Preliminary report VH TNP
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http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/...?oneclick=true
Controllers stood down over deadly plane crash
September 17, 2004 - 10:20AM
The remains of the aircraft at Benalla after the accident. Photo Michael Clayton-Jones
Two air traffic controllers have been stood down following a light plane crash in uncontrolled airspace which killed six people, the federal government said today.
The twin-engine Piper Cheyenne aircraft was off course when it crashed into a mountain while experienced pilot Kerry Endicott was approaching Benalla airfield in north-east Victoria on July 28.
Mr Endicott, Sydney chip-board executive Robert Henderson, his daughter Jacqueline, her husband RAAF helicopter pilot Alan Stark, Belinda Andrews and Qantas pilot Geoff Brockie all died in the crash.
Federal Transport Minister John Anderson said the crash was being investigated by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.
Mr Anderson said there was nothing untoward about the two air traffic controllers being stood down.
"It's not unusual for air traffic controllers to be stood aside during an investigation of this sort," he told Sydney radio 2UE.
"But no-one should draw any conclusions or jump to any judgments at this stage."
Mr Anderson said he understood the angst of the family and friends of those who died in the crash.
"I know first hand, not from personal experience, but from meeting with the family of the people who've died in the aircraft accident, just how traumatic it is waiting to get a handle on what has happened and why and where justice is needed ...," he said.
AAP
Controllers stood down over deadly plane crash
September 17, 2004 - 10:20AM
The remains of the aircraft at Benalla after the accident. Photo Michael Clayton-Jones
Two air traffic controllers have been stood down following a light plane crash in uncontrolled airspace which killed six people, the federal government said today.
The twin-engine Piper Cheyenne aircraft was off course when it crashed into a mountain while experienced pilot Kerry Endicott was approaching Benalla airfield in north-east Victoria on July 28.
Mr Endicott, Sydney chip-board executive Robert Henderson, his daughter Jacqueline, her husband RAAF helicopter pilot Alan Stark, Belinda Andrews and Qantas pilot Geoff Brockie all died in the crash.
Federal Transport Minister John Anderson said the crash was being investigated by the Australian Transport Safety Bureau.
Mr Anderson said there was nothing untoward about the two air traffic controllers being stood down.
"It's not unusual for air traffic controllers to be stood aside during an investigation of this sort," he told Sydney radio 2UE.
"But no-one should draw any conclusions or jump to any judgments at this stage."
Mr Anderson said he understood the angst of the family and friends of those who died in the crash.
"I know first hand, not from personal experience, but from meeting with the family of the people who've died in the aircraft accident, just how traumatic it is waiting to get a handle on what has happened and why and where justice is needed ...," he said.
AAP
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This tragic accident produced 6 victims already; please don't 'create' any more victims. I am certain NAS 2b or c has nothing to do with this accident.
As compressor stall pointed out you can't manually load the GPSNPA waypoints and in fact their location is not published. One thing bothers me with these 3.83 degrees off track. The GPS does not work in degrees; it works in distance off track. In other words parallelling track. If indeed they were 3.83 degrees off, that suggests to me that they were navigating by conventional navaids. I am only speculating and I hope it's not so. Perhaps if the HSI was selected to a VOR instead of the GPS????
When I first had my Garmin 155 it had a feature that when you selected an ILS on Nav 1 the HSI would automatically select the Nav mode. After a while an AD came out and this automatic selection had to be disabled. I got caught flying 1 ILS thinking the HSI displayed ILS information when in fact I had forgotten to switch it from GPS to ILS. The same thing could happen in reverse. There is also a problem with their distances. They crashed south of the southern initial approach fix. The minimum altitude there is 5000'. They crashed at 1500'. They could have had some problem that distracted them and resulted in being 3500' too low. Or they could have thought they were much closer to Benalla than they really were.
I hope the ATSB finds the real causes so that all of us can learn.
