Quite agree, dervish. I have no problem accepting that "pin procedure" has evolved greatly since I first perched tentatively on an MB Mk3P. As you say, technology moves on, designs change, rules and procedures adapt and change accordingly. The point is that in a disciplined environment that is forever trying to make you fondly remembered, you stick to the rules.

The worst thing is when the rules are changed or simply scrapped, not to protect life but money, and short term money at that. There we move away from the cockpit to the murky corridors of power, from JOs to VSOs. That is where Sean Cunningham's fatal accident was conceived, that is where the system designed to safeguard his life became the one that killed him. That is where the court should be directed.

I didn't mention design because it's hasn't fundamentally changed in years yet the rules and procedures seem to grow and grow until the point people are not quite sure why they are even there.

My point related to the practice of unstrapping from an ejector seat during taxi back. Something that was stopped with (IMHO) no real justification other than to satisfy the desire to be seen to be doing something.

mOnkfish

Thanks, and I agree. But it could be inferred that SOMETHING has changed, because there was once a valid safety case, and now there isn't!

I am very curious to discover why crews were unstrapping during taxi back. During ALL of my time on ejection seats, 12 years, I never, ever, saw anyone unstrapping, or even attempting such before shutdown and as a refresher QFI I flew with a LOT of very experience students, from P/O to AM. ( Perhaps some easing of shoulder harnesses but nothing more.)

Similarly in my 25 years on civil jets never ever saw any pilot fully unstrap during taxi in.
Shoulder straps, perhaps but never a full unstrap.

What do you "unstrappers" now know that the rest of us did not ?

I am surprised you never observed the practise of unstrapping on taxiing back. I flew with three different air forces and found it a very common occurrence.

There are arguments both for and against but nothing that can apparently definitively lay the matter to rest.

I believe this should have been left up to the individuals to make their own informed decisions and did not need further regulating, but it seems now that you have to be seen to be doing something, etc, etc

I think that you will find that the practice was not that uncommon on the older 90kts S & L seats where ejection was not an option at taxy speeds. After an hour plus of being tightly strapped in to a seat that had no compromises to comfort, it was often a merciful release to be able to restore feeling to one's nether regions. Loosening off shoulder straps just didn't do it. So, on clearing the R/W it was pins in often followed by various levels of unstrap

m0nkfish:-
As a matter of interest, has the instruction to disarm only after shutdown come from the regulator (ie the MAA) or from the operator (standardisation flight etc)? Either way I am surprised that you think it should be left to each individual pilot or crew, as the case may be, to decide for themselves whether to disarm or not while taxiing in. What about the ground crew receiving an aircraft, not knowing if it is armed or disarmed? What about the crash crews not knowing if an aircraft that has been abandoned on a taxiway (on fire?) is armed or disarmed?

As I've said before, I don't pretend to understand the pros or cons of which is the best procedure for modern zero zero seats, but I'm pretty sure that once the procedure is set then it should be adhered to, if for no other reason that everybody knows what to expect.

In any case, aren't we straying somewhat from the thread OP? MBA (and not the MOD!) are being prosecuted over the death of Sean Cunningham it says. Given the interesting stat posted by tucumseh in post #231:-

So a 28% cut every year for over three years. Just think about that one. This to a system that is one requiring a process of continuous uninterrupted auditing. UK Military Air Safety was killed stone dead by that. It has never recovered. This seat had no Safety Case Report. It was unairworthy. The aircraft was therefore unairworthy. What the hell was the regulator doing? If your only quibble is that it has messed you around simply to be seen doing something you have my sympathy, but I would expect it to be doing its job, which is to ensure the airworthiness of HM aircraft. It has singularly failed in that.

It's not left to the crew, the procedure is in the FRCs and is standard across the fleet.

Pin stowage on all types I've flown are highly visible from the ground so the ground crew will know at a distance if the seat pins are in or not.

