JCA is a maritime strike requirement, for which the money for a GR4 replacement was sacrificed. My point being that this unpalatable fact somehow got lost in the chaff of SDSR and reference to a GR4 replacement has been made ever since.

I honestly believe that there is still a general supposition that GR4 is to be replaced - even if not by DPOC which (I stand to be corrected - my sources are those openly available from parliament) is now no more.

It is also my belief that the dawning realisation of where this will leave the RAF (which you are totally correct about) is a mainstay in the 'revert to STOVL' thinking. i.e. we get DPOC back. Do you think we really will though?

So your point is entirely accurate - if JCA falls over there is a chance that it's Typhoon alone. Horrendous.

I think we do disagree on one thing. We are a small island nation - so the fact that others make do with dedicated land based air might have no direct read across to us. An extension of this argument might be that we should not worry about our current lack of MPA (in my opinion the single biggest error of our time) as Switzerland seems to have managed without one for years.

And one thing well worth remembering. JCA is not JUST strike. The original FCBA requirement (which JCA emerged from as a joint effort with FOAS) included and still includes a requirement to provide a DCA capability for maritime AD, that's the Fleet (ie amphibs, strategic lift etc).

All the leaking of performance/OA data is doing nothing. Everyone accepts C is a more capable option than B. Orca's point 3 has it all - question the £2Bn conversion cost. It has to be "made up".

New warplanes 'less capable', secret paper shows - Telegraph

This article states the obvious somewhat, but what puzzles, is just why did the last Labour Government go for B in the first place? Also, the claim here is that a total of either 136 or 97 airframes are to be ordered, depending onwhether it is B or C?:confused:

FB:)

And now I've just seen 163627's link!:O

FB:)

Ignore the pros and cons of each variant for the moment, all very well covered again and again in this thread. As soon as one type appears to be gaining the ascendency, confidential sources start to spin for the other type. So what is going on?

1. There is complete confusion in the government about which is really the best military or economic version. They do not trust the information they are being given by their advisers (military or financial), as their advice seemingly conflicts.

2. This indecision means that when one type looks to be nosing ahead, it's detractors immediately start to spin against it, as they can see the opportunity to reverse the decision yet again.

3. Inter-service rivalry may well be part of the above mix - many on here are better judges than I as to how much this is the case.

4. It seems the choice is close run thing. If it was a no-brainer, then a choice should already have been made.

And the way out?

The root problem is that the government is being weak. It needs to determine what is it's absolute priority: military or financial. If it is financial then it makes it's choice on that basis - go the lower cost route. If it is military then go the route that gives the best military capability. At the moment the government is trying to mix and match both and that is causing the indecision. In normal times this is the normal situation. But these are very very abnormal times for the country's finances and it may be the unpalatable truth that money must hold complete sway over some military decisions, for the next few years at least.

It then has the problem of getting factual, unbiased advice as to the true military capabilities and the true financial comparisons. It seems that it cannot get either from within it's own military or financial experts so it should call on independent external sources if necessary (howls of protest expected, but if your own specialists won't stop fighting each other how else do you get impartial advice? If external advice is abhorrent, then make it redundant by stopping squabbling like children).

Above all the government must decide on it's objectives and then make the selection accordingly. And then you just have to get on with it, protests, objections, criticisms and everything else just comes with the territory. The government is being pushed and pulled around by every vested interest going at present and this weakness is causing harm on all fronts. The executive has the job of making the hard call. Make it and then go flat out to make it happen.

DC, you need to grow a couple.

This whole story and the Telegraph article featured quite prominently on the midday BBC 1 news today. The 'narrative' of the story is that the government is clueless and doesn't know it's arse from it's elbow.

I agree with LF's assessment above ^^^
It will be interesting to see this spun positively by the Whitehall PR bunnies.

This latest leak of OA info is worrying - but not because there is anything new or particularly worrying contained - but because the way it is being spun and presented is quite dangerous.

At the end of the day both B and C are pretty capable, but there is a risk that the "we can't afford cats/C" and "B is no good" soundbites may end up giving the current loonies the excuse they need to buy neither!

