Lockhart River Coroners Findings (Merged)
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This tragedy eclipsed Seaview, Monarch and Whyalla, but was simply better stage managed.
Pity they still have to learn how to protect the flying public.
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Not an excellent post at all Mainframe - absolutely outstanding and on the mark. 
Coming from Whyalla I travelled regularly on Whyalla Airlines, knew the operators family going back to the late 50's and knew some of the families of the deceased. What I find galling is I went to a companies CEO, ATSB and CASA with concerns as to how business was done in a certain company and was anyone interested? Hello!!! All the failings found in the Lockhart case were exactly the failings I brought up, indeed, it could be said with some measure of truth that Transair was the more professional of the two. The professionals within CASA and the ATSB must cry in their beers at night, certainly Don Anderson must surely be rolling in his grave. Sadly we can already write the script for the next accident - take the Lockhart report and just change the names. I wonder who will be next to lose in this game of Russian Roulette - you or me?
Coming from Whyalla I travelled regularly on Whyalla Airlines, knew the operators family going back to the late 50's and knew some of the families of the deceased. What I find galling is I went to a companies CEO, ATSB and CASA with concerns as to how business was done in a certain company and was anyone interested? Hello!!! All the failings found in the Lockhart case were exactly the failings I brought up, indeed, it could be said with some measure of truth that Transair was the more professional of the two. The professionals within CASA and the ATSB must cry in their beers at night, certainly Don Anderson must surely be rolling in his grave. Sadly we can already write the script for the next accident - take the Lockhart report and just change the names. I wonder who will be next to lose in this game of Russian Roulette - you or me?
"...certainly Don Anderson must surely be rolling in his grave.."
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Hey Brian - did Whyalla Airlines ever get anything by way of compensation from Lycoming? I know the passenger's relatives got an "out of court" settlement. But I'd heard that Whyalla got something back for the aircraft, and was wondering if they got anything for the loss of their business?
Di
Di
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CASA's response
Di, and Brian Abraham.
It seems we are among those who can't see the King's new clothes.
I did not wish to continue on this thread through sheer disgust,
but today's response by BB fails to address my question,
WHAT CREATED THE CULTURE THAT IT WAS OK NOT TO COMPLY?
BB, a lot of people, in and out of CASA, knew that a special relationship may have been in place between the regulator and the operator.
We know the name, you know the name, and he has conveniently retired.
A Royal Commission, or a Judicial Inquiry, may just find the evidence needed.
One does not need to be a Rhodes Scholar to deduce that knowledge of a lenient surveillance regime,
and not the dreaded "FULSOME AUDIT" as reported in Hansard, can lead to substandard operating practices.
In simple terms, if your mate is the policeman with the radar gun,
do you really need to worry about exceeding the speed limit in your mate's jurisdiction?
For those who haven't seen today's response, here it is.
August 2007
From CEO Bruce Byron
CASA is carefully studying the Queensland Coroner's report into the May 2005 Lockhart River accident. In a 54 page report Coroner Michael Barnes concludes that primary responsibility for the Metroliner accident in Far North Queensland must rest with the Captain of the aircraft. The report says:
"He knew that the approach he was planning to undertake into Lockhart River on 7 May was inconsistent with official regulations and Transair's policies. He must have also known that his departure from it was fraught with risk."
In examining the question of why the aircraft departed from standard published approach procedures, the Coroner states:
"It seems likely that when descending below the minimum safe altitude of 2060 feet, Mr Hotchin was relying upon a perception of terrain visibility that he hoped would continue and improve as he got lower. Further, it seems he formed the equally false perception that he was closer to Lockhart River in the approach that he was attempting than he actually was. It is impossible for me to accept that Captain Hotchin would have flown at the vertical speed he did with the nose pitched down as steeply as it was had he not seen the ground at some point. The force with which the plane crashed into the mountain indicates he lost visual contact before impact. The most likely explanation for his continuing with this flight path after losing sight of the ground is the attitude...of having made a decision, pressing on regardless."
