So what are you after tuc? An MAA without serving military personnel? How will that provide informed, current, knowledge of the Military Air Environment? To answer your question, CAS is not in the management chain for those in the MAA (it goes D MAA to DG DSA to SofS). Yes, of course, people serving in the MAA will return to the mainstream RAF and no doubt you will see this as vulnerability to pressure; but how is that different from those operators working in the CAA returning to the wider commercial aviation world?

And while I do not condone the pressure that you were once subjected to, can you provide current evidence (anytime this century will do) of ANY government individual being disciplined for 'refusing to make a false declaration'? I've never witnessed such an event, nor have I ever heard a colleague express any worry regarding such pressure. I'm not denying your claim that it happended in the past, I'm querying its relevance to the current environment.

Thank you tuc, you put it far better than I, as ever. As you say, both military and civilian personnel within DSA (including the DG) are subject to the MOD CoC, just as they were previously when that CoC subverted Air Safety some three decades ago to leave it in the parlous state it is now. The signs on the door may change, the reality does not.

Fortissimo, the analogy you make with civilian aviation does not bear scrutiny. Yes, both systems come under one SoS (Defence and Transport), but the civilian Regulator and Investigator are separate and independent of each other, whereas in military aviation they come under one DG. If his investigator finds (as it should) the regulator to have failed utterly in ensuring airworthiness in investigating accident after accident is he going to severely censure himself? The throttling of UK Military Air Accident Investigation continues unhindered whereas the AAIB can find Regulator or Operator equally to have failed.

The military operator is of course the elephant in the room, and its principal guise is that of the RAF. It is that Service's Very Senior Officers that first caused the subversion by issuing illegal orders and by illegally granting RTS's to knowingly unairworthy aircraft. It is that Service's Very Senior Officers that have ensured the cover up of that subversion ever since. Thus was the Nimrod Report subverted, thus was the MAA founded on a lie.

It is being freed of such baleful influence that is the essential pre-requisite of UK Military Air Safety reform. That can only happen when the MAA and MilAAIB are outside the MOD, and thus independent of it and of each other.

Unless I've greatly misunderstood, isn't the problem with all this that no-one has actually refused to make a false declaration, knowing that the order to make a false declaration is not treated as an offence, whereas refusing an order to lie is treated as an offence. I am given to understand that this extraordinary policy has been formally confirmed by several successive governments and is still in force.

I suspect that currently (and probably wisely) no-one is actually issuing such orders, therefore there is nothing to refuse, and anything to do with airworthiness is being quietly fudged.

...............

Ogre,
You are correct, I only had the UK in mind (although I once had cause to read DEF(AUST) 5679!). You say "...to prove we have done everything reasonably practicable, with requests for details of what mitigations we didn't implement and why not." Who is asking this? The legal authorities or the procuring agencies? There was/is a similar issue in the UK. The legal authorities only come into play when, as in this sad case, something goes wrong. The procuring agencies seemed to be the ones asking such questions despite the legal duties only applying to the manufacturer. It can be argued that accepting the Def Stan (00-56) in the contract allows this investigation but it doesn't alter the law of the land nor those charged with responsibility for its observation.

While the UK Health And Safety At Work Act uses "reasonably practicable" it doesn't attempt to define it as it represents a relatively well understood UK legal concept. When the Act was published in 1974, it's contents weren't new, the Act just codified what the Common Law already said about health and safety. I still believe that the translation of SFAIRP into something meaningful for engineers isn't very straightforward. The HSE is quite good at this - their web pages are quite informative - but the guidance has limited utility for manufacturing complex products like military aircraft.

