Thanks Schiller and if we end up with the 'B' it will sneak down the port side and then plonk itself on the deck :ok:

We should have a poll to see who believes the F-35 will be scrapped or even the carrier program will be sent to that big scrap yard in the sky.

SRVL question.
 

If we do switch back does anyone have any idea how is the SRVL programme going?

I always wondered why we needed it in comparison to the US Marines who didn't seem to express any interest? Is it because we plan to use our aircraft with a heavier combination of weapons than the Americans and therefore need a greater bring back capability. If so is that linked to the different designs of carriers ie with the marines using a flat deck versus our use of a ski jump, meaning that our aircraft can take off with a heavier load?

Think it has a lot to do with the Wasp class having less space on deck than the QE class, so not practicable for them.

To which I believe there is is a time-honoured response that goes something along the lines of 'Just as soon as we can get you qualified on type, Minister, we'll let you put your theory to the test'.

Would Canada not be well served by something like F15 Silent Eagle for Artic work? You'd get more of them than you will F35 and a good chance they will work pretty well a lot earlier than F35 too. I hasten to add I am well out of my depth here so just thinking out loud really.

Yes, that would be interesting. My vote is: Carriers dumped SDR 2015; decision on F35 deferred until SDR 2020.

My vote is the same as Lowe Flieger.

As to Canada's requirements, I was just a shag pilot, and wouldn't feel qualified to argue with the Generals. However, I would note the following.

Complete engine failure on long oversea/night/remote area mission would be liable to result in death quite often. I can recall numerous sorties where we would have been unlikely to survive the parachute descent (surface windspeed), or died of hypothermia long before rescue reached us. I would thus be bloody unhappy about flying single-engine.

"Quantity has its own quality"

There is also a tendency to fight the last war. I would purchase Super Hornet before 2020, and get to work on UAVs right now. I strongly suspect they will be the major (but not sole) component of Air Forces by 2040. It also gives Canada, and every other smaller nation like Australia, The Netherlands, etc, a chance to get back into the aircraft building business.

Just changing the subject slightly, does anyone know if the Government are due to announce their decision on whether its answer B or C?:confused:

Or is this question going to continue to vex that an ill-advised decision won't be at hand until the Billions more pounds, which they seek to avoid, have been wasted and further costs accrued? And all before knowing the actual price tag of either C or B? It'd be interesting to know what each of the service Chiefs are both openly, and secretly, advising?!:E

FB:)

USMC Interest in SRVL for F-35B on CVNs Integration
 

Probably on the backburner for USMC now that they will share CVNs with their F-35Cs (rather than an all F-35B force). The ski jump at Patuxent River is still in midfield AFAIK.

US Marines eye UK JSF shipborne technique DATE:15/06/07 Flight International

US Marines eye UK JSF shipborne technique

“A shipborne rolling vertical landing (SRVL) technique being developed by the UK for the Lockheed Martin F-35B is being eyed by the US Marine Corps as a way to facilitate operation of short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) Joint Strike Fighters from US Navy aircraft carriers....

...For the USMC, the technique would allow a conventional approach to a short landing on the carrier and could ease integration of the F-35B with US Navy F/A-18E/Fs.

“We strongly support what the UK is doing on rolling landings,” says Lt Gen John Castellaw, USMC deputy commandant for aviation. Studies on how the F-35B will be operated continue, but SRVL “appears to be a viable option”, he says....

...“We continue to work with the navy on this,” Castellaw says, pointing out the STOVL Harrier has been operated successfully alongside US Navy fighters as part of an air wing the carrier USS Roosevelt.” [1976-7]
__________

JSF To Develop Landing Technique For U.K. carriers Oct 15 , 2010 By Graham Warwick

AVIATION WEEK

"While the future of the U.K. Royal Navy’s two new aircraft carriers is uncertain, Lockheed Martin has been awarded a $13 million contract to incorporate shipborne rolling vertical landing (SRVL) capability into the F-35B for the U.K...."

Aviation Week has an item that partly addresses your question: U.K. F-35 Ready for Takeoff

I feel like a bitter old cynic, possessed with the desire to ramble like a curmudgeon.

