supporting evidence regarding radar coverage?
I was once performing an instrument approach at Avalon and at 1,000 feet I nearly collided with a small aircraft. I asked the radar controller if this aircraft was shown on their screen and they said no.
Please don’t let this matter die. Does anyone have any evidence of the existence of a simple chart which shows the lowest level of the reliable primary radar coverage for small aircraft at the airport?
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Careful what you wish for...
Whilst I fully support the need for a TWR service at YMAV; playing their game about 'radar coverage' may force them into putting in a radar head near YMAV (cheaper than a TWR service) which solves your 'angle' but does not approach a TWR service.
My understanding is their is one primary radar source at Melbourne; currently located on Gellibrand (spelling?) Hill, to the right of the approach path to RWY27. It is about to be replaced by a new Primary and Mode S radar being installed (currently spinning) on the Melbourne aerodrome.
I would be surprised about lower than 1000ft "primary only" returns near YMAV; but does that really matter?
Should not the VFRs be self announcing on the CTAF(R)?
To me the question still remains about a true 'establishment and de-establishment criteria'. This should be a priority.
Using the process from the early 90's i.e. closing YSWG TWR or keeping YCFS (new code) open may be seriously flawed now that we have separated regulation/service provision. Is that sufficient in a more SMS aware world.
The trigger points contained in the draft part 71 only considered things in isolation, Pax numbers, total movements, RPT movements. Nothing about terrain, facilities, approach types (i.e. PILS/NDB/VOR training), airspace complexities etc.
Additionally there is no way to truly capture the above data, it relies on true statistics from the RPTs who oft want to avoid the service, and the aerodrome operator about the total movements; but do they really have the 'true' data? Then it is at least 18 months old by the time the triggers are realised, not exactly a modern/mature response to 'safety'.
Edited to add, The part 71 does not cater for seasonal events, but only annual data, so there could be a location that needs a TWR for 6-10 weeks but then doesn't etc; so does it get an unsafe period for a while or a TWR for 42-46 weeks when it doesn't need one; well on the part 71 draft it would be no service at all? Do TWRs get established or de-established in 2 year periods, is that practical? Does anything cater for amended RPT schedules?
What about places like YMAY, or YWLM; low cost carriers have made announcements recently about targeting them? Does the RAAF still close YWLM for most of January? Will facilities (such as decommissioned YMML radar heads) get a go at YMAY to fill in the radar gaps; especially with the increases in numbers (thinking Virgin E170s to YMAY).
My understanding is their is one primary radar source at Melbourne; currently located on Gellibrand (spelling?) Hill, to the right of the approach path to RWY27. It is about to be replaced by a new Primary and Mode S radar being installed (currently spinning) on the Melbourne aerodrome.
I would be surprised about lower than 1000ft "primary only" returns near YMAV; but does that really matter?
Should not the VFRs be self announcing on the CTAF(R)?
To me the question still remains about a true 'establishment and de-establishment criteria'. This should be a priority.
Using the process from the early 90's i.e. closing YSWG TWR or keeping YCFS (new code) open may be seriously flawed now that we have separated regulation/service provision. Is that sufficient in a more SMS aware world.
The trigger points contained in the draft part 71 only considered things in isolation, Pax numbers, total movements, RPT movements. Nothing about terrain, facilities, approach types (i.e. PILS/NDB/VOR training), airspace complexities etc.
Additionally there is no way to truly capture the above data, it relies on true statistics from the RPTs who oft want to avoid the service, and the aerodrome operator about the total movements; but do they really have the 'true' data? Then it is at least 18 months old by the time the triggers are realised, not exactly a modern/mature response to 'safety'.
Edited to add, The part 71 does not cater for seasonal events, but only annual data, so there could be a location that needs a TWR for 6-10 weeks but then doesn't etc; so does it get an unsafe period for a while or a TWR for 42-46 weeks when it doesn't need one; well on the part 71 draft it would be no service at all? Do TWRs get established or de-established in 2 year periods, is that practical? Does anything cater for amended RPT schedules?