I agree that there can be hard side effects on manufacturing companies, but mostly those whose products have the highest severity hazards in use. I believe such companies need to recognise this and use a safety engineering process from product concept to delivery and in-service. Companies need to recognise that safety engineering is a fundamental part of the Systems Engineer's toolbox. For me Def Stan 00-56 (in any of its early versions) hasn't really been very good at making this clear and in my experience this helps lead PTs to address safety just before entry into service. This approach puts the emphasis on process outputs rather than continuous monitoring and involvement which is the way if they're truly interested in "details of mitigations". I often thought that the requirements of earlier versions of Mil Std 882 tended to be better about the use of safety through product life. Funnily enough, the Eurofighter contractual process is based on the Mil Std as the Def Stan hadn't been published when the contract was signed.

EAP

OK, I work for the government, so this is stuff that I should be aware of. Please give me ANY reference document, policy letter, speech or formal source that confirms your belief.

I am not disputing what someone may or may not have said to a fellow PPruner over 2 decades ago, I am simply saying that I do not believe that anyone working in govt today believes, for a second, that refusing an order to lie would lead to disciplinary action.

Martin-Baker - Ejection History 12mins & ONLY 1946-47

Has this convoluted "orders to lie" stuff been tested in court?

Personal testimony of being ordered to suborn the regulations and being disciplined for not doing so has been posted on this forum on a number of occasions. No doubt it will be so again, but in the meantime I commend the site "Military Airworthiness - A Tale of Mendacity" in which the subject of this thread is covered, together with other military airworthiness related fatal air accidents. The part that covers the issues raised by Red Line Entry is in Part 8.1 "The Elephant in the Room and the Case for Independence" :-

https://sites.google.com/site/milita...A/independence

To answer your question Wander00, nothing has been tested in court. Neither the Thames Valley Police nor the RAF Provost Marshal have shown any interest in investigating, let alone laying charges against anyone. I wonder why?

Red Line Entry

I've been prepared to publish, twice, what you ask about, under my own name. Cited therein is correspondence from MoD following submission of proofs, when I offered to change anything that was inaccurate. In one reply (28.10.14), the Cabinet Secretary (Sir Jeremy Heywood) referred directly to such disciplinary action and stated it would be "inappropriate" to make any changes to the rulings.

I do not speak of a single event "over two decades ago". I speak of consistent rulings and action since I first experienced this in December 1992. I cannot say if it happened before that, but have opined that it began as a reaction to the Director of Flight Safety notifying the Chief Engineer and ACAS in August 1992 of systemic failings. Until then, relatively infrequent notifications of the same (from January 1988), by MoD auditors, were simply ignored. As a direct result of this 1992 action, the Director Of Internal Audit undertook a 3 year audit and confirmed the failings to PUS in June 1996. The primary aim of that audit was to provide top cover for those who had been threatened with dismissal. Thereafter (to my knowledge) the action taken was "only" formal warnings, which of course have long term effects as they are always brought up at subsequent interviews.

Forgive me if I skip forward into this century, but in April 2003 PUS was advised by MoD's Director of Personnel, Resources and Development that MoD did not regard issuing an order to commit fraud by misrepresentation (making a false declaration) as "wrongdoing" and that adverse staff reports would not be amended to remove references to the offence (the refusal to commit fraud). At 2 Star level, a direct question was asked, in writing - which is the greater offence, the refusal or the order? His written ruling was that only one offence was committed - the refusal. This was subsequently upheld by the Chief of Defence Procurement and (from memory) five Ministers for the Armed Forces. In the same letter (April 2003), PUS was advised that there was only one person in MoD who had voiced concern at systemic airworthiness failings and waste; and that this person was wrong. This claim ignored the raft of internal audits reporting the same. This correspondence followed a formal hearing on the subject in September 2002, which led to CDP issuing his rulings, twice. Civilian staff were advised in writing by their Trades Union (prospect) who, after investigating, decided it could not make a formal complaint about the policy. MoD now claims this formal hearing did not take place, but the transcript of the recording is very clear (as is the recording). My opinion is that, again, this 2003 ruling was (in part) designed to divert attention from a significant event - the loss of Tornado ZG710 the previous month. Part of the original complaint had been that aircraft were being delivered functionally unsafe, but false declarations made that they were safe. It was well known that an inspection of Tornado IFF system integration, specifically failure warnings, had been rejected at 2 Star level in 1999 and 2002, and ACM Burridge in his remarks confirmed the accident would probably have been avoided had such integration been effected properly.

