There's been extensive analysis of Boeing and its financials over on leehamnews.com. Suggestions are that the company is in deep financial doo-doo, especially now with corona virus screwing everything (including the money markets) up.

It seems that Boeing has been lobbying for a government bailout in these extraordinary times, but has now changed its mind. The rumours are that the US Gov said that any government aid would come with government controls attached - near enough a nationalisation. My guess is that the company management, knowing what sort of damage that'd do to them personally (through their devalued shareholdings) and their reputations, are now trying to tough it out in the (vain?) hope of somehow getting away with it.

There really is a question as to how long this can keep going on. Does Boeing actually have the financial and personnel resources to finish the KC46? If the USAF does end up with A330-MRTTs, that'd be one less reason for the US gov to prop up Boeing. Perhaps Europe can swap facemasks and medical provisions for tankers...

Worth remembering that even if everything on the KC-46 had worked exactly as advertised, even if it had not been delivered groaning with FOD, with cargo locks that self-opened, and pissing fuel, it would still have been an inferior tanker to the A330MRTT, needing more balanced field length to lift an inferior load of fuel.

VH-71 remains a better choice for the Presidential helicopter. Bigger cabin, quieter, smoother, faster. What defeated it were shifting goalposts and the addition of more and more kit (including, famously, very heavy safes). The requirement for all of this heavy stuff was suddenly removed to allow VH-92 to win....... There really aren't very many cases where Europe has a much better solution to a requirement than US industry can provide, but you have identified two of them in US101 and KC-30/45/A330MRTT..

Easy, the source selection team found the Airbus superior under the established criteria.
It was politics that nixed the selection.

This basically accurate. The VH-71 was two knots faster, had better range, but had a crew of four whereas the VH-72's crew is two, and as far as pax go, may actually carry a few more, depending o how the cabin is configured. After the "US101" got the contract, more and more change orders came through requiring more power, extra mods, etc. This meant more costs, naturally, by March 2008 the program cost had reached $400 million per helicopter and by March 2009 was $464.2 million each. Lockheed's management in the program wasn't held in high regard, either. When President Obama came in, he publicly stated that "The helicopter I have now seems perfectly adequate to me". Even though it might cost more overall to terminate the VH-71 and start a new program, this pretty much sealed its fate.

Change orders have been the death of many a program.

Again, I'm not going to defend Boeing's performance post award, but that first sentence ain't quite what happened.

Briefly there are two basic kind of awards. The first is Lowest Bid Technically Acceptable. They're quite handy for many non-complex solicitations. Basically, you put out your basic requirements. Whoever has the capability to meet all those basic requirements and has the lowest price wins. Period. The other is Best Value. You don't have to award to lowest price, but you've got to be very explicit on what is the minimum acceptable and how much exceeding that is worth. This can be used to justify not awarding to the lowest bidder, but you must do the analysis exactly as you say you will. The KC-X was one of these.

Keep in mind that KC-X was a replacement for the KC-135. They [said] they weren't looking for a KC-10 replacement or a much higher capacity vehicle. That would come later in KC-Y or KC-Z. They wanted it quickly ("quickly" being a relative term in the Government), established minimum capabilities required and desirable features. They indicated how much extra credit would be given for certain features that could be used to offset a higher price in the competition, and said there may be other things considered only as a tie breaker but otherwise would receive no extra credit.

When the two bids came in, they noted how much extra cargo the KC-30, especially under the floor and decided they wanted that cargo capacity. Problem is, they never asked for all that in the solicitation. The proper thing to do would be to revise and reissue the RFP and analyze the subsequent bids under the new criteria, but they didn't do that. Instead they just decided to not follow their own rules and do the analysis in such a way that they could get the new stuff they now wanted. Some examples:

One of the requirements was that KC-X had to perform a standard, defined "escape maneuver" (used when the tanker was threatened by opposing forces). The KC-135 could do this maneuver and apparently so could the KC-767. The KC-30 could not, so they simply ignored that in the evaluation.

There was a go/no go requirement that KC-X had to be able to refuel any AAR-capable fixed wing aircraft in USAF inventory. KC-30 couldn't, but this was ignored.

At the time, USAF wanted a guarantee that once in service major maintenance would transition to the Air Force and the contractor would facilitate this transition. Airbus wouldn't provide such a guarantee, but AF dismissed this as a "clerical error".

