It is possible for parts of an AAIB report to be used as evidence in a criminal trial if the content is deemed admissible and the required parts are presented formally as a witness statement. In AH's trial, one example was that 'Annex H - Report on Data Gathering Flying Related to the Accident to G-BXFI' from the AAIB report was presented by the author and thereafter was available to the court. At this point, the author, who had been working for AAIB as an advisor, became an expert witness for the trial.

H Peacock,
I am not suggesting that we can live in a world which is risk free, but simply that there are sometimes consequences which are so unpalatable that the risk of them occurring has to be demonstrably extremely small to allow the activity to rationally take place. I would respectfully submit that civil aviation operations around busy airports are demonstrably very low risk, whereas display flying particularly of vintage fast jets is not.
Don't get me wrong, I love to see vintage aircraft put through their paces, but the venue has to be appropriate to the intended display. I don't think Shoreham was, and I don't think that is down to the pilot.

As far as the UK goes fatalities and accidents at air shows generally have been through a spate in the last 20 or so years. Biggin Hill saw two in as many days in 2001, a Hurricane was lost with the Pilot at Shoreham a few years ago, there have been others, all so far have involved vintage ex military types. Back in the late forties and early fifties, every annual Battle of Britain 'At Home' day would see at least two fatalities! But then we're looking at around 70 odd similar events on the same day! Something else to make the modern mind boggle.

FB

Even the best practised are not immune from errors, though in this case he had a safe place in which to crash. The Hunter test pilot, Bill Bedford, demonstrating the aircraft to the Swiss made the error of forgetting he was displaying at a high altitude airport and on the down line of a loop realised he may not make it, but did.

If it wasn't a loop, what was it...?!

As much of this post involves discussion of loops, to keep the record straight I believe that Bill's event that you describe was actually during the recovery from an intentional spin, not a loop.

I feel that there is little correlation between these statistics and the Shoreham accident. You have to look at why the accident rate was as it was in the '50s and '60s. There is nothing to indicate that at Shoreham there was any causal factor related to the aircraft type or its era. There are certainly factors related to it being a swept wing jet but those apply equally to types that are in production today. The Hunter has generally very good, benign flying qualities. Its main (only?) deficiency is that it is easy to exceed the g limit during manoeuvres involving rapid g onset rates but that will not cause air display accidents. The main consideration with aeroplanes of this era is that for flying in IMC the instruments, unless updated, require 'old skills' and are unreliable. However, as the aircraft that are displayed are cleared for VMC only that is not a safety factor in this context.

One more point of accuracy with respect to 'In the time of the Hunter ..', the Hunter remained in RAF service until 1994 and MAA registered ones are still flying today!

Thanks for the education Mr Lomcevak, I am sorry, I didn’t realize posts were being graded on this thread. I assumed comment was still allowed. I’ll run the next post past my lawyer.

Oddly enough even with my lack of SA, when I was flying in close with a Hunter in the 90s, I actually spotted it was still flying. But then as 6 crashed on the same day in 1956, I reckon that carries more weight. Using your logic, we still live in the time of Bleriot seeing as the Shuttleworth collection get one out every now and then.

So, on the topic of Dad's ....mine kept the newspaper cuttings from most of the 50s air crashes and I recall the six Hunter article - my recollection is it was weather related, with most of the jets running out of fuel after trying to find somehwere to put down in thick fog.

See following link.

https://aviation-safety.net/wikibase/wiki.php?id=58328

It would seem a dangerous precedent has been set - have a defence of cognitive impairment that is impossible to prove either way (but the burden of proof is on the prosecution) and you can basically do anything in an aircraft and get away with it - frankly sir the law is an ass!

Digression but this may be of interest.
I joined the Met Office that year. The West Raynham Hunter debacle was infamous, but I never understood why the purveyor of the rubbish forecast was not himself/ herself infamous ........ cock ups much less serious were embedded in the folklore, such as losing 1000 racing pigeons.or suggesting that Holme on Spalding Moor would be a good div.
Perhaps losing aircraft to rubbish forecasts was all in the day's work.

I have to say Legalapproach, that you and your colleagues played an absolute blinder by introducing the Cognitive Impairment aspect to the defence. With no way of proving that it did or didn't happen via medical evidence, then strictly by the book, there is no way a conviction could have occurred under the burden of proof.

Job done. Forget about everything else. 1-0 to the defence.

If a true jury of peers drawn from suitably qualified pilots had sat for this case I wonder if the verdict would have been different. Juries always seem to struggle with more specialist cases (eg Mike Morison) and now high-performance aviation and aviation medicine can be added to the list of troublesome topics.

I still don't know how AH can live with himself with the defence he offered. My professional open-mindedness was slammed shut when he claimed almost no knowledge and no RAF training with respect to the effects of G when flying high-performance aircraft - including the relatively low G available when flying so slow. These were utterly absurd and untruthful statements that were designed to deceive, yet the prosecution did not have the counter to hand. I understand that he was entitled to defend himself and that the burden of proving a case is with the prosecution but you would struggle to find any RAF or RN fast-jet aircrew who thought his answers on that subject were accurate or truthful.

