RAF v RN - Falklands
 

At the suggestion of a forum member, am reading Jerry Pook's book RAF Harrier Ground Attack Falklands.
As a naïve civilian - staggered by the enmity at the time between the senior service and the crabs, and the navy's lack of co-ordination/knowledge of GR3 capabilities and SOPs in a ground attack role.
I assume that given there is no longer a Fleet Air Arm, it's a different world - i.e. Navy carriers and RAF F-35s operate as one totally integrated team?
Am sure there's still banter...

Tartare
 

There’s a nice fella, with a beard, that might be able to help you out. Now what’s his name again? Fishy? Sharpy?

BV

I never quite understood it but RN Officers seemed to be trained from a very early age to hate the RAF. The feeling was not reciprocated as far as I remember.

Oh God. I've read his book too.
Am staying well away...

In my experience, the RN officers were always more 'on message' than we were. Whether that meant they were better informed, or more indoctrinated than us, was never clear to me, but it was unusual to hear them criticise the RN in a public forum. Maybe we were just a bunch of whingers.

In my career, I have been both an RN and an RAF officer. The main difference between the two in my experience was the RN did not care about your family whereas the RAF did - in those days. For example the RN had no equivalent to Families Flt and and if an RN arrival interview included your family circumstances, it was just social chit chat rather than a genuine enquiry.

Historically that makes sense

the Navy used to send ships on long deployments and often switched bases - almost all of their strength was at sea and many missions were well over six months or even years.

The RAF had a very very large tail, almost all of which was deployed around the same base for long periods. Very few missions lasted over 10 hours.

When you married a sailor (civil or military) you knew what you were getting into and loving care attention never came into it.

Ooo, the WAFU aren't going to like that, banter or not.

​​​​​​They're still hanging in there.

https://www.royalnavy.mod.uk/our-org.../fleet-air-arm

The relationship between RN and RAF at squadron level was excellent during Corporate. We worked (and slept!) very much as a team and even flew as part of the same attack package on occasions. Where problems occurred, they were caused by the loss of RN expertise in tasking and co-ordinating ground attack missions. This was in turn a result of the wilderness years between F4/Bucc ops and the advent of the SHAR.

To the RN, aircraft are merely another weapon in the ready-use locker, whereas in the RAF they are their raison d’être - a not-so-subtle difference! This was exacerbated by personalities and it was rumoured that the Captain of Hermes was fighting three wars; the first against the RAF, the second against HMS Invincible and the third against the Argentines. We spent a lot of time attempting to ameliorate this, with varying degrees of success.

Where the RN won was in their belief in independent action. The RN pilot had much more flexibility in peacetime, which meant that flying at 50’ was the norm and did not require a special course in Scotland to achieve! Hence our ability to fly comfortably below 20’ on our very first attack mission against a heavily defended airfield and not lose a single aircraft from the team of 12.

As mentioned in Jerry’s book, the GR3s very offered the brown end of the stick and put in harm’s way to protect the SHARs. This was because it was (rightly) assessed that air defence would be critical to the success of the endeavour and the only aircraft that could do that were the 21 SHARs.

Having served in both light and dark blue uniforms, I can honestly say that the only discrimination I suffered was at the hands of the RAF - when I was still light blue but serving with the RN. I was actually told by my desk officer that my glowing Annual Report from the RN after the Falklands would not be considered when I was assessed for promotion, as it was not from a RAF unit. My riposte was short and to the point, which did not enhance my prospects!

Swing the lamp!

In my (albeit brief) acquaintance with the RN and RAF the gaping divide seemed to be between the RN's pragmatic and 'operational' approach to events compared to the RAF's obsession with bureaucracy and procedure. When things go awry on a ship anyone and everyone needs to take such action as is necessary on the spot often without waiting for instructions and this has translated into a can-do and will-do attitude that the RAF never seemed to have. Mogwi's illustration re low flying is a perfect example. A RN colleague of mine went on to instruct at Shawbury at the joint helo training school and one day was tasked to collect a VIP from another station. He did his planning and was stopped by the duty Ops Officer who told him he wasn't authorised to go as the weather was too bad - it was a blue sky day. The Ops goon pointed out there was fog visible to the North. But I'm going South he explained...No, standing orders say fog in the vicinity, no flying...and my pal was an instructor - teaching IF! You couldn't make it up!
The difference is exemplified by the old tale of the crab and RN officer who pass each other in the Gent's. Seeing the RN officer shake off the drips, zip up and leave the crab later approaches him in the bar and rather haughtily anounces that at Cranwell they were taught, for hygiene's sake, to wash their hands after a pee. The Naval officer retorted that at Dartmouth they were just advised not to pee on their fingers...
I shan't go into the Junglies sleeping under their cabs in the desert in Iraq while the Chinook pilots wouldn't deploy anywhere without air-con portacabins and showers positioned in advance, or the GR3 guys whingeing about being embarked away from home for a week or two and claiming sub standard accommodation allowances which gained them little respect, as one would imagine.
Later in both civvy helo and airline ops the ex RAF were always the stiff, inflexible operators always calling Ops for instructions/approval while the RN and Army guys were almost always much more easygoing and creative too when it came to workarounds and problems.
There's definately a substantial cultural difference.