Those knocking the B now are playing with fire - and may leave the UK with nothing and selling the carriers.

Those who assume the carriers can be sold need to have a think as to who will buy them.

If no cats / traps, then likely customer base is zero. Sp & It have just bought new (small) STOVL ships.

India? Needs STOBAR and has two ships arriving before QE & PoW.

Fr? Needs cat n trap.

China? (see India, but ships slightly further away)

Argentina? Oh, hang on.....

65 000 tons of steel is worth quite lot. You don't have to sell them to someone who will use them as carriers! (I don't advocate this COA)

Orca - I don't understand your GR4 point. JSF is, at least in part, going to replace GR4 so yes, it is a maritime strike capability, but it is also going to be a land based capability hence the main reason why the entire thing is joint RAF/RN. As a hard up UK plc we will need to be flexible with where we operate from, we don't have the luxury that the USA has of a dedicated carrier force and a dedicated land based force. If the next 20 years are like the last 20 then JSF could spend the vast majority of its time flying from land on operations not fom a carrier. If we spend the next 20 years trying to recapture the Falklands then the basing will be a carrier.

Last, I do find it amusing that some spun the change to F35C as an RAF plot to somehow do over the RN and now the change to F35B is being spun (by a few) as another RAF plot! More tinfoil hats needed, me thinks.

There is another level to the problem, which is the executability of the JSF program as a whole, given the following facts:

The SDD program is farther from completion than it was (according to official plans) three years ago.

The estimated program cost (R&D + acquisition) has increased by $36+ million dollars per day in then-year dollars since the contract was awarded. (Source: 2011 SAR.)

The program of record calls for US-only JSF procurement funding to reach $13 billion-plus (in 2012 dollars) at full rate, which is much more than all TacAir funding today, at a time when the USAF is expecting to be developing a new bomber and acquiring tankers.

This peak level will be sustained throughout the 2020s. If the operating cost estimates in the SAR are correct, there will be a parallel surge in TacAir O&S as the growing JSF force coexists with older aircraft with aging issue.

(Note: it can be posited that in 2030 we approach the sunlit uplands of a force dominated by mature, but still relatively new F-35s. The question is whether the fiscal pig represented in the above two paragraphs can fit through the budgetary python.)

The US government, Congress and Administration, are committed to further budget cuts, whether as a result of sequestration or as part of a deal to avoid sequestration. If neither happens, the risk to US credit is extreme. Defense cannot be exempt from Federal spending cuts and F-35 cannot be ring-fenced within defense, because it is too large relative to other programs.

Any UK decision must take into account the risk that these factors pose to the JSF program, in terms of cost, schedule and the pursuit of all three variants.

potential customers
 

Maybe the Australian navy can start dreaming again like they did 4 years ago,
Aircraft carrier on navy's secret $4bn wish list | News.com.au

This made me think back of an editorial I read also 5-ish years ago on how a Carrier could work for Australia.

It basically envisioned a medium sized carrier with a couple of Harrier type squadrons to be based mainly on the West,North and South coast of Australia
functionning as a feeder/support/command base for several small landbases all around Australia and its islands.
There would be no need for anything other than fighters and some support helo's and the cost would be not much more than 1 big landbase but could cover a lot more area without using too much personnnel.

This 65000T carrier was probably bigger than what they had in mind but it could work ok ,I guess.

Anyway, sounded much like a pipedream ,back then,and it probably still is but seeing how things evolve in that area in the world combined with the commitment they already made towards the JSF and the fact that they are doing quite well economy-wise always could revive 'the dream'.

65 000 tons of steel is worth quite lot. You don't have to sell them to someone who will use them as carriers! (I don't advocate this COA)

There's about 28000 te of DH32 grade steel in each one. Plus a fair bit of copper, cabling etc.

Scrap price for steel atm is about £200/te. Call it £6M per ship, plus the copper & cable. If we got £12m per ship I'd be surprised.

"and long-range Tomahawk cruise missiles for its submarine fleet."