As compressor stall pointed out you can't manually load the GPSNPA waypoints and in fact their location is not published. One thing bothers me with these 3.83 degrees off track. The GPS does not work in degrees; it works in distance off track. In other words parallelling track. If indeed they were 3.83 degrees off, that suggests to me that they were navigating by conventional navaids. I am only speculating and I hope it's not so. Perhaps if the HSI was selected to a VOR instead of the GPS????
When I first had my Garmin 155 it had a feature that when you selected an ILS on Nav 1 the HSI would automatically select the Nav mode. After a while an AD came out and this automatic selection had to be disabled. I got caught flying 1 ILS thinking the HSI displayed ILS information when in fact I had forgotten to switch it from GPS to ILS. The same thing could happen in reverse. There is also a problem with their distances. They crashed south of the southern initial approach fix. The minimum altitude there is 5000'. They crashed at 1500'. They could have had some problem that distracted them and resulted in being 3500' too low. Or they could have thought they were much closer to Benalla than they really were.
I hope the ATSB finds the real causes so that all of us can learn.
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Don't get me wrong
Sonny Hammond,
I didn't intend to bag the pilot when I said was he having a snooze. It was a flippant response to a previous poster.
My point was he was very experienced and would have been receptive to his environment.
At no stage do i mean to bag anyone, if it has come across that way.
I didn't intend to bag the pilot when I said was he having a snooze. It was a flippant response to a previous poster.
My point was he was very experienced and would have been receptive to his environment.
At no stage do i mean to bag anyone, if it has come across that way.
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remember the tolerances that ATC applies for GPS and other navaids. Things go beep all the time solely due to aircraft equipment error. The route monitoring systems in TAAATS are different to these figures. I say blame dick, TAAATS was his idea.
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Radar Altimeter
Can anyone tell me the maximum height above ground a R/ALT will read?
At a 5° approach TPN would have been approx 1489' above the impact site at a point 2.8 nm away. The first hill must have been 3 to 4° inclined from the impact point, or 892' / 1190' at the 2.8 nm mark. Would the R/ALT have worked this high above that first hill?
At a 5° approach TPN would have been approx 1489' above the impact site at a point 2.8 nm away. The first hill must have been 3 to 4° inclined from the impact point, or 892' / 1190' at the 2.8 nm mark. Would the R/ALT have worked this high above that first hill?
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Typically 2,500 ft for GA equipment I belive there are models that will go to 5,000 but seem to be mostly military.
The GPWS is/was an extension of the original concept.
You would have to know the particular model installed to get the "correct" answer. But I would bet on 2,500 as the original spec, whether it was still operating to it I cannot tell.
They also only operate vertically or at least normal to the aircraft plane of flight. They would not normally "see" steep terrain until perhaps it was too late.
Bit like the depth sounder on your boat telling you that you have just hit a reef abouyt the same time as the crunch sound, when a forwarding looking sonar would have given you prior warning.
The GPWS is/was an extension of the original concept.
You would have to know the particular model installed to get the "correct" answer. But I would bet on 2,500 as the original spec, whether it was still operating to it I cannot tell.
They also only operate vertically or at least normal to the aircraft plane of flight. They would not normally "see" steep terrain until perhaps it was too late.
Bit like the depth sounder on your boat telling you that you have just hit a reef abouyt the same time as the crunch sound, when a forwarding looking sonar would have given you prior warning.
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RADAR ALT
Thanks guys!
I wonder whether there is an audible warning with R/ALT or you just rely on your observation?
I don't know if you saw the photos posted on the www.atsb.gov.au but you would think some indication would have been given?
I couldn't help but feel how close they must have come to hitting that first hill.
I wonder whether there is an audible warning with R/ALT or you just rely on your observation?
I don't know if you saw the photos posted on the www.atsb.gov.au but you would think some indication would have been given?
I couldn't help but feel how close they must have come to hitting that first hill.
