The West: Plane Safe After Engine Trouble
Richo,
Interesting quote from ANSETT.
A rival organisation put it somewhat differently, and instructed Captains to NOT consider anything but the first item on the ANSETT list --- ie; commercial convenience would not figure in the Captain's decision making --- and believe me, this operator meant it --- not just pious words in a manual.
This is one of the (few) CAO's which counts me as an enthusiastic supporter, and I have had a few engine inops. over the years.
I wouldn't be too quick to quote Bader, great wartime pilot, but the priorities of civil aviation are just a little different, he never really adapted, even though he worked for the Shell aviation unit for some years after WW11.
Tootle pip !!
Interesting quote from ANSETT.
A rival organisation put it somewhat differently, and instructed Captains to NOT consider anything but the first item on the ANSETT list --- ie; commercial convenience would not figure in the Captain's decision making --- and believe me, this operator meant it --- not just pious words in a manual.
This is one of the (few) CAO's which counts me as an enthusiastic supporter, and I have had a few engine inops. over the years.
I wouldn't be too quick to quote Bader, great wartime pilot, but the priorities of civil aviation are just a little different, he never really adapted, even though he worked for the Shell aviation unit for some years after WW11.
Tootle pip !!
Join Date: Nov 2005
Location: waiting for that blo&dy plane!!
Posts: 16
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
All the comments Re: "green" crew... FO at least has been on the type at said company for well over a year..!
Report will come out in due time, let's wait till then shall we? Will make for some interesting reading I am sure!
Report will come out in due time, let's wait till then shall we? Will make for some interesting reading I am sure!
Join Date: May 2003
Location: PH 298/7.4DME
Posts: 554
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Gunger
As you stated, to each their own.
Richo has managed to succesfully convey in words the thoughts from which my previous statement stemmed.
The crew were doing the best job that they knew how to do, after all.
520.
Richo has managed to succesfully convey in words the thoughts from which my previous statement stemmed.
The crew were doing the best job that they knew how to do, after all.
520.
all operators must use an EMB120 simulator.
Given they are operated everywhere in this country maybe it's time a sim was setup and CASA enforced training take place. In the fair dinkum department any operation with aircraft >5700 should be sim trained.
As they say if you think training is expensive try having an accident.
Leadsled - what if you had three options that were all safe and had to make a decision?
Having a list of priorities to assist with decision making is a good idea.
Having a list of priorities to assist with decision making is a good idea.
Join Date: Sep 2000
Posts: 131
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
whole lot of hoohaaover nothing really
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This "whole lot of hoohaaover nothing really" has resulted in an ATSB investigation bigger than Ben Hur with the lack of burning juice being a distinct possible cause of the flameout.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------
This "whole lot of hoohaaover nothing really" has resulted in an ATSB investigation bigger than Ben Hur with the lack of burning juice being a distinct possible cause of the flameout.
Why didn't the autofeather autofeather?
According to the report, the prop was manually feathered.
I know the investigation will be looking into this, but why didn't the prop autofeather when power was applied in the go around?
I know the investigation will be looking into this, but why didn't the prop autofeather when power was applied in the go around?
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: Alice Springs
Posts: 77
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
I know the investigation will be looking into this, but why didn't the prop autofeather when power was applied in the go around?
"6 The automatic propeller feathering system did not activate unless three conditions were met. Those were that the torque on both engines was greater than 62 percent, both power lever angles were greater than 62 degrees, and the automatic feathering system was ARMED."
JarJar
jarjar,
Thanks for the response.
So just when will the autofeather autofeather? The report states that one of the conditions for autofeather is that both engines are above 62% torque.
But, if both engines are above 62% torque then one engine cannot be failed!
Thanks for the response.
So just when will the autofeather autofeather? The report states that one of the conditions for autofeather is that both engines are above 62% torque.
But, if both engines are above 62% torque then one engine cannot be failed!
