I imagine Argentina shares similar thoughts about our naval air arm.

With respect to STARK, there is a significant difference between being hit in a very localised body of water, with plentiful shore support locally, and being in deep ocean a long way from useful harbours and support.

I suspect lessons were learned in intervening period of 82-87 that helped.

A lot of the decisions were taken a long time before as well - such as lack of close-in defences. We tend to forget just how quickly the whole war blew up and how soon people were put in harm's way.

The whole war was fought in the time it takes to circulate a draft change to a work order on new kit........................

Three questions there mate.

Close range defences: The Type 42 was designed to defend against air threats with the Sea Dart missile, and as this was in the Cold War it was intended for use against Soviet high/medium altitude threats. Fitting Sea Wolf to the Type 42 as well would have been a non starter.

The Americans has only just developed Phalanx CIWS and priority was given to their own ships. We the UK got some it was sensibly fitted to the carriers first.

Filters: No idea - but were they filters for the ESM (how would they work without blocking I band?) or filters for the SCOT antenna, possibly reducing sidelobes? If it was the latter, this could mean a heavy piece of kit that would need fitting in a maintenance period, as opposed to something the ship could design/build/install herself.

Allowing interference: This is the exam question. Other ships had banned the use of SCOT during daylight hours. Somehow Sheffield had not. Signals need to be sent, and given HF was problematic (in recent years new technology has gone into HF systems) so the temptation to use SCOT was there - after all those nice Americans were allowing us to use their Communications Satellites.

Given it was a sea skimming missile fired from a low flying aircraft, the most significant thing the task force lacked was Airborne Early Warning. Some Sea Kings were modified and became AEW2s in a a very short time.

Pretty-much sums up the arrogance in the RN at the time. After years of dictating threat profiles to aggressor aircraft and ignoring 'leakers' who came in low or on mass was just the start of it.

Even facing a cold war adversary equipped with some rather nasty anti-surface weapons and adversary threat flight-profiles from the deck to nose-bleed level they stumbled into a real shooting war equipped with years of unrealistic lessons, self-deception and an ignorance of the threat. A modern navy task force getting hit by everything from dumb bombs delivered by a Hercules to an Exocet fired by an improvised land-based contraption. Thank heavens for poor bomb fusing. 3 other RN vessels had been hit by air attack in the days leading up to Sheffield, yet they were still not prepared.

The RN learned some terrible lessons but that knowledge has faded again. Watching a gun-only CIWS, top-tech in the 80's, being fitted to our latest carriers leaves me dumbfounded and the RN hoping that the next generation of anti-ship missiles will fly predictable flightpaths and somehow slow down enough for the bullets to get there in time.

Arrogance is cheap; keeping pace with the threat is expensive.

But the Soviets did not fly low and they were considered THE threat. When they started to develop missiles fired by submarines that were low level, we developed Sea Wolf (unfortunately on the two Type 22s in the task group had it) and the Americans developed Phalanx.

It was a passing merchant vessel (nothing to do with the task force, or the UK) that got by bombs from an Argentine Hercules - fortunately not exploding. HMS Glamorgan, hit by the land based Exocet, had no means to detect or defeat the missile.

AEW is mentioned here on this old thread.

JTO,

In part I agree with you. I disagree with you antipathy towards guns. Guns do work (5 kills in FI), but you need LOTS of them. IJN Mushashi had one hundred and thirty 25 mm guns, but that was not enough to save her from being sunk by aircraft in the Battle of Leyte Gulf.

I wonder if 3 CIWS will cope with an attack from 1,000+ cheap drones or multiple remotely piloted torpedoes.

EG

Actually, British Wye was Herc-bombed on (?) 29th May when re-supplying the TF but not damaged. The well-named Hercules was the US tanker also hit and later scuttled (?insurance).

Really? Did you expect them to hang-around in your weapon engagement zone?