What about places like YMAY, or YWLM; low cost carriers have made announcements recently about targeting them? Does the RAAF still close YWLM for most of January? Will facilities (such as decommissioned YMML radar heads) get a go at YMAY to fill in the radar gaps; especially with the increases in numbers (thinking Virgin E170s to YMAY).
Last edited by SM4 Pirate; 28th Nov 2007 at 22:12.
For what it's worth, my own experience of transiting YMAV was at about A2500 on a coastal round the Bay jaunt.
The zone was not active, but Jetstar was inbound and there was a call from Melbourne radar to "the VFR aircraft at 2500 near Avalon" from what I can remember.
I piped up and announced myself to the South, tracking to Clifton Springs and just over Point Henry or suchlike.
Mel Radar then came back asking for a range and bearing from YMAV, explaining that their radar display didn't "know" where Clifton Springs, Leopold, Point Henry, etc. actually "were". I suspect a Tower at YMAV would know these things.
Anyway I'm out of my depth in this discussion.
The zone was not active, but Jetstar was inbound and there was a call from Melbourne radar to "the VFR aircraft at 2500 near Avalon" from what I can remember.
I piped up and announced myself to the South, tracking to Clifton Springs and just over Point Henry or suchlike.
Mel Radar then came back asking for a range and bearing from YMAV, explaining that their radar display didn't "know" where Clifton Springs, Leopold, Point Henry, etc. actually "were". I suspect a Tower at YMAV would know these things.
Anyway I'm out of my depth in this discussion.
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Hey Dick does this sound familiar..............
Still at it hey !
Minister for Transport, John Anderson, did the right thing on 17 November 2004 when he finally cut Dick Smith loose from the airspace reform process saying:
Still at it hey !
Minister for Transport, John Anderson, did the right thing on 17 November 2004 when he finally cut Dick Smith loose from the airspace reform process saying:
“Australia’s skies are safe and will continue to be safe after 25 November, despite the comments today by Dick Smith [re the National Airspace System]…… Mr Smith’s claims are not supported by anyone with any credibility in the aviation sector……I have advised him that his role is at an end.”
Mel Radar then came back asking for a range and bearing from YMAV,
AV area is a good place to stay away from, presumably why the warning boxes and VFR route have been placed on the new VTC.
I'm in one of those moods
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… nice post Mr Pirate!
.
Part 71 is designed as a ‘trigger’ document. Its parameters are baseline thresholds for initiation of an aeronautical study! The aeronautical study then takes account of those very important other factors you rightly point out! … one could argue that not gazetting 71 (by the former Gov’t) provided an excuse for not expediting aero studies!
.
… that said, for some time now I have been researching the way in which the draft Part 71 triggers were set, and whilst not confirmed yet (so I will refrain from inference), I have concerns about the robustness of those trigger points!
.
…that aside, at the end of the day it is semantics. The point should always be that where ‘experience’ shows a concern, whether through incident/accident data or when in the view of individuals or groups who are highlighting concerns, those matters should be looked at in a very careful, transparent and timely fashion! ….. but are they?
.
…. The oversight role sits with CASA AND the ANSP’s, along with users of the system! …. Is the regulator equipped with the right personnel to do this? … is the regulator supporting its experts with an interference free platform from which to address any adverse observations? …. Is CASA talking with the ANSP/s? ….Is the ANSP ‘senior management’ listening to their frontline operators? …. Is CASA talking to the ANSP’s frontline operators? … In all of this, are issues being looked at properly and followed up with remedies?? …. One wonders how we arrived where we are if the regulator (+ regulation) and service provider were so equipped!!
.
… whether a volume meets part 71 (or the FAA formula) triggers or not, should not be the sole determinant on which aero study assessments should be undertaken! … however, as with most things in life, systems require baseline rules to ensure objectivity … without them …the results are clear!
.
… gazetting 71 would be a good first step! … also … ensuring the ANSP was not involved in the aerostudy process other than providing open access to input from frontline subject matter experts (as it is pointless asking non-op management) to ensure evidence based conclusions are accurate, and can be acted on promptly!
