Air Adventures Pa31 Crash Coroners Inquiry
Indeed this Keith "aviation expert" Mitchell seems to be making some huge assumptions. As I understand 'black hole approaches are a visual phenomonem. There is no indication inthe TAIC report that the pilot ever made visual contact with the runway.
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Farkin Experts and Journalists
I know the boys across the ditch have the same problem with useless reporting of aviation, which really helps no one. I never knew I was "plunging to the ground"as I didnt have a Rad Alt on the piston twins. Now because I have one, I merely fly a stabilised Instrument approach
I dont think a red flashing light would have caught the pilots overloaded attention anyway, but to say that this is causal and forced him to fly visually is quite ludicrous and simply underlines this so called experts lack of expertise
Nosey
I dont think a red flashing light would have caught the pilots overloaded attention anyway, but to say that this is causal and forced him to fly visually is quite ludicrous and simply underlines this so called experts lack of expertise
Nosey
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Total speculation.
We all know what happened but we will never know why. The so called "experts" should really stop the speculation.
They were not on board, nor are they mind readers.
On the subject of IMC approaches, an approach is "unstable" unless the A/C is in the landing confiquration and within the V/S and A/S limits according to the company procedures, before the final approach fix. That is my understanding of it.
Having stated this I am well aware, of the "need" to try and "fit in" with faster traffic, the limitations of piston A/C etc., but extreme care must be taken.
We all know what happened but we will never know why. The so called "experts" should really stop the speculation.
They were not on board, nor are they mind readers.
On the subject of IMC approaches, an approach is "unstable" unless the A/C is in the landing confiquration and within the V/S and A/S limits according to the company procedures, before the final approach fix. That is my understanding of it.
Having stated this I am well aware, of the "need" to try and "fit in" with faster traffic, the limitations of piston A/C etc., but extreme care must be taken.
Last edited by doubleu-anker; 29th Sep 2004 at 11:48.
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Gaunty
The ammount of equipment aboard an aircraft, or the ammount of paperwork is really irrelevent, if the pilot makes phone calls while flying an ils approach. Nearly all accidents are caused by people, not machines. PA31's have provided many thousands of hours of safe flying, and will do so for many years to come.
The ammount of equipment aboard an aircraft, or the ammount of paperwork is really irrelevent, if the pilot makes phone calls while flying an ils approach. Nearly all accidents are caused by people, not machines. PA31's have provided many thousands of hours of safe flying, and will do so for many years to come.
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bushy
Then you mised my point entirely, which had nothing to do with PA31 per se, or telephone calls during an ILS approach.
The DC3 was a wonderful aircraft and made airline travel as routine a daily affair as winding your watch.
Then you mised my point entirely, which had nothing to do with PA31 per se, or telephone calls during an ILS approach.
The DC3 was a wonderful aircraft and made airline travel as routine a daily affair as winding your watch.
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Just to clear something up Sandal boy ; from the report:
Unlikely that by monitoring GPS distance you would get low because unless he had put in a user defined waypoint on the threshold of runway 20, then the active waypoint would most likely have been CH, i.e. the co-located VOR and DME. This would give you almost identical distance information (slant range not an issue at low level). It is conceivable he had the aerodrome reference point (NZCH) as the active waypoint and was using distance information from that, but that would make him an idiot.
If you have any doubt about the lunacy of doing approaches using user defined waypoints, take a gander at this little ripper. (You might have to sign up to the free site).
http://www.flightsafety.org/members/.../ap_june02.pdf
1.6.10 The aircraft was equipped and approved for single-pilot IFR operations. Standard flight instruments were fitted to both the pilot and co-pilot panels. Avionics items were Bendix or King equipment, and consisted of 3 very high frequency (VHF) communications radios, 2 VHF navigation receivers (NAV 1 and 2), marker beacon receiver, one distance measuring equipment (DME) system, 2 automatic direction finder (ADF) receivers, audio and intercom systems, one radio altimeter, one global positioning system (GPS) and one ELT. VHF navigation information was presented to the pilot on a horizontal situation indicator (HSI), by a flight director on the attitude director indicator, and by a secondary course deviation indicator (CDI). ADF or VOR bearings were presented on a radio magnetic indicator (RMI). A Bendix Altimatic V autopilot was fitted, with altitude hold, heading, navigation, approach and go-around modes available. The pilot also had a portable Garmin Pilot III GPS mounted on the instrument panel.