You could write a book.......

That assumes you have sufficient clearance and if you do not, reducing the bolt diameter does not detract from the required design strength.
A longer bolt shank so it does not pinch when torqued down due to becoming thread bound may have been the answer, however the length may also be an issue.

It has always struck me that the MAA's position, outlined by Red Line Entry, is not dissimilar to anyone with financial and technical delegation. When conducting scrutiny, technical (and it must be technical) staff are seen to be working direct to PUS, as the Chief Accounting Officer. When making their written declaration and signing, they act separately of their line management chain. In the same way the MAA have a more direct link to SofS. But that does not make them "independent", as they have another line management chain which determines their career path far more directly than PUS/SofS ever does. In both cases, the system falls apart because the systemic failures have taken place in that second, more traditional, chain. And, notably, in both cases the PUS/SofS chain has shown no inclination to act upon notification of total breakdown. Set aside, if you like, my evidence, and just ask this. When were systemic failings formally notified by auditors? (13.1.88-on). Who caused them and who judged the complaint? (Same people). Were the notifications repeated regularly? (Yes, every year since). Who rejected them? (Same people). What event brought matters to a head? (Nimrod XV230, and notification of previous reports to the Coroner). Did MoD continue to deny this thereafter? (Yes). Did similar failings continue to occur? (Yes). What's gone wrong? MoD is judge and jury.


I've answered that before. But I offer this, again. MoD has stated, in writing, that only one person believes there were systemic failings. Written in 2003, this claim has been cited repeatedly by Ministers, in correspondence with other Ministers. I'd like to know what MAA staff think of this claim, given the obligation, set out in every letter of delegation, to report such failings and ensure they are escalated. Of course, the claim is nonsense, so one must ask who is writing these Ministerial briefings? And why the MAA senior management is content with them (because they have been notified of them, and in one particular case wrote the briefing). That doesn't sound like an independent organisation. It sounds like one that is scared to stick its head above the parapet. Content to wait for an accident and react, rather than be proactive.

If I could just row back to the safety case issue, in particular #68 and the comment by EAP86. My memory of detail from 15 years ago is a bit sketchy, but I am sure the Mk 10 seat and the Mk9 in Jaguar were considered legacy systems. Now, notwithstanding all the valid comment, regulations and rights and wrongs I think that was how it was.

I expect many have read David Hill's paper on the accident which I admire for the research; however, I find a couple of the arguments a bit weak to present to such a high powered distribution.

SB:-
Fair enough. Would you please explain? Also I find your comment "a bit weak":-

The Hawk Mk 10 seat had no safety case, rendering it unairworthy. No "legacy" consideration can accomodate that!

I'm sure any weakness could be corrected, or better explained. But few readers will miss the central point, that it does not contain allegations or supposition, being based on MoD's own statements, and practices Vs policies. Not least, as Chug points out, the Service Inquiry's statement that there was no safety case report. This in itself is a bit of a weak statement, because it doesn't actually say Martin Baker had not compiled a safety case. My guess is they did, but just weren't under contract to maintain it, or under directed sub-contract to BAeS to contribute to the whole aircraft safety cases for all Mk10 users. In other words, exactly the same situation faced by the Nimrod IPT Leader in 1999. But in this case, the IPTs (S&AD and Hawk) had, apparently, passed rigourous MAA audit in the past year; whereas in 1999 it was known and accepted by senior staff that safety cases were not funded properly, the entire process being a bit hit and miss. The SI report does comment on this, but stops short of open criticism. As ever with SI reports, it is very light on events that led to factors and cause.

There was no safety case, but, as I said, notwithstanding all the valid comment, regulations and rights and wrongs, that was how it was. Sadly, the person who could shed a lot of light onto events of those days is no longer with us.
As for 'The Paper', I think very subjective comment, such as MBA saying 'still use this seat' to suggest it should have been upgraded detracts from the more serious issues discussed.
Anyway, said my bit so that's me done.

