F35 Stitch Up
 

Deliberately provocative title - but as it says.

It appears that the RAF are about to stitch the Fleet Air Arm and RN fixed wing aviation - again.

https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/gove...rst-48-f-35bs/

I'm aware of the history, the shared concept of F35 Ops etc, but we are buying 2 carriers. The RAF will be delighted if they can pull this off under the guise of cost saving.

You can argue the logic all you like. Personally, I'd be hard to persuade that this is not the RAF sticking one on the Fleet Air Arm - standard.

Any informed opinions on this...?

indie.

I realise some will always try to see the negative side but this long rumoured change would be an excellent move for UK Defence.

I'm an Air Force man but I can see the clear benefit of both. Carrier based F35s are an excellent asset but it doesn't mean they should all be of this ilk. Land based F35s with better range and payload are also a great asset.

I'd say we get the best of both worlds and it would be a rare application of common sense which will benefit us all.

BV

The only problem concerning F-35A is that Lockheed would no doubt charge an arm and a leg to integrate an AAR probe, even though both the -B and -C are fitted with them.

"You Limeys wanna probe? Give us your cheque book, bend over and grab your ankles....."

At 48 aircraft the RN fleet would be larger than the SHAR fleet (26 active from a total of 44 aircraft IIRC), so it's hardly being screwed AFAICS.

PDR

Best we stick some booms on a few of those Voyagers then!! F35A, P8, RJ, E-3D would all benefit hugely from any such addition.

So, RAF Harrier cancelled meaning RN found it incredibly difficult to maintain any sort of in cockpit FJ experience (let alone deck ops) so, funny old thing, the majority of cockpits will be filled with light blue. If you didn't see this coming you've been sleeping for the last 6-7 years!

Pure Pursuit, the Voyagers are not 'ours' to modify! They already cost MoD more than £1M per day for the AirTanker PFI AAR service, so Lord knows what contract penalties would apply if MoD suddenly woke up to the fact that quite a few RAF aircraft would benefit from such a modification.

The K2s would seem the obvious candidates for such modification though. Training boom operators and maintaining their currency might be a problem though, given that the Voyager doesn't have a UARRSI...:ugh: So no mutual AAR trips, unlike the Victor or the VC10K.

We are indeed buying 2 carriers. However, we will only have enough manpower, money and escorts to normally have one at sea. The "surge" number of F-35Bs on the QEC is around 40 airframes - impossible organically with a fleet size of 48, but perfectly "do-able" if third party F-35B operators (USMC, Italy) contribute assets. IMHO a fleet of around 70 F-35B would be sensible to enable one "surge" CAG or even enough for both QECs to have TAGs in extremis. Re the nefarious Crabs, the Tornado needs replacing. Typhoon has replaced the F3/Jag and is swing-role capable of covering elements of the GR4 role, but the additional survivability conferred by the F-35's LO elements and SA make it better placed for many mission sets such as SEAD, EA and attacks against highly defended targets. For this role the F-35A or C are better as they can carry, internally, 2000lb class weapons and both have longer range than the "B" thanks to increased fuel and not carrying powered lift mechanisms with them. The decision between A and C comes down to picking between more "g", lower cost and internal gun (A) or probe/drogue refuelling (C). Pay yer money, makes yer choice. The 138 number is also, seemingly, viewed as a "lifetime buy" and may take decades to be fully delivered as the lines will be open for a long time. I'd even suggest that with fatigue/attrition we'll likely see more "tails" than 138 by OSD - aircraft like the Chinook in the RAF have benefited from long production runs with the opportunity to "dip in" when finances and needs dictate.

This may actually work out for the FAA. There's now a fairly clear argument for the Navy to focus on carrier based flying (with the B) and the RAF focus on land based flying with the A. Keep the aircraft at Mariam to keep the logs savings, but give the B to the Navy and let them operate it as the AOA. It would certainly end a lot of the silly arguments that we've seen between the two Services over the years.

Beagle, I completely agree however, the cost of using other nation's boom tankers for training and currency is ridiculous. I know that Air Tanker have looked at a boom option but, you're quite right, they'd pull out pants down for it!!