If you have any doubt about the lunacy of doing approaches using user defined waypoints, take a gander at this little ripper. (You might have to sign up to the free site).
http://www.flightsafety.org/members/.../ap_june02.pdf
AIRCAB
You summed it up mate, why on earth would you be on a mobile tackling a ILS at night with questionable weather. Even in clear VFR conditions you have to be on the game.
All you need is a donk to fail and then see how things pan out.
Shame none of this will bring them back.
You summed it up mate, why on earth would you be on a mobile tackling a ILS at night with questionable weather. Even in clear VFR conditions you have to be on the game.
All you need is a donk to fail and then see how things pan out.
Shame none of this will bring them back.
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I may not have been 100% clear in my last post. I don't think for a moment that he was using inappropriate information during the approach. Why would you with what appears to be a fully serviceable ILS setup. Most of you will have noticed a trend from my previous posts on this thread, and that is to qoute from the TAIC report. That's where I keep coming up with all these juicy rumours and far out ideas.
I can highly recommend reading the report, in fact I would have thought it a prerequisite before discussing the accident. It's the only place that we can get the absolute, undisputed facts about it. That is the investigators job; to only draw conclusions supported by fact. It's our job to take that information and wonder, suppose, or even hypothesis! So please, read the report.
http://www2.taic.org.nz/InvDetail.aspx?InvNo=03-004
And in keeping with tradition:
Lethalweapon: appart from diving in there, I agree that the subject of wake turbulence has perhaps been glossed over. Almost 4 minutes does seem plenty, but who could be sure. With a surface wind of just 3 knots and being well below the correct profile would tend to put you in harms way. Given the way that a heart attack has not been ruled out, you would think they could say the same for wake turbulence. On the other hand the aircraft did make first impact in a near wings level attitude, which would tend to rule it out.
Just for good measure:
I can highly recommend reading the report, in fact I would have thought it a prerequisite before discussing the accident. It's the only place that we can get the absolute, undisputed facts about it. That is the investigators job; to only draw conclusions supported by fact. It's our job to take that information and wonder, suppose, or even hypothesis! So please, read the report.
http://www2.taic.org.nz/InvDetail.aspx?InvNo=03-004
And in keeping with tradition:
1.18.5 The standard wake turbulence separation prescribed between a light aircraft following a medium (such as a Boeing 737) aircraft is 3 minutes, or 5nm if under radar control. ZK-NCA was 3 minutes 50 seconds, or about 9nm behind the preceding aircraft.
1.7.5 The Christchurch ATIS, Information Whiskey issued at 1811, which the pilot was referred to at 1853, with the change to runway 20 was:
runway-in-use 20, runway wet; expect ILS approach; surface wind 030º/3kt; visibility 500m in drizzle; cloud scattered at 200 feet, overcast at 700 feet; temperature 9º, dewpoint 9º; reported 2000 foot wind 320º/29kt; QNH 999.
runway-in-use 20, runway wet; expect ILS approach; surface wind 030º/3kt; visibility 500m in drizzle; cloud scattered at 200 feet, overcast at 700 feet; temperature 9º, dewpoint 9º; reported 2000 foot wind 320º/29kt; QNH 999.
Just for good measure:
1.12.1 The first point of impact in the accident sequence was between the right wingtip of ZK-NCA and a poplar tree about 10 feet above ground. This was followed closely by 2 more tree impacts on the left side of the aircraft. One of these was severe, on the fuselage side and left wing root area, leading to separation of the left wing. The relative heights of the 3 tree strikes indicated that the aircraft had been banked about 5° left, while the distance to the first ground scar, and the shallowness of the scar indicated that the aircraft had been descending slightly or in nearly level flight at moderately high speed. The first tree impact was 1.27 nm from the runway 20 threshold, on a bearing of 013°M.
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Lethalweapon,
If the ATIS report Whiskey issued at 18:11 was indeed correct, and there has been no suggestion that it was not, the forecast 2000ft wind, 320/29 kts would surely have dissipated any wake turbulence very rapidly at that altitude. At what point the wind became 030/03 kts as reported on the surface would not be known with any certainty. Quite a wind shear but very likely enough wind to dissipate any vortices produced by the 737 in the time/distance reported between the aircraft.
Prospector
If the ATIS report Whiskey issued at 18:11 was indeed correct, and there has been no suggestion that it was not, the forecast 2000ft wind, 320/29 kts would surely have dissipated any wake turbulence very rapidly at that altitude. At what point the wind became 030/03 kts as reported on the surface would not be known with any certainty. Quite a wind shear but very likely enough wind to dissipate any vortices produced by the 737 in the time/distance reported between the aircraft.