The more I read about JSF, the more I feel that this has precious little to do with providing the key combat aeroplane for most 'Western' air forces, and the more it looks like a huge job creation scheme.

It is probably not in anyone's interest (other than the shooters at the sharp end) to get the project delivered at a Combat Effective level early, as that would means loads of money would not get thrown about for decades to come.

It seems to be a gravy train which is trying to fabricate an answer to a question for which there are tried and tested answers.

Unfortunately it links into the mindset of blokes (politicians and military) who want the 'best thing', and scores highest in a game of Top Trumps against over rivals. If I could point you in the direction of a psychologist called Cialdini, he wrote about the "6 Weapons of Influence" which affect human decision making.

I would say that all 6 could apply to the continued support for this project as opposed to good business sense.

There are other options, which have been refined over years of combat ops which are clearly not ready for the boneyard yet.

Chasing the Holy Grail (or Dave if you prefer) is not necessarily the answer.

If it is that good, why aren't we (Euro air forces) going to bin Eurofighter? If the Typhoon is so good in the FGR role, why would Euro air forces go for F-35?

I tend to agree with the posts above which talk about the Top Trumps inspired "Day 1" capability.

Is this not a role of already stealthy(ish) drones (tee-hee. Other TLAs are available) or long range guided munitions like Storm Shadow & Tomahawk?

I grew up on the Day 1 role of the Tonka GR force with JP233 which I always felt was one of the ballsiest jobs for any air arm. Would we do that the same way now, 20 years on from Op Granby?

SRVL - I think it has been intimated by those who seem to be in the know that the RN wanted to recover on a "Gulf hot day" which is more demanding than the Marine hot day.

UK decision - My bet at the moment is that there will be no early announcement and that the cat/trap decision will stand. The implications of the SAR data for the operating and acquisition costs of the F-35B are eyewatering. The propulsion system costs $21 million more than the A/C engine, at full rate.

Fox3 - A good point and one that is missed all too often. Your troubles are not all over with a successful ejection. The same goes for much of the GAFA, or the Great Australian :mad: All. And in fact the RCAF has never used a single-engine jet dedicated to air defense - the Voodoo did that job during the F-104 era, having replaced the CF-100.

What the Canadians should really do is build the Arrow 2020 with a bloody great AESA, F110 engines and a bay full of Meteors. Suck it Ivan!

Finnpog - The JSF has created more bitter old cynics than you can imagine. And of course the result of chasing the Holy Grail is that you get your head bitten off by a rabbit, or the French squash you with a flying cow.

LO, as mentioned earlier if the F-35B KPP (from the 'Scorecard' article) is "sea level, tropical day, 10 kts operational WOD" then what is a GULF hot day? Thanks.

But...what is the air speed velocity of an unladen swallow?

African, or European?

Blue. No yel-- Auuuuuuuugh!

Spaz - I don't know specifically, but I suspect if you search Engines' and Not-a-boffin's posts you may find information of value.

LO making assertions that cannot be backed up are not useful. How about you search to back up your 'nebulous claim'. Thanks. Sharkey Ward makes similar claims without attribution. It is a bit pathetic IMHO.

maybe we should run a sweepstake on who will pull the plug on their F-35 buy first.....

Normally it's the Canadians or the Norwegians..................... two big countries with (relatively) small populations whose military have top table aspirations and whose politicians like spending money on "social" issues

The Conservative Canadian Government is desperate to spend money on the F-35. So much so that they've ignored all the procedures for purchasing (you wouldn't be allowed to buy a box of pencils the way they've gone about F-35). Problem is the Auditor General has just hung the dirty washing up in public, and the backlash may lead to the cancellation.

Canada is not all pinko liberals; think oil sands, seal clubbing and hockey. It's an interesting mix.