The chap came close to crashing on take-off on that fateful day - that could have been a better outcome for all concerned. We could then just debate the wisdom of no proper performance calculations and the mystery of accepting a tailwind in an aircraft that he had almost no experience flying.

Hi LOMCEVAK, all the references I've seen say loop when demonstrating the aircraft to the Swiss, during one course the event was used as an example of the effects of DA on performance, and as an example of even the best are capably of screwing the pooch without any help. The spin event was another item on Bill's CV.

Just This Once
When the defence lawyers receive material from the prosecution etc they go to independent experts to confirm the accuracy or not of the material and whether any opinion based on the material is correct/whether there is a conflicting body of opinion, whether there are areas that have not been properly investigated etc etc. Sometimes the independent expert will say "I agree" sometimes they will say "No it is wrong and for this reason". This is what happens in many many cases. It is what happened here. AH remembers nothing about the flight , he never put himself forward as a medical expert. His defence was not created by him nor by his lawyers but put forward by independent expert witnesses.

As to G knowledge I am afraid that you base your opinion on what was reported in the newspapers. This was not completely accurate and taken out of context. Prosecution witnesses had already given evidence that G knowledge and training has changed dramatically in recent years. At the time AH was trained, there was limited (mostly classroom based and brief) G training, no centrifuge training, no use of the expression A-LOC etc. If you and then many like you accuse AH of telling deliberate lies then the prosecution witnesses must have been likewise perjuring themselves. This evidence was unchallenged by the prosecution because many of their own witnesses confirmed it.
Don't believe everything you read in the newspapers. I read reports of KKQC cross examining particular witnesses and the xx apparently reported verbatim including his name. Those witnesses were called on a day when AFAIK KK was in New York and some other bloke was doing the XX!

Nice to see that with a bit of money you can buy your way out of any trouble you cause. I must remember that one.:mad:

Defence lawyers everywhere may well be smacking their lips ! A plea of cognitive impairment means that no one will ever be guilty of anything !

Bill Bedford addressed a symposium of the European SETP in Switzerland in 1989 I think it was, and recounted the tale. His close encounter with the ground was during his famous multi-turn spin demonstration. He was on a sales drive to sell Hunters to the Swiss some years before the symposium and the incident was caused by an inaccurate altimeter setting, I believe.

If it wasn't a loop, what was it...?!

The CI defence elicits a whole host of questions does it not Legalapproach?

When did it begin? This is critical of course-was it before the start of the manoeuvre, or during it? If the pilot felt 'a bit odd' should he not just have abandoned the display, and if he didn't is that not negligence to continue flying it?
If CI was a contributory factor to the event, then what are the odds of a qualified display pilot, who is medically fit and has otherwise shown no similar symptoms over many years display flying, suffering such an event at that very moment, causing the catastrophic consequences it did? Holes. Cheeses. Lots. I would argue a miniscule probability.
And it seems to me (although I am no expert) that this CI incident must have been quite short lived, as it seems that the pilot was pulling quite hard at the end of the manoeuvre, when he realised he was going to end up running out of airspace? Presumably the CI incident was over then, as his judgement seemed to be restored at that point?

Just for the record-I have no connection with anyone affected by the Shoreham incident. I usually attend the airshow (in the airfield) but did not that year. My friend was attending and he messaged me with the details of the incident shortly after it occurred. I am merely interested in the legal process.

Training Risky
What does money have to do with it? What are you suggesting - that, as I stressed, independent experts are prepared to perjure themselves and risk their reputations if paid enough? Does that also apply to experts paid for by the prosecution? Can the prosecution get people wrongly convicted with a bit of money?

Capt Kremen
Rubbish. Cognitive impairment has been recognised as a potential defence to some offences for decades - it rarely comes up (you would need medical evidence to support it) and the courts continue to convict people.

I totally agree. The fact that AH had been trained and qualified as an RAF fast jet pilot mean that he HAD been trained in G Awareness and all of its facets, be it on aircraft performance or effect on the human body. The fact that the prosecution did not expose these lies makes them negligent in performing their duty. A qualified RAF QFI, past or present, could have testified as to what RAF pilot training involves.


As for What a load of nonsense. AH's display card showed that an offset loop was planned at that point. Apart from starting a few hundred feet TOO Low and over 100kts TOO Slow there was clear intent to attempt a loop. At that point in time, due to "something" he clearly thought that he was in a different aircraft , possibly a JP? Poor discipline based on complacency.

Nige321
In the Hoyle case a hare was set running that the fatal manoeuvre was a loop. This came from an eye witness who had seen a Tiger Moth enter a loop in roughly the location of the accident. During the course of the trial it became apparent that (because of timings) the witness had seen an earlier flight in which it was known a loop had been flown. The timings had never been properly looked into before and so the witness statement had influenced both the AAIB report and the prosecution case with many assuming that she had seen the final flight. She had not and she could not have done because the timings could be pretty well pinpointed..

On the accident flight the pilot described performing a tightish turn and experiencing a rudder restriction which, in attempting to recover, had caused the aircraft to flick into a spin. This was confirmed by experts who attempted to replicate the various possible flight profiles and this scenario was the one that in fact fitted.