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The Rad Alt on GA aircraft tends not to be in the "normal scan" and down the bottom of the pilots side panel, sometimes on the other side, which is in any event usually pretty crowded due to its small relative size.
If there is an audible alert it tends to be an integral part of the instrument and piezo type not especially audible amongst all of the normal snap crackles and pop going on, especially if you are not "looking or listening" for it.
I.E. if you are not looking for, expecting nor anticipating it's activation in that part of the approach sequence there is a high probability you will not "hear/see" its activation or coming off the stops.
Whether it was connected to the Annunciator Panel or Master Caution I do not know, but it is probably unlikely and in any event in steep country the time beteeen its activation and impact is likely to be very short.
A study of the contours along the final track plotted against the aircrafts ground speed may give some indications of the rate of change of altitude. Then it is possible to calculate what the rate of change or climb rate of the terrain was in relation to the available climb rate of the aircraft in that configuration.
The question that must be asked is was the Rad Alt operational or was the pilot relying solely on the GPS for position and relative height and did the GPS have a TAWS or terrain warning function.
Wangarrata is only 20 or so NM away ??, with an NDB?? was this being monitored as a routine cross check against what other aids viz VOR/DME were available to do likewise. ?
The manufactured hysteria surrounding the routine "stand down" of the ATC guys and accusation that it was their fault, does not IMHO stand up to rational scrutiny.
The pilot was not under their direct control, nor was he being vectored, he was not conducting a precision approach, he was, as I understand it and as we are all, responsible for his own navigation under these circumstances.
If there is an audible alert it tends to be an integral part of the instrument and piezo type not especially audible amongst all of the normal snap crackles and pop going on, especially if you are not "looking or listening" for it.
I.E. if you are not looking for, expecting nor anticipating it's activation in that part of the approach sequence there is a high probability you will not "hear/see" its activation or coming off the stops.
Whether it was connected to the Annunciator Panel or Master Caution I do not know, but it is probably unlikely and in any event in steep country the time beteeen its activation and impact is likely to be very short.
A study of the contours along the final track plotted against the aircrafts ground speed may give some indications of the rate of change of altitude. Then it is possible to calculate what the rate of change or climb rate of the terrain was in relation to the available climb rate of the aircraft in that configuration.
The question that must be asked is was the Rad Alt operational or was the pilot relying solely on the GPS for position and relative height and did the GPS have a TAWS or terrain warning function.
Wangarrata is only 20 or so NM away ??, with an NDB?? was this being monitored as a routine cross check against what other aids viz VOR/DME were available to do likewise. ?
The manufactured hysteria surrounding the routine "stand down" of the ATC guys and accusation that it was their fault, does not IMHO stand up to rational scrutiny.
The pilot was not under their direct control, nor was he being vectored, he was not conducting a precision approach, he was, as I understand it and as we are all, responsible for his own navigation under these circumstances.
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Listen Everbody!
As stated in the ATSB interim report:
If everyone has a say regardless of credibility of statements, maybe, we will be informed more quickly by the relevant authorities.
Given the heightened interest, the ATSB has released an interim report on progress with its investigation into the tragic Benalla fatal accident
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I've got a few Cheyenne hours and (on those that I flew) the Rad Alt is max 2500'. It was set at each stage of a stepped approach to the rounded up MDH AGL for that step and worked in concert with the altitude alerter and GPS Alt Alert. They also have both aural and visual warning (light and dinger) as well as the actual readout on the instrument and a digital readout on a display at the bottom of the VG. I found it hard to miss those cues, but at typical Cheyenne approach speeds those cues change pretty bludy fast when the're reading directly below you instead of forward of your path.
The manufactured hysteria surrounding the routine "stand down" of the ATC guys and accusation that it was their fault, does not IMHO stand up to rational scrutiny. The pilot was not under their direct control, nor was he being vectored, he was not conducting a precision approach, he was, as I understand it and as we are all, responsible for his own navigation under these circumstances.
