Quite agree, dervish. I have no problem accepting that "pin procedure" has evolved greatly since I first perched tentatively on an MB Mk3P. As you say, technology moves on, designs change, rules and procedures adapt and change accordingly. The point is that in a disciplined environment that is forever trying to make you fondly remembered, you stick to the rules.

The worst thing is when the rules are changed or simply scrapped, not to protect life but money, and short term money at that. There we move away from the cockpit to the murky corridors of power, from JOs to VSOs. That is where Sean Cunningham's fatal accident was conceived, that is where the system designed to safeguard his life became the one that killed him. That is where the court should be directed.

I didn't mention design because it's hasn't fundamentally changed in years yet the rules and procedures seem to grow and grow until the point people are not quite sure why they are even there.

My point related to the practice of unstrapping from an ejector seat during taxi back. Something that was stopped with (IMHO) no real justification other than to satisfy the desire to be seen to be doing something.

mOnkfish

Thanks, and I agree. But it could be inferred that SOMETHING has changed, because there was once a valid safety case, and now there isn't!

I am very curious to discover why crews were unstrapping during taxi back. During ALL of my time on ejection seats, 12 years, I never, ever, saw anyone unstrapping, or even attempting such before shutdown and as a refresher QFI I flew with a LOT of very experience students, from P/O to AM. ( Perhaps some easing of shoulder harnesses but nothing more.)

Similarly in my 25 years on civil jets never ever saw any pilot fully unstrap during taxi in.
Shoulder straps, perhaps but never a full unstrap.

What do you "unstrappers" now know that the rest of us did not ?

I am surprised you never observed the practise of unstrapping on taxiing back. I flew with three different air forces and found it a very common occurrence.

There are arguments both for and against but nothing that can apparently definitively lay the matter to rest.

I believe this should have been left up to the individuals to make their own informed decisions and did not need further regulating, but it seems now that you have to be seen to be doing something, etc, etc

I think that you will find that the practice was not that uncommon on the older 90kts S & L seats where ejection was not an option at taxy speeds. After an hour plus of being tightly strapped in to a seat that had no compromises to comfort, it was often a merciful release to be able to restore feeling to one's nether regions. Loosening off shoulder straps just didn't do it. So, on clearing the R/W it was pins in often followed by various levels of unstrap

m0nkfish:-
As a matter of interest, has the instruction to disarm only after shutdown come from the regulator (ie the MAA) or from the operator (standardisation flight etc)? Either way I am surprised that you think it should be left to each individual pilot or crew, as the case may be, to decide for themselves whether to disarm or not while taxiing in. What about the ground crew receiving an aircraft, not knowing if it is armed or disarmed? What about the crash crews not knowing if an aircraft that has been abandoned on a taxiway (on fire?) is armed or disarmed?

As I've said before, I don't pretend to understand the pros or cons of which is the best procedure for modern zero zero seats, but I'm pretty sure that once the procedure is set then it should be adhered to, if for no other reason that everybody knows what to expect.

In any case, aren't we straying somewhat from the thread OP? MBA (and not the MOD!) are being prosecuted over the death of Sean Cunningham it says. Given the interesting stat posted by tucumseh in post #231:-

So a 28% cut every year for over three years. Just think about that one. This to a system that is one requiring a process of continuous uninterrupted auditing. UK Military Air Safety was killed stone dead by that. It has never recovered. This seat had no Safety Case Report. It was unairworthy. The aircraft was therefore unairworthy. What the hell was the regulator doing? If your only quibble is that it has messed you around simply to be seen doing something you have my sympathy, but I would expect it to be doing its job, which is to ensure the airworthiness of HM aircraft. It has singularly failed in that.

It's not left to the crew, the procedure is in the FRCs and is standard across the fleet.

Pin stowage on all types I've flown are highly visible from the ground so the ground crew will know at a distance if the seat pins are in or not.

As a side note, the seat is never referred to as being armed or disarmed. To do so would be to suggest that when 'disarmed' it's entirely safe. It is not, the explosives remain in place. The seat would only be talked about as being 'live', 'safe for parking' or 'safe for servicing'. I'm sure the armourers have further distinctions beyond 'safe for servicing' but that would involve serious specialist knowledge of the seat in question.