Personally, I think we need it and our current drogue only option is very fast jet centric and rather embarrassing. We rely on other nations assets in order to utilise our ISTAR assets fully. Unacceptable.

I seem to recall that the MoD announced a little while back that they were looking into the cost/benefit of fitting at least some of the Voyagers with a boom.

You did it with the F-4K and M fleets and had RN and RAF fleets...

I'd like, if I may, to add a few observations to this thread - which i hope generates some interesting discussion. My view is that there are two issues to be looked at. The first (as ever) is deciding policy and requirements. The second is aircraft numbers. Policy and requirements are nearly always influenced by politics, national and inter-service. Nationally, the UK Government decided in SDR 98 that it wanted to field a credible maritime strike capability from two big carriers. At the same time, the MoD decided that the best way to get to the aircraft side sorted out was a Joint Force of RAF and RN Harriers and Sea Harriers to develop new concepts of operations for both strike and air defence roles, both land and sea based. This would (it was hoped) inform and guide the procurement and deployment of the new aircraft (Future Joint Combat Aircraft). The carrier programme has, via a series of fits and starts, begun to deliver. The UK's F-35B procurement programme (which was significantly delayed as long ago as 2003) is now delivering. The bit that failed was the Joint Force concept, and here we come to inter-service politics.

I have heard from a number of friends that the angst of JFH is in the past, the RAF and the RN are working together on F-35B, and it's going to be OK. At the level of SO1 and below, I'm sure that's true. I have posted many times that almost all of the RAF people I worked with over many years were professional, dedicated and damn good. My concerns are based on the basic 'ethos' of the RAF as it affects their senior leadership.

I don't subscribe to the 'devious crabs trying to stitch up the FAA' view of things. But my view is that the truth is worse. The RAF senior leadership (my opinion here) doesn't 'oppose' naval aviation - it just doesn't really care about it. Again, my view. The RAF's leadership has been trained, developed and influenced by the goal of 'independent air power' since 1918. That is, air power replacing other forms of warfare (land and sea) by virtue of its overwhelming advantages (as seen by the RAF). When faced with a choice, again and again over the years, the RAF has put resources into land based air power rather than air power that relies upon a ship. To repeat, I don't see these as 'devious' decisions - they are perfectly logical if your aim is the application of independent air power. So, the MoD has to come up with a logical set of requirements for a split fleet. That will, I suspect, generate some unfortunate inter-service stuff.

And so we come to deciding allocation of resources, or in this case, numbers. (To correct a previous post, the RN Sea Harrier fleet had about 33 active aircraft out of around 52 airframes. It actually had new build aircraft in storage to support the active fleet in the planed 'out years'. But that was to support two front line units comprising no more than 8 aircraft per active carrier. What the UK wants to do with F-35B is something much more capable). My old friend Evalu8ter (as ever) is 'spot on'. If the 'top line' figure really is 138, then a 50/50 split of around 70 As and 70 Bs looks (to me) sensible - depending on the requirements. These fleets should be able to achieve significant efficiencies is they adopt a joint supply organisation, a joint training system, and joint OCU. 'Joint' should also extend to the vital areas of developing mission support and mission planning facilities.

Operational control and management of the As should rest with the RAF, but the Bs should be handed off to the RN. It makes no sense at all to try to control and direct F-35B operations from a remote land based HQ - and that is what the RAF will inevitably (and understandably) seek to do. Handing operational control to the RN also (again my view) makes better sense for allocating the 'duty holder' roles for 'air safety' management in the 'MAA world' the services now work in.

Evalu8ter is also absolutely right about looking at the F-35C - longer range and better endurance. And a proper refuelling probe. But at a higher cost than the A. And the C carries around a hell of a lot of steel and structure that does nothing but allow cat and trap ops.

My thoughts, to wrap up:

1. 70 Bs for two carriers sounds about right, and the idea of getting USMC assets on the decks is a great one. We'd just need to sort out a few (not insignificant) issues around weapons supply, security and disclosure issues and safety management. The FAA has a good chance of solving those with the USMC.

2. The UK F-35 buy will probably increase. The '138' figure is a historic one, based on the need to replace both GR7/9 and Sea Harriers. Factor in reducing costs and a further run down in the Typhoon fleet in favour of F-35A/C, and I could see the Uk's total F-35 buy going to around 170 or 180.