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Has anyone done any study in to Human Factors and reason models here? Basically only one thing is for sure, accidents are a culmination of many little events that catastrophically lead to one end.
As pilots, we would have all experienced a situation where you have been able to convince yourself that a situation you have been in makes sence, when all the evidence is to the contrary.
It hurts me to read, people squarely blaming ATC ie DICK SMITH. We are ultimately responsible for our own actions, whatever role we may or may not have played in this tragic incident. Whether the wrong coordinates were entered into the GPS, alarms on the ATC console were misinterrpereted or whatever, any system, NAS or other, is fallable when human factors are taken into consideration.
Condolences to the people affected by this accident. ATC's included.
As pilots, we would have all experienced a situation where you have been able to convince yourself that a situation you have been in makes sence, when all the evidence is to the contrary.
It hurts me to read, people squarely blaming ATC ie DICK SMITH. We are ultimately responsible for our own actions, whatever role we may or may not have played in this tragic incident. Whether the wrong coordinates were entered into the GPS, alarms on the ATC console were misinterrpereted or whatever, any system, NAS or other, is fallable when human factors are taken into consideration.
Condolences to the people affected by this accident. ATC's included.
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GPS interference
I note, with interest, in the latest Flight Saftey Australia, dated Sep - Oct 2004, page 10, ACA acts to prohibit GNSS jammers.
While it is not my intention to infer someone local was conducting one's self in an untoward manner, it does prove the device is succeptible to error. I don't believe interference would discriminate between WAAS, DGPS or GNSS or other means when it comes to satellite data.
Any thoughts People?
The ACA has decided to institute the ban because of widespread use of the GPS and its vulnerability to interference.
Any thoughts People?
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Jamming/interference would be local, not a rock solid deviation for 100+ nm
Localised GPS jamming is very possible with low-power transmitters. (do a Google search)
Jammers can effectively disable normal GPS operation over quite a wide radius.
(>200km depending on power).
To create false position information would require creating fake signals
for at least 4 GPS satellites to fool the receiver, which, whilst technically
feasible, is not likely to be done unless someone is *very* evil.
GPS will either work, (if there are enough satellites in view),
or not (if there are not enough satellites, or if the US-DOD is fiddling with it in your area.)
muddergoose,
Further to that Woomeras comments on Rad Alt, they normally have a lineal scale from 0-500 ft, and logarithmic 500-2500 ft. They have an accuracy of ±5 ft or 5 % above 500 ft, and ± 2ft or 2% below 500 ft. They generally do not work with bank angles in excess of 40º or pitch attitudes in excess of 30º.
The scan footprint is elliptical, 20º for and aft of the lateral axis, and 40º either side of the longitudinal axis. It employs a frequency modulated continuous wave transmission in the SHF band, about 1W output. The one Woomera mentioned up to 5000’ is not the current generation of RAD ALT, it is a pulse modulated device, which is not as accurate close to the ground, but does have a larger power output.
Depending on the avionics installed, on the bottom of the AH can have a DH set on the LHS on the bottom of the AH, with RAD ALT on the RHS or a separate display with 2500 ft at the 12 o'clock position, 500 ft at the 6 o'clock position, and 0 ft at the 3 o’clock position, the needle moving anticlockwise as you descend.
Unless you have GPWS/EGPWS installed the only general alert given to crew the in illumination of the DH annunciator, or DH light on the stand alone display.
The Rad Alt is normally not associated with altitude alerter which is a pure barometric device.
The altitude alerter normally shares the same static source as the altimeter, the GPS may have its barometric input from an altimeter, encoder, or separate input. Altitude alerter is normally coupled to the autopilot allowing the pilot to descend the aircraft to the level selected on the altitude alerter. 1000' above or below this preselected height, a single gong is generated a light illuminates, 300' from the target altitude the light generally turns off. Once at the target altitude any deviation or a magnitude of 200-300 ft will cause a single gong is generated a light illuminate.