The views expressed by the Coroner mirror the conclusions I came to when I studied the first Lockhart River accident factual report, which was released in late 2005. This report contained information from the flight data recorder and after some careful analysis over several days it led me to believe that the aircraft was being flown with a deliberate high rate of descent, with the aim of gaining or maintaining visual contact with the ground. I know this same view is held by a range of industry people with extensive experience and expertise. I believe that to aviation people with a background in training and checking in this class of aircraft this is a logical conclusion. Of course, no-one can prove this conclusion as the information from the cockpit voice recorder was not available - but there is a high probability it is the correct scenario.
Having decided this scenario was the likely explanation behind the accident, I was confident stating earlier this year that it was not possible to make a direct link between the actions of CASA and the failures that took place on the flight deck of the Metroliner. While there have been various attempts to make a direct connection between CASA and the mistakes made by the crew, the Coroner's report does not support them. The Coroner says CASA should not be blamed for the crash. The report states:
"There is no compelling evidence that if it (CASA) had scrupulously followed all of its procedures and processes, the deficiencies that led to the crash would have been obviated, although it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the risk may have been reduced. I find that CASA could have done more to insist that Transair improved certain aspects of its operations but I do not believe that the evidence supports a finding that they could reasonably have stopped it from operating or prevented the crash."
I agree with the Coroner's key message - that CASA could not have prevented the accident but never-the-less must always be committed to supporting the aviation industry's safe operations. CASA has a duty to make sure everything possible is done to influence, assist and direct the aviation industry to deliver the best safety outcomes. The Coroner quite rightly pointed to shortcomings in the way CASA operated in the past and has recommended changes in a number of areas. I do not shy away from accepting that in the past CASA should have been doing a better job in areas such as industry oversight. That is why I have been leading a change program across CASA for the last three years, which is putting more inspectors on the tarmac and increasing surveillance of passenger carrying operations and using risk analysis to drive activities.
I have directed that the Coroner's recommendations be assessed and implemented as soon as possible, recognising that some of these improvements are already underway. The recommendations included expediting the introduction of mandatory crew resource management training, consideration of firm guidelines for CASA staff who approve appointments of key personnel in aviation organisations such as chief pilot and reconsideration of measures to ensure the efficiency of training and checking in air transport operations. CASA will also co-operate fully with the implementation of the Coroner's fourth recommendation, which calls for the Federal Transport Minister to appoint an external consultant to examine the relationship between CASA and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau. The Minister, Mark Vaile, has announced he will adopt this recommendation.
For people in the aviation industry I believe it is very important to take careful note of the findings of the Lockhart River accident Coronial report. There are stark lessons for pilots and indeed anyone in a position of responsibility in the industry. These lessons are best summed up by this statement in the report:
"...had the pilots adhered to the accepted aviation procedures and well published guidelines, the crash would not have occurred."
WHY DID THEY BELIEVE IT WAS OK NOT TO COMPLY??
A mate had the radar gun?
It seems we are among those who can't see the King's new clothes.
I did not wish to continue on this thread through sheer disgust,
but today's response by BB fails to address my question,
WHAT CREATED THE CULTURE THAT IT WAS OK NOT TO COMPLY?
BB, a lot of people, in and out of CASA, knew that a special relationship may have been in place between the regulator and the operator.
We know the name, you know the name, and he has conveniently retired.
A Royal Commission, or a Judicial Inquiry, may just find the evidence needed.
One does not need to be a Rhodes Scholar to deduce that knowledge of a lenient surveillance regime,
and not the dreaded "FULSOME AUDIT" as reported in Hansard, can lead to substandard operating practices.
In simple terms, if your mate is the policeman with the radar gun,
do you really need to worry about exceeding the speed limit in your mate's jurisdiction?
For those who haven't seen today's response, here it is.
August 2007
From CEO Bruce Byron
CASA is carefully studying the Queensland Coroner's report into the May 2005 Lockhart River accident. In a 54 page report Coroner Michael Barnes concludes that primary responsibility for the Metroliner accident in Far North Queensland must rest with the Captain of the aircraft. The report says:
"He knew that the approach he was planning to undertake into Lockhart River on 7 May was inconsistent with official regulations and Transair's policies. He must have also known that his departure from it was fraught with risk."