There was a requirement that KC-X had to be able to routinely operate from any KC-135 base or other fields that the KC-135 could. Much was made by the Europeans that the KC30 did not need runways as long as did the KC-767, and they were 100% correct. What the problem was that because it was so much larger and heavier, it couldn't use existing KC-135-capable taxiways and intersections. If AF wanted to allow this, they would have to add the cost of modifying those at KC-135 bases, where necessary, to the KC-30 requirements to the overall price of the KC-30 bid. Since this would add hundreds of millions of $ to the KC-30 bid, they just didn't add the costs.

One significant analysis point was how many KC-Xs could operate from a specified ramp size using standard USAF wingtip-to-wingtip spacing. Being a larger aircraft, naturally fewer KC-30s could fit. So, without telling Boeing, they simply reduced the required spacing so more KC-30s would fit.

Although the solicitation said that beyond a certain value, no further credit would be given (I believe it was for even more below floor cargo). Yet in the analysis they gave the KC-30 extra credit beyond that point.

Again, one of Boeing's most powerful arguments was that if USAF had published specifications for them to bid to for what USAF actually selected on, rather than what they announced they were going to select on, their bid would have been substantially different. They bid the KC-767 because they could meet the AF's stated requirements at a lower cost with it than with a larger machine with larger capabilities. We might have even seen the KC-777. Not saying it would have won. Not saying the KC-30 wasn't a more capable tanker overall than the KC-767, albeit more expensive. We know it was more expensive, because if it had come in lower cost, Boeing would have had nothing to protest.

Just saying that the cancellation of the KC-30/45 award can't be explained away by saying it was simply politics.

But it was MAINLY politics I think..................

OK, I'll bite.

1) what escape manoeuvre could a 330 not fly that a -135 and a -46 can?
2) which fixed wing aircraft can the 330 not refuel that a -46 can?
3) Airbus say that isn't so. Your evidence is....?
4) Which tanker bases could not accomodate a 330 because of taxyway restrictions? There are a host that a KC-46 can't operate from with full fuel because of runway length.....

Yes, In my opinion, it was purely politics, that Boeing was chosen.. The A330MRTT is the better platform. The C-27J that they canceled, was also a good one.

!) I don't know the specific details of the maneuver, I suspect it is classified. However, this was one of the findings that was cited as why the evaluation of the bids was not up to snuff.
2) The V-22 comes to mind, there may be others.
3) Boeing (naturally) said it is, it was part of their protest and so did GAO. It is true that in their defense of the award Airbus relented, but apparently at the time of the analysis the USAF didn't get the guarantee they required.
4) I can't name the specific bases, but GAO found that indeed hundreds of millions of $ should have added to the costs of the KC-30 to cover this. Air Force acknowledged this was true. It is also true that the A330 needs less runway length that the 767. I assume this holds true for the tanker versions with full fuel, although Boeing claimed the KC-767 needed less runway than the KC-30 because it was smaller (ramp footprint for KC-767 was 25,000 ft², while KC-30 was 38,000 ft², and I assume that Airbus' numbers don't take into account its "receptacle credit which allows it cite a runway length with less that full fuel and "top off" once airborne). But runway length was not the issue here, both competitors met that requirement. The issue was ability to do full operations from a KC-135 base and the hangup was the taxiways and intersections, and to a lesser extent runway width and strength. Note that a KC-777 would have had the same issues, which is one of the reasons Boeing didn't try bidding that It would have had the same problems, and its capacity was not needed to meet the requirements of the solicitation.

GAO, in partly sustaining Boeing's protest, ruled that the competition was conducted in a flawed manner. Note that it did not say the award should have gone to Boeing, just that the way the award was made it was flawed.

Airbus could have bid an A300/310 based tanker but chose to go with the larger A330 because it was easier for them as the A300/310 line was planned to wind down and they were already working on the A330 MRTT anyway. This put them at a cost disadvantage.

Boeing waited until the RFP for the third came out before deciding to rebid the KC-767 because it better suited what USAF was asking for than a KC-777. The CEO of Northrop Grumman, Airbus' partner, in commenting on the RFP for the third competition said that the Air Force had shown a "clear preference," for a smaller tanker. He then stated that competing would impose, “contractual and financial burdens on the company that we simply cannot accept”. This whole thing could have been avoided had USAF simply revised the first competition's RFP to reflect their changed priorities and then competed, letting the chips fall where they may.

You can find a lot of this stuff in Aviation Week of the time.

C.C, wonderful insights. I assume when an auditing body axes a public procurement due to selection not following the rules within itself, it's not a bad thing. Whether or not the auditing agency was tasked to dig up all they could, might give it a different taste, but does not alter the course.

It is all bit relative since no large government investment project worldwide is ever flawless or deep-water current free. Still, I enjoyed reading the way you present the arguments.