Join Date: Jan 2005
Location: Alice Springs
Posts: 77
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Aircraft,
I dont fly the Braz, never have, but all autofeather systems are similar in function. Its primarily designed to operate during the EFATO scenario(this is considered to be the most critical). On final approach , you are typically at low power settings, therefore any engine failure will not result in the same control forces and aircraft controllability issues, as per the EFATO scenario.
As for the go-around, judging by the information in the report, if a go-around had been initiated and then an engine failure occured, as long as the specified criteria are met, then an autofeather should occur.
In regards to the ATSB report, my understanding is that the crew didnt realize that an engine had failed(sorry-run out of fuel), hence the control issues on final and in the go-around.
Hope this has helped(anyone else care to comment?)
JarJar
I dont fly the Braz, never have, but all autofeather systems are similar in function. Its primarily designed to operate during the EFATO scenario(this is considered to be the most critical). On final approach , you are typically at low power settings, therefore any engine failure will not result in the same control forces and aircraft controllability issues, as per the EFATO scenario.
As for the go-around, judging by the information in the report, if a go-around had been initiated and then an engine failure occured, as long as the specified criteria are met, then an autofeather should occur.
In regards to the ATSB report, my understanding is that the crew didnt realize that an engine had failed(sorry-run out of fuel), hence the control issues on final and in the go-around.
Hope this has helped(anyone else care to comment?)
JarJar
jarjar,
Thanks again. There must be some mistake in the text of the report in regard to those 3 conditions.
I say this because, if it were true that the autofeather would activate upon those 3 conditions being met, no Brasilia would ever get airborne! At least, not with the autofeather switched on - unless it has an extremely long runway and can accelerate sufficiently with only 62% torque set.
The mere act of advancing the power levers for takeoff will result in all 3 of those conditions being met!
So it has to be a misprint on the part of the author of the report. The fact that the number 62 appears twice (power lever angle and torque) would seem to suggest this.
So, back to the original question:
Why didn't the autofeather autofeather when power was increased for the go around?
It is unlikely to be because that power increase was too small, because the report states that torque limits on the R engine were exceeded during the go around, so the power lever advancement and torque differential had to be more than sufficient.
Thanks again. There must be some mistake in the text of the report in regard to those 3 conditions.
I say this because, if it were true that the autofeather would activate upon those 3 conditions being met, no Brasilia would ever get airborne! At least, not with the autofeather switched on - unless it has an extremely long runway and can accelerate sufficiently with only 62% torque set.
The mere act of advancing the power levers for takeoff will result in all 3 of those conditions being met!
So it has to be a misprint on the part of the author of the report. The fact that the number 62 appears twice (power lever angle and torque) would seem to suggest this.
So, back to the original question:
Why didn't the autofeather autofeather when power was increased for the go around?
It is unlikely to be because that power increase was too small, because the report states that torque limits on the R engine were exceeded during the go around, so the power lever advancement and torque differential had to be more than sufficient.
Join Date: Jul 2007
Location: France
Posts: 610
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
The Dance of the Falcon
Well done to the crew of the Brasilia that eventually landed at Wiluna WA.
A crew is expected to perform to the best of their ability when a problem occurs,either known or unknown. In the unknown case the crew have to attempt to control the aircraft flight path so that they have time to solve the problem.
Below is a recollection of an event, I hope it is of interest to the members.
"Dear Peter,
As per our conversation, below is my recollection of the events of 20th September 1987, in the Falcon 20F at Sydney Airport.
The story commenced at 140 feet above Runway 16 (now called 16 Right) at Sydney Airport on a normal visual, manual approach and landing. There was a slight rain shower on medium to short final. The Pilot Flying (PF) was in the right hand seat and myself, as the Pilot in Command (PIC) was in the left hand seat.
The body angle of the aircraft seemed to flatten and the (PF) mentioned the term wind shear. Our speed was VREF + 20 or 25, we checked again gear and flap positions.