In examining the question of why the aircraft departed from standard published approach procedures, the Coroner states:
"It seems likely that when descending below the minimum safe altitude of 2060 feet, Mr Hotchin was relying upon a perception of terrain visibility that he hoped would continue and improve as he got lower. Further, it seems he formed the equally false perception that he was closer to Lockhart River in the approach that he was attempting than he actually was. It is impossible for me to accept that Captain Hotchin would have flown at the vertical speed he did with the nose pitched down as steeply as it was had he not seen the ground at some point. The force with which the plane crashed into the mountain indicates he lost visual contact before impact. The most likely explanation for his continuing with this flight path after losing sight of the ground is the attitude...of having made a decision, pressing on regardless."
The views expressed by the Coroner mirror the conclusions I came to when I studied the first Lockhart River accident factual report, which was released in late 2005. This report contained information from the flight data recorder and after some careful analysis over several days it led me to believe that the aircraft was being flown with a deliberate high rate of descent, with the aim of gaining or maintaining visual contact with the ground. I know this same view is held by a range of industry people with extensive experience and expertise. I believe that to aviation people with a background in training and checking in this class of aircraft this is a logical conclusion. Of course, no-one can prove this conclusion as the information from the cockpit voice recorder was not available - but there is a high probability it is the correct scenario.
Having decided this scenario was the likely explanation behind the accident, I was confident stating earlier this year that it was not possible to make a direct link between the actions of CASA and the failures that took place on the flight deck of the Metroliner. While there have been various attempts to make a direct connection between CASA and the mistakes made by the crew, the Coroner's report does not support them. The Coroner says CASA should not be blamed for the crash. The report states:
"There is no compelling evidence that if it (CASA) had scrupulously followed all of its procedures and processes, the deficiencies that led to the crash would have been obviated, although it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the risk may have been reduced. I find that CASA could have done more to insist that Transair improved certain aspects of its operations but I do not believe that the evidence supports a finding that they could reasonably have stopped it from operating or prevented the crash."
I agree with the Coroner's key message - that CASA could not have prevented the accident but never-the-less must always be committed to supporting the aviation industry's safe operations. CASA has a duty to make sure everything possible is done to influence, assist and direct the aviation industry to deliver the best safety outcomes. The Coroner quite rightly pointed to shortcomings in the way CASA operated in the past and has recommended changes in a number of areas. I do not shy away from accepting that in the past CASA should have been doing a better job in areas such as industry oversight. That is why I have been leading a change program across CASA for the last three years, which is putting more inspectors on the tarmac and increasing surveillance of passenger carrying operations and using risk analysis to drive activities.
I have directed that the Coroner's recommendations be assessed and implemented as soon as possible, recognising that some of these improvements are already underway. The recommendations included expediting the introduction of mandatory crew resource management training, consideration of firm guidelines for CASA staff who approve appointments of key personnel in aviation organisations such as chief pilot and reconsideration of measures to ensure the efficiency of training and checking in air transport operations. CASA will also co-operate fully with the implementation of the Coroner's fourth recommendation, which calls for the Federal Transport Minister to appoint an external consultant to examine the relationship between CASA and the Australian Transport Safety Bureau. The Minister, Mark Vaile, has announced he will adopt this recommendation.
For people in the aviation industry I believe it is very important to take careful note of the findings of the Lockhart River accident Coronial report. There are stark lessons for pilots and indeed anyone in a position of responsibility in the industry. These lessons are best summed up by this statement in the report:
"...had the pilots adhered to the accepted aviation procedures and well published guidelines, the crash would not have occurred."
WHY DID THEY BELIEVE IT WAS OK NOT TO COMPLY??
A mate had the radar gun?
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Mainframe I understand you wanting to cease the dialogue, but I see you can't so easily. Its as you say a disgusting whitewash.
You keep asking WHY DID THEY BELIEVE IT WAS OK NOT TO COMPLY?? is this a rhetorical question? I think we all know the answer, because once some lazy or slack or cowboy attitudes and behaviours start, they then become practised a bit, and then become normal, and then become an unofficial SOP!
Why did it ge that far?........your mate has the radar gun! You have hit the nail on the head.
Why is it in aviation and many other professions that the whistle blower is often haunted out of the industry or worse, and nothing is done about stopping Cowboys. I watched Australian Story this week and it was about a Dr McLaren in Canberra hospital, and the had Neurosurgeon who was plainly incapable of performing at the level required. Nothing was done for years and years although everybody knew and would talk about it amongst themselves. Dr McLaren blew the whistle and he became the one who suffered.