As a side note, the seat is never referred to as being armed or disarmed. To do so would be to suggest that when 'disarmed' it's entirely safe. It is not, the explosives remain in place. The seat would only be talked about as being 'live', 'safe for parking' or 'safe for servicing'. I'm sure the armourers have further distinctions beyond 'safe for servicing' but that would involve serious specialist knowledge of the seat in question.

For us, it's drilled from training that you always stop and have a good look of the AAES, checking that all pins are fitted before entering the cockpit. Even if you leave the aircraft and come back again.
If a pin is in the wrong place or incorrectly fitted * , nobody can enter until an Armorer or the Aircrew are recalled to refit the pin.
There is a cockpit access auth that we need, that requires revalidating every 6 months. This auth includes training on AAES and switches ( arrestor hook, brake chute, emergency jettison, selective jettison, canopy jettison, etc ).
The cockpit access auth is type specific, if we are posted onto a new Sqn we need to do the training and auth again.

I believe its a similar requirement for RAF Firefighters too?

* Note... Pins have been fitted but the pip pin not pushed all the way through. Or on a Tornado canopy, missed the hole entirely and placed the pin in an adjacent gap.

Loonrat wrote - 16 Feb -
Indeed ..... Confirmed by the Court. At the request of the parties, for submission of reports. ......... LFH

.............

Thank you Stuff and gr4techie for your assurances that both air and ground crew are properly instructed in Live and Safe for Parking procedures (thanks stuff, I'll try to remember not to use "armed" and "disarmed" again) and to rigidly conform with them accordingly. I had little doubt it was otherwise, hence my concern at m0nkfish's post.

It will be interesting what effects the submission of reports called for by the court have, as posted by LFH. Could it be that certain revelations made here have already had some effect? Will there be yet even further rescheduling? This case has very important implications for every UK military aviator and for the MAA. Put 17/05/2017 in your diaries now!

Martin Baker pleaded Not Guilty in court today. Trial set for January 2018. No mention of MoD's admission of serious offences on its part.

Great news tuc! Thanks for the info. So at long last someone is prepared to stand up to the MOD! Why HSE ever chose to take MBA to court rather than the MOD is still puzzling, but no doubt there are those better informed who can cast some light into these murky corners.

What never changes it seems is the snail like pace with which such matters of life and death take these days. There was no safety case, rendering both seat and aircraft unairworthy. How many other systems and aircraft are in service similarly waiting to pounce and start yet another tragic Airworthiness Related Fatal Air Accident thread on this forum?

almost certainly.

S-D

S-D

An uncalled for snipe, especially as MoD themselves admit no safety case. No one has said MB are innocent, but MoD have admitted guilt but escaped prosecution.

While individuals employed by MOD can be prosecuted under the HASAWA for failing to perform their prescribed duties, the MOD cannot. At the most, the MOD could only expect a Crown Censure (by which the Health and Safety Executive records there would be sufficient evidence to secure a H&S conviction against the MOD).

EAP

Thanks EAP86. Understand. I was thinking of the previous decision by the CPS not to prosecute MoD. IIRC there was a formal announcement, mentioned earlier in the thread.

EAP86:-
Then let us hope that is exactly what happens. Personally I would rate Crown Censure of the MOD as equivalent to a conviction, given that the latter would merely mean the PBTP would end up picking up the tab anyway. As to:-

We can only hope that the apparent exclusion of those of 2* and above from any prosecution under Military Law does not extend to the HASAWA.

Yep, for the MoD and other government bodies the maximum sanction is either a Crown Sensure or a Regulation 28 (previously a Rule 43). Of course, those that claimed an adequate safety case when one did not exist can be sentenced for up to 2 years with or without a fine - even if no incident arose due to the failing. The mere act of failing to check is enough for a prosecution (Armed Forces Act 2009).