.
.. in the current climate, can you imagine reacting with anything other than fits of laughter to hear intimations from the regulator that “ASA is a mature organisation and can manage issues through their own processes” … WTF???
.
…. Little will change (before a serious incident or accident) until there is an acceptance by the Gov’t of the day, that they need to make critical decisions (no more obfuscation) and soon, to ensure the above can occur!
.
….. it is urgent, and must be done without delay lest ALL of the wheels fall off and the inevitable happens!
.
Sunfish
.
Spot on re the eye’s in a tower …. Class D IFR/VFR can be solved using sep standards (both procedural, visual and a mix) and studious use of ‘segregation’ .. which is all further enhanced by surveillance data being made available in the tower!
.
… I must ask;
.
1. How far below the cloud base (estimate) did this near collision (your words) occur?
2. Were you monitoring the CTAF, did you broadcast and did the VFR call?
3. How would the result have been different in class E (assuming all of the factors were EXACTLY the same)?
4. Did you have time to take avoiding action, or was this just a lucky miss?
.
.. much obliged!
.
Part 71 is designed as a ‘trigger’ document. Its parameters are baseline thresholds for initiation of an aeronautical study! The aeronautical study then takes account of those very important other factors you rightly point out! … one could argue that not gazetting 71 (by the former Gov’t) provided an excuse for not expediting aero studies!
.
… that said, for some time now I have been researching the way in which the draft Part 71 triggers were set, and whilst not confirmed yet (so I will refrain from inference), I have concerns about the robustness of those trigger points!
.
…that aside, at the end of the day it is semantics. The point should always be that where ‘experience’ shows a concern, whether through incident/accident data or when in the view of individuals or groups who are highlighting concerns, those matters should be looked at in a very careful, transparent and timely fashion! ….. but are they?
.
…. The oversight role sits with CASA AND the ANSP’s, along with users of the system! …. Is the regulator equipped with the right personnel to do this? … is the regulator supporting its experts with an interference free platform from which to address any adverse observations? …. Is CASA talking with the ANSP/s? ….Is the ANSP ‘senior management’ listening to their frontline operators? …. Is CASA talking to the ANSP’s frontline operators? … In all of this, are issues being looked at properly and followed up with remedies?? …. One wonders how we arrived where we are if the regulator (+ regulation) and service provider were so equipped!!
.
… whether a volume meets part 71 (or the FAA formula) triggers or not, should not be the sole determinant on which aero study assessments should be undertaken! … however, as with most things in life, systems require baseline rules to ensure objectivity … without them …the results are clear!
.
… gazetting 71 would be a good first step! … also … ensuring the ANSP was not involved in the aerostudy process other than providing open access to input from frontline subject matter experts (as it is pointless asking non-op management) to ensure evidence based conclusions are accurate, and can be acted on promptly!
.
.. in the current climate, can you imagine reacting with anything other than fits of laughter to hear intimations from the regulator that “ASA is a mature organisation and can manage issues through their own processes” … WTF???
.
…. Little will change (before a serious incident or accident) until there is an acceptance by the Gov’t of the day, that they need to make critical decisions (no more obfuscation) and soon, to ensure the above can occur!
.
….. it is urgent, and must be done without delay lest ALL of the wheels fall off and the inevitable happens!
.
Sunfish
.
Spot on re the eye’s in a tower …. Class D IFR/VFR can be solved using sep standards (both procedural, visual and a mix) and studious use of ‘segregation’ .. which is all further enhanced by surveillance data being made available in the tower!
.
I was once performing an instrument approach at Avalon and at 1,000 feet I nearly collided with a small aircraft. I asked the radar controller if this aircraft was shown on their screen and they said no.
.
1. How far below the cloud base (estimate) did this near collision (your words) occur?
2. Were you monitoring the CTAF, did you broadcast and did the VFR call?
3. How would the result have been different in class E (assuming all of the factors were EXACTLY the same)?
4. Did you have time to take avoiding action, or was this just a lucky miss?
.