For us, it's drilled from training that you always stop and have a good look of the AAES, checking that all pins are fitted before entering the cockpit. Even if you leave the aircraft and come back again.
If a pin is in the wrong place or incorrectly fitted * , nobody can enter until an Armorer or the Aircrew are recalled to refit the pin.
There is a cockpit access auth that we need, that requires revalidating every 6 months. This auth includes training on AAES and switches ( arrestor hook, brake chute, emergency jettison, selective jettison, canopy jettison, etc ).
The cockpit access auth is type specific, if we are posted onto a new Sqn we need to do the training and auth again.

I believe its a similar requirement for RAF Firefighters too?

* Note... Pins have been fitted but the pip pin not pushed all the way through. Or on a Tornado canopy, missed the hole entirely and placed the pin in an adjacent gap.

Loonrat wrote - 16 Feb -
Indeed ..... Confirmed by the Court. At the request of the parties, for submission of reports. ......... LFH

.............

Thank you Stuff and gr4techie for your assurances that both air and ground crew are properly instructed in Live and Safe for Parking procedures (thanks stuff, I'll try to remember not to use "armed" and "disarmed" again) and to rigidly conform with them accordingly. I had little doubt it was otherwise, hence my concern at m0nkfish's post.

It will be interesting what effects the submission of reports called for by the court have, as posted by LFH. Could it be that certain revelations made here have already had some effect? Will there be yet even further rescheduling? This case has very important implications for every UK military aviator and for the MAA. Put 17/05/2017 in your diaries now!

Martin Baker pleaded Not Guilty in court today. Trial set for January 2018. No mention of MoD's admission of serious offences on its part.

Great news tuc! Thanks for the info. So at long last someone is prepared to stand up to the MOD! Why HSE ever chose to take MBA to court rather than the MOD is still puzzling, but no doubt there are those better informed who can cast some light into these murky corners.

What never changes it seems is the snail like pace with which such matters of life and death take these days. There was no safety case, rendering both seat and aircraft unairworthy. How many other systems and aircraft are in service similarly waiting to pounce and start yet another tragic Airworthiness Related Fatal Air Accident thread on this forum?

almost certainly.

S-D

S-D

An uncalled for snipe, especially as MoD themselves admit no safety case. No one has said MB are innocent, but MoD have admitted guilt but escaped prosecution.

While individuals employed by MOD can be prosecuted under the HASAWA for failing to perform their prescribed duties, the MOD cannot. At the most, the MOD could only expect a Crown Censure (by which the Health and Safety Executive records there would be sufficient evidence to secure a H&S conviction against the MOD).

EAP

Thanks EAP86. Understand. I was thinking of the previous decision by the CPS not to prosecute MoD. IIRC there was a formal announcement, mentioned earlier in the thread.

EAP86:-
Then let us hope that is exactly what happens. Personally I would rate Crown Censure of the MOD as equivalent to a conviction, given that the latter would merely mean the PBTP would end up picking up the tab anyway. As to:-

We can only hope that the apparent exclusion of those of 2* and above from any prosecution under Military Law does not extend to the HASAWA.

Yep, for the MoD and other government bodies the maximum sanction is either a Crown Sensure or a Regulation 28 (previously a Rule 43). Of course, those that claimed an adequate safety case when one did not exist can be sentenced for up to 2 years with or without a fine - even if no incident arose due to the failing. The mere act of failing to check is enough for a prosecution (Armed Forces Act 2009).

Of course, nobody has ever been prosecuted and the non-existent ejection seat safety case was relied upon and quoted in a coroner's court previously. Hopefully the court will remember that Sean Cunningham's death was not the first that questioned the Mk10 safety management and airworthiness.

Air Marshal Leeson used his comments on the Mike Harland accident report to champion the safety record of Martin Baker, whilst rejecting some of the report's recommendations. As to how Air Marshal Leeson could oversee and comment on the airworthiness of the Mk10 ejection seat without reference to the safety case just hangs in the air...

https://www.gov.uk/government/upload...ornado_rpt.pdf

This decision only addressed the seat servicing. The CPS, as ever, evaded its responsibility to address corporate level failings. (Followers of the Nimrod XV230 case may recall it and Thames Valley Police lied to families, saying no-one would come forward with evidence, omitting to say they were sitting on witness statements).

JTO - good post. If I might just add a reminder that it is MoD's responsibility to ensure a valid Safety Case. It is inconceivable that Martin Baker don't hold the necessary evidence, but likely that they were simply not under contract to produce the mandated Safety Case Reports - again, similar to Nimrod XV230. More than likely, given public admissions by the former IPTL.