Dominator 2
Loop
I wasn't talking about the Shoreham crash but the Hoyle case and responding to a comment where someone suggested that Hoyle was another case resulting from a badly flown loop. Please read my post #276 carefully before accusing me of spouting a load of nonesense.

G training
The prosecution called qualified RAF QFI's both past and present and their evidence was consistent with what AH actually said.

I did my basic training on the JP way back in '65-'66. We had aeromed lectures and practical demonstrations of the effects of G. Only very basic (I was never on FJ), but surely it was retained in the syllabus?

Herod

Spot on - that's what AH and others spoke about at the trial. The training back in the day was fairly basic when compared to today's training. That was the only point, all the witnesses agreed. The news reports of his evidence were not complete and not put in proper context.

Your statement as quoted is not correct. In CAP403 it always has been, and sill is, permissible to commence a loop from the Flypast minima. AH was above his for the final manoeuvre. Where you can fly below SERA 5005 minima and down to your DA minima is a separate issue for which there was considerable ambiguity at the time of the accident. As a Hunter DAE, I consider the minimum entry speed for a singleton Hunter T7 to pull up for a complete loop is 350 KIAS. AH pulled up at 310 +/- 15 KIAS.

The few hundred feet too low, witness the result. There is no doubt that 350kts with 2 notches of flap AND full power the T7 would loop fairly comfortably with a current pilot at the controls!! What is current, that is for you "experts" to decide?

I saw nothing in the AAIB report about that apart from doenwind t/o and lower than usual rotate speed stated, wigh no note of censure. (Did I miss something elsewhere?)

Anyone care to amplify this please?

He's 'talked' his way out of a conviction but I wouldn't have his karma . . .

The entry height is not a problem; the entry speed needs to be appropriate for the entry height. 350 KIAS is a very safe minimum entry speed for a loop entered at flypast minima (30 ft for some pilots) with 0 flap and will give you an apex height of in excess of 5000 ft albeit, as you say, needing full T7 thrust.

I am reasonably cognoscente of the effects of "G" on pilot performance and there has been a fair amount of discussion of it on this thread. However I am slightly puzzled by what appears to be AH's claimed knowledge of such and particularly so as whilst in the RAF I believe he served a tour on Harriers as an operational jockey. Plenty of high "G" experience there I would have thought!

The point was being made with regard to accidents causing the death of spectators at the air show or those going about their business outside the airfield boundaries - as was the case at Shoreham. The mitigations put in place wrt crowdlines, not flying over or towards the crowd etc have successfully ensured that spectators and others are not put at risk, going all the way back to Derry's accident at Farnborough, significantly more than 20 years.

The unfortunate kneejerk response to display requirements taking much of the flying further away from the crowd and thus outside the boundaries provides even further protection to the crowds, who don't really need it, and increased risk to those outside the airfield, who in some cases are now closer to the aircraft than the paying spectators.

I was both a Hunter and Hawk QFI in the early 80s. I have about 1,000 Hunter hours including 65 sorties on WV372 (bit miffed that ‘my’ jet has been trashed). Looped probably thousands of times. MRTs in the Hawk were ‘pull 6 squeeze 7’ initially then ‘pull 5 squeeze 6’ when it was thought that we might use too much fatigue. We received (and gave) plenty of training on the safe application of high G, both rapid and gradual onset, although expressions such as ALoc and GLoc were probably not in the vocabulary. So I am puzzled that possible incapacitation from high g should be used as an argument by the defence team, especially in a Hunter at 300kts when you're likely to hit the buffet before 4g. Also, it appeared to me that the aircraft was under positive control for the last half of the loop (and it was a loop).

Peter

It was a loop and my comments in a previous post related to a different case. The defence never suggested that it was possible incapacitation from high G. Very few people who are commenting on this case heard any of the evidence that was given at trial. Many have been selective in picking bits read in newspapers and newspapers are themselves selective in what they report "always worth sacrificing the truth for a good headline"

Can I make it quite plain this case was never about high G, it was never about G-LOC it was never about A-LOC please read my post at #132 above where I sought to give an explanation as to what the issue actually was.

Thank you for making the point about the expressions A-LOC and G-LOC were not really used in the 80's. That was what AH said in evidence and has been leapt on by people suggesting he lied when he said he hadn't heard certain expressions because he said he didn't know about the effect of G. He didn't lie, he talked about the limitations of training and imparted knowledge at the time compared with knowledge/training today. Other witnesses, prosecution witneses, confirmed what he said.

This High-G briefing doc from 1988 gives some good context on timings for when G-LOC was first recognised, noting of course this is US specific and it always takes some time for new discoveries to cross the pond. The doc does highlight that G-LOC really only came about as a result of the highly maneuverable F-15 & F-16 fighters, which matches my own understanding as I distinctly recall the G-LOC phenomena (as it was then) becoming more commonplace in the UK/Europe in the mid-late 80's - coincident with the widespread adoption of the Viper by many Nato air arms.

Because it was. Even more so with the pole bending going on with the realisation that a muck up was occuring.