Of course, nobody has ever been prosecuted and the non-existent ejection seat safety case was relied upon and quoted in a coroner's court previously. Hopefully the court will remember that Sean Cunningham's death was not the first that questioned the Mk10 safety management and airworthiness.

Air Marshal Leeson used his comments on the Mike Harland accident report to champion the safety record of Martin Baker, whilst rejecting some of the report's recommendations. As to how Air Marshal Leeson could oversee and comment on the airworthiness of the Mk10 ejection seat without reference to the safety case just hangs in the air...

https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...ornado_rpt.pdf

This decision only addressed the seat servicing. The CPS, as ever, evaded its responsibility to address corporate level failings. (Followers of the Nimrod XV230 case may recall it and Thames Valley Police lied to families, saying no-one would come forward with evidence, omitting to say they were sitting on witness statements).

JTO - good post. If I might just add a reminder that it is MoD's responsibility to ensure a valid Safety Case. It is inconceivable that Martin Baker don't hold the necessary evidence, but likely that they were simply not under contract to produce the mandated Safety Case Reports - again, similar to Nimrod XV230. More than likely, given public admissions by the former IPTL.

From what I understand the prosecution of MB is appropriate and follows quite a few issues at that company. Somehow a halo-effect took hold around MB, its designs and its ability to honestly investigate, learn and communicate issues with the seats. Worryingly they seem to have addressed design issues with some customers whilst leaving others in the dark.

I wonder if anyone stumped up to attend the lecture about XX177 by MoD's Hawk Type Airworthiness Authority (at the time of the accident) last month at the University of Chester? He was a witness at the Inquest. Did he mention why there was no safety case report to be found? Or the impact this had on the validity of the aircraft safety case?

As an aside - and I'm no legal person - why are Martin-Baker prohibited from speaking to potential witnesses under contempt of court rules, while MoD employees are allowed to give public lectures when the case is sub judice? Even if permitted, a strange thing to do given it admitted serious offences.

Crown employees
11 Although the Crown is bound by the general duties of the Act it cannot be prosecuted nor can it be served with improvement or prohibition notices (HSW Act s.48). (Though administrative sanctions, including Crown censure and Crown notices are available.) This immunity from formal enforcement applies to central government departments, and Crown bodies such as HM Prison Service, as well as to other organisations in specific circumstances, e.g. the Environment Agency when it is undertaking specific duties for the Minister. If you have any doubt about the status of an apparently 'crown' body then contact the Public Services Sector (Defence, Fire and Police Unit) for advice.

Prosecuting individuals - OC 130/08

No lawyers here who can answer my question? Is a witness at the inquest, who will be a potential witness at the court case (as Type Airworthiness Authority, presumably he had some say in the decision not to have a valid ejection seat or Hawk safety case) permitted to give lectures on the subject? Is this a form of contempt?

Last I heard, May 2017 Sky News - https://news.sky.com/story/ejector-s...death-10881378

- was that the case would open at Lincoln Crown Court on 22nd Jan 2018 - now less than two months away.

Perhaps he was practicing his speech in case he is called ? Unless they've changed their plea ??

LFH

.....................

LFH:-

If he is called it won't be to give a speech but to give evidence and face cross examination, while on oath to tell the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

And hasn't the then SEngO been doing promotional presentations on the accident on behalf of a certain training company who it is said were actually working with the Reds on "compliance" issues BEFORE the ejection??

Tuc, looking at this fellas credentials I wonder how he was considered by his superiors as SQEP?
I have no doubt that they are having difficulty filling positions.
Another point: he would have had to get his presentation cleared prior to delivery to the RAeS. When I gave a presentation I had to have a synopsis approved prior to completion. Then all my slides had to be approved. They needed a great deal of notice and only just made it, having had to chase them a few times. All the rules were set out in a DIN.
Still the rules keep changing. I have been gone six years. I guess these days folks are allowed to log on to xhamster at ABW without fear of dismissal.