Seems that same practice is very healthy in GA and maybe a little in the airlines although SIM checks etc help correct any issues before they become serious.
BB says he is aware of the need for change and has been embarking on it, but I wonder when I hear of CASA trying to prosecute a private guy for missing an inspection date for an AD by a couple of days and flying the plane (job was done a few days later no defects) when surely they are meant to be focussing on the commercial and RPT issues. Sure write a letter saying you are a naughty boy etc, wrap over the knuckles but why waste the resources on such a thing when there are bigger more important things to do. Yes this was in NQ.
Mainframe, do you think the Leopard has not changed its spots yet?
J
You keep asking WHY DID THEY BELIEVE IT WAS OK NOT TO COMPLY?? is this a rhetorical question? I think we all know the answer, because once some lazy or slack or cowboy attitudes and behaviours start, they then become practised a bit, and then become normal, and then become an unofficial SOP!
Why did it ge that far?........your mate has the radar gun! You have hit the nail on the head.
Why is it in aviation and many other professions that the whistle blower is often haunted out of the industry or worse, and nothing is done about stopping Cowboys. I watched Australian Story this week and it was about a Dr McLaren in Canberra hospital, and the had Neurosurgeon who was plainly incapable of performing at the level required. Nothing was done for years and years although everybody knew and would talk about it amongst themselves. Dr McLaren blew the whistle and he became the one who suffered.
Seems that same practice is very healthy in GA and maybe a little in the airlines although SIM checks etc help correct any issues before they become serious.
BB says he is aware of the need for change and has been embarking on it, but I wonder when I hear of CASA trying to prosecute a private guy for missing an inspection date for an AD by a couple of days and flying the plane (job was done a few days later no defects) when surely they are meant to be focussing on the commercial and RPT issues. Sure write a letter saying you are a naughty boy etc, wrap over the knuckles but why waste the resources on such a thing when there are bigger more important things to do. Yes this was in NQ.
Mainframe, do you think the Leopard has not changed its spots yet?
J
Grandpa Aerotart
Further, it seems he formed the equally false perception that he was closer to Lockhart River in the approach that he was attempting than he actually was.
Check Attitude
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LHR
Jabawocky
Some replies:
Yes, it is a rhetorical question, and one that should have been asked at the inquest as part of the "WHY" (1 of Coroner's 5 thingies).
Yes, the Leopard is changing its spots, BB inherited the problems and the culture,
and he is committed to rectifying them all.
He has quite correctly stated that he is actually doing that.
I am confident that he will instill some integrity back into the culture, but until some accountability is also included, it will be just window dressing.
CASA itself did not contribute to the tragedy, but perhaps someone formerly employed by CASA may have.
as for your comments on NQAO, there are some slow learners still there.
Keep watching NQ office, the culture change is not yet complete, but eventually will be.
Some of the changes are already obvious but there is still resistance to change and that too will be resolved.
Yes, I am disgusted at what used to happen, and what has happened,
but I am willing to concede that although BB cant accept responsibility for the past,
he can and will accept responsibility for fixing it and keeping it fixed.
Change will be complete when we see criminal charges handed out instead of backdoor exits with golden Handshakes for the miscreants.
Some replies:
Yes, it is a rhetorical question, and one that should have been asked at the inquest as part of the "WHY" (1 of Coroner's 5 thingies).
Yes, the Leopard is changing its spots, BB inherited the problems and the culture,
and he is committed to rectifying them all.
He has quite correctly stated that he is actually doing that.
I am confident that he will instill some integrity back into the culture, but until some accountability is also included, it will be just window dressing.
CASA itself did not contribute to the tragedy, but perhaps someone formerly employed by CASA may have.
as for your comments on NQAO, there are some slow learners still there.
Keep watching NQ office, the culture change is not yet complete, but eventually will be.
Some of the changes are already obvious but there is still resistance to change and that too will be resolved.
Yes, I am disgusted at what used to happen, and what has happened,
but I am willing to concede that although BB cant accept responsibility for the past,
he can and will accept responsibility for fixing it and keeping it fixed.
Change will be complete when we see criminal charges handed out instead of backdoor exits with golden Handshakes for the miscreants.