What submarine fleet ? The one where the majority are in dock being fixed
or we don't have enough crews ?

How about we get what we have, crewed and in the water first !!!

Agreed, it's unlikely there would be customers falling over each other to outbid their rivals for the ships. If sold as carriers, or any other type of active vessel, it's a racing certainty they would only get sold if they were a 'too-good-to-miss' bargain for the purchaser. We would have to brace ourselves for more 'They cost us £x and we sold them for £x - 90%' headlines.

Speculative purchasers for a not-to-be-missed bargain might include Japan, South Korea, Australia, India and Brazil. I'd bet that a Korean shipyard would do the needful on converting to cat and trap, or any other conversion for role, at a price that would still make the whole deal an absolute steal for the buyer.

And, of course, the UK wouldn't be selling them for the the cash it gets back, it would be because of the cash it no longer has to splash out to operate and maintain a full carrier capability. Not what I want to see, but a very real possibility in my opinion, whether sold on or not.


Edit: Forgot the need for Europe to beef up it's capabilities now Uncle Sam is back off to the Pacific, so they could become a European capability. Still cheaper to get any mods done in Korea but that would not be our call once our European allies are calling the shots and get themselves organised. Somewhere around 2050, perhaps.

Backwards PLT.

My point was simply that as it stands there is no longer a GR4 replacement and when that (very loyal, long serving) war horse is put out to grass then nothing is going to back fill it. This is because the money was spent in the 'let's go to the C' decision in SDSR.

So there is no GR4 replacement.

But JCA (not repeat not JSF) can help fill the GR4 replacement criteria if we buy the C. It cannot if we buy the B.

So if you want to 'have DPOC' or 'replace GR4' (same difference) you have to do one of two things. Either accept that there are no extra frames but the new ones will cover up some of what you can no longer have - buy the C. Or you can argue for a reversion to the B to meet the JCA requirement and ask for your money back - buy DPOC.

Not_a_boffin,

Steel is currently significantly less than £200 a tonne. Try £155 to £175. The added cost of cutting up and separating what has already been used, plus transportation has to be taken in to account.

What people sometimes forget is that the raw materials are actually a very small part of the costs for a project. It's the cutting, shaping and fabricating that cost, plus man hours, design and BAEs rip off prices. The political decisions by both labour and the Conservatives have added significantly to the overall costs. Building in different yards hasn't helped.

I believe that the costs for emals is at the upper end of the scale. Mind you the costs are probably realistic as something will go wrong, the politicians will change their mind etc.

Not sure about why the Aussies need to buy a carrier when they could fly F-35B off the new Canberra class LHD which handily come with a ski jump.


Likewise the Japanese could fly F-35B from the Hyuga class 'Through deck destroyers'.

Both are already in the programme and could add the B to their slated purchase of A's to go down the mixed fleet route like the Italians.

It also fits with the re-focus of US eyes on the Pacific and adds backup to the USMC B purchase.

Just thoughts....:8

Her Majesty's Prison Service? :E

based on every other Mess and ship sold to the Prison Service, they'll need upgraded facilities (TVs etc) before they are fit for rapists, terrorists and similar scum. Better budget for that.:mad:

Hval - so you're suggesting that we might get less than £12M per ship? Do you know, I believe you.

You think that EMALS is at the upper end of the scale? Excellent. The hardware costs are known, to a credible degree. The manpower figures to make up the remaining gap to £1.8Bn are simply not credible. Something between 10 and 20 million manhours depending on whether you think BAES charge £50/hr or £100/hr (both higher than reality) is simply not credible.

10 million manhours is 5000 people full bore for a year. A more credible estimate would be one tenth that amount.........

Not_a_boffin,

I agree that the additional costs are not credible. You did forget a few items though: -

1/ Project management
1a/ Tea breaks
2/ Transportation
2a/ Tea breaks
3/ Modifications to existing carrier hull and infrastructure
3a/ Tea breaks
4/ Installation of meals
4a/ Guess what?
5/ ITP (instrument and testing plan)
6/ Risk management costs
7/ Project management and team install infrastructure
8/ Cost of all the other dock yard workers who will have to stop what they are doing for a year, and still be paid whilst meals are installed.

