Flying large military aircraft is NOT inherently dangerous and accidents do NOT just happen as long as we are operating somewhere close to the tight airworthiness requirements that the MOD (says it) requires. This aircraft was not in a hazardous flight regime (ignoring the presence of the unfriendly people below), it was making routine use of the fuel system. The fleet may be old but in the real world, nobody in their right mind would seriously believe that regular incidents of fuel pishing out of an aircraft is vaguely acceptable or sensible.

Edited to add......We increase the risks inherent in aviation significantly at times by putting military aircraft into extremely demanding environments. What we must not do is confuse the very real need to take risks to get the job done - particularly on ops - with the unnecessary risks of routinely flying aircraft that should not be in the air.

Quite a lot of mudslinging in these pages is directed at senior officers and the MOD. However, the reality is that the armed forces must be accountable to a democratically elected civilian administration. Senior officers and the MOD do the government's bidding and the government is elected by the people. The bottom line is that the government makes decisions on the allocation of resources according to the priorities which it believes will get it re-elected by the people. The problem here is that we have been engaged on operations which the government believe to be 'the right thing to do' but the Treasury (and the people) would rather that tax was spent on Health, Education and pretty much anything but Defence. At the same time industrial, economic and employment interests mean that the government (Treasury) wants to retain UK defence industries and so impose additional costs on defence procurement without making any provision for those costs.

The consequence of all of this is that Defence Chiefs are required to achieve more whilst spending unnecessary amounts of money on securing future capability. Every year the spending round requires difficult decisions about what important areas of expenditure should take a cut to balance the books. Trade-offs between managing current commitments (and safety) and ensuring that the UK still has Armed Forces worth a damn in 25 years' time are made in every round. Inevitably, eventually something had to break. The British people and the Treasury need to understand that it is their priorities which caused this tragedy not MOD or military ineptitude. Hopefully, the outcome of this will be a reconciliation between our commitments and our resources; if not, the next disaster is in the pipeline.

I might add that it is for the Cabinet to provide a coherent Grand Strategy for the United Kingdom. A recent BBC documentary alleged that Cabinet Government ceased to function under the current government. If so, then it might be a good idea to re-instate it.

OK, fair call - the RAF's airworthiness sytem has been found at fault for not picking up a design fault (hot air pipe in unprotected bay that only every needed one fuel leak on it - and no-one can guarantee a leak free jet) but how the hell did British waste-of -Space get away with fitting the pipes in the first place? Where are you now Jimmy Jones?

CLA

Padhist

The "usual trick" with setting BOI TORs to avoid the real issues may have been prevalent in the 1950s but that does not mean that this is the case with this BOI. The president and members had an extraordinarily difficult task with the limited evidence and I have nothing but respect for them.

Whilst it is tempting to rush in with opinions on every detail of the BOI's report, better now to just think of the families for whom this must be an extremely difficult time.

N Joe

everythingbuttheboy

I notice your lack of posts on this forum and would strongly suggest that you read everything from page one onwards. You will then see that you are completely wrong in most of what you are saying.

Flying military aircraft is no more dangerous than flying any other aircraft. The only thing that makes it potentially more dangerous is the area of operation and the fact that someone may be trying to shoot you down.

XV230 did NOT crash because it was a miltary aircraft; it crashed because of a number of failings, many of which had been identified as a potential danger many many months, and possibly even years earlier. The RAF didn't learn a damned thing from those incidents, and your ridiculous comment about the one that diverted last week beggars belief! Are you for a second suggesting that diverting with a major fuel leak is OK?

Your other comment 'simply not viable to spend million on this a/c. just make it safe to fly, and keep it safe, until the 4 comes in' is a disgrace and an insult to those who perished. I don't care what it costs to make them safe to fly, £10 million or £10 billion. Until they are safe to fly, they should be grounded. Perhaps you could inform us all here what it is worth to make them safe to fly?

The fact is that the RAF took it upon itself to ignore those warnings from expert people such as BAe and QQ. Had they acted upon those recomendations and heeded the reports and further recomendations following the loss of TWA Flight 500, then I believe that we would not be having this debate now.

I am of the opinion that was an avoidable accident, and I feel that those responsible should be held to account, and by that I mean the SoS, CAS, ACAS, AOC 2Gp and Stn Cdr ISK; ALL of who knew that the aircraft had, and was having continuous problems centred around AAR and Fuel leaks.