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WHY DID THEY BELIEVE IT WAS OK NOT TO COMPLY
The operator I referred to earlier effectively took no notice of what was written in AIP, CAO, CAR, or anything else. Operations were conducted IMC below LSALT (supposed to be VFR), made up instrument approaches because you didn’t have the fuel to fly a legal approach (you’re VFR remember), no alternates provided for although ALL operations required one, TAFs and Area reports not deemed by the organisation to be necessary although AIP required same. I could go on but you get the salient drift. I was seduced I must admit by the operating ethos that “this is how we do things around here”, as were all employees, although everyone, almost to a fault, said on joining “what the hell is going on here”. I woke up, figuratively speaking, when the operator had a non aviation accident in which two people were killed, quite a few badly injured, and the non availability of a states resource for a fortnight, putting a great many people out of work and businesses incurring financial loss. They attempted to lay all the blame at the feet of the lowest guy on the totem pole, but a Royal Commission found otherwise. A book authored by Andrew Hopkins summed it up
“the accident was quite preventable. It was caused by a series of organisational failures; the failure to respond to clear warning signs, communication problems, lack of attention to major hazards, superficial auditing and a failure to learn from previous experience.”
All those points could have also been written about the aviation operations. This a company with extremely deep pockets and not a GA operator trying to eke out an existance. In attempting change I was of course cast in the role of “bad boy”. The operator was of the opinion that because they had never suffered an accident in 30 years of its aviation operation, and having received industry awards for their safety record, everything must be OK. Mind you, there had been quite a number of close, and I mean BLOODY CLOSE calls in that time. How about a CFIT miss by 35 to 40 feet. Operating IMC when supposed to be VFR will do that. You won’t find any reports on those sort of events of course, because unless you were involved, or good friends with the person involved, you wouldn’t find out. Only things that ever got reported were mechanical failures, chip lights, engine failures etc etc.
Having gone to the ATSB and CASA the best answer (verbal - nothing in print) I got, unless I misunderstood the answer, was "because its a private operation and doesn't have an AOC we can't do anything." Go figure.
Di - To answer your question, I know not I'm afraid.
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Ref.Torres post
Some of us do.
It was a far better organisation than what it is today.
Integrity & competence are the key phrases, we hope that common sense returns to our industry.
Are the basic standards today, any better than 40 years ago & if not then why not.
It was a far better organisation than what it is today.
Integrity & competence are the key phrases, we hope that common sense returns to our industry.
Are the basic standards today, any better than 40 years ago & if not then why not.
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Chimbu says "Yeah...because the design of the approach makes it inevitable"
It looks like you have been beating your head against the wall too often Chimbu, or are you always beating something else.
If you go way below the minimum altitude on ANY published approach the inevitable will happen.
I think it's called CFIT.
Airservices are advertising for procedure designers, why don't you apply and solve all the problems in aviation.
It looks like you have been beating your head against the wall too often Chimbu, or are you always beating something else.
If you go way below the minimum altitude on ANY published approach the inevitable will happen.
I think it's called CFIT.
Airservices are advertising for procedure designers, why don't you apply and solve all the problems in aviation.
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From BB:
Well I guess that says it all. This tells me there are more than likely operators out there who are operating in the same manner - likely to have major accidents in the future - and CASA believes there is nothing they can do about it.
Disgracefull.
Di
CASA could not have prevented the accident
Well I guess that says it all. This tells me there are more than likely operators out there who are operating in the same manner - likely to have major accidents in the future - and CASA believes there is nothing they can do about it.
Disgracefull.
Di
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ROARING RIMAU - I'm afraid I have to agree with Chimbus observation, as do many others. Read the Lockhart River thread in its entirety and you will find much discussion on GPS approach design.
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...Lockhart+River
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthr...Lockhart+River
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Chuck. If the design of the approach makes a false perception inevitable, why is it that only one aircraft, over a long period of time, ended up with CFIT?
No doubt that approach has been flown hundreds of times by many aircraft and pilots; only one accident?
I don’t think there is any dispute the design of the approach could be significantly improved, however it was not fundamentally flawed and if the Transair Metro pilot had flown the approach in accordance with the existing approach parameters, the outcome would have been very different.