.. much obliged!
Originally Posted by Dick Smith
However I understand the primary radar is at Tullamarine Airport. Can anyone confirm this? I have recently been told that the primary radar coverage at Avalon can only be relied on at about 1,000 feet or higher. Can someone confirm this?
The radar was relocated to the top of Mt Macedon some 5 years ago, and has excellent coverage; some 200nm, IIRC. I've often heard radar reports of aircraft at Avalon down in the circuit, and also have been reported as traffic to RPT's when transitting at 500 feet along the Princes Highway.
Off topic, my current nark at Avalon is the false ILS glidepath about 500 metres east of the true one
And the Victorian Government legislating to allow private airfield owners to charge for the use of airspace within Victoria
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Current radar coverage
SSR only - located Mount Macedon
SSR plus primary - located Gellibrand Hill (just east of ML as described earlier)
I work in this area but am not aware of whether the radar (currently rotating) on the airfield will replace Gellibrand Hill in the airfield location or if it is testing for redeployment. I must note that as currently sited this radar would have less coverage at AV than Gellibrand Hill.
Current coverage includes the gas pipeline survey aircraft which is at about 500 ft agl and goes from the NE corner of the AV zone to the SW passing about 2-3nm north of AV. This operator is primary only and occasionally fades but is fairly solid to a couple of miles SW of AV. I have passed traffic on it to JST as a possible train only to be advised it was actually an aircraft. Oh well!
I would estimate this as the lowest practical primary coverage in the area.
SSR plus primary - located Gellibrand Hill (just east of ML as described earlier)
I work in this area but am not aware of whether the radar (currently rotating) on the airfield will replace Gellibrand Hill in the airfield location or if it is testing for redeployment. I must note that as currently sited this radar would have less coverage at AV than Gellibrand Hill.
Current coverage includes the gas pipeline survey aircraft which is at about 500 ft agl and goes from the NE corner of the AV zone to the SW passing about 2-3nm north of AV. This operator is primary only and occasionally fades but is fairly solid to a couple of miles SW of AV. I have passed traffic on it to JST as a possible train only to be advised it was actually an aircraft. Oh well!
I would estimate this as the lowest practical primary coverage in the area.
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Transponder reqt in E Aiirspace
Late into this discussion, but I think you should check out the current CAO(s) regarding requirements for carriage of a serviceable and active transponder in E Airspace. I recall an amendment (within the last 2 years) allowing some sports aviation (or similar) aircraft to NOT carry transponders in (some?) E Airspace.
ID
ID
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Melbourne Radar
The 'new' radar at Melbourne Airport (on-airport) is a temporary (transportable) facility that will be commissioned to enable AirServices to turn-off, dismantle and replace/commission the Gellibrand Hill primary radar as part of the 'Australian Mode-S Terminal Approach Radar' (AM-STAR) project.
Therefore anticipate poorer radar coverage over Avalon during this period.
Therefore anticipate poorer radar coverage over Avalon during this period.
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Although initially I didn't agree with Dick that Avalon needed a tower, I have decided that a tower would ensure the highest level of safety. One day in winter last year, I had overflown Point Cook, then made a call advising that I would be overflying Avalon for the south at 2000 feet. The cloud base looked to be at about 2200 feet at the time. Another aircraft reported that they were about 10 miles west of Avalon at the time at 2500 feet and would be overflying also. I made an overhead call when I was overhead the aerodrome, and had still failed to sight this aircraft that I believed must be getting quite close. After my call, this other aircraft advised that it had sighted me and was manoeuvring to avoid me. It was now at my altitude and less than 10 seconds away from me.
Although Avalon is a CTAF(R), it is ineffective to an extent when people are not using their radios correctly. In this case, I expected that he may come down from his reported altitude because of the cloud, so I made sure that I didn't delay my overhead call for one second longer as I thought he may be very close to me. Despite maintaining a good lookout, I had been unable to sight him, and he was not at the altitude that he had advised. In my situation he was far enough away when he had sighted me to manoeuvre away from me before we got dangerously close to each other. However, those 10 seconds or less may become only 5 seconds with an A320 on approach, and you don't want to be taking these risks with nearly 200 people on board.