This will not be the end of this tragedy. It is incumbant upon us all to continue to fight for safe and airworthy aircraft within the RAF, and I sincerely hope that those named above find the courage to do the honourable thing.

The Winco

Forgive me, Winco, but I'm puzzled as to why you believe the current ACAS, AOC 2 Grp and Stn Cdr ISK should resign? Since the former took up his post in April this year, AOC 2 Grp arrived there this February and Stn Cdr ISK is not the same chap as the one who was in post when the accident occurred, I presume that your call relates to events after the accident? Or do you refer to those who held the relevant posts at the time?

Forgive me for being dense :confused:

Anyone see Bob Ainsworth on Newsnight tonight claiming that the Nimrod MR2 ????????????

What the :mad:is wrong with these people, a couple of extinguishers does not constitute a fire suppression system.

Mr Ainsworth also said that the BoI had I should like to point Mr Ainsworth in the direction of section 32, A, (6) of the BoI report...


21 accepted recommendations from 33 so that's roughly 30% of the recommendations rejected and no indication of how many of the 21 have been implemented.

Actions speak louder than words Mr Ainsworth and if you think you can say sorry and walk away your wrong.

General AR, your instructive piece on UK constitutional practice relevant to the UK Armed Forces was flowing so well, so persuasively, until you had to get to your point, which I quote above. You then have the utter gall to blame the British people for the tragedy! If you work in the MOD then you are a part of the problem. If your work involves Airworthiness Regulation then the attitude that you express confirms far more clearly than I ever could why the MOD is unworthy of discharging that responsibility. In short, Sir, your sentiments are outrageous and you should be ashamed. By the way if you are an MOD apparatchik and feel uncertain as to what you personally should do if ordered to compromise the Airworthiness process, may I commend the posts of tucumseh on this and the 'Parliamentary Answers' threads.

Today, the MOD is allocated 2.4% of GDP in war time. A sensible level would be 4-6%. In the absence of 4-6% a large number of compromises have to be made and it isn't just ac safety.

The electorate sets the agenda on expenditure on the doorstep during elections. When voters start to ask politicians what they will do about the parlous state of the armed forces, then and only then will there be any more money. Until then the Treasury will put its money where the voters want it: Health, Education and Social Security.

Like your previous post I'm tempted to ask "So what?" If your duties encompass flight safety and are being compromised by the government, the treasury, the SoS, your boss, or Old Mother Riley, whoever, what have you done about it? Have you protested, have you carried on anyway doing what should be done and damn the consequences, would you resign? Every one who serves a discreditable policy that directly undermines flight safety may one day have to live with the knowledge that an accident such as is subject of this thread resulted. Never mind whether we have armed forces worth a damn in 5 years or 25 years, that is for others. If you are responsible for Airworthiness provision now, then that is your priority. That it cannot be done within the intrigue of the MOD I do not doubt, that is why it must be removed from its control as a matter of urgency and passed to an MAA who will enforce it.

Chug,
Have a look at page 2-22 through to Page 2-24. BAe was involved in the hazard analysis. It wasn't a case of self-policing, as you seem to suggest. It would be very difficult to challenge your boss about a risk when the design authority backs him up with an "improbable" assessment.

However, I am very disappointed that someone on the Nimrod IPT didn't challenge the erroneous stated provision, by a hazard analyst, of a fire detection system in Zone 614 (the accepted seat of the fire) and the assumption that the crossfeed pipe is only used to start engines.

This isn't systemic failure or cost cutting.

At least 2 people, involved with hazard analysis, were not doing their jobs properly.

Hence the Review.

Da4orce,

It was said during the Q&A session following the presentation of the BOI to the House, that of the 12 outstanding recommendations, eight were still under discussion, with four rejected as a result of alternative methods of dealing with the issues that they addressed having been found/accepted.

Fair enough then, the RAF's airworthiness system has been found at fault for not identifying that a super heated pipe was in an unprotected bay and only ever needed a single fuel leak (which i assume most of us would agree is impossible to prevent) on it to ignite. What i want to know is how the hell did british waste-of-Space get away with fitting the thing in the first place?