Thank you. The auditing agency got involved because when you protest, you have to choose one of two paths: the courts or the GAO, you can't do both. Boeing chose the GAO route. In those days, very few big procurements were protested, but the flaws in this process were so egregious that Boeing decided to go forward, knowing they'd risk the wrath of the customer.

I blame not Boeing, or Airbus or the GAO for how this went down. I blame USAF. Looking back at that time, you'll see that they were bungling procurement after procurement. There were glaring errors made, awards that didn't make sense, and outright corruption. In fact, after the first debacle on KC-X, DoD took the KC-X procurement away from USAF and considered running the whole thing themselves, a tremendous vote of no confidence

The C-27J craziness was not an example of politics, but rather of bureaucratic infighting and "It's MY sandbox".

Briefly: Army felt it was spending way too much money hauling people and cargo in CH-47s between Army bases that had runways . Plus, this used up precious Chinook flight hours. So they thought they could gain a double benefit by procuring a smallish cargo aircraft to perform this mission (not to takes forces/supplies into combat). USAF, who believes that by Divine Right they should run all fixed wing bitterly opposed this, saying it was not needed, it was their mission even if they didn't have the available assets to do it and that was what the C-130 was for anyway. Congress, though, thought the idea made sense.

USAF then pivoted and said, "Well, maybe it's not such a bad idea, maybe we should get some too for lighter missions. We'd like to participate as well and Army, we're your Best Pal". Thus was born the Joint Cargo Aircraft (JCA). In due time, a competition was held and was won by a partnership of Alenia Aeronautica (who had designed the G.222 on which the C-27J is based) with L3Communications, forming the Global Military Aircraft Systems GMAS company to bid the C-27J. Boeing later joined. Army had leadership because they were going to be buying substantially more.

As production got underway, each service placed their own orders. A curious thing was soon discovered. Even though the AF and Army versions were virtually identical except for a few radios and paint, thanks to their contracting acumen USAF was paying twice what Army was paying per aircraft. The solution seemed obvious: USAF said it would all work out better if management of the program was transferred to them. for reasons I've never figured out, DoD agreed and so AF took over. Well, it wasn't to long after that that AF announced they were killing the C-27J program because it was not needed, it was their mission even if they didn't have the available assets to do it and that was what the C-130 was for anyway. They also said the plane cost too much, but there were a few details there that weren't addressed.

The few that made into service were soon retired and those still under construction were flown directly from the factory to Davis-Monthan. Army had to go back to using CH-47s.

In a footnote, USAF tried to recover some of the cost by offering the Spartans on the world market. Alenia, though was thoroughly pissed because they had geared up for substantial production for the program and were ending up out in the cold. They were also offering the C-27J on the world market separately, and were not too happy about having to compete against these C-27Js which would be offered at fire sale prices. They announced to the world that they would provide no support for any of these aircraft sold outside the US, which of course rendered them unsalable and the US taxpayer ended up with nothing for all the money expended so far.

The final result was that the 21 built remained in US hands. Seven C-27Js went to SOCOM, who was very happy with them, and the remaining 14 went to the Coast Guard who was thrilled because they got them for free, which did wonders for their budget.

From what I know of the Aussie perspective. Is that we were going to piggyback on US procurement. We had L3 fit ours out. We got a static trainer from the US recently. I'll assume SOCOM are joint with RAAF. To keep the kit current and with development cost sharing. US gov. has better public contract information that our ADF/RAAF. I haven't followed it. A fear at the time, was that we would have an orphan fleet.

Seems like a total rework of the troubled vision system.

https://aviationweek.com/defense-spa...ystem-redesign

So back to the drawing board, release $882M so they can try come up with a totally new system, 'cause they couldn't get the first (or second) version correct. That will teach them!!

So it can't actually be stood up?

Why would a 330 MRTT not be able to refuel a V-22? And where is this, in black and white, because without evidence, these A330 shortcomings sound a bit makey-uppy.....

Right.... so the bottom line is that Airbus were, in fact, able to meet the requirement.

Funny that. No-one ever can. I wonder why?

You assume correctly. My understanding is that the 767 can theoretically take off in a shorter distance, but can't stop as quickly so needs a longer runway to operate safely.

As a result, the KC-46 cannot take off with full fuel from some well known real world tanker bases, and yet Boeing were not penalised for this, even though it would have cost millions of dollars to extend the runways...... or indeed to operate with sub-optimal fuel loads.

I was once told that at one base (Altus, I seem to recall) there was supposedly a runway intersection that the A330 was too big to use. But there was another intersection a little further along that it could use. The kicker? The intersection concerned was too close to the threshold for any tanker to actually use.