SB:-
Not only was but is in my view. The point that tuc and I are making is that how it was has led to 63 deaths in airworthiness related accidents and how it is will go on doing so unless some really radical steps are taken PDQ. The RAF has to confront the elephant in its own room, which is the continuing cover up of illegal orders and illegal actions made by its own Very Senior Officers. Only then can the Nimrod Report be seen as part of that cover up. There was no "Golden Period", quite the contrary there was deliberate sabotage of the UK Military Air Safety system. Once the Nimrod Report is seen as the sham that it is then the MAA, which proclaims Haddon-Cave as its corner stone, can likewise be seen in its true light. Regulation and Investigation is not safe in the MOD's hands and must be wrested free of them and of each other. Then and only then can the long and difficult road to regaining UK Military Airworthiness be started out on.
There was an MOD apologist that was forever saying much the same on the Mull thread, yet he returned time and time again. So stay with the conversation SB. Jaw jaw, and all that...

Okay, okay, I'll stay with it, but really, I don't think I can add much to the conversation. I'm on the same side as you and tuc and I understand how safety has been eroded by VSOs and their drive for budget cuts and then turning a blind eye to the inevitable results. Reading some of the learned posts on this site has made me think how poorly I was trained (!) and prepared for the role I undertook; I had to work it out as I went along, just making sure I didn't do anything stupid. I suppose that fits in with many of the arguments you both make.
Gotta go now for the unbiased Brexit argument on Question Time!

Slow Biker, with the greatest respect you have already added much value, simply by accepting the truth of what is being said. A few here endured much criticism when these failures were first raised, many repeating the MoD line that such things could never happen. Now, dare I say it, it is only a few hard liners who refuse to accept the facts laid bare before Haddon-Cave and Lord Philip. It is often better to read the evidence before trying to refute it. Especially when it is in MoD's own hand! I don't make accusations here, simply note MoD's own statements in an attempt to explain accidents like this. Very unoriginal I'm afraid.

Slow Biker:-
On the contrary you have already added much. Your own experience emphasises the dysfunctional system that meant that you were left simply hoping not to be the one that acted wrongly out of ignorance. It was not your fault not being fully informed but of those that rendered the system dysfunctional to such a gross extent. As you say we are all on the same side. We all want UK military aircraft to be airworthy. It will take all of us to demand that real reforms rather than pretend ones make that happen. As to learned posts, they certainly don't come from me! I was a lowly GD/P. They don't come more unlearned than that!

Come on in and join the fray! I must though regrettably end on a note of mild censure. Question Time biased? Really Sir, how can you suggest such a thing? :E

Its in the news again today.. Ejection seat firm in court over Red Arrows pilot death - BBC News

MB make something that has saved many lives, but which does that by employing some dangerous and violent methods in a last resort solution. And all that with an excellent record.
I really don't see how this is justified in general with the above said, and specifically when having read the report which doesnt seem to point much to MB being at fault compared to other factors.

050

Agreed, and well said. There is so much evidence to counter MoD's main claim. It may be that other evidence has yet to be revealed. But for MoD to escape prosecution, it will have to be much worse than ACAS falsely declaring in the RTS that there was a valid safety case. Of course, MoD has form here, and has escaped prosecution before. I really do wonder why MB haven't played this, and other cards.

thank you tuc
I guess its a case of 'how much do you want to drop one of your primary customers in the poop?' I hope this sorts itself out in the wash, perhaps the deal has already been reached behind the scenes... a court case for appearances and then business as usual.

hoss183:-
If that is the case then MB and the MOD would jointly be guilty of conspiring to pervert the course of justice. The MOD of course wouldn't bat an eyelid, but MB needs to consider its actions carefully. Nowhere is "behind the scenes" these days. MOD's attempts to pin a manslaughter rap on two deceased JOs is already a matter of record. In short it has form.