The primary question must remain in the operator’s culture which permitted the event to occur and why that culture was not detected by CASA over a prolonged series of rigorous audits?
No doubt that approach has been flown hundreds of times by many aircraft and pilots; only one accident?
I don’t think there is any dispute the design of the approach could be significantly improved, however it was not fundamentally flawed and if the Transair Metro pilot had flown the approach in accordance with the existing approach parameters, the outcome would have been very different.
The primary question must remain in the operator’s culture which permitted the event to occur and why that culture was not detected by CASA over a prolonged series of rigorous audits?
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Air Ace,
Yea - I think you might have a point. Generally speaking "inevitable" is probably a bit strong a term in most cases. Perhaps "more likely" would be better.
However with all the other factors which came into the equation in this accident, "inevitable" could well be closer to the mark. The approach design issues might have been the final hole to line up in the Swiss Cheese!
Di
Yea - I think you might have a point. Generally speaking "inevitable" is probably a bit strong a term in most cases. Perhaps "more likely" would be better.
However with all the other factors which came into the equation in this accident, "inevitable" could well be closer to the mark. The approach design issues might have been the final hole to line up in the Swiss Cheese!
Di
Grandpa Aerotart
Inevitable simply means something WILL happen sooner or later...and it did.
Inevitable does not mean something will happen regularly or sooner rather than later...and guess what? If the INCREDIBLY fecking stupid, idiotic, negligent, dangerous GPSNPA approach design is not addressed sooner rather than later it is INEVITABLE that a similar accident will happen again.
Scenario 1.
A cowboy metro captain flies an approach at speeds and rates of descent that are off scale for ANY IAL procedure.
Scenario 2.
An relatvely experienced captain flying a VERY poorly designed approach is 'helped' by a well intentioned but non qualified copilot and becomes convinced that he is on the final 5nm approach segment to the MAP, rather than the preceeding 5nm segment to the Foxtrot waypoint, and therefore high..he increases RoD to salvage the approach and crashes into terrain.
If you were the regulatory authority that approved the GPSNPA design (let alone completely confusing waypoint naming protocol) and promulgation what scenario would you prefer was in the public domain?
Roaring Rimau, can I make my position any more clear for thickheads like you?
Inevitable does not mean something will happen regularly or sooner rather than later...and guess what? If the INCREDIBLY fecking stupid, idiotic, negligent, dangerous GPSNPA approach design is not addressed sooner rather than later it is INEVITABLE that a similar accident will happen again.
Scenario 1.
A cowboy metro captain flies an approach at speeds and rates of descent that are off scale for ANY IAL procedure.
Scenario 2.
An relatvely experienced captain flying a VERY poorly designed approach is 'helped' by a well intentioned but non qualified copilot and becomes convinced that he is on the final 5nm approach segment to the MAP, rather than the preceeding 5nm segment to the Foxtrot waypoint, and therefore high..he increases RoD to salvage the approach and crashes into terrain.
If you were the regulatory authority that approved the GPSNPA design (let alone completely confusing waypoint naming protocol) and promulgation what scenario would you prefer was in the public domain?
Roaring Rimau, can I make my position any more clear for thickheads like you?
Last edited by Chimbu chuckles; 30th Aug 2007 at 10:41.
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CC
from a thickheads perspective, I fly VFR (so no formal training yet I can work it out)....I studied the approach plate and others back when the prnag happened....I came quickly to the conclusion CC came to and many many others, even investigators have. The "distance to" is the issue.
It is easy to get confused with the segments when a lot is happening in a dynamic situation, and you might only mess it once in a thousand, and even then you may get lucky......but you might not. I think Di sums it up.
So to ROARING RIMAU have a read back thru two years of thread....and tell me and others we do not have a point. Its a significant factor, along with a few others. This guy clearly flew HOT and took short cuts etc, so maybe this day he was a bit too slick and also got his segments wrong.....swiss cheese!
J
from a thickheads perspective, I fly VFR (so no formal training yet I can work it out)....I studied the approach plate and others back when the prnag happened....I came quickly to the conclusion CC came to and many many others, even investigators have. The "distance to" is the issue.
It is easy to get confused with the segments when a lot is happening in a dynamic situation, and you might only mess it once in a thousand, and even then you may get lucky......but you might not. I think Di sums it up.