Depending on the autopilot installed, failure of the pilot to arm either the altitude alerter (some have a altitude arm button on them) and/or the altitude select on the autopilot will allow the aircraft/autopilot not capture the selected altitude and may result in a CFIT, depending on the altitude alerter installed, if the altitude is not armed the pilot will receive no warnings when approaching or departing from the selected altitude.
Biggles_in_Oz et al,
Shooting a GPS/NPA requires the pilot to conduct a RAIM prediction prior to conducting the approach and have GPS notams, this checks to see satellites will be in view at the time of arrival and the US DOD has made them available for civil use. The current fleet of satellites allows for the US DOD to selectively control the time bias for position deteration as experienced during gulf war 1. This would now only be applicable in targeted war zones.
Prior to arming the approach the barometric altitude (QNH) must be inputted into the GPS for RAIM.
Local jamming as you suggest has been experienced in Italy due to interference from pay TV transmissions, however this would result in a RAIM failure, with a MSG flashing on the GPS annunciator panel and on the GPS, the approach will fail to arm, and will not scale down to finals sensitivity.
Further to that Woomeras comments on Rad Alt, they normally have a lineal scale from 0-500 ft, and logarithmic 500-2500 ft. They have an accuracy of ±5 ft or 5 % above 500 ft, and ± 2ft or 2% below 500 ft. They generally do not work with bank angles in excess of 40º or pitch attitudes in excess of 30º.
The scan footprint is elliptical, 20º for and aft of the lateral axis, and 40º either side of the longitudinal axis. It employs a frequency modulated continuous wave transmission in the SHF band, about 1W output. The one Woomera mentioned up to 5000’ is not the current generation of RAD ALT, it is a pulse modulated device, which is not as accurate close to the ground, but does have a larger power output.
Depending on the avionics installed, on the bottom of the AH can have a DH set on the LHS on the bottom of the AH, with RAD ALT on the RHS or a separate display with 2500 ft at the 12 o'clock position, 500 ft at the 6 o'clock position, and 0 ft at the 3 o’clock position, the needle moving anticlockwise as you descend.
Unless you have GPWS/EGPWS installed the only general alert given to crew the in illumination of the DH annunciator, or DH light on the stand alone display.
The Rad Alt is normally not associated with altitude alerter which is a pure barometric device.
The altitude alerter normally shares the same static source as the altimeter, the GPS may have its barometric input from an altimeter, encoder, or separate input. Altitude alerter is normally coupled to the autopilot allowing the pilot to descend the aircraft to the level selected on the altitude alerter. 1000' above or below this preselected height, a single gong is generated a light illuminates, 300' from the target altitude the light generally turns off. Once at the target altitude any deviation or a magnitude of 200-300 ft will cause a single gong is generated a light illuminate.
Depending on the autopilot installed, failure of the pilot to arm either the altitude alerter (some have a altitude arm button on them) and/or the altitude select on the autopilot will allow the aircraft/autopilot not capture the selected altitude and may result in a CFIT, depending on the altitude alerter installed, if the altitude is not armed the pilot will receive no warnings when approaching or departing from the selected altitude.
Biggles_in_Oz et al,
Shooting a GPS/NPA requires the pilot to conduct a RAIM prediction prior to conducting the approach and have GPS notams, this checks to see satellites will be in view at the time of arrival and the US DOD has made them available for civil use. The current fleet of satellites allows for the US DOD to selectively control the time bias for position deteration as experienced during gulf war 1. This would now only be applicable in targeted war zones.
Prior to arming the approach the barometric altitude (QNH) must be inputted into the GPS for RAIM.
Local jamming as you suggest has been experienced in Italy due to interference from pay TV transmissions, however this would result in a RAIM failure, with a MSG flashing on the GPS annunciator panel and on the GPS, the approach will fail to arm, and will not scale down to finals sensitivity.