"In my (albeit brief) acquaintance with the RN and RAF the gaping divide seemed to be between the RN's pragmatic and 'operational' approach to events compared to the RAF's obsession with bureaucracy and procedure". Hmm, I picked up my Frag Sheet from Lower Air Ops on Ark in Feb 2003, for one of our first sorties over Northern Kuwait (which meant flying through the highly alert SAM defences, both afloat and onshore…) and I noted that some of the CSAR/SPINS information seemed a bit 'Off' for CAOC generated procedures (they were very RN colloquial…). When I challenged the staff they admitted that they were used to 'making it up' as they were normally part of a self-licking lollipop of a Naval Task Group, and this 'Littoral Stuff' where they needed to operate under an ACC was all a bit 'different'. All the time we were 'working up' off Cyprus and even in Oman, this really didn't matter, but the fact they hadn't mentally clicked over to the 'real deal' was a little concerning, to say the least. A short 'rebrief' later, the appropriate CAOC issued details were retrieved and provided, and the Ops Team provided a stellar service, 24/7, henceforth. On this occasion, I was pleased to be the 'bureaucracy and procedure' obsessed RAF aircrew….

Oh, and 'I shan't go into the Junglies sleeping under their cabs in the desert in Iraq while the Chinook pilots wouldn't deploy anywhere without air-con portacabins' is total and utter b*llocks. I checked into the 'Boeing Hilton' for several nights in the desert in 2003, and slept in nothing else but a non-air conditioned tent until the end of the war (complete with being flooded out of one at Al Amarah during a thunderstorm). In fact, the only reason we had to sleep in the cabs and/or crap tents prior to the start of the campaign was that the RN PR machine needed the Junglies to be involved on the first night and their asthmatic Sea Kings lacked the ability to move 6 troops the 30-odd miles from the ship to the objective and back because the ship drivers (understandably) wanted to keep their ships outside SSM range. It was the RN hierarchy that pushed us into the desert, and under SCUD attack (including a few hours in CBRN kit), rather than apply the pragmatic military solution of using the additional Chinooks at AAS and disembarking the Sea Kings….who, likely, would have joined the battle at first light with the rest of the SHF after the USMC insert was abruptly terminated after the tragic loss of the CH-46.


Sorry, didn't mean to enter a rant…Spent a lot of time with the RN over the years and always enjoyed my time on Ops with the Junglies (and even WAFUs…), several of whom became good friends.

You are Sharky Ward and I claim my £5.

The Chinook guys who left HMS Ocean in 2002 and ended up at Bagram were in tents with no Air Con, eating boil in the bag and ****ting in an oil can (the Junglies had sailed home at that point), likewise those based at Basra in 2003, who spent the summer heatwave in an office block with no windows or aircon, just like the Junglies. I'm not sure which Chinook crews insisted on air con in Iraq, given the invasion was in Winter you may have dreamt that one.

Otherwise, a well reasoned post of stereotypical tropes and latent inferiority. Bravo!

I found in my latter years of Service, that the RAF sought specific authority to undertake tasks, whereas the RN undertook them unless they were specifically not authorised to.

I wonder if the 5 Bde BASO could be persuaded to chip in here - he once mentioned to me that RAF/AAC crews stuck to the tasks allocated and would RTB on completion for refuel, re-arm and rebrief. RN crews, however, would go on the first task they'd been allocated then stick around with that unit doing any other tasks they requested, rather than being useful to the Brigade as a whole. Obvs 2nd-hand and generalisations, but it was a source of frustration when assets were so limited.

Meleagertoo's dits of the First Gulf Unpleasantness are greatly at variance with my recollection of our time at Al Jouf - the politicking involved in trying to give the RN SKs an SF role were beyond a joke, they were a serious distraction.

I sure, however, that his QHI oppo - an IF instructor too (wow...) - would have handled his destination being fogged-in with aplomb, what with the amazing IFR reserves of the mighty Gazelle.

Not your best effort, Sharky..

