He was an excellent administrator. And did a bloody good job with Hermes. Given that the thing was sinking most of the time and positioned quite so far to the East. Compared to N.
Frankly we were blessed with all our commanders, Moore/ LM and Woodward. They weren’t there to be charitable !

Unlikely of course in your role but, for your amusement on a lighter note, I understand that LM was underwhelmed when the then FOF2, inbound in a Lynx after a sea day, and flying past HERMES at anchor in Plymouth Sound, had the pilot hover in front of HERMES's very bulbous bow and pass the message "From FOF2 to HERMES: 'Would you like me to pick your nose?'":hmm:

Jack

It would probably have grated even more as his son was a Lynx pilot. And landed on Hermes during the conflict.

Lovely (true) story; The late great Fred was sent ashore by LM to find out how we could help them out. On return LM asked what the escorts had asked for and Fred answered “Send more CAP, Sir”. LM explained that he had to keep a couple of SHARs in the anti-shipping rôle in case 25 de Mayo hove over the horizon (they were hidden aft of the island, so that the admiral didn’t see them).

Next question was “Did you see my son?” To which Fred answered in the affirmative. LM then asked if his son had sent him a message, to which Fred answered “Yes, Sir, he said SEND MORE EFFIN CAP!”

Fred dismissed!

Mog

Happy ship
 

I'd like to ask a more general question but vaguely in keeping with the thread about a term I've heard - "Happy ship" vs I suppose an Unhappy ship. Having never been to sea would anyone care to elaborate?

Just a general feeling about the way that the ship
is run and therefore the general atmosphere onboard. Bear in mind that that bit of floating ( or submerging ) metal becomes your home very quickly and you form attachments to it. And the people therein.
Hermes had the nickname the Happy H. Quite where it came from Lord knows and I’m not sure it was overly applicable during Corporate… see the foregoing. It was however quite well run as a fighting unit. Others better placed than me but the carriers in general had a good reputation, Eagle, Ark and the later Ark and Illustrious. Perhaps it was just the space available and the work.
In general terms the old man on any ship or boat ( sub for you landlubbers) had more than his part to play in the atmosphere on the ship. But it was management at every level that counted and the senior rates were the real man managers. Led usually by the Master at Arms or Coxswain on lesser ships or subs. It could also just boil down to the actual material state of the ship, (Hermes was in a dreadful state from age, as were Plymouth, and the rest of the Type 12’s, some of the RFA’s. Some limped home with damage {just about} .like Glasgow etc). Exeter had a terrible hammering, saw lots of action, had been dragged off an exercise on the wrong side of the planet, had a green ships’ company that wasn’t trained fully or worked up properly, yet managed to survive Bomb Alley reasonably intact and was an extremely ‘ happy ship’. I doubt that any one reason could be pinned down for that. It would make for an interesting case study some day.
Finally the ships’ programme ( applicable obviously in peacetime) had its part to play. A decent time ashore, as opposed to a “gash run”, and a bit of vitamin D etc worked wonders for morale. In that part of the world the only decent run would have been Buenos Aires or Montevideo; we were frankly a bit PNG in one and we used the other for disembarking prisoners ( a story for another day ). And we were a bit short on sunshine. However I had visited both with the Navy in pre conflict days and they were excellent. And great for morale.. and indeed queues outside the sick bay, for certain parts ( pun intended ) of the ships’ company.
Witness that recent execrable offering about the carrier on TV where a) there are no vantage points to occasionally watch flying ops { vital for morale for the non flyers } and therefore they are locked down in the Stygian doom for days on end and b) they went all round the Far East and couldn’t get off due to Covid and c) had Covid outbreaks on board and were confined to their mess decks and quite frankly I’ve no idea how they avoided a mutiny.
I was fortunate to serve in primarily happy ships. Despite some fairly dire circumstances on occasion.

As SLXOwft said, I too can vouch that 1980s Dartmouth staff were indeed still teaching the RAF's underhand behaviour in the matter of the CVA01 etc cancellation of the 1960s (whether rightly or wrongly; and indeed whether it was necessary or not). There was definitely a sense in that period (and since) that the RN had to work extra hard simply to maintain its viability as a reasonably rounded force.

Regarding skippers being fairly grim individuals the RAF shouldn't feel particularly singled out. If you take a read of Bartosik's behaviour you'll appreciate that they could be even more grim to their own brethren. This is only one of many such dits I've heard over the years,

"During his time in command of London he was involved in a notorious incident. Having sacked his second-in-command in the newly commissioned guided-missile destroyer London in late 1965, he was sent the strong character Mike Henry as a replacement. When London arrived in Singapore for maintenance work Bartosik, for unspecified reasons, had him placed under arrest in his cabin. Mike Henry endured this treatment, but the Fleet chaplain had to intervene with the Captain of the Fleet to obtain his release."