3. Joint support and training systems for all the UK's F-35s, separate operational command structures to ensure the best delivery of combat effect from land and sea.

4. Solve the AAR issue. Honestly, I can't see the RAF being seen as a credible strike force if it can't refuel it's own aircraft.

Ok, sorry for the length, I'm done. looking forward to responses.

Best regards as ever to those running the spreadsheets up in town, it's always a thankless task.

Engines

But Engines - the Treasury is looking to CUT costs - not buy more

There is little chance we'll ever see the two carriers fully and identically equipped and at sea at the same time

48 B's looks sensible but any more???

48 'B's is far too small a figure, you've left no room fo training and support/attrition airframes at all. 70FAA/70RAF is a much more realistic level, as these aircraft will have to last us decades.

And as LockMart have been saying for at least a decade now, if you want A's with probes for refuelling, you just have to ask! the cockpits for all three models are identical, the A has the space for probe left empty and as for aerodynamic testing, in flight it's identical to the B so it's been done. Any extra costs to certify such a mod are going to be a lot less than spending big bucks on new tanking equipment for the RAF's fleet and the associated training and logistic pipelines.

I hate to sound presumtuous, but I have to disagree here. The peace-time organisation had three SHAR squadrons (800, 801 and 899 training squadron), with nominal complements of 8 FA2s for each of the front-line squadrons and 10 for 899 giving a total of 26 aircraft. I've just checked in my files and found these statements made repeatedly in all the requirements documents for the FA2 mod programmes - the original FA2 MLU programme, the IN/GPS upgrade, the JTIDS upgrade and even the abandonned SIFF and big-engine projects.

They all say the same thing - an active fleet of 26 aircraft to be used as the basis of support planning and a total number of kit sets to cover a total fleet of 44 aircraft. This is also repeated in the quantities of aircraft covered in the "by air" and "by road" RTW reports for the IN/GPS programme, so it would seem that these numbers were real and not just planning assumptions.

The squadron numbers were pumped up a bit during the Falklands War, but only by sending FRS1s from 899 Sqn to add to the existing 800 and 801 sqns (and the briefly reformed 809 sqn) to fill the available carrier space, not by increasing the overall numbers.

PDR

Spending 15 minutes looking at delivery dates and OSDs for individual SHARs, it seems that the FAA had an average of 37 aircraft on charge at any one time, including stored aircraft and those undergoing maintenance/repair/conversion etc. It peaked around 1998-2001 at 49 when the new-build FA.2s were in service.

PDR1,

Thanks for coming back - discussion is always a good thing. My background here is that I was the Sea Harrier Operational Fleet Manager, then the Engineering fleet manager (including bringing the FA2 into service) and then the Operational Fleet Manager for JFH.

Yes, the 2 SHAR FLS were 8 aircraft each, and 899 had a stated complement of 10. However.....the total RN 'Active' fleet also included aircraft undergoing scheduled maintenance at 2nd line (4 to 6 lines) plus aircraft retained in the active fleet as spares for immediate deployment or undergoing extended Cat 3 repairs. (Unlike the RAF, where the 12 aircraft supposedly on a front line squadron included aircraft undergoing second line work packages and even mod programmes). My normal complement of active fleet aircraft was, as I said, around 33 to 36. (Martin has just come up with a supporting figure). It went even higher during the FRS1 to FA2 conversion, as he says.

One of the many challenges of JFH was that the basic planning assumptions, methods, and even definitions used in fleet management were totally different between the RN and the RAF. This, among other things, made the whole business of determining proper fleet numbers a bit of a game.

If the RN ends up with 48 it has, in my humble view, been screwed. The Sea harrier Fleet of 52 odd was designed to equip and sustain 26 front line aircraft through life, but only to equip the small CVS. The 138 figure was the original planning assumption to generate 4 FJCA (JSF) front line squadrons, split between 2 'RN heavy' and 2 'RAF heavy' plus an OCU, and sustain these through life. It wasn't ever linked to replacing Tornado as well. The maritime strike capability should (again. just my view) be able to generate and sustain somewhere about 40 to 48 aircraft to operate from one (or two) of the carriers. 70 F-35Bs sounds about right. If needed, these aircraft could be 'swung' to land based ops to support an RAF 'A' fleet. Don't forget, the figure of 138 was supposed to support a fleet of Bs that could all go to sea if required. That included RAF units. That idea seems to have been ditched by the RAF, and my previous post sets out why I think that's happened.