Finnpog's description of the programme being a giant job creation scheme is, I think, uncomfortably close to the truth. F35 is so important to the US military/industrial heartbeat that it's too big to fail. And other countries have a finger in this pie too, so, to a lesser degree, have the same sort of motivation. If the programme survives and prospers as a commercial success, those governments want to be associated with that success, even if it is only a relatively small percentage of the whole. So, while the F35's trials and tribulations raise the fear of failure and spectre of additional cost which suggests they should get out, there is a counter-balancing fear of success if they do. Making a decision is therefore dangerous and most politicians will choose to do nothing if the opportunity presents itself. Once more, I support Finnpog's analysis that the military objectives of the people who eventually have to fly the plane into battle are probably not the most important issue for the continuation of the programme.

Now, if F35 were a Euro-consortium programme, it would have shaken itself to bits long ago. If the US were a customer rather than producer, it would have cancelled way back and made such a dent in the production numbers that the programme would crash anyway, assuming it came through the Euro-politics. But the way it is, with the US the biggest customer and manufacturer, it is likely to survive as a commercial programme, even if initial capability does not turn out to be what was expected. Capability will be developed over a long period. This happens with complex military programmes, but F35 will likely really push the boundaries at this stage as it pushed reliance on simulation and modelling too far at an earlier one.

The biggest threat to the programme is US cancellation, which is the fear that rattled export customers when the Pentagon slowed production down a couple of months ago. I think it would take a significant new technical issue for that to happen, an as yet unknown show-stopper. As far as any outsider can tell, this is unlikely. But only a complete collapse of capability is likely to deflect the US from continuing to support it's military manufacturing base. It would be a monumental dent in their credibility too, so further glitches will not be enough to derail the project, even if the accumulation of such problems erodes military capability.

Now, an export customer or two might cut and run, and this will impact pricing somewhat. LM will work hard to sell the dream to a new client fearful of being left behind or anxious to join the big boys, and this would take up the slack. Most, I think, will wait and see. Stay with the party for now and see how it looks in a few years time.

At present F35 excites public debate because times are hard, government spending is under scrutiny, there are technical challenges which put more pressure on price and delivery dates and a strong whiff of political incompetence and public service ineptitude wherever you look. So, F35 is a politically-driven programme for now. It will only become a military programme again several years into operational use, when upgrades and associated costs to make it work as required can be assimilated in smaller, more manageable phases. These will attract little attention outside military circles but will probably determine if it's the fighting machine everyone hoped for at the outset.

Fox3 - Cancellation may be a few steps down the road. On the other hand, imposition of a cost cap will cause problems unless the program stays on plan, which would be a first.

Spaz - No need to be rude, sunshine. I was commenting on what I recalled reading here and where I remembered reading it (from two generally pro-JSF posters). At a certain point you need to take on some responsibility for doing your own research, because I have neither the time for, nor any interest in doing it for you.

LO, back at you: "...At a certain point you need to take on some responsibility for doing your own research, because I have neither the time for, nor any interest in doing it for you."

I'm willing to provide my own research to all on 'Carrier Landing' for all manner of aircraft, including the F-35B/C. It is clear you have nothing to back up your claim and I'm not going to do 'your research' for you. You make the claim - you back it up. Thanks for the effort though.

_How to Deck Land March 2012 PDF 2GB folder name:

https://skydrive.live.com/?cid=cbcd6...340707E6%21296

HowToDeckLand13MARCH2012.pdf name of PDF in 20 parts which re-assembled make a '2GB PDF'.

Spaz - Let me make it clear that I am not interested in debating you about this, still less download two gigabytes of randomness. I was not trying to claim anything (because I'm not aware of any official source), merely to point to a possible answer as to why the UK led the way in SRVL, by way of helping the conversation along.

LO/Spaz,

Is your debate about why SRVL existed for the UK F-35B?

Yes, it's because of marginal F-35B performance in the UK (and US) 'hot/tropical' day criteria.

Do you need more?

FB11

FB - Thanks.

In your view, was there a reason that the UK was leading on SRVL (with, IIRC, the National Accounting Office mentioning its necessity)?

Different emphasis, or a different flight deck shape that provided the opportunity?

LO,

The UK would never do something purely because opportunity presented itself. Not when it costs money.