The Soviets used low-level tactics just like everyone else. They also had reach, speed and stand-off capability. The RN faced formidable threats such as the Backfire / Kitchen capability (and the Blinder / Kitchen before that) as well as tactical air, but tried to convince itself that it wasn't.

The Backfire crews in particular saw themselves as worthy adversaries to the USN CBGs and honed their tactics to suit. In equal regard the USN respected, trained and equipped themselves to meet such threats.

If the RN had faced its chosen adversary with its 1982 capabilities it would have been rather more ugly. Fundamentally it had an unrealistic view on air threats and post '82 things had to change.

I recently finished reading the story of HMS Ardent - Through Fire and Water, a brave little ship with a fine company to be sure, but parts of it made painful reading. There is so much talk about tying a GPMG to railings to “improve the ship’s close range air defence”, one officer even opened up on an attacking A-4 with his 9mm Browning pistol, and WW2 era 20mm Oerlikons were in such demand that they were removed from sunken ships to be re-used. One paragraph describes how 60 round magazines were over charged with 65 or more rounds to only then read that the guns mysteriously started jamming, which is just poor weapons training. Seacat was universally referred to as Sea Mouse and regarded as utterly useless. The overall impression I got was of ships that were poorly equipped with outdated air defence equipment with a crew equipped and trained primarily for ASW missions. On the other hand everything was stacked against the RN, stationary ships in narrow inlets surrounded by rising terrain, it doesn’t get much worse than that.

I was just a sprog in sixth form college when all this was happening, but I remember how proud we all were of our armed forces and how they ultimately overcame all obstacles to secure victory. I wasn’t quite 18, just a few months short in fact, and regarded myself as far too young to be involved in all that sort of thing, I was just a kid after all - then I saw the story of HMS Argonaut and the 18 year old who was killed when an Argentine bomb hit and detonated a Sea Cat in the main missile magazine and it really hit home - there were young men my age dying down there.

So yes I’m sure there were many mistakes made on HMS Sheffield, and other ships too, and yes we also need to discuss and learn from those mistakes, but to me all those lads who served down there are heroes and the least we can do is to make sure that our armed forces have the very best equipment available, a lesson the MoD still seems to be struggling with.

I think JtO has stated something we'd all rather not think about:-

"The RN faced formidable threats such as the Backfire / Kitchen capability (and the Blinder / Kitchen before that) as well as tactical air, but tried to convince itself that it wasn't."

We're all set up in some siutation and then we see a potential threat.

A logical analysis says it really IS a threat and worse we don't have the money/men/kit/doctrine/will to counter it.

In general people will not 'fess up but will tend to play down the threat or conjur up some (often unworkeable) counter-measure...........

I start to think about "the machine gun is a much over rated weapon"; day bombing Germany without LR fighter cover; "Malaya is covered in impenetrable forests"; "Germany will never invade Russia" etc etc etc

I hate to think what levels of wishful thinking still occur...... especialy in the UK MoD

I remember being told that as the Sheffield was listing and evacuations were starting to be performed an unknown sailor started singing ‘always look on the. Right side of life’ to which the whole able company including the captain promptly joined in. Hopefully not an urban myth.
I had a mate who was on the Sir Galahad and was in charge of a blowpipe. He told me the A4 had dropped its bomb and was long gone before he could say “what the f@ck was that.
Another issue was a certain European freight company falling out of favour with the UK over an issue of transportation of fresh Exocets to Argentina during the crisis. I think they had a lucrative Hong Kong contract removed.

My bro' was out there. Apparently one of the jokes was:

"I spy with my little eye something beginning with E - a-a-and_you_have_3.5_seconds_to_ tell_me!"

Mac

:cool:

No, not an urban myth, it was a D (fighter controller) on loan from HERMES who started it!

