my contribution, ill-conceived as it might appear to be, was intended to demonstrate the received wisdom on Day 1, nothing more, nothing less.

My recollection is that the Iron Lady was, however, a believer.

PN

Slightly misread your post. For the round trip missions the Herc needed more than one prod on the Southern leg in order to make an eventual RV going north again . The C130s used were fitted with internal tanks I believe. Clearly if the ac was going to carry any significant quantity weapons then the weight of the long range tanks(and their fuel) would have to be sacrificed in order to achieve the objective. Without the long range tanks then more prods would be needed further south from Victors which themselves would need extra brackets