It's probably all going to be about numbers now, and one can only hope that the boys in town play nicely with each other. If they don't, the Treasury will have them for breakfast.

To pick up on Obi Wan's excellent post - fitting an A with a retractable B/C type probe would also generate around around 600 pounds extra fuel capacity and a similar weight saving by removal of the large and heavy boom AAR receptacle located in the mid upper fuel tank. The retractable probe and piping will add some weight, but nowhere hear that much. There would be a ton of detail mods as well to the fuel system, but none of it risky or rocket science. The result (my view only) ould be a better A model.

Best regards to all those writing the papers in Whitehall, whatever their colour of stripe.

Engines

Engines, a well considered post, as always.

To increase flexibility & reduce cost/risk, why not leave the "other" refuelling system in place? Having watched an Air Force (RAAF) struggle with a seemingly minor mod to an off-the-shelf jet (they requested McD remove the catapult launch bar ("it isn't a naval jet!") leading to nose wheel shimmy on the Hornet) maybe less mucking around would be better? Didn't the F-105 have both systems fitted (random historical precedent for credibility)?

280,

Good idea, and one that, honestly, I hadn't considered. Age creeping up, I guess. That said, getting 600 pounds of fuel back plus a weight reduction sounds like gold to me.

Good thread already, this.

Best regards ever to those doing the hard work on F-35B trials next year.

Engines

If you want an F35 with a probe, why not buy the F35c (the US Navy version). Or is this too simplistic an answer?

bobward.

There will be some associated carrier gubbins that adds extra weight that isn't needed on a ground based platform. Things such as stronger landing gear etc. About 3000lbs extra weight if Wikipedia is to be believed.

BV

Not to mention that we've already changed from the B to the C.........and then back again to the B.

Of course, had we not changed back to the B.....:E

The MoD has always been careful to stress that the uptake of 138 is "over the life of the programme". I have also seen it suggested that the plan is for four front line sqns eventually.

I therefore have a suspicion that is has never been the intention to have 138 airframes at any one time - and that a final batch of very late model Bs at the fag end of the programme might replace the initial batch to see the carriers through the latter part of their lives. Hopefully I'm wrong though and in any event things can change.

I'd certainly agree that 70 or so is the minimum needed if we're to come anywhere close to using the carriers to their proper potential.

If I might offer some information on F-35 variant weights and ranges: The latest information out there shows the following empty weights:

F-35A: 28,999 lb
F-35B: 32,442 lb
F-35C: 34,581 lb

So, F-35C is about 5,400 lbs heavier than the A. That cat and trap stuff adds a lot of weight all over the aircraft, especially in the stronger structure required to handle launch and landing loads. The low speed precision approach also demands a larger wing, fins, tails and control surfaces.

However, there's a bit of a surprise in the stated combat radius. Here are the figures, with threshold and objective (target and 'must achieve') figures shown in brackets afterwards:

F-35A: 669 mi (690/590)
F-35B: 505 mi (550/450)
F-35C: 640 mi (730/600)

My guess here is that the F-35C's extra weight and drag has caught up with it, and despite its additional fuel it just burns more to get out there. However, it still (just) meets the objective requirement. On this data, the A model looks like the right one for the RAF, but the AAR issue probably needs to be sorted.

Best regards as ever to all those working the flight test programmes - this is tough and complex stuff.

Engines

Does anyone know if any of the other nations buying the 'A have asked for a probe to be fitted rather than the boom receptacle?

Engines,

While I'm sure your figures for numbers of SHars was accurate the picture is not quite that simple for the RN. The FAA struggled for a long time, especially in the latter years to fill those cockpits. What makes you think giving them 70 F-35s would be any different?

does anyone know if the external fuel tank project for F-35 has been resurected?

i know that the project for an L/O tank got canned many years ago, but surely basic ferry tanks - particulary given the trials with other external stores are at the least, mature - are going to be a must-have before long?

one imagines that the cost of dragging F-35's across the Atlantic/Pacific on internal fuel only will soon enough start to overtake the development cost of a bog-standard tank...