CLA

skua, ref your last,

I can assure you that we moved as quickly as possible to reach the crash site. In 'just' 50 minutes, we had to be informed of what happened, find some maps of the area (14 nm = approx 30 km and that was outside of our AOR), collect extra ammunition, water, rations etc for a possible stay of up to 72 hrs in an area that was not overwatched by the Taliban, but was smack in the middle of a known Taliban position that was an objective for Op MEDUSA. We then had to get to the chinook that took us and fly there. i'm no expert on how chinooks fly to places, but it certainly isn't in a straight line, especially when there are bloody big mountains in the way. IMHO, 50 mins to do what we did was an amazing effort.

The RCD were already there when we arrived and fortunately they had armoured fighting vehicles. When they left early the next day, we were left in an exposed position surrounded by over 500 'civilians' as well as numerous unarmed Taliban who were recce'ing our positions and preparing to launch an assualt. Thats the reason we were forced to leave the area, but only after we had recovered all the bodies and whatever kit looked vaguely classified or important. If you know a way that this could be done quicker by 40 blokes, on foot, then please tell me.

RIP fellas

Tappers Dad,

Would you mind clarifying your statement on the 10 O'clock new last night when you said words to the effect of Do you mean Nimrod groundcrew and engineers?

Downsizer

relax fella, TD has always been supportive of the people working at ISK.

There is no suggestion anywhere that anything the groundcrew/engineers have done is in anyway a contributory factor. The confusion arises because the SofS mentioned that there could be flaws in the maintenance procedures (not the professional way they have been carried out) as defined by higher authority, caused by any number of factors to be investigated during the next inquiry.

In this case the engineers did everything they were required to do, the argument goes that the books should have required them to do more.

Methinks the inquiry will have huge ramifications for the way the MoD approaches airworthiness in the future.

SB

The BoI yesterday is devasting news, how do we all come to terms with what in Civi St would be classed as corporate man slaughter?
Mr Brownes apology and compensation can be stuck where the sun does not shine. Spend the money on new fuel system rubber seals, a proper maintenance policy and procedure or implementing any of the now eight reccommendations.

Someone needs to be made accountable! (I do understand we are all guilty re GDP % spend on defence, unfortunately I didnt understand the conseqeunces of my political apathy until it was too late)

Respect and thanks to the Canadians who were at the scene and the RAF Regiment who risked there own lives to get there, 50 mins in my mind was amazing.

The VOs have been wonderful, on call 24/7 always available, helpful - Also the techi types that helped explain the BoI need to be thanked, how they kept calm when most knew the crew well, is beyond me!

Keep safe all those still flying.

Archimedes

The reason why I have called for the resignation of these people is simply because they all knew about the fuel leaks and the escalating problems associated with AAR.

CAS and ACAS both knew of the problems concerning AAR and fuel leaks, (as did AOC 2 GP and Stn Cdr ISK). Any one of them could and should have said 'enough, we must fix this problem'

AOC 2Gp was DIRECTLY responsible (I am assured) for personaly authorising all AAR flights post XV230.

Stn Cdr ISK even commented on the problems and effectively 'forcast' further problems.

Couple all of that with the fact that they all knew about the BAe and QQ reports and I rest my case Sir.

This has been an unmitifgated disaster, both for the RAF, Aircrew and Groundcrew alike and more especially, for the families and friends of those lost. It is nothing short of a scandal that this occurred in the first place, and it is a greater scandal that no one yet appears to be carrying the can and doing the right and proper thing.

downsizer
I do not believe TD was refering to the groundcrew or the engineers at all. I'm pretty sure he was refering to those I mention above, and expecting them to make the correct decisions. Clearly they didn't, and the likes of TD and the other families are left behind to ponder 'what if'
I'm sure Graham himself will clarify for you exactloy what he was meaning.

The Winco

ps GAR
You forget to mention the billions of pounds that go in foreign aid each year to the likes of Sudan (the people that wanted to execute a teacher about a teddy bear called Muhammed, remember?) and all the asylum seekers, and the other 'worthy' causes.

I'm sure Tappers Dad meant those in charge, the desk pilots, the people who ignored the 2004 incident recommendations, which second time around ended in tragedy, the budget holders who feel the risk to life was acceptable, no where was financial constraints mentioned in the BoI as a contributing factor?! Those on the ground who felt it was not worth spending time and money on an old plane soon to retire, fingers crossed let people risk their lives! The people with the power and budgets.

Winco - 100% agree well said