As was once said after a USAF briefing "What the Major (Sqn/Ldr) really means is...."..it`s been a really big `f**k-up all along......
Shame you didn`t throw in a few `leaning forwards`,reaching-out,and picking -up the the low-fruiting hangers-on` in that `total management concept` there Beags...!!:cool:

IIRC, THE 'J' was almost two years late into service as Lockheed seriously underestimated the task.This caused the 'K' to be run on longer than anticipated with a huge knock on effect on spares and personnel. None of this could have reasonably been forseen by the RAF as it was not until late in the day that Lockheed came clean about the problems with their 'easy' project.

I think you’re being generous there AA62. Not sure quite how long it took for FOC to be achieved. LM took on a lot with the J, but the UK was not helped by an appallingly badly written contract that was then poorly enforced. It was treated as a COTS buy, but had to undergo full development.

Mr N,
I am sure you are right but whatever the (usual) lousy contract said the boys and girls at the coal face had to do with an increasingly unserviceable 'K' fleet.
My only contact with the 'J' came as a member of the HEART when we visited Abbey Wood for the day The team there were very cagey about the 'J' and it did not inspire us with confidence By the time the 'J' came into service I had already left having already been extended for a year to do the HEART job.
As the RAF was the 'J' launch customer I think that Lockheed could have shown a bit more respect ! Perhaps I am being very naive !

I doubt the ‘naive’ bit. The J procurement was a mess. LM ran rings around the MoD, their poorly written contract, and the people on the PT. I was out at Marietta on one visit and was having a look around one of our new J models during testing. It had obviously failed one particular test, but I remember the LM engineer clearly expected the RAF engineer witnessing the test to sign it off. He didn’t, but i have always thought that was only because I was there.

I seem to remember LM was paying to have the aircraft ‘stored’ in the UK (Marshall’s?) as they needed them out of the way.

Those who think the J should be retained for longer should perhaps consider the state that these aircraft are in after years of brutal work in the deserts of Afghan, Iraq, Kuwait and Saudi. My informants tell me that they are effectively "life expired" and the only solution along the "J" road is brand new replacements.

The MoD had already begun a centre wing-box replacement programme to extend the fleet out to 2035.

sounds like they probably need a bit more than just a centre wing box. Didn’t the last avionics block upgrade get cancelled?

At least two are done and back in service already

if they sell them off there`ll be a big `cancellation` fee going to Marshalls...

You don’t understand how the MOD works. They’ll complete the program and then sell them for less than the cost of the work to another Air Force that will get 20 years of service from the ‘tired’ frames!

Re avionics upgrade, It would be interesting to know, as the upgrade to Block 8.1 sounds fairly crucial to the aircraft's continued viability. As recently as last year it was referred to as being "under way".

Kabul
 

Are there no rules regarding covid in Afghanistan?

Is that relevant to this thread?

In respect of avionic updates to the Hercules fleet as part of our remit the HEART team interviewed the civil servant overseeing ' the 'K' ' HINS nav update It was very late and over budget.
It appeared that the contract for the INS bit and GPS bit had been given to different companies without either one being responsible for the whole. When difficulties arose each, predictably blamed each other ! The 'overseer ' seemed not bothered in the least at this sate of affairs despite the urgent need to get it into service.

Ken,3 of the `K`s went to Austria,and 2 to SriLanka( maybe even ex-tankers) and still appear to be working....

Unfortunately AA, still a common failure, despite being mandated in every aviation contract. FADEC for Chinook Mk1, and MADGE for SHAR FRS1, being obvious examples with far-reaching effects.

Indeed, sycamore, I did the odd training sortie to their home base and would occasionally see them flying. It would seem there’s still some life in the old dogs!

The Sri Lankan’s did take a couple of the old tankers and they really were tired. Multiple sorties at TOWs of 175,000lb did take their toll, as did the fighter affiliation even if we had to burn down to 135,000lb (as I recall) before we started to rack up the FI. Happy days!!

Back to the original question of retaining the J - a few years ago I had to host an amiable young lady at one of the OM annual shindigs for local dignitaries. She was from the A400 wing design team at Filton and I asked her about battle damage repair to the composite wing. She said there was none possible and that a single round through the structure would scrap the entire wing. ‘How many spare wings were there?’ I asked. ‘’None’ she said...

So in any future war scenario we might need some alternative Tac AT ac!

2 went to Mexico as well

The Dutch recently rejected the A400 as the C130 replacement as it had operational limitations.
Every other A400 operator apart from Belgium operates either the C130 & / or C235 / C295.
The RAF C130 fleet was due to remain in service until 2035 & If the RAF were replacing them with C295 or C27J it may make more sense.
In an increasing volatile world both politically & with more adverse weather conditions any cut to our transport fleet (fixed wing & rotary) seems a very short sighted decision.