SHAR
 

I recognise what Engines talks of, although use different terminology. I don't know about the RAF, but the RN broke fleets down into FAE (Front Line Aircraft Establishment), TAE (Training), IUR (In Use Reserve) and IR6 (held at 6 months readiness - some argued 6 weeks). Some fleets had Half-TAE. Each category was allocated an average annual flying rate (say, 300 for FAE, 150 for TAE, and so on) from which one calculated support requirements. As Fleet Manager, Engines will recall numbers better than I, but I do know there was a lot of flex in the SHAR fleet because these Establishments were actually met; whereas, for example, Sea King AEW Mk2 only had FAE and TAE (so were always 6 cabs down; partially corrected by Mk7). The practical difficulty (for me) was that the ratio of FAE to Whole Fleet meant a full fleet fit of all avionics was very expensive, so I'd always use the highest number Active Fleet number the FM could come up with. (His best day in the past year). When the attrition buys were made post-Falklands, we weren't allowed radars for example. The remaining 54 had to do the job of 70 for most of the FRS1's life. A 6 month deployment at sea left precious little ashore. Just different ways of looking at it.

Using open source figures for the F-35B internal fuel and guessing at the transit burn rate, fuel onload rate and refuelling burn rate, I had a go at a trail plan using Autumn 75% stat met to trail 3 x F-35B from Halifax to Marham at FL270. The system reckoned it would need 5 brackets and a total offload of 33.4 tonnes for the 5:45 hr flight on the Northern Route - with abort aerodromes at Gander, Narsarsuaq, Keflavik, Prestwick and Leeming. For the tanker type assumed, 78% stat met was the absolute limit for 3 x F-35B, but if only 2 were trailed the normal 85% stat met planning assumption was do-able

So are external tanks really needed? Organic shipborne AAR for the QE class would seem to pose a problem for blue water ops though, given the constraints of STOVL operations. A single role tanker configured V-22 would seem expensive for such a 'one trick pony' role and could probably only offer around 8000 kg offload from a single centreline hose, but what other options exist?

I thought the point of Joint Force Lightning or whatever it's called is that the FAA isn't required to fill all the cockpits? So 70 F-35B to allow a full 48 aircraft air group when needed could include a number of RAF filled cockpits. The point is if you have less than ~70 B models that's not an option.

Indeed but Engines post #14 mentions operational control of the Bs being passed to the FAA. Doesn't sound very joint to me. So, if you were in a blue suit with lots of braid would you give up operational control of 70 shiney new jets to the FAA knowing that the only way they could operate them is by filling the cockpits with RAF pilots? I'm kinda thinking no!

Drop tanks
 

Recent F22 transits through Mildenhall etc have had jets with under wing tanks. These look pretty similar to those used by the F15. For routine peacetime deployments wouldn't this kind of kit suffice?

Perhaps I could respond to a few of the points that have come up in recent posts.

First FAA manning for any F-35 fleet: Flap62 raised some good points. (Note here: I was an engineer, so anything I offer here is based on what I saw happening, not first hand professional expertise). It's quite true that the RN struggled to keep the Sea Harrier fleet manned towards the end. There were a few reasons for that. We lost a number of pilots after the transfer to the RAF and relocation away from familiar stations and the RN/FAA way of doing business. (I left the RN, with a lot of sadness, for the same reasons). There were also problems with the RN's Sea Harrier aircrew training pipeline, which just didn't deliver the numbers that it should have done. To be honest, that one lies firmly at the feet of the more senior RN aircrew in charge of the system. Finally, the RN was suffering the same sorts of issues the RAF was experiencing then, as now, which was high aircrew PVR rates. These were driven by external factors (airline recruiting) as much as internal ones.

However, going forward with a larger fleet of aircraft spread across the two services, using joint support and training where it works, my feeling (and that's all it is here) is that if the RN was given the task of supporting a 70 aircraft F-35B fleet, it could do it. I would assume movement of aircrew between dark and light blue in both directions to help spread best practice and experience.