RAF vs RN
 

I love how some think an individual’s personal viewpoint from a very narrow standpoint can be assumed to mean anything whatsoever. Applying this view to an entire organisation is myopic to say the least.

For what it’s worth I think the RAF is better than the RN. Because I said so.

BV

I have no knowledge of the RAF vs RN in the Falklands other than what I have read about so I cannot offer any useful contributions.

RAF ... accustomed to working on a fixed base with all facilities,
RN ... accustomed to working on a lonely bouncing base surrounded by water.
Army ... accustomed to working from tents in mud/sand in the middle of nowhere.

I can see how various mindsets can evolve.

In my experience, the mindset required to "fight" a ship (float, move, fight) is very similar to the mindset required to keep an RAF base operational and a long way from the Army way of thinking, from the blank looks I got when trying to do the same thing on an Army base, who bizarrely seemed to have no idea of Ground Defence as it was known then. Is it still Survive to Operate these days?

In my experience, the RN didn't believe they needed weather limits (or any others for that matter) because they felt so superior to the RAF and told everyone could always get the job done.

That explains the myriad of dits detailing close calls, almost mid-airs, just getting in by the skin of their teeth and, btw, quite a few actual accidents.

I was at a training ground near Peterborough one day in fog, with all the training tasking cancelled and then a Navy Wessex appeared over the fence having hover taxied for miles to get there - FOR A TRAINING EXERCISE.

Nuff said about attitude.

Whenever a batch of naval students pitched up for an OCU course, they were generally a refreshing change.

Less refreshing was that they would do half a dog watch (navel terminology), and then go and drive a boat in accordance with general list career paths, necessitating training replacements.

Not too sure about gleeful cries of man overboard for stepping on the grass.

But thanks for runs ashore and mooses milk

In the autumn of ‘82, I was ashore in Stanley with a det of 2 x SHARs (living in the Upland Goose not the green tents!) to help No 1(F) with the air defence rôle by flying mixed pairs. Fatty Ives invited us to bounce a four-ship GR3 SAP that they had planned around the islands, which we were very happy to do.

At the briefing, it was stated that the GR3s would be NB 250’ (it’s a peace-time low flying area now - oh no it’s not!) and we were invited to stay above 500’ AGL. I pointed out that this height would negate any training value for us and I that was able to authorise the SHARs down to 50’ AGL, as that would be our modus operandi. There was a great harrumph and I was invited to booger orf in fine pitch. As it transpired, we already had their route and timings and “happened across” them numerous times on the way round anyway.

I think the boys enjoyed it but we weren’t invited to the debrief!

Mog

My ex Marine friends tell me that, if they had a man down in Borneo, they always tried to get a Navy helicopter for a medivac as they were more likely to cope with whatever clearing was available. The instructor who taught me to fly was RAF and based at Boscombe Down. One of the many aircraft he flew was a Beaver. At that time there was a flight of Army Beavers at Old Sarum and these guys used to go out looking for difficult fields to land in. My RAF instructor was not even allowed to land his Beaver at Compton Abbas, or anywhere there wasn't regulation fire and rescue facilities.

My STO office [5 of us] in RAF War Plans and Policy was shut down in 1992. Some of our work was transferred to HQ STC. I have no idea whether anything emerged from there.

Slightly later I was asked to lead the revision of the Met. Office War Book. Then suddenly it didn't need revision. I doubt if it exists now.

These piping times of peace do seem rather edgy, do they not?.

A Navy Wessex showed up out of the murk while the RAF sat perched like Sea Gulls on Dolphins.:D

I suppose it will take the Navy to explain the concept to Air Force.


https://cimg3.ibsrv.net/gimg/pprune....531a160d73.jpg

RAF/RN Culture Differences
 

Whilst on RAF IOT at Cranwell in 1981- 5 of us were told on Thursday we would be travelling to Dartmouth on Sat to compete in Tri college cross country- We arrived and the RAF SRego who was with us told us the RAF had always come last in this race and the same would happen this time but we were to try hard!
The RN team were all Marine officers who had returned from Artic Warfare to train for the event several weeks earlier- one chap asked me how long we had been training - we only heard on Thursday was the reply - he asked if we had any men with us- we were perplexed till he mentioned that they would never run with enlisted men in the team because if one fell they would have to stop. The Sandhurst team showed up and each one was an Ethiopian officer cadet -yep, we came last by a long way. That night we went into the Dartmouth cadets mess- they appeared to do an 18 month IOT - all in a large barrack block with dawn sailing on the Dart- we were invited ashore for drinks- I returned to Cranwell defeated in the race but with a better appreciation of the different cultures of the services and the relative ease of our 18 week IOT compared to the RN course!