To be fair, the best defence for a naval force against a high-speed bomber launching very long range stand-off missiles which (if my memory of the relevant threat manuals is correct) came in at either very high or moderate levels - certainly NOT sea-skimming a la AM39, is organic long range interceptors and AEW. Unfortunately, another service had suggested that it was more than capable of providing said effect.


That AEW / interceptor (and EW) combo is exactly what the USN CVBGs had at the time and exactly what the RN had been denuded of. The limitation of GWS30 was primarily the launcher / CoF capability, which budgets prevented addressing seriously. The USN had to develop AEGIS to address the same threat - some years after GWS30 was fielded.


That's not to say that low-level FBA were not a threat, but not in the open ocean which is primarily where the RN had been directed to plan to fight. The recognition of the threat is exactly why the GWS25 system had been developed. It's also fair to say that guided weapon systems are not exactly easy - or more pertinently quick or cheap - to design, develop and bring into service. I seem to remember fields full of Bloodhound 2 in East Anglia throughout most of the 80s, because we couldn't afford anything else.


Suggesting the RN had an arrogance because they didn't address exercise profiles flown by the RAF is a little bit like asking the RAF what it's current airfield defence (ground and air) capability is like. Not in the threat profile, so not funded and not exercised......


Was the RN over-optimistic? Almost certainly - the loss of institutional DC and fire-prevention measures in ship design are obvious. Whether it was caused by arrogance or choices made in budget reality may be a more finely-nuanced question.


I'm also interested to discover which three RN vessels had been hit prior to Sheffield. Doesn't tally with my recollections.

I think you have reaffirmed the level of denial at the time regarding the threat profiles.

Again, Soviet tactics included low-level tactics for maritime attack and included everything from dumb-bombing (as per the Argentinian threat) to a range of stand-off weapons. Their tactics included cooperative profiles with data-links providing the targeting information from high-flyer to the launch aircraft skimming the waves on the attack run. Contemporary Soviet tactics manuals used simple graphics to outline the attack plans, so little knowledge of Russian is required to read them. Of course for shorter-range tactical aircraft low-level flying was the name of the game.

The ‘open-ocean only’ idea is laughable. The RN still had to transit the Soviet air threat area to get to and from ‘open ocean’. Of course, the RN had other tasks that required operating in the littoral threat area, facing a brace land, sea and air threats. With a NATO declared amphib role the RN, including the RM, was supposed to be able to operate in a Soviet air threat environment. The excuses regarding the ASW role in open ocean are just that - excuses. If the RN was genuinely prepared for amphibious ops on NATO’s northern flank it would have been better prepared for similar ops in the South Atlantic.

- HMS ALACRITY, ARROW and GLAMORGAN on the Saturday before.

"Suggesting the RN had an arrogance because they didn't address exercise profiles flown by the RAF is a little bit like asking the RAF what it's current airfield defence (ground and air) capability is like. Not in the threat profile, so not funded and not exercised......"

Agree totatlly - I've asked several times on PPrune why the UK has zero medium/long range ground-to-air missiles when most other countries have them..... but as you say no-one is interested in lfighting for the funding.......

If you don't ask, you don't get.....
 

Precisely. This was my first HQ job, at least for FAA avionics. My very first task on joining in 1985 was to write and staff an Admiralty Board Submission for a upgrade programme. Two years later I gave my relief a handover, but he was out of a job within 6 months as the posts were all disbanded as part of the Hallifax Savings. They have NEVER been replaced. There were some around that did a small part of the task, but if you asked who did the table thumping at Screening meetings, you got a blank look.

All of which conveniently ignores the fact that the best defence against air & missile attack for a naval force has always been (preferably organic) AEW and DCA fighters. Something which someone else had said they'd provide. But couldn't. And still can't.


I suspect that most western navies (and their systems at the time) would have struggled against that threat. It's not as if Tartar/SM1 or BPDMS Sparrow were any more capable against a LL threat.


It is entirely possible that procedures could and should have been better, but very difficult indeed to accelerate the kit.