SRVL is required if a B model is to ever safely carry a useful warload and have an option of bringing it back to a QEC in operationally representative environmental conditions.

The QEC deck is big enough for SRVL. Other STOVL decks are not.

"SRVL is required if a B model is to ever safely carry a useful warload and have an option of bringing it back to a QEC in operationally representative environmental conditions.

"The QEC deck is big enough for SRVL. Other STOVL decks are not."

There is a lot there to ponder, FB.

Are we saying that "other STOVL decks" (do we mean the narrow LHA/LHD?) don't have the option of returning a "useful warload" under "operationally representative environmental conditions"?

Because VLBB including weapons... was sorta why we got into this in the first place.

LO,

If you look at the deck layout of an LHA or LHD and consider the other assets on board you will be able to make your own sensible judgement on the safe recovery of an aircraft doing around 35 knots along the deck on landing with no arrested 'hold back' from a conventional cable.

VLBB is physics limited as you know. A F-35B isn't going to get lighter and the current VLBB KPP is challenging. With the assumption you will always want at least the 'standard' load (already a pretty limited loadout in a B) this simply means you have a tighter margin for fuel and the motor wears out quicker.

If we go back to the B, it would be good if we could look at where we will be in 10 or 15 years time when we will have tired engines and a heavier basic aircraft. On an aircraft that will have another 15 to 20 years ahead of it. It won't be pretty for those who can only VL onto their landing spot if they want to bring anything useful back to their ship.

You could also look now at how you are going to bring back anything other than 2 firecrackers in the belly from the first day of service if all you can do is VL.

I agree. It's already pushing its mass limit and we know it will only keep getting heavier. The vertical option comes with too many capability limitations. Mind you, so does being single engine. Options are being examined very carefully.

FB, thanks again.

Having had some involvement in the early service intro of Concorde, there's an interesting parallel with the B: Concorde's nominal payload (100 pax and bags, 20-25000 klb) was a tiny fraction of TOW (408 klb IIRC), so very small percentage increases in OEW, or declines in aero-propulsion efficiency, could wipe it out. And TOW was maxed.

Likewise, the B's weapon bringback is a small fraction of VL weight, which cannot itself be increased without upgrading the entire propulsion system - engine, fan, transmission.

Conversely, if you look at history's more successful aircraft, many either started with a very healthy payload margin or were adapted through-life to have one, through higher operating weights and more power.

LO,

Thanks. It's lucky that we are focussed on the cost of cats and traps and not the cost and capability of the aircraft.

Strange that the B costs more to buy, costs more to fly each hour, you need more of.them, carries less over a shorter distance and we're worried about a low risk installation of EMALS and AAG because it's cost is more than anticipated.

Penny wise dollar foolish.

Bear in mind, it's cost is probably not more than anticipated. However, what is being presented as conversion cost may be.

The cost of conversion is more than the cost of keeping Queen Elizabeth as a STOVL carrier no matter how much the CV conversion cost has been skewed.

The point is that you are not hearing anyone commenting on the long term financial impact of F-35B yet the costs of that aircraft are increasing by the minute. Odd that we are tumbling towards a decision to revert STOVL with no apparent concern for the bigger 30 year F-35B mortgage payments for less capability.

Agreed. And that's if F35B survives.......

Snatching defeat from the jaws of a victory springs to mind.

My point was, some are being seduced by the no conversion = two operable carriers argument on the basis of flawed (inflated) conversion costs. For the budgetted amount, suspect you could get two conversions, particularly with QE done post 2020 (far end of EPP).

Indeed, but the viewpoint here is a Treasury one, not a military capability one. Treasury thinking probably goes something like:

Cost of F35 - not known, but nothing like predictions and higher than we want.
Cost of converting QE's - not certain but significant and MoD always gets taken for a ride by Contractors.
Probability of killing off both QE's in SDR 2015- High.

Optimum Treasury solution:

Opt for F35B now (real costs of which are later) so no conversion costs now to be wasted in next SDR.

Hope to Cancel F35 entirely later. Then buy cheap manufacturing licence for something else to deal with industrial issues if needed.