I have worked with a number of former RM/Army Commando types.

All would prefer an RN Pilot to retrieve them if the weather went belly up.

Enough said surely.

TN.

I flew with several test pilots at Farnborough from all 4 services; they were all excellent but the best ones were the Royal Marines and Army Air Corps in that order.

Thanks Mog, was unaware of those personality dynamics, and will read the rest of the book with that perspective overlaid.
First reaction was it's crazy that egos and inter-personal conflicts still blow up amongst those who are leading the people who are fighting and dying - but then on reflection it's been that way throughout military history, and probably always will be!
I continue to find Falklands stories absolutely extraordinary - and am working on the screenplay.

Just read Paul Tremelling's book Harrier 'How To Be a Fighter Pilot' which has some comments relevant to the subject under discussion in a later era.

Damn good book that.
His description of 2 ship low-level close air-support in a narrow valley in Afghanistan (?) in marginal weather was hair raising...!

Meanwhile the US Army is giving itself another medal for turning up to work on time...........

Reminds me of the Incirkik Ryder Cup…..strange how the RAF always won with its special golf team always on Det that week….

I don't remember much whingeing from them when I was on a TACP, organising RAF MERT to extract them in some unbelievably dangerous situations. So probably not enough said.

Rather like the meeting of the heads with Maggie on 2nd April 82, where CAS said he couldn’t help, head pongo said he would require 30k troops to retake the islands and 1SL said “We will sail on Monday Ma’am”. (I paraphrase!) And we did. The only SHARs left behind were still on the production line at Dunsfold.

Mog

Yes, some of our SAR rearcrew were on the MERT dets and their tales of recovery under fire are hair-raising - maybe TN could just remind us what the RN helicopters were doing at the time?

On 4th April 1982, 42 Sqn received the warning order. The following day 2 Nimrods departed for Ascension. On the 7th April they flew the first surveillance sorties south of Ascension. Just remind us how far your war canoe had got by that time Mog?😜

YS

If we return to the time of the thread, I believe a lot of the problem stemmed from the fact that prior to the war John Knott was about to cut the Navy. So when the war broke out the Navy saw it as a way to prove they were the force that was needed. An example is, what to 72 Sqn became known as Op Headless Chicken. 5 Bde was due to sail along with the Puma Force, until someone at Northwood said Pumas can't operate off ships. Oh so where is there another Wessex Squadron they said. Send 72 they said. So in typical War Film fashion we were all at a Squadron Dining In when the Sqn Cdr was given the message, you're off to war. Over the Easter weekend we all packed and flew from NI back to Benson passing the Pumas going to take over in NI. Engineers worked like beavers to modify our Cabs for the cold weather and we raided stores for war kit having handed it all in when we went to NI. Sqn Cdr went to Northwood for final briefing before embarking, to be told by Admiral Fieldhouse, "You can **** off back to Ireland, I don't want anymore Crabs in my War". We returned to NI, Pumas returned to Odiham, our wife's had had a party and drank all the Booze and the Navy reformed 847 with Wessex that had been in storage and with aircrew that had been in Desk Jobs. So from the very top it was seen as a Navy war and they didn't need any help from anyone and certainly not a fully operational RAF squadron!

I can confirm the RAF "We have no plan" scenario from an oblique source.
C Met O HQSTC rang me [I was P Met O 1 Group Bawtry]. "The bastards have invaded the Falklands!"
Me: "What are my orders sir [or some such humble stance]?"
C Met O: "Nobody appears to have a plan. Just stay near the phone".

With the best will in the world LB, but 42 Sqn deployed to Ascension, not on the spur of the moment, but to an operating base with which they were acquainted and visited on a regular basis. There may have been no contingency to retake the Falklands but there were plans in place to operate in the South Atlantic and it was some of these that were activated. I doubt that the C Met O would have been aware of any relevant contingency plans, other than in the broadest terms.

YS

Point taken. At that time Met was not operating a southern hemisphere numerical forecast model. I was an ex-programmer and also ex-Central Forecast Office southern hemisphere analyst, but latterly got near the sharper end, where my spiritual home had always been.

Certainly Met support for S hemisphere was pretty crude [upper winds were very much based on what previous aircraft had reported].
In a commendably short space of time the numerical model was extended to S hemisphere once the balloon went up. If there were contingency plans to extend south, they did not get much priority before the invasion..

The other area where C Met O should have been in the loop is the involvement of the Mobile Met Office: forecasters holding VR commissions, because he was their head honcho at one star level. I had a fair few MMU staff on my books [eleven stations] and there was precious little excitement in the early days.

But it was a long time ago and I do not trust my memory so I have to claim E & O. E!