So to ROARING RIMAU have a read back thru two years of thread....and tell me and others we do not have a point. Its a significant factor, along with a few others. This guy clearly flew HOT and took short cuts etc, so maybe this day he was a bit too slick and also got his segments wrong.....swiss cheese!
J
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CC - Wait a sec
Re: Scenario Two - for this op., 2 pilots were required and both were required to be qualified on the procedure to be used. Co-pilot wasn't qualified , thus shouldn't have flown the GNSS approach in any case. Also, annunciator should show APP mode at/just before FAF - if you're not seeing that, you're either not in the place you think you are or the GPS thingy (or the space segment thingies) have chucked a wobbly and you shouldn't descend further in any case - another back up. If wx too bad for NDB APPCH and GNSS not possible due above limitations, then divert if fuel not critical....is that hard?
Should the design be made simpler so that rulebreakers can "get away" with it? Dunno.
As Ace said, there's thousands of these approaches flown, and if you do them often, you get quite familiar with them, including the waypoint naming (which i think is better than the random US/FAA naming of GPS waypoints). PIC's have fecked up ILS, LLZ/DME, VOR/DME APPCH, GPS Arrivals and visual arrivals, too....does that prove those accidents were inevitable due to design of the procedure?
Re: Scenario Two - for this op., 2 pilots were required and both were required to be qualified on the procedure to be used. Co-pilot wasn't qualified , thus shouldn't have flown the GNSS approach in any case. Also, annunciator should show APP mode at/just before FAF - if you're not seeing that, you're either not in the place you think you are or the GPS thingy (or the space segment thingies) have chucked a wobbly and you shouldn't descend further in any case - another back up. If wx too bad for NDB APPCH and GNSS not possible due above limitations, then divert if fuel not critical....is that hard?
Should the design be made simpler so that rulebreakers can "get away" with it? Dunno.
As Ace said, there's thousands of these approaches flown, and if you do them often, you get quite familiar with them, including the waypoint naming (which i think is better than the random US/FAA naming of GPS waypoints). PIC's have fecked up ILS, LLZ/DME, VOR/DME APPCH, GPS Arrivals and visual arrivals, too....does that prove those accidents were inevitable due to design of the procedure?
Join Date: May 2007
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What is the POOR PART OF THE DESIGN of the Lockhart GNSS approach that is not part of the internationally accredited DESIGN CRITERIA?
Just because you don't like them doesn't mean they are unsafe.
I bet your passengers are glad that you don't fly GNSS approaches, because clearly it is inevitable that you will have a CFIT flying one to your own rules.
If you get your landings wrong the instructor doesn't sign you off for solo.
If you fail your GNSS rating/renewal, the ATO doesn't sign you off.
If you don't fly the procedure as published, you kill all of your passengers and yourself.
The main issue with the approach was the way that JEPPESEN doesn't depict the initial segment that can cause confusion to undisciplined or untrained crews.
AsA DAP depicts the entire approach.
Just because you don't like them doesn't mean they are unsafe.
I bet your passengers are glad that you don't fly GNSS approaches, because clearly it is inevitable that you will have a CFIT flying one to your own rules.
If you get your landings wrong the instructor doesn't sign you off for solo.
If you fail your GNSS rating/renewal, the ATO doesn't sign you off.
If you don't fly the procedure as published, you kill all of your passengers and yourself.
The main issue with the approach was the way that JEPPESEN doesn't depict the initial segment that can cause confusion to undisciplined or untrained crews.
AsA DAP depicts the entire approach.
Join Date: Jul 2007
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Hey RR
I bet CC will be along soon to set the record straight
. I might fetch a beer and a snack, this could get entertaining!
and
Reckon we all agree with you on that!
J
I bet your passengers are glad that you don't fly GNSS approaches, because clearly it is inevitable that you will have a CFIT flying one to your own rules.
. I might fetch a beer and a snack, this could get entertaining!and
If you get your landings wrong the instructor doesn't sign you off for solo.
If you fail your GNSS rating/renewal, the ATO doesn't sign you off.
If you don't fly the procedure as published, you kill all of your passengers and yourself.
If you fail your GNSS rating/renewal, the ATO doesn't sign you off.
If you don't fly the procedure as published, you kill all of your passengers and yourself.
J