Jackonicko:

I'm not as good as you at embedding previous posts, so let me address
your concerns in this way, please.

Escape maneuver: I'm not sure what you mean by "So it can't actually be
stood up"? Although I don't think all the details are public knowledge,
from what I do know part of the maneuver involves accelerating away from
the receiving aircraft and climbing. The GAO specifically noted,
"...the Air Force did not reasonably evaluate the capability of Northrop
Grumman’s proposed aircraft to initiate emergency breakaway
procedures...".


V-22: GAO's finding was, "...the record did not show that the Air Force
reasonably determined that Northrop Grumman’s proposed aircraft could
refuel all current Air Force fixed-wing, tanker-compatible aircraft...".
That the V-22 was one of the aircraft concerned came from an article, I
believe, in Aviation Week.

The maintenance issue and Airbus' relenting: Airbus may have changed
their mind after the award was protested. That's too late. The award
had to consider only what was being offered in the response to the RFP at
the time the solicitation closed. GAO again: "Specifically, the
solicitation required offerors to plan and support the agency to achieve
initial organic depot-level maintenance within 2 years after delivery of
the first full-rate production aircraft. Northrop Grumman was informed
several times by the Air Force that the firm had not committed to the
required 2-year timeframe, but Northrop Grumman refused to commit to the
required schedule".

The specific bases that I couldn't name: That's because I don't know
the name of every USAF tanker base worldwide.

A330 and runway length. The civil A330's balanced field length is less
than that of the civil 767. Again, I'm assuming that holds true for the
tanker versions as well. Boeing (and you) say that the 767 can take off
in less space than the A330, so the discrepancy must be that at V1 an
A330 can stop in less space than a 767. This would mean that the civil
Accelerate Stop Distance Required for the A330 is less. Fair point.
But we are not talking a civil situation here. Not all of the
procedures that are required for civil operations apply to the military.
They don't worry as much about ASDR in determining the runway length
required. For example, except for that brilliant strategy of the Guard
in creating the E model, I don't believe any of the KC-135s have thrust
reversers. I don't think the KC-46 does, either (don't know about the
A330MRTT). I know I've seen heavy KC-135s rolling down the last 1/3-1/4
of the runway where there's no way they're going to be able to stop if
they don't get airborne. So for the purposes of the solicitation the
takeoff, not balanced field length, would be the driver. However, as
previously stated, runway length was not the issue. It was runway width
and strength, but more importantly existing taxiways and intersections.
That was the problem, and not just one taxiway at one base. AF might
have addressed this by saying they would make the modifications as
necessary, but for the analysis to be valid that would have to add the
cost of that to the A330 bid. When they start talking KC-10
replacement, which KC-X was not, they'll have to revise requirements,
because that would be a larger plane.

I could go into more aspects [giving extra credit for things they said
they wouldn't give extra credit for, making changes without informing
Boeing, etc.), but for brevity I've just limited my self to the points
you raised. Everything I've said is a matter of public record,
including the full (redacted because of proprietary and source
information) GAO decision. Again, GAO never said which plane was better
just that the award, based on what was asked for and how it was
announced evaluation would take place, couldn't be sustained. It's also
worthy of note that most of Boeing's claims were denied. But what was
sustained was enough to "poison" the award.

Finally, let me include another direct quote from GAO: "In its decision,
GAO recommends that the Air Force reopen discussions with the offerors,
obtain revised proposals, re-evaluate the revised proposals, and make a
new source selection decision, consistent with GAO’s decision. GAO
further recommends that, if the Air Force believed that the solicitation
does not adequately state its needs, the agency should amend the
solicitation prior to conducting further discussions with the offerors".

Exactly.

Jackonicko:

Now if you were talking about the proposed lease and options examined before KC-X, you might have a point. It is definitely arguable that Airbus got screwed there.

CC

The A330/Voyager/MRTT operate fully compliant with civilian performance-not the ancient rules applied to the KC135.

The only stopper for refuelling a V22 would be the AAR speed -is 180 KCAS too fast for a V22 and where is the evidence that a KC46 could do it any slower?

The KC46 doesn't seem to doing too well in the refuelling stakes at the moment.

Best thing for Airbus with regards to USAF and the tanking is to do enough work to put in a bid to think Boeing might lose to Airbus so Boeing incur more costs. Basically let's face it there is no way certain people in the US will allow Airbus to actually win and produce tankers for the USAF. Let Boeing have it, they cannot do the job properly on this 767 tanker let alone on the Boeing problems with 787 and the current ongoing 737 "not" MAX or whatever it may get called.