Is this prosecution still due to commence on Monday 22nd ?

The Court lists - Lincoln / 19-01-2018 - usually seem to be updated the night before at the earliest and there's nothing recent in the media.

LFH

............

LFH

Scheduled for 22nd, but for example I am aware the defence team actively tracked down former MoD witnesses who were in post in 1990 (date of one alleged offence), but have since failed to interview all but one. This may indicate the HSE has finally read the evidence (as of October last, it clearly hadn't) and realised it was MoD who admitted imprisonable offences. Or perhaps Haddon-Cave, who was due to hear it on the original date, had a word in an effort to (a) avoid wasting public money, and (b) avoid embarrassing the CPS (an impossible task!), HSE and MoD. No Safety Case, No Fly. End of.

Have just called Lincoln Crown Court Listings. They confirm the case is due to start on Monday 22nd.

Earlier information suggested it could last 4-5 weeks.

airsound

No gas shackle modification. Problems with the scissor shackle were known about in 2002, at the latest.

DV

Thanks airsound. Wonder what the defence line will be, if they're apparently not using the witnesses they sought? I can see it's risky simply pointing at someone else; but when that someone else has actually admitted wrongdoing, things look distinctly odd. Perhaps an unwillingness to upset MoD. Day 1, witness 1 'Please read aloud CAS's admission that there was no safety case. Then tell me who made false record that it existed'.

Well on current CPS/police form, at what late stage will it become apparent either there is no case to answer or evidence has been withheld from the defence.....only asking.....

Correct.
I'm an ex-armourer (25 years), with 6 years on Hawk at 2 TWU (1988-94).

Safe for Maintenance:
All AAES pins fitted

Safe for Parking:
MDC Internal Handle, MDC Firing Unit and Seat Pan Firing Pins all fitted. Ejection Gun, Rocket Initiator and Manual Separation Pins in the cockpit stowage.

It was common for Hawks to taxi onto the pan with MDC Int. Handle and Seat Pan pins refitted by the crew (stowage visibly empty). Aircrew would then refit the MDC Firing Unit Pin on exiting the aircraft.
I flew about 40 hours as 'back seat' engineer and was always told to refit as above on taxi in once clear of the runway and I always flew with a QFI/QWI, never students.
I always took this to be that in the event of having to evacuate the aircraft once off the runway, we would be climbing out as opposed to ejecting.

Only once did I ever see a student get out and leave the entire seat live. He was so elated at passing his last trip. When our senior QWI found out, he had the guy almost in tears as he tore him apart! Probably one of the most heinous crimes a 'stude' could commit.

Regards
Mortmeister

Martin Baker have pleaded guilty to the charges laid against them.

Red Arrows death firm admits failings - BBC News

Wow.
Knowing what we know, that begs all kinds of questions. Are MB taking one on the chin to protect their best customer?

Including "do you actually know what you know?" and "Do they know things that you don't?"...

PDR

Perhaps wiser to wait to see if the specifics of the charge(s) are revealed. Initially, it was a catch-all charge. In October, it was narrowed down a bit, but still very vague. As PDR1 implies, there has got to be something else, because (as DV mentioned a few days ago) there is a 2002 QinetiQ report that makes a nonsense of the accusations made at the Inquest.

Danny Savage, BBC correspondent, will report in 1300 news.

airsound

They have pleaded guilty. Great shame when you consider the number of lives that have been saved in the past. I feel sorry for all concerned.

The guilty plea today avoided the trial. Sentence has been adjourned until 12 February.

Immediately prior to sentence the basis and particulars of the charge and the basis of the plea, together with any mitigation, will be explained in open court.

Here's Martin-Baker's statement:airsound

Thanks roving and airsound. So, a single breach; a change from the two charges in October; and it would seem it relates to the over-tightening of the nut (by MoD, in accordance with an illegal instruction issued by the MoD). That's probably why this was an 'isolated failure', because previous procedures were safe.

Glad to see MB brought to book. I have witnessed too many issues and dismissive attitudes to have any sympathy with this company. For far too long they have dined on the goodwill provided by the lives saved rather than an open, honest and questioning safety culture that can admit to design errors.

The RAF are but one customer of this company and the attempt to imply that this fatality was due to RAFAT mechanics (today's press release) suggests they have a long way to go to engage with their customers.

For those who wish to lay the blame at the UK MoD may wish to reconcile as to how similar issues arose with other nations and the inexplicable difference in safety information shared with multiple international customers. The only common factor is Martin Baker and whilst they have pleaded guilty they just could not help themselves to having one last jab at the very last chap who tightened this poorly designed shackle.

JTO

While it is possible Martin-Baker erred in some way, the RAF's offences are admitted.

The Routine Technical Instruction the maintainer was working to was illegal. An RTI or UTI is only permitted if the Design Authorities (M-B and BAeS) are NOT involved. On a safety critical escape system, they must be. The crucial issue is that an RTI/UTI does not ensure a safety case update. This is why they are not Special Instructions (Technical), and aren't even mentioned in the authoritative Def Stan. Had the correct route been taken (an SI) then the lack of a safety case would have been flagged. Oversight was lacking, as it had been removed as a savings at the expense of safety. Plainly, no one with the remotest understanding of the regulations scrutinised this entire process - which had nothing to do with M-B.

Regardless of whether the 1990 bulletin was issued to MoD (and the only office it was required to be sent to ceased to exist in 1993, so how can one prove it either way?), MoD has released the 2002 report in which the warning about the possibility of the shackle jamming is crystal clear. This renders the alleged offence entirely academic, as MoD admits that it knew nine years before the accident.

The maintainer cut new thread on a bolt. The nut and bolt were therefore immediately scrap, but were not replaced. We don't know why, as his evidence has not been released. My own experience - you feel it.

The Service Inquiry made much of the 1.5 threads issue, ignoring a contradiction in MoD training that says one thread. Had it been one thread, the parachute would have deployed. I can't speak for the RAF, but an RN maintainer would follow NAMMS and his trade training - one thread. Also, out of interest, the FAA says one.

There's a lot more to this, and I'm afraid I must disagree that the only common factor is Martin-Baker. One crucial common factor between this and other cases is that 56 of the 60 recommendations in the SI report can be summarised - do what the regulations tell you to do. NONE of them are Martin-Baker failures.

Well said Tuc....

Good post, tuc. The pigeons are now coming home to roost. We may expect more harrumphing from the apologists in the meantime. The cover up appears to consist more and more of filigree lace these days.