Now another man has died, let right be done, and the real culprit be put up for trial.

An observation, if I may?

Re: 'how much do you want to drop one of your primary customers in the poop?'

For several years, the UK MoD has been at best, a `secondary` customer for MBA. However, I believe the perception that "if its good for the RAF, its good enough for us" still (up to ~5 years ago, anyway) held sway with many of the company's other customers.

...but I get the points Hoss and Chug.

All the legalities aside, the accident report was chilling and informative at the same time, and an excellent piece of work in my opinion (I write reports for a living).

It makes me wonder how many flight crew have accidentally passed a crotch strap through the ejection seat D ring when strapping in and not noticed it. I have seen flexible "crotch shields" on some aircraft that would have prevented this from happening, I believe the early JAS39 seat required some work in this area. It certainly made me think.

A tragedy all round.

I find it extremely difficult to understand why ANY pilot could not be utterly meticulous about checking and strapping into his seat, to have any strap out of place , let alone one through the firing handle and no notice the fact is absurdly bad airmanship.

And I still can't imagine why the pin was being replaced on the roll out with other aircraft in the vicinity, why on earth does, or perhaps did, the RAF allow such sloppy procedures?

Pins should only be installed when , ideally stopped, but only when circumstances allow visual confirmation of correct insertion. Period

When I first started on a JP 1962 my QFI hammered into me that the seat could save my life, but if mishandled could just as easily kill me.

Six months later we both ejected and he is coming to lunch today !

All my RAF life, particularly as a QFI myself, I practiced my QFIs teaching
, what changed ?

RBA/BY, your point is well made and I too remember both the sense of security and the respect that was drummed into me when under instruction on the JP at the same time as you were. As a trainee trucker first the seat went, leaving only a parachute for the Varsity AFTS, and then even that went at the Hastings OCU (bad for passenger morale apparently).

The change in culture that you instance is what happens when an Air Safety system is deliberately and malevolently attacked. It is wrong to suppose that airworthiness alone was a victim of that attack in the late 80s/early 90s, every aspect of Flight Safety was hit; reporting, collating, rectifying, disseminating. Add to that the truculent view that "Safety is for Wimps" and you arrive at the cavalier practices found in this report.

It took mere months to destroy a system that had taken decades to build. It will take more decades to rebuild, and that has to start with an independent Regulator and Investigator, both of the MOD and of each other, in order to avoid a repeat attack. That is the point of an Investigation after all, to avoid a recurrence!

For too long BoIs/MIs have satisfied themselves with counting the trees when it is the woods that need investigating, and that can only be done by investigators independent of those with something to hide.

I'll go fetch a ladder so you can get off your high horse safely.

The existence of position 2 and 3 for the SFH were not known about and neither was the possibility of initiating an ejection with anything other than a vertical pull.

The best knowledge at the time was that if you had inserted the pin then the SFH must have been safe. No visual inspection was required, why would it be? The pin wasn't believed to be capable of going anywhere else. In any event, a visual inspection of the pin when the SFH was in position 2 or 3 from the normal seated position would simply show the pin to be "correct" as looking at it from above wouldn't show the problem.

Retired BA/BY

It's easy to criticise but unless you were in Sean's shoes then it is very hard to say you wouldn't have done the same thing.

We are all taught (and for us QFIs we all teach) to be very careful with pins and respectful of EJ seats. Nothing has changed in that regard.

All I can say is that Sean learned a very hard lesson for the eternal benefit of the rest of us. I check my seat pin far closer now than I did before his accident. As Stuff says, we just weren't fully aware of the problem beforehand.

I'm not overly chuffed when people come on here and say things like "I would never have done that" and "what the hell was he thinking?!".

The quote 'Don't judge a man until you have walked a mile in his shoes' springs to my mind. You may well have been a previous FJ pilot and you may have achieved thousands of hours in them but you weren't a Red Arrows pilot in 2011. If the criticism had come from one of the team then I would listen. To the best of my knowledge, this has never happened.