All easily spun as MoD balancing budget, achieving F35 IOC with first QE, maintaining interoperability with USMC etc etc.

Cynical? Moi?

Still, I hope I'm wrong. The old Ark's Roof was a fun place to be once you got up the learning curve. The Invincibles and Hermes with SHAR were much more relaxed, even nearly forgiving by comparison.

N

Operating cost?
 

I don't know anything about any of this so my question should be seen purely as one arising from reading this discussion:

It has been said that operations with a catapult are about a great combination of all the elements. Lots of training is needed and crews need to remain current. I was reading about the pre deployment training of one of the US carriers recently and it seemed very extensive. Could this be the cost that's making people pause for thought? i.e. a very large fixed cost that cannot ever be put aside?

In the computing world I see lots of systems of great capability and cheap unit cost whose running cost is moderate but which don't run well unless you maintain about 10 very expensive people to look after them and those people have to stay on the system to maintain their knowledge. The system has to be running continuously for them to be able to do this. The company could buy simple, crappier software and much more expensive hardware to run it and be able to put those skilled people to use in generating new revenue.

I know this isn't the same but I am wondering if there is any similarity. Is the B something that is expensive to buy and fly but doesn't need such large and continuously commited and trained group of people to be effective?

t43562 - That has been the theory. Because the B is much easier to land (an operation which is automated to a remarkable degree) the carrier group spends less time working up in home waters and more time available to generate sorties at full rate, anywhere that it might be.

It's also been suggested here that the RAF liked the idea of Joint Force F-35B because you don't have to be a full-time carrier pilot (locked inside big grey floaty thing with a bunch of matelots) to be ship-capable.

However, you're not just training pilots, but the whole wing - maintenance, armourers, deck crew, helo crews - all performing a complicated ballet in a confined space, on a much bigger scale than SHAR or JFH.

And even if you don't go all the way to autoland - surely FBW and full-time autothrottle have to make the job easier? Typhoon, I believe, has a landing mode where you basically dial in the airspeed and hold a HUD pipper on the landing spot, to reduce scatter if you want to use a short runway.

see this weeks "Flight" for further discussion of operations afloat

basically if the RN try and re-invent the wheel after 40++ years instead of following USN practices it will be a terrible cock-up

t43562,

I'm afraid you don't get something for nothing.

There are indeed less personnel directly related to the launch and recovery of a B vice a C but you need more in other areas if we revert to B.

In order to produce the same effect as a C with a B, you will either need more aircraft (= more maintainers) or fly the same aircraft more often (= more maintainers).

And the training burden reduction inherent in C operations when compared with legacy (even the USN is looking at reducing the training burden with a C) will offer relative savings.

They will not do that,the USN procedures will do just fine LOL :ok:

FB11 - Not to mention that the B carries an extra complete, dissimilar propulsion system = more maintainers.

Thanks
 

Thanks very much, for that explanation, LO and FB11. It makes the whole thing more comprehensible.

It is obviously an argument that needs a spreadsheet model and accurate data. Danger of having insufficiently powerful capability vs trying to operate a model that only the Americans have a big enough margin of wealth to be sure they can always maintain.

Might be a question of how fragile each option is. e.g. how easily can one lose capability how hard to regain it. Is all the complexity at the dangerous end or in some hangar where there is time. Is there any way to operate a degraded capability or do you need every bit of a big operation to be perfect for it to work at all. If the americans solve problems with money then that might present problems for anyone else and their experience might be no more than interesting.

Hence the incredible difficulty for someone without any experience like me or the rest of the public in knowing what to think.

t...

There's also a strategic issue. Carriers have had a longer service life than fighter aircraft types. Only two US carriers have been commissioned since the Super Hornet became operational.

It is as close to certain as we get in this business that there will be CATOBAR aircraft in service and under development through the life of the QEs, because that is a major US strategic capability.

There are few who would argue seriously that the Marine STOVL capability is at the same level of importance. The B came close to being chopped in 2010. Given its performance, likely operating costs and the budget environment, its survival is not a given.