Most of the time the Avalon CTAF works fine, it is just on occasions like these when aircraft are not doing what they said they would be doing that problems arise. In the interests of safety, a tower is essential. Although this may make things a bit more difficult for VFR aircraft overflying, it is important that safety must come first, especially with so many lives at stake if something happened to go wrong.
Sorry for the slight thread drift by the way, I have no idea at what altitude the primary radar can detect aircraft!
Although Avalon is a CTAF(R), it is ineffective to an extent when people are not using their radios correctly. In this case, I expected that he may come down from his reported altitude because of the cloud, so I made sure that I didn't delay my overhead call for one second longer as I thought he may be very close to me. Despite maintaining a good lookout, I had been unable to sight him, and he was not at the altitude that he had advised. In my situation he was far enough away when he had sighted me to manoeuvre away from me before we got dangerously close to each other. However, those 10 seconds or less may become only 5 seconds with an A320 on approach, and you don't want to be taking these risks with nearly 200 people on board.
Most of the time the Avalon CTAF works fine, it is just on occasions like these when aircraft are not doing what they said they would be doing that problems arise. In the interests of safety, a tower is essential. Although this may make things a bit more difficult for VFR aircraft overflying, it is important that safety must come first, especially with so many lives at stake if something happened to go wrong.
Sorry for the slight thread drift by the way, I have no idea at what altitude the primary radar can detect aircraft!
Thread Starter
Torqueman, yes I am still “at it.”
You may have noticed the considerable support I have been given in relation to stopping Airservices from removing an independent VHF Flightwatch system without proper consultation and a proper safety study.
You will also be interested in knowing that for over 15 years I have been working on having the US style UNICOM to improve safety at non-tower airports, as well as Class E airspace to low levels to improve safety.
It looks as though both of these things are now happening. Yes, 15 years too late, but it shows that you can overcome resistance to change if you keep working on something and allow people to gradually come on board.
I have not noticed too many people pulling out the AFRU (“beep back”) units since my “role” has come to an end. You may not know that I built and designed the original “beep back” unit in my home workshop. I installed the first unit at Bundaberg after a horrific incident – where two commercial aircraft (including one airline aircraft) were in the same cloud at the same time, doing the same instrument approach, but on different frequencies because of the “calling in the blind” system.
There was a lot of resistance to the AFRU originally but now they are very widely supported. I believe the same will happen with UNICOMs and also with Class E airspace at lower levels.
You may have noticed the considerable support I have been given in relation to stopping Airservices from removing an independent VHF Flightwatch system without proper consultation and a proper safety study.
You will also be interested in knowing that for over 15 years I have been working on having the US style UNICOM to improve safety at non-tower airports, as well as Class E airspace to low levels to improve safety.
It looks as though both of these things are now happening. Yes, 15 years too late, but it shows that you can overcome resistance to change if you keep working on something and allow people to gradually come on board.
I have not noticed too many people pulling out the AFRU (“beep back”) units since my “role” has come to an end. You may not know that I built and designed the original “beep back” unit in my home workshop. I installed the first unit at Bundaberg after a horrific incident – where two commercial aircraft (including one airline aircraft) were in the same cloud at the same time, doing the same instrument approach, but on different frequencies because of the “calling in the blind” system.
There was a lot of resistance to the AFRU originally but now they are very widely supported. I believe the same will happen with UNICOMs and also with Class E airspace at lower levels.
Thread Starter
John Eacott, as pointed out by others I think you are referring to the secondary surveillance radar (SSR) coverage, which of course requires a transponder. I was asking about the primary radar coverage which gives a paint from the metal of an aircraft without any transponder.
At the present time there is no transponder requirement at Avalon Airport.
At the present time there is no transponder requirement at Avalon Airport.