You may disagree with me and I'm not trying to start a fight but those are my thoughts. As a counter argument how would you feel if I were to come onto a similar forum and bad mouth the actions of a BA pilot after a fatal accident? Sure I'm a pilot but I've never flown a heavy transport aircraft.

BV

Bob Viking,
Surely the fact that the pilot was a member of the Red Arrows in 2011 raises the bar in terms of standard of care?
We surely don't need to await a pronouncement from someone else in the Red Arrows (as if there is likely to be one) to be able to conclude that the crotch strap through the handle was bad form, and was down to the pilot? I am not trying to deflect the general flow of the debate,or alter where the fingers are pointing, but lets call a spade a spade.

Falcon900

The question of why an experienced operator incorrectly routed his crotch strap may never be answered, although the SI goes to great lengths to attempt to explain. Sean wasn't the first to do it and I'm sure he won't be the last.

I'm not saying it was correct to do so. Sean knew that as well. I just find it a little specious to state that 'it could never happen to me'. You could say that for every accident that ever occurred. The victim of the accident would probably have said the same. But they'd be wrong.

I think I've made my point but I'm sure there is more to discuss.

BV

Stuff: No need for a ladder, checking visually that the pin was correctly installed is too utterly basic to ignore. Never heard of double checking a critical item, in this case feel and visual observations ?

And as far as Mr Viking is concerned I HAVE walked in very similar shoes to Sean's. So I am VERY critical of the idea of inserting a seat pan firing handle on the rollout and NEVER saw it done because it was certainly not SOP. I question just why it was necessary to insert the pin before safely stopped and parked on the pan. Perhaps there was/is a reason I just don't get it based on the experience of 12 years of flying ejection seat equipped aircraft. After this accident and the associated publicity its a pretty poor state of affairs if Sean is NOT the last to do this. I am not bad mouthing anyone, just critical of the culture based on real life experience and if you wish to be crtitical of any other incident feel free to do so, BUT make it factual and preferrably based on real knowledge or experience.

Never a Red but there have been times when I was rushed but seat checks were NEVER compromised. Perhaps an ejection very early in my career rammed that home and I hammered that home to all my crew and students ( which included commandants designate of CFS and RAFC when I was a standards QFI) for which I make no apology. It served me well.

I could never, ever, say it could NOT have happened to me but I did my damndest to make sure it did not and that includes the double check I mentioned.

Actually Bob the accident report did address that question. They believed the previous pilot flew the aircraft in the exact same condition, and that he exited the cockpit with the now undone crotch strap lying loose but still routed through the seat handle, Sean didn't pass the strap through the handle, it was already there. On recreating the scenario the examiners noted how easy it was to reach down and grab the strap without being able to see the mis-routing.

No need for ill-feeling over this, it was a tragedy and lessons will be learned. RIP Sean.

This needless and avoidable accident should send out a clarion call to the military aviation community of the importance of a fully functioning Air Safety System and what can happen when there isn't one, as then, and as now.

This seat did not have a Safety Case. If it had then a continuous auditing process would have highlighted the possibility of the drogue shackle nut being overtightened as a result of the improper use of an RTI requiring the nut to be unfastened and refastened on the line every 50 hours. It would also have highlighted reports of the SPH pin being inserted leaving the seat live, and for that matter the ease of misrouting the crotch strap through the SPH, and measures would have been taken to alleviate all of these issues.

There was no Safety Case though, and the aircraft RTS was therefore illegal. There was no overview of this vital safety component by the Regulator, rather all was left to the airmanship of the pilots and the professionalism of the ground engineers. The Regulator should be in the dock in my view, attempting to defend the indefensible. Unless and until it is, then needless and avoidable accidents will simply carry on happening...