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jozef_Bartosik

To be fair to the late Captain Mike Henry, you missed a bit in your quotation from Wiki, and in order to keep a proper perspective on the current thread subject, it may also be helpful to see what, with deference to Chugalug and apologies for quoting myself, he and I posted in 2015, vide:

"Union Jack

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The highest rank they obtained, at least as far as I am aware, was Wing Commander. - Chugalug

That is rather sad for many reasons in view of their outstanding war service, and provides an interesting, and perhaps equally sad, contrast with the post war career of Rear Admiral Józef Bartosik CB DSC, as will readily be seen by reading between the lines in both

Rear-Admiral Joe Bartosik - Telegraph

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J%C3%B3zef_Bartosik

The reference in the latter to Commander (later Captain) Mike Henry in which the then Captain Bartosik is quoted as saying 'that he considered Henry unsuitable for an important submarine appointment "understood to be impending"' is of special interest since the appointment concerned was as Commanding Officer of HMS RESOLUTION (Port Crew), the first Royal Navy Polaris submarine, and subsequently as Captain of the 10th Submarine Squadron, consisting of the four SSBNs.https://www.pprune.org/images/smilies/thumbs.gif

Jack
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Thanks for those interesting links, UJ. It seems that Bartosik was very much the exception, both for good and for bad! I guess that generalisations about the Poles, or any other group of people for that matter, are best avoided as every one is an individual. There is no doubt though that as a group they very much enhanced the Royal Air Force, both in their finest hour and thereafter.

Danny good point about sons and daughters, and their sons and daughters in turn. The RAF especially should be proud of its Polish constituents and hopefully will always contain them in that way.
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Fiat lux!

Jack

For a further insight into the Falklands campaign a recently published book mostly about the land battle, written from a Welsh Guardsman's perspective and focusing on how the Galahad tragedy occurred "Too thin for a Shroud" is a very sobering read.

Appalling.

He tells his story from his perspective as a very junior officer. I think it is fair to say that there is another way to describe the events leading to the Sir Galahad tragedy that places the blame in a different place.I recommend reading a variety of accounts.

Reading around the subject more fully is good advice Timelord. It may be that as a junior officer his view might not be complete but as a non-military lay person this book has shocked me. Very much.

I shall indeed endeavour to read more.

Probably the most sobering 40 minutes of my life CAPing at 10k overhead the Galahad and Tristram that evening, watching the superhuman efforts of the helos trying to rescue the Welsh Guards. A thoroughly avoidable debacle with massive loss of life.

Luckily, we caught the second wave but not before one of them had hit F4 north of Lively Island. Then came the long, dark transit back for my first ever night deck landing - in a thunderstorm with 90 secs of fuel remaining. But that is another story.

Mog

Ewan Southby-Tailyour's work would be a good place to go next if you wish to read more on the subject.

Mog, Tell us more. That is a very interesting story - only 90 secs of fuel left on a dark and dirty night!!

Or you could just buy his book…!!

​​​​​​​A fine read, it will give you all the detail you might want.

Chapters XVII and XVIII of Reasons in Writing to be precise and should be read in context with Chapter 8 of Michael Clapp's Amphibious Assault Falklands (wriiten with the help of Ewan Southby-Tailyour)

Loss of the Chinooks and Wessii on Atlantic Conveyor was part of the root cause, others were politics, unfamiliarity with amphibious ops, disobeyed orders from CTG 317.0, break down in communications, cap badge rivalry, general fog of war etc.

Probably a whole '5 Brigade v 3 Commando Brigade - Falklands' thread for another forum.:sad:

The reanimation of this thread allows me to ask Mog a question that has been niggling me.

I presume that this would be for two unlucky pilots on a last ditch suicide mission with retarded iron bombs - did planning get as far as the attack profile? Or was there a theory 2 inch could render the flight deck u/s?

The sortie was meant to be a “training” trip to complete my night deck qual and was supposed to be my first inky-poo landing. We were scrambled to cover the Tristram and Galahad after the first attack and witnessed the carnage from the overhead.

I was just approaching Bingo fuel when a further attack developed and the two of us got stuck into 4 Skyhawks at extremely (below 50’) low level. I splashed 2 with AIM9, one at V close range and one who evaded, then emptied my 30mm at a third without a gunsight (but managed 1 hit on the port flap) before pulling off. My #2 splashed him with a L and we both headed home without enough gas to get there.

luckily the ship headed towards us at max speed which allowed us to just make it back for a straight-in, glide approach from 90 miles, only touching the throttle for the first time at about 500’ as we cleared the cloud. Loads of braking stop, power and flare, followed by “expeditious” VL with the fuel low level lights flashing madly.

300 lbs remained on shut-down (200lbs/min in the hover) and pilots notes suggest up to 300 can be unuseable depending upon attitude (aircraft not pilot!).

Luckily they kept the bar open for us.

Mog

PS I am now very close friends with the fourth guy, who got back to Argentina being towed by a Herc, as fuel peed out the back of his Skyhawk as fast as it went in the front.

We did have a planned attack profile using a mix of 2” rockets and KRT against the Type 42s but this would have been a 2-ship, KRT only, low-level attack. Not good!

Mog

KRT for the slow of thinking Mog?

CG

Seems the Oppo's had their own share of Heroes as in most Wars where folks on both sides rise to the occasion when needed and earn the respect of their foes.