The (PF) stated that things were wrong and he was going around, power was applied and loss of pitch control followed immediately. I took over the control of the aircraft and I can still recall the alarming pitch attitude we had and saw the Indicated Air Speed drop below 107 kts. I had both my hands holding the control column fully forward trying to limit the rearing of the body angle. My concern was that we were going over on to our back, which would have been the end, as this manoeuvre started at about 80 to 90 feet AGL. In my mind was that the vertical lift of the aircraft had to be minimised so I rolled it to the left in a very steep turn and had the (PNF) close the throttles to assist me in getting the nose of the aircraft to come below the horizon. This turned out to be successful and we recovered prior to ground contact. As power was restored the nose pitch attitude reached again the 60 to 80 degrees (as some eyewitnesses in the control tower claimed).
During the first go around the flaps and gear were retracted and we did a series of the above manoeuvres, using the roll and power off and on application technique as described above, each time gaining some height above ground level, although we had very limited heading control. We did this for about 5 or 6 times and obtained about 6500 feet AMSL. During this time I was unable to take either hand off the control column or relax the force required to limit the rear of the body angle. The (PNF) was completely occupied with the closing and opening of the throttles to help me semi-control the nose position.
During the initial loss of pitch control I glanced at the trim indicator which appeared to me to be in the normal range. I did not see the red light "on" for an aft stabiliser condition. My own efforts of trimming with the normal system did not initally help the situation.
The aircraft then "flew out" of the problem and returned to normal operation, with no further input from the crew. The aircraft position was now North East of Sydney and we returned for a landing at Sydney, Runway 16, using 10 degrees of flap. The landing was successful.
Some brief comments:
a. Once the first recovery had been achieved, I knew that I could control the aircraft to a certain extent whilst the fuel lasted.
b. This could not have been possible without the excellent crew co-ordination between PF and PNF.
c. A help to me was the knowledge of aerodynamics instilled by Instructors during my early training on Tiger Moths.
d. The aircraft had a single electric trim system, they now have a dual system to try to prevent the possibility of dust causing relay sticking problems.
e. Immediately after this incident we made arrangements for the CVR and FDR to be forwarded to the BASI for their investigation.
f. At a later date, after the BASI investigation, we simulated the problem in a flight simulator which was spectacular.
g. The ATC assistance during the incident was of the highest order.
We were both lucky to come back from this incident to tell this story and I hope that any other crew faced with an immediate, critical situation,work as a team and do not give up."
A crew is expected to perform to the best of their ability when a problem occurs,either known or unknown. In the unknown case the crew have to attempt to control the aircraft flight path so that they have time to solve the problem.
Below is a recollection of an event, I hope it is of interest to the members.
"Dear Peter,
As per our conversation, below is my recollection of the events of 20th September 1987, in the Falcon 20F at Sydney Airport.
The story commenced at 140 feet above Runway 16 (now called 16 Right) at Sydney Airport on a normal visual, manual approach and landing. There was a slight rain shower on medium to short final. The Pilot Flying (PF) was in the right hand seat and myself, as the Pilot in Command (PIC) was in the left hand seat.
The body angle of the aircraft seemed to flatten and the (PF) mentioned the term wind shear. Our speed was VREF + 20 or 25, we checked again gear and flap positions.
The (PF) stated that things were wrong and he was going around, power was applied and loss of pitch control followed immediately. I took over the control of the aircraft and I can still recall the alarming pitch attitude we had and saw the Indicated Air Speed drop below 107 kts. I had both my hands holding the control column fully forward trying to limit the rearing of the body angle. My concern was that we were going over on to our back, which would have been the end, as this manoeuvre started at about 80 to 90 feet AGL. In my mind was that the vertical lift of the aircraft had to be minimised so I rolled it to the left in a very steep turn and had the (PNF) close the throttles to assist me in getting the nose of the aircraft to come below the horizon. This turned out to be successful and we recovered prior to ground contact. As power was restored the nose pitch attitude reached again the 60 to 80 degrees (as some eyewitnesses in the control tower claimed).