Dragartist

I'm not sure there even is a definition for SQEP. I know there is for 'inexperience'; at least in my field. One has to have (successfully) managed (not just worked on) at least 125 projects to be even considered for promotion to PPTO/UG7/B2. I know this because my MP once raised this during the Nimrod case (as Haddon-Cave noted the safety manager was not SQEP). MoD declined to say how many staff satisfied this criteria. I have an opinion. And it is not very high.

For the dim or ignorant, "SQEP"?

Wander- suitably qualified experienced person.

As for project management within defence procurement being SQEP - please don't make me laugh any more!

aah - I had made a guess close to that but thought it must be really complicated so dismissed my attempt! Thanks

A commonly held view, which ignores that the majority of projects are delivered to time, cost and performance - or better - with effortless competence. There is a reason why MoD won't release Post Project Evaluation reports - because the reasons for the high profile failures were predictable, predicted, notified and ignored. Very often the primary cause is failure of management oversight. How many at that level meet the SQEP criteria?

One could take this further and ask what the background was of those who notified and were ignored. One would find they are what most here would look for in a SQEP. This applies to both projects and the deaths Chug refers to. While I disagree with the above 125 successful projects criteria, someone must have considered it reasonable and attainable.

I think most of us would agree pba, I think it a little unfair to throw people in to the deep end. I was led into things gently with small projects with suitable mentors. Although I hated it at the time, being moved out of aircraft Office into the equipment office, I realised afterwards that it was part of the grooming process to come back to head the aircraft office. Don’t believe I could list 125 projects to my name but I did receive recognition for a good number.

@Never Fretter....the point you make is? A spot of training solves what is likely to be ingrained issues that go back many years? Most of these issues are not training problems...most drivers are trained yet choose to use their mobiles!

I was at the Chester lecture. Alan O'Connor was at pains to report only on publicly available information, rather than give opinion or new information. It was an excellent presentation, humble particularly due to his own role within the system, and cemented for me my decision not to return to flying (or indeed anything else) with the RAF Air Cadets.

Whilst MB have their part to play in the death of SC, they will end up taking the public flack for an event (or series of events) that lead up to the shackle not releasing that had very little to do with them. It'll be a useful smokescreen for hiding why he ended up at 100' AGL in the first place.

Thank you Dusty B. I think the point is that the 'publicly available' information (i.e. MoD's version) is full of holes. Did he mention the serious offences admitted in the SI report? Primarily, a series of false declarations about and within the Aircraft Document Set which the Type Airworthiness Authority would be party to, or certainly be expected to spot at a casual glance.

We all know that at a certain level people just sign papers thrust under their noses. But if asked to put my name to a legally binding document saying I have personally assured myself there is a valid safety case, I'd expect said safety case report to be attached. Indeed, a certified copy in the filing cabinet closest to hand. One's 2 Star has to assess the top ten risks every month. Here, 'can't find safety case report for ejection seat' would be #1, so what on earth was said at these reviews? That 2 Star has a lot to answer for.

I'd be interested to know what part M-B is thought to have played. There was a suggestion that, in 1990, they didn't disseminate a technical bulletin; but whoever wrote that hadn't bothered to read MoD's own regulations. Assuming the company don't roll over to preserve relations, I suspect MoD will be asked some pretty embarrassing questions.

Pity the court case was delayed. It wouldn't have lasted 5 minutes had Judge Haddon-Cave sat, as originally planned. No safety case? Directed verdict and early lunch. Anything else and he'd have looked foolish.

Interesting point, tuc.

I'm sure you're not suggesting another conspiracy theory, whereby the learned judge's absence from the trial had anything to do with the fiendishly cunning MoD....?

Or are you? (oooer missus)

airsound

Vox populi, vox veritatis

The nation has spoken, but perhaps it's the 99% who give the rest a bad name...

:E

PDR

airsound

I couldn't possibly comment!



PDR1

Ditto!!