I am obviously a bit old fashioned. Safety Cases came in, possibly in the late 90s, not sure, but I sat on ejection seats for 40 years, not just MB, but also Folland and ACES 2. I recall safety being absolutely drummed in to us in initial training and beyond. Particularly partial pin insertion and crotch strap positioning. I don't recall many or any such cases like this one.
This was an absolute tragedy and I do not blame Sean in any way. Despite all the training, I managed to get airborne on a live Q scramble with the straps completely wrong and the seat live. With some trepidation on the climb out, I made the seat safe, unstrapped and did it properly. Things can screw you up and I was lucky nothing else happened. Will a safety case make you absolutely safe or is it just a legal requirement? I don't know.
What I do know is I am grateful for the security that an ejection seat gave me and was happy to sit on one despite its own inherent dangers.

This touches on a much misunderstood aspect. While Safety Cases were mandated in the early 1990s, that is not to say safety was ignored before that. It was just called something different - the Safety Argument for example. I still have my copy of the mandated regulations procurers were under, dated 1977. They underwent a major update in 1985, which added chapters; but the original 10 remained extant and mandated. (For example, managing software projects became a bigger aspect of our work and specific regs were added). In the section covering contract acceptance, safety features heavily. In other words, and regardless of what the bit of paper was called, if the contractor couldn't prove the product met its safety criteria (set out in the project plan from day 1) then it was not accepted off contract by procurers, and (obviously) could not be offered to the Service and accepted into Service. Nor, obviously, could a Release to Service be issued (legally).

All contractors understand this, and very few in my experience would remotely consider defrauding MoD by falsifying safety reports. (I'd like to say "none", but unfortunately I know of two - both led to multiple deaths and injuries, but no action was taken). The problem, admitted by MoD in the Service Inquiry report, is that this process broke down catastrophically in the case of the Mk10 ejection seat. I'd bet my house Martin Baker has a valid Safety Case. As I'd still have the house, I'd bet it again that MoD has not had Martin Baker under appropriate contract, so the MoD Safety Cases have lapsed or just been ignored - and this is what the SI refers to when it admits there is no Safety Case.

In other words, precisely the same as happened on Nimrod MR2, when MoD didn't bother contracting its upkeep for many years, and when an attempt was eventually made to resurrect it, it employed a safety manager who hadn't a clue, as it had been so long since MoD trained anyone. (And therein lies the reason he, and his RAF officer colleagues, were not prosecuted). Which gets us back to XX177 and why (a) the Crown prosecution Service determined that no case could be brought, and (b) the Health and Safety Executive have decided to pursue Martin Baker but not MoD, despite the latter openly admitting serious offences. Something's going on.

Tuc, many thanks for your comeback, your further explanation and correct dating. However, I am still unsure as to whether a Safety Case really makes things completely safe or is just a legal requirement, giving the opportunity for litigation when it goes wrong. Military aviation is inherently dangerous, thats why I am going grey! I prefer to talk in terms of airworthiness, where I have had some experience, not all good I might add.

Mach2number

I agree. It adds a degree of confidence - a high degree if done properly. The real issue is, as you say, practical implementation. The Safety Case for the seat (in this case) must then be subsumed into the whole aircraft Safety Case for the platform, and what is safe in one application may not be in another. That is why the SI report is so alarming - that the MoD system, post-MAA and Haddon-Cave, permitted the basic Safety Case to be ignored. Put another way, what MoD tends to ignore is the difference between physical and functional safety. It (or rather the manufacturer) will usually check the first, but MoD uses that evidence to sign off both. Martin Baker can say the seat is physically safe, but it cannot say it is functionally safe as it has no control over how it is fitted, maintained or used.

I know that I have asked this (professionally unqualified) question before.
Is there any possible circumstantial link between the events surrounding the death of Sean Cunningham and that of Steve Beckley, who apparently stepped on the bottom handle of his seat ( pins in )and was ejected to his death on ground impact whilst climbing out of a Harrier at Yeovilton c.1974.?

Yes, the SPH issue is not new. It did occur on a Harrier years ago but I don't recall a fatality linked to it. I do remember that the SPH issue was then highlighted in Air Clues or on a poster.