The operational control bit is, to my mind, important, and is linked to the split between RAF and RN personnel. Operating aircraft from the sea is very different to operating from the land. I'm not talking about the flying tasks of landing and recovering - in the F-35B, the skill levels and currency requirements will probably be less onerous than was the case for legacy aircraft, although still important. The main area I'm looking at is the whole business of planning and executing missions, be they strike, air defence for reconnaissance, from a carrier that is part of a maritime task force. There's not a part of that complex activity that's not affected by being at sea, and to do it successfully and safely needs specialist experience and ability, in enough numbers, all the way up the food chain. Building that experience and those numbers requires an organisation that believes in what it's doing. As I've posted before, I believe that the RAF could, eventually, develop the skill and experience set to do the job from the sea - the problem is that deep down they just don't believe in it as a useful activity. And that (again just my opinion) means that they won't. Example - during SDSR 2010, CAS was asked for his view on the carriers. He replied that 'they were a potentially useful basing option'. And he considered that a strong vote of support.

My views here are based on what best for the country's defence capability. The RAF is an amazingly professional air force that really does know how to do air power from land bases. We should give them the kit they need to get on and do that. The RN has an equally proud and strong record of delivering airborne effect (call it what you want) from the sea. We should give them the kit they need to get on and do that. Both services have worked with each other closely for many years, and can, with good will and imagination, do these jobs to good effect at best cost.

A couple of points on drop tanks. Surprisingly, there was never a stated requirement for them. There was a study carried out by LM in about 2003 into external tanks, but they weren't LO. I did see mention of an Israeli study into LO tanks, but not much since then. The tanks in the original study were quite large and specially shaped to allow use with external stores. At some stage, they were removed from the programme, and I've not seen them resurrected since.

Hope this helps promote discussion and exchanges of views - that's the point of a forum, after all.

Best Regards as ever to all those working the issues where it really matters - at the coal face

Engines

F-35B Transatlantic TRANSIT map from: https://www.scribd.com/document/3233...from-RIAT-2016 (PDF 5Mb)

Some good discussion going on here and so far avoiding partisan opinions. Re the generation of FW pilots. This was a problem in the past for several reasons. Engines has mentioned some but in addition there was the issue of the RN relying on an RAF led training system, which, as a result of various SDRs was in decline. Add to this the internecine warfare that surrounded the drawdown of embarked aviation with the Harrier and the result was rapid decline in RN FW numbers.

It was at this stage that the RN approached the USN and asked for help. Basically the USN opened its training pipeline up to the RN (in return for a 3yr ROS in the AV8B or F18). Pipeline aircrew also went to Canada and (I think) France. The result is that the RN have a healthy cadre of FW aircrew with embarked, battle, experience which is feeding directly into the F35 programme.

Bismarck

I agree with all you said but feel I should correct one point you made. The RN students that went to Canada joined the RCAF (they were not on exchange) because the RN made them redundant. The fact that some of them subsequently returned can hardly be attributed to the RNs masterful planning.

BV

SpazSinbad, that route does seem to go rather a long way north and 10 hr is a loooong time to be in a FJ cockpit...

My route from CYHZ was via YQY YQX ALLRY 52N50W 55N40W 57N30W 58N20W 58N10W BEN then 'Refueler East' to LUK, with a Split Point at LEE before the landing at EGYM. Total Great Circle distance of 2607 nm. I also assumed that the formation would fly at FL270 / 320KIAS decelerating to 290KIAS for AAR, but that was just a WAG.

Various transits have indicated weather is a factor for the route along with the usual considerations and whether USAF provides tankers, bringing more complications apparently.

Further to Engines' comments:

One document I have seen describes A and C mission profiles as "hi-med-med-hi" and the B as HHH. That was old and may have changed, and nobody as far as I know has disclosed how much time in combat with A/B is included.

The published reason for ditching the tanks on the A (around 2008) was that the radius increase was small. A 2007 brief for Norway put it at 55nm on an all-high-alt surveillance mission.

The shorter range of the C is not all that surprising. It has more fuel (because of the deletion of the gun and ammo as much as/if not more than the larger wing) but the larger OEW means that the fuel fraction is a bit smaller.