Have I forgotten anything?

Orca - sorry still don't get it. As I understand it, if the money was spent on the C decision (which is confusing in itself because through life most claim the C is cheaper) then that will be with the expectation that the C is the GR4 replacement, surely?

Although I was told that JSF was part of the GR4 replacement well before the last SDSR as part of the 2 FJ fleet plan so it didn't matter if it was the B or the C, except the C is greatly superior of course.

Sorry mate, probably the sort of conversation that would take 1 minute over a beer.

F35A could fulfill the criteria for DPOC, the GR4 replacement. £1 billion had been allotted to DPOC. Given the length of gestation these days it was safe to say that any manned solution to DPOC would involve F35A.

SDSR chose Tornado over Harrier/CVS in the knowledge that this would save money in the short term (about £300 million over 3 years) but lose in the long term (£680 million more expensive over 10 years).

Something had to give and the obvious economy was that if we chose the C model for JCA then we could still meet some DPOC criteria - at this point the the F35As you were briefed about disappeared. The £1 billion was folded into the cost of the ship upgrade.

So I guess what I am saying is that you can either view the decision to save Tornado as a decision that consigned its successor to the dust bin. Or you can (to my mind) skew the argument and and start talking about JCA as the de facto GR4 replacement.

The alternative is to revert to STOVL and ask for that DPOC money back - which may eventually result in a mixed A/B fleet for the JCA/ DPOC requirement. It might result in a B that deosn't work and DPOC money already spent on GR4 which (as rumour has it) has eaten a further £1 billion since SDSR.

I personally Lowe Fleiger has it right and I suspect that DC could be aided in growing a pair if he was being briefed honestly and competently. I fail to see how a U-turn is necessary unless someone has dropped an almighty ball, someone has been unable to deliver on a promise or someone no longer likes the deal they made having had 18 months of 'cold light of day'.

The dithering has to be a result of incompetent staff work (when we phoned they said EMALS was a fiver but we've double checked and it's now £1.7 billion), conflicting advice probably due to single service agenda (surely not) or the fact that no-one knows the facts...a known unknown if you will.

There are only two reasons for the U-turn which appear credible to my mind. The first is that industry simply isn't up to the challenge and has had it's bluff called despite ridiculous tariffs. The second is that someone in MoD has realised the full implications of SDSR and wants a new deal.

Hval

Yes. Most of those factors even the tea breaks (!) are already in the existing cost. Assuming it's PoW for conversion, the relevant parts of the structure haven't been fabricated yet, so assuming the design teams get cracking (particularly on the detail of the supporting structure) delay is unlikely to affect more than a small proportion of those working on the project. The electrickery elements will also require work, but again mostly in the design stage.

Project and risk mgmt teams are already in place, as is their infrastructure, ITP will largely be supplied as part of the sale and will then fall on the existing test & commissioning team.

There will be no need for anyone else to stop what they're doing while the systems are installed.

Apologies for the slightly intemperate tone last night, post beer-festival posting never a good idea......

Not_a_boffin,

I agree that all I listed is already within the project. The emals is an additional package to the main construction project. The sub contractor will have costed their risk, project management etc, but the main contractor certainly has not included meals in their project cost.

Much of the electrickery stuff is well past the design phase. Much hours work to be done, maybe, ooh, I don't know guv, back of a fag packet calc, how about £1 billion? Just for you. Cutting new access routes etc will cost you a lot, you know. We haven't tested the generators under this load, nor type of load before. They're only tested for one six volt light bulb. That's all you asked for, err, signed for in the contract. Talking of which, this is a contract change. Means the lawyers will get involved. There's another £500 million to the costs.

The above is tongue in cheek, but you know how it is.

I didn't notice any intemperate tone. In fact you should drink more often and then post. Nice humour.

Could this turn out to be the most blatant mismanagement of resources my generation sees?