During the first go around the flaps and gear were retracted and we did a series of the above manoeuvres, using the roll and power off and on application technique as described above, each time gaining some height above ground level, although we had very limited heading control. We did this for about 5 or 6 times and obtained about 6500 feet AMSL. During this time I was unable to take either hand off the control column or relax the force required to limit the rear of the body angle. The (PNF) was completely occupied with the closing and opening of the throttles to help me semi-control the nose position.
During the initial loss of pitch control I glanced at the trim indicator which appeared to me to be in the normal range. I did not see the red light "on" for an aft stabiliser condition. My own efforts of trimming with the normal system did not initally help the situation.
The aircraft then "flew out" of the problem and returned to normal operation, with no further input from the crew. The aircraft position was now North East of Sydney and we returned for a landing at Sydney, Runway 16, using 10 degrees of flap. The landing was successful.
Some brief comments:
a. Once the first recovery had been achieved, I knew that I could control the aircraft to a certain extent whilst the fuel lasted.
b. This could not have been possible without the excellent crew co-ordination between PF and PNF.
c. A help to me was the knowledge of aerodynamics instilled by Instructors during my early training on Tiger Moths.
d. The aircraft had a single electric trim system, they now have a dual system to try to prevent the possibility of dust causing relay sticking problems.
e. Immediately after this incident we made arrangements for the CVR and FDR to be forwarded to the BASI for their investigation.
f. At a later date, after the BASI investigation, we simulated the problem in a flight simulator which was spectacular.
g. The ATC assistance during the incident was of the highest order.
We were both lucky to come back from this incident to tell this story and I hope that any other crew faced with an immediate, critical situation,work as a team and do not give up."
Join Date: Jun 2004
Location: Australia
Age: 36
Posts: 130
Likes: 0
Received 0 Likes
on
0 Posts
Aircraft,
With the 3 conditions met, the autofeather system is ARMED (not activated). For it to actually autofeather a prop, the system (with the 3 cond. met) must then sense a drop in torque on one engine (usually below a fairly low value).
In the Skippers case being mentioned, the 3 conditions were never met at the time an engine failed, even when both power levers were set to go-around power.
Therefore at the point when the go-around was attempted only two out of the three conditions for autofeather were met...
1. Both power levers above 62 deg: YES
2. Both torques above 62%: NO (the failed engine never got above the 62% required for the system to be armed)
3. Autofeather switch armed: YES
As above, both engines needed to be producing above 62% torque for the system to be armed. The failed engine obviously wasn't doing this.
Remember that for the autofeather system to autofeather a prop, the 3 conditions must be met at the time of the engine failure, and then the system will sense the torque drop (as the engine fails) and feather the prop. If the engine fails at low power settings then the system will never become armed since the torque from both engines will never exceed 62%.
Sorry i'm not that great at explaining technical types of things, hopefully this makes a bit of sense
Tiger.
I say this because, if it were true that the autofeather would activate upon those 3 conditions being met, no Brasilia would ever get airborne! At least, not with the autofeather switched on
In the Skippers case being mentioned, the 3 conditions were never met at the time an engine failed, even when both power levers were set to go-around power.
Therefore at the point when the go-around was attempted only two out of the three conditions for autofeather were met...
1. Both power levers above 62 deg: YES
2. Both torques above 62%: NO (the failed engine never got above the 62% required for the system to be armed)
3. Autofeather switch armed: YES
Why didn't the autofeather autofeather when power was increased for the go around?
It is unlikely to be because that power increase was too small, because the report states that torque limits on the R engine were exceeded during the go around, so the power lever advancement and torque differential had to be more than sufficient.
Sorry i'm not that great at explaining technical types of things, hopefully this makes a bit of sense
Tiger.
Bottums Up
It's been a while but as best I can recall the autofeather on the DH8 is only armed for takeoff. The Bras has the same family of engines (PW100) so probably the same/similar autofeather system.