Prospector
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Saw on the news tonight some messy sounding details of past screw ups, not good news for the company.
Lethal weapon, you are quite insistant on this windshear/wake turbulence thing. The accident a/c was 9 miles behind the 737, no chance of wake encounter, and if it was, it would not have accounted for a constant below slope ILS. A sudden spiral into the ground yes, but not a slow, wings level descent. I have been 3 miles behind a 747 into AA on 05 and have watched the wake settle on the water behind and never had a burble of turbulence at that distance, so 9 miles behind a 737 begs belief. Windshear is more of a problem for the jets than prop a/c as I am sure I don't have to explain why to you. If you look at the profile flown, it is totally incosistent with a windshear encounter. The pilot had a CFIT accident, caused by pilot error, not some mysterious wake or windshear encounter. As an aside, I understand the phone call was perhaps a redial as his wife has said she heard only engine noise for several minutes and no conversation took place, which is not to say the phone did not interfere with the G/S signal, but I don't believe the pilot made a phone call at that stage of the flight.
Quite agree with Six Lima, read the report.
Nosey
Lethal weapon, you are quite insistant on this windshear/wake turbulence thing. The accident a/c was 9 miles behind the 737, no chance of wake encounter, and if it was, it would not have accounted for a constant below slope ILS. A sudden spiral into the ground yes, but not a slow, wings level descent. I have been 3 miles behind a 747 into AA on 05 and have watched the wake settle on the water behind and never had a burble of turbulence at that distance, so 9 miles behind a 737 begs belief. Windshear is more of a problem for the jets than prop a/c as I am sure I don't have to explain why to you. If you look at the profile flown, it is totally incosistent with a windshear encounter. The pilot had a CFIT accident, caused by pilot error, not some mysterious wake or windshear encounter. As an aside, I understand the phone call was perhaps a redial as his wife has said she heard only engine noise for several minutes and no conversation took place, which is not to say the phone did not interfere with the G/S signal, but I don't believe the pilot made a phone call at that stage of the flight.
Quite agree with Six Lima, read the report.
Nosey
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The news reports are certainly putting a different view on the event.
What I find hard to accept is that to be a chief pilot one must be approved by CAA.
How can one have the experience level to be chief pilot and training officer before the ink is dry on his own initial issue instrument rating??. Perhaps the CAA have some secret formula for these assessments.
The report of the previous chief pilot makes sobering reading.
Prospector
Edited to remove URL now not relevant, the story was pulled.
What I find hard to accept is that to be a chief pilot one must be approved by CAA.
How can one have the experience level to be chief pilot and training officer before the ink is dry on his own initial issue instrument rating??. Perhaps the CAA have some secret formula for these assessments.
The report of the previous chief pilot makes sobering reading.
Prospector
Edited to remove URL now not relevant, the story was pulled.
Last edited by prospector; 7th Oct 2004 at 00:13.
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Lethalweapon,
Your comment that the report is not worth the paper it is written on is a very rash statement.
Perhaps you could enlighten us on the depth of experience, especially in single pilot IFR operations, that you base this sweeping statement on?
With my 13,000 odd total hours, which includes some 5,000 hr Single pilot IFR ops, I believe it is a very good report based on the information available.
What will no doubt be an even more interesting report will be that of the Coroners enquiry, especially with the history of the operation that is now being made public, that was not included as part of the TAIC report.
Prospector
Your comment that the report is not worth the paper it is written on is a very rash statement.
Perhaps you could enlighten us on the depth of experience, especially in single pilot IFR operations, that you base this sweeping statement on?
With my 13,000 odd total hours, which includes some 5,000 hr Single pilot IFR ops, I believe it is a very good report based on the information available.
What will no doubt be an even more interesting report will be that of the Coroners enquiry, especially with the history of the operation that is now being made public, that was not included as part of the TAIC report.
Prospector
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easy, easy, starting to lose focus here....
But really folks, what is the point of all of this name calling and finger pointing? If he was that much of a problem then the CAA should have grounded him should they not? Perhaps thats who should be getting shafted here, not a dead man.
But really folks, what is the point of all of this name calling and finger pointing? If he was that much of a problem then the CAA should have grounded him should they not? Perhaps thats who should be getting shafted here, not a dead man.