Interestingly, for the first time that I've seen, firm figures are mentioned...

British Study Determines F-35C Would be More Economical Option Despite Costly Carrier Upgrade | Defense Update

Fighter jets about-turn 'will harm capability’ - Telegraph

Following on from the previous post I noticed another link regarding the USMC purchase of B's and C's. The story isn't new but is significant in that it indicates further unit cost increases for the B model.

Five Marine Corps F-35Cs Units to Fly Off Navy Carriers | Defense Update


''Under the agreement, the two services will maintain the planned acquisition of 680 F-35s but change the proportion between the carrier based and STOVL variants. Under the new plan the Navy will buy 260 of the F-35C carrier variant, with the Marine Corps adding additional 80, along with 340 F-35Bs STOVL versions. Reduction of 80 ‘B’ aircraft is expected to further increase the unit cost of the STOVL version, already blamed to be the most complex, expensive and troubled part of the JSF program.''

Both the articles linked use similar figures, but they are, in my view, examples of selective leaking of figures plus uninformed 'spin'.

Leaking a DSTL 'secret' document is a serious matter in itself. However, the figures that are being revealed are not all that surprising. If anyone takes a look at the KPPs for the F-35 variants (open source and dating back to 07) the difference in range of the B and the C have been there for all to see. I have also seen open source briefs from LM detailing fuel capacities of the B and the C. I know that, because I delivered one of them to the RAeS in 2006. From these, it's not hard for a competent performance engineer to derive quite accurate estimates for 'time on station'.

Some errors mixed in with these old facts. The CVF deck surface does not need to be modified to 'protect it' from vertical anding jet blast. Catapults and arresting gear were included in the original CVF design. F-35C increased fuel capacity comes from larger wing tanks as much as the extra fuselage tank. And some partiality as well. The F-35B landing is not 'fuel-guzzling' - do the detailed calculations on fuel burn for a normal STOVL recovery and a normal CV trap recovery, and you find not much difference.

I really do agree with Bastardeaux that this recent 'B vs C' saga has been badly handled by the Government and the MoD. Objective analysis appears to have gone out of the window, and in my view it was a victim of inter-service politics, lack of technical grasp at at higher levels, and plain poor execution of the SDSR. Not good, and seriously damages the Uk's reputation for competence in defence acquisition. Bernard Gray will be looking for a new job soon, in my view.

Best regards as ever

Engines

F35B = more aircraft= more bums on seats for the two -winged, future leaders of the RAF Master Race.

F35C = Less aircraft and more competency required = more time at sea= more navy pilots = less bums on seats for the two-winged, future leaders of the RAF Master Race and an obsolete platform in the Typhoon. SHAR FA2 vs F3 all over again!!

And would your fishy-folk flying the F35C have also been trained at an FAA EFTS, FAA BFTS, FAA AFTS and FAA TWU? Or do you expect the 'crabs' to have done all that for you?

Nah, it's ok, the USN are all good.

It'll take some doing to beat MRA4, but anything's possible when the MoD get involved :ugh:

S-D

You would have to try hard to beat the RAN's Sea Sprite debarcle, $1.1 Billion wasted on eleven refurbished helicopters that never entered service.

and that is the other mistake in assuming all the 'schools' are RAF as opposed to 'Central'.

I dunno, MRA4 was less aircraft, refurbished, for 4 times the price, all scrapped.

I wonder if some of the inter-service aspects of this kerfuffle were sparked after the SDSR, when people realized that there would not (for a very long time) be enough UK JSFs, regardless of variant, to do more than maintain the carrier air wing. (Note that the Froggies have 60 Rafales for one carrier.) However, that problem (for the RAF) is less with the more "jointly operable" B...

Who is the budget holder for JCA? I think we have a winner.......

CAP TA probably and the TA Programme Board in Main Building. I think we have a winner!

Gentlemen,

It might be useful to remember the circumstances that led to FJCA, and the intentions for the UK F-35 fleet.

Cast your minds back to 2000 and the heady days of 'Joint Force Harrier' standing up. The RAF and RN had agreed that, in return for the RN relinquishing ownership of its fixed wing fleet, the RAF would command, operate and develop JFH as a two aircraft fleet, bringing AD and Strike assets together into a fleet of aircraft that would support both land and sea based ops, using STOVL aircraft.

We had also committed to the JSF programme via a special 'STOVL MoU' which recognised the UK/US long partnership (over 45 years) on STOVL, and in which the UK stated that it saw the STOVL JSF as a key element of future UK tactical aircraft force planning. JFH was to be the 'route through' to those sunny uplands, building a true joint ethos ready to receive an aircraft that could deliver both AD capability and strike power from land or sea.

And to complete the picture, CVF was moving towards contract, built around a requirement that specified two large STOVL carriers with the capability to accept cat and trap as a fallback.

It was against that picture that the original Future Carrier Borne Aircraft (FCBA) programme, Navy owned, turned into FJCA - Future Joint Combat Aircraft. No change to requirements, just a change of title. Still a joint STOVL future. Sounded great. Then the wheels began to fall off the wagon.

First wheel off - within weeks of formation of JFH, the RAF, who now owned the SHAR, decided to offer it up as a savings measure to pay for the huge cost overruns on the GR9 programme. Sadly, the RN went along with this, reassured that a 'Joint Air Wing' would form up to maintain two FAA front line GR9 units to maintain embarked currency. Incidentally, a plan that was not even discussed with the engineering Fleet Managers for the GR7/9 fleet before it was approved. (But hey, the pilots said it was possible, and who was going to argue with them?)

Second wheel off - The RAF decided to block formation of the second RN commanded front line unit. At about the same time, the RAF decided that the Harrier fleet FEAR should be reduced, and thus effectively withdraw their commitment to maintain embarked currency. Result - marked reduction in ability of JFH to effectively embark in CVS and fight. But not a problem for the RAF, who understandably gave priority to the Afghan ops.

Third wheel off - SDSR 2010, and the RAF (CAS, with CDS support) makes a decision to dispense with Harrier to preserve its entire Tornado fleet. This decision was not discussed with CNS before it was given to the PM.

Now add in the final element - the RAF's hidden problem that it had blown all its future tactical aircraft budget (and a few other budgets as well) on Typhoon, leaving the square root of s*d all for a Tornado replacement. The failure of a number of options and programmes (FOAS, etc.) followed.

The result of all these is that the decision to for cat and trap (and I am not saying it's the wrong one) was not accompanied by the important discussion on what the future F-35C force was now going to do. All the public discussions to date have revolved around the impact on the carriers, but the impact on land based strike has hardly been mentioned. And when it does, we get the sort of single service language ('fishy', 'crabs') that prevent any rational discussion.

So, just for stamps, here's my put. First, having decided to go for F-35C, the UK should now see it through. Another reversal of course would, I think, involve even more expense and we would end up with a less capable jet. Second, accept that cat and trap can't be handled like JFH tried (and utterly failed) to do naval aviation. The RAF just isn't interested, nor in my view should it be expected to be. Leave the F-35C force to the RN to own and command, with a secondary role to go land based if required (which all FAA units had in the past). Third, meet the RAF GR4 replacement requirement with F-35A. It's radius of action is only 10 miles less than the 35C, and it's cheaper. Reduced RAF requirement, as the RN F-35Cs could, in some cases, come in as backup. Finally, task DE&S set up a joint training, support and sustainment model for the two F-35 customers. Lots of reaL commonality to exploit there.

Result? a mixed F-35A/C buy. The country gets what it needs - effective strike capabilities based on land and at sea, and both owned by people who are competent and committed. Pipe dream? Probably. But better than the 'ferrets in a sack' spectacle the country is watching now.

Best Regards as ever to those who, while all this is being played out, are in harm's way...

Engines

And (as ever) put logically and in a nutshell by Engines.

That argument (and history) is what should be in the forefront of the debate / debacle regarding the ships and JCA.

I wonder how many of the higher-up non-service protagonists are actually aware of this?