@Old Fat One: The currency/recency issue came up in our discussion about AF 447 and hand flying at altitude. Based on the few displays I every did (nothing as exotic as flying a vintage jet) the amount of practice, pre briefing, and currency was not trivial.


This is where pilots have to be honest with themselves. As with one's golf game, it is best to get current/practice a bit before a money match.

Cows

You can't have it both ways. If you accept one death per airshow or one Shoreham per year, then you accept it. If you decide that something needs to be done then you have just accepted mission creep.

That doesn't mean you can't look at the incidents to see if something small could make it even safer without losing anything, but at this point there are no easy fixes. All the easy yards went decades ago.
We are well along the road of diminishing returns into the part of the graph where huge efforts produce negligible gains in safety.

If you feel the need to make aviation safer after every incident, then you might as well just cut out e intervening stages and ban flying because that is the logical conclusion of requiring ever increasing amounts of safety.

I live in Shoreham, drive the A27 regularly, love the airshow and would hate to see it terminated or emasculated. It would seem to me to be an adequate response to this tragedy if the administration and planning of the show be tightened up in appropriate ways - which I'm not qualified to assess.
I was also present and witnessed the Hurricane crash in 2007. Without trawling though interminable posts I think it's worth noting - if it hasn't already been noted - that the Hurricane crash occurred barely a few hundred yards from the site of the Hunter accident and very close (on the hillside to the north) to the A27. It was, as far as I recollect, at least partially a consequence of an unplanned manoeuvre. I wonder if the Hurricane accident had any influence on the subsequent planning?

There is a HSE document on the acceptability of risks of various kinds in various scenarios called "Reducing Risks and Protecting People" [generally refered to as "R2P2" in the engineering profession] which is widely respected as a practicable approach to this question. It's actually worth a read, because it talks a lot more sense than most people's prejudices would expect!

PDR

You're still confusing risk, likelihood and consequence.

The number of deaths in an event is the consequence (or cost or impact). If preventing deaths associated is your aim, "the risk of occurrences which may lead to deaths" is meaningless. You would use the likelihood of occurrences which lead to deaths.

Your question about how many air shows: straight forward risk won't tell you that because of random distribution and probability. If you're using positional risk, then you might be tempted to argue that doubling the number of air shows doubles the likelihood of a crash, but that is not the case, because frequency also affects other factors that affect likelihood.

Of course, the level of risk that is acceptable is an entirely different matter and has to decided separately from a dispassionate assessment of risk. Again, level of risk and acceptability are being confused here. As far as I can see, the only means of achieving zero risk of death caused (directly or indirectly) by air displays is to have zero air diaplays. If the argument is about what level of risk is acceptable, then everyone here is fully entitled to their opinion of that, but those opinions do not alter the actual level of risk. Likewise, the effectiveness of any risk assessment conducted for a particular event does not change the level of risk, simply the accuracy of the understanding of that risk and the value of any decisions based on the risk.

No, it doesn't. The risk doesn't become "unacceptable" just because of the severity of the outcome as you said yourself. If the probability of the event happening is small enough, a catastrophic outcome can still produce either a medium or even low risk. If you simply use the outcome as your measure of acceptability, we would have no airliners, high speed trains or nuclear power stations.

You, and others here, will only make proper sense of this when you stop confusing the terms risk, probability and consequence. Once you apply those terms correctly and consistently, you can assess the level of risk appropriately and tackle BOTH the factors in risk reduction. Reduce likely hood: training, assessment, currency, engineering standards, frequency, etc. Reduce impact: Separation from people and property, crash response, energy at impact, fire suppression, etc.

CGB Do we?

I can think of a fair number of GA accidents in the last year and more notable than the number of air show accidents. Many (most) have been as a result of flight in marginal conditions. Fortuitously most of the fatal casualties have been limited to those on board.

Quite a list here: https://www.gov.uk/aaib-reports even if some are simple runway excursions or collisions it is rather more than the air show accidents.

Damn, statistics always get in the way of a bald statement.

We do. You just need to read page 15 of the AAIB special bulletin to give an actual number and the metrics used.

But we miss the point. In the end risk and its management have all be defined by the regulator. The principle document that related to air display was CAP 403, it is mature, being as it was in its 13th version. We can all read so there is no need to restate the points made in the same AAIB SB as referenced above.

We can argue it differently and/or believe that the 13th edition of CAP403 was not as we would like it but that is beside the point after the event.

What we might take away from the emerging accepted facts - if we can agree that the AAIB reports establish them - is that the narrative hasn't revealed a "magic bullet" that explains all with some 1 in a million engineering failure. So far it has followed that tired old path (which for want of a better term) has complacency and human error front and centre.

We will never know how and if this event could have been captured earlier because those who are closest to this - including the CAA - kept no data. Hence why the 2014 JP incident is of focus purely because it is within memory - but who knows what is or who else was doing what earlier?

Regardless what this thread increasingly demonstrates is there are those who fail to engage and speak up because...well who knows? Some loyalty to kindred spirits, old pals, whatever you choose to class them as or even define "them" as.

The "wait for the final report", the "disgusted" at those who hold opinion, the trolling, the having a chip and the "who are you and what do you fly" calls start to lack credibility and become themselves rediculous when so much of what was said earlier proves not to be wild speculation but accurate - and not because of any special genius but very often by being able to see what is hidden in plain sight.

That would be because they haven't reported on the accident inquiry yet. All you've seen are special bulletins on issues that have emerged from their investigation that they feel would have an effect on flight safety.

A lot of what you say is well founded, but you're becoming a bit irate in your ranting. No one has ever said that your speculated conclusions won't end up being proved correct, just that you don't know yet. I'm longing to see your rant if the final report accords with your speculations. We'll be selling ring side seats for that one.

Until then...

that tired old path
complacency and human error front and centre
who knows what is or who else was doing what earlier?
loyalty to kindred spirits, old pals, whatever you choose
wait for the final report
disgusted
the trolling
having a chip
who are you and what do you fly
not to be wild speculation but accurate
hidden in plain sight

Again, no one has ever told you that your speculations drew incorrect conclusions - check back. But are still wrong to express them in public when you can't prove them. Not when you are effectively accusing someone of terrible things. Not professional.

I'm not irate and its not ranting. Its conversation via the internet on a forum with the word rumour in its title. You might be unsurprised therefore when some people post rumour - i.e. you hear from someone, which maybe well placed, to give a view on events.

Beyond that element I think you overlook the fact that people can not only see a great amount of this accident for themselves, others did, both live and via recorded media, so very much is hardly speculated conclusion. The 1/4 clover nonsense a case in point. The all at sea CAA another, the execution of the figure another...

Nothing to do with me, being right - the bigger picture is a lot of people dead and an industry with peoples earnings potential along with so many peoples enjoyment threatened and all because why?? How do the see nothing, hear nothing, say nothing club help them??

Nice edit - fyi accusing someone of terrible things - how?? where?

Those would be the people that have seen the same as you, but are sensible enough only to discuss the know facts, not trying to start your "rumours".

EDIT: Mods, large amount of text missing from this and other posts. Is there a problem?

OK so what exactly is the criticism? That the view is accurate but you don't like that view aired until a time you or someone else deems that it is fit to air that view?

How does that work?

Would you take that view if you were talking about historical child sex abuse? You just just hold no opinion? Could you possibly foresee that in that instance you'd develop a culture where nobody would ever speak up?

You said :

So why does it then become unprofessional?

Much of what I've posted about this accident has had nothing to do with the pilot. Yes I suggested he was low, I suggested that the figure was a 1/4 clover and later that it looked scruffy - to mean that as one could see, it wouldn't be as one would fly it for aeros in a piston plane (which btw is the category of aircraft the pilot in question is well practiced in, although as we know there has been good colour on a pilot with experience on this type of aircraft - which in itself provides potential explanation in itself). But we can't debate any of that because you don't see that it is relevant yet.

But then the criticism has been to the CAA - does APG63 still believe they avoid criticism? - for a variety of reasons where I questioned resource and communication and that of the AAIB - its publication of the SB is cynically timed vis the ending of the CAA fees consultation and what part of this latest SB's content required 7 months to research? 7 months, even at a 1950's 40hour week is over 1200hrs of work per person - that is a lot of time.

I mean does the AAIB have 1 person per case? 1 person for 10 cases. 100?? I don't know, but I do know in the interim period the AAIB and CAA have being hiring...

Yet its all set against a backdrop where the CAA's P&L for 2014 was +£14m post tax and £5.5m in 2015. Yet now the CAA are scrabbling for £250k for 4 guys to stick fingers in the leaking dam?!

So yeah I think a great deal was as plain as the nose on your face.

Pitts,

Everything you have just asked me, I have already told you and, once again, you are reading what you want to see. I did not say your view was accurate. I said nothing about when someone deems anything.

Read what I have written not what you want to rant about. As you well know, or should if you read carefully, I have never discussed any other aspects of the reports such as the actions and performance of the CAA; that is because it is an area that I am neither particularly familiar with nor interested in. I have expressed no opinion on the accident itself because I am sensible enough not to make defamatory statements about a pilot involved in a high profile case until factors other than pilot error are ruled out. The evidence for that will not be available until the final report is published. Until then I do not feel the need to go shooting my mouth off with any unfounded conclusions.

I have a very firm opinion of what happened. But it is not confirmed nor is it disproved due to lacking evidence and I shall not be discussing it until that evidence becomes available to me. Your desire to jump to conclusions would not be a very professional attitude for a pilot.

I cannot answer for other members, you will have to ask them.

when before you said

Accurate / A lot of what you say is well founded... Isn't that the same thing?

If not then that is my poor understanding / usage of the English language.

Other than being interested in comments made by the CAA as reflected by me in a post which you tried to call me out over...

There is a mixture of things here. So you can have a "very firm opinion of what happened" and yet my opinions are classed as "a desire to jump to conclusions". So what evidence do you have that allows your strong opinion to be formed - because you've formed it regardless of its communication.

So now its the voicing of an opinion that is an issue, but of course that might not apply to people you see as your peers in a bar perhaps and so its now just here, which you seem to caveat as defamatory... although you'd have to clarify which bits they are and then take a view on fair comment.

It's OK, PN, we've discussed it off line - at Pitts' instigation, I might add. Distracting discussion over.

Local TV news reports that the Police are applying to the High Court to obtain evidence from the AAIB investigation.

Shoreham crash: Police go to High Court to see evidence - BBC News

And there is legal precedent for using AAIB evidence for prosecutions. All well and good, it is expert evidence, after all. But from a flight safety perspective it will mean that witnesses will be far more guarded about being open and honest if they think their words could be quoted in court when they were least expecting it.

I suppose it all depends whether you want to make flying safer by improvement or threat of prosecution.

CM,
I seem to recall, many years ago, the RAF tried to apply "Flight Safety by Crucifiction". I can't remember this being particularly helpful or in any way successful.
M2N

Indeed not, M2N.

Am I missing something, or would the police be just as well as to wait until the AAIB has published its report, at which time it will all be in the open anyway?

The AAIB does not make publicly available all the data and evidence that they hold. For example, they don't release the audio tapes from the CVR, nor do they publish all the photos from the crash site, as such data would breach personal privacy laws if published. However, such data could form an important part of a police investigation, hence the police have to apply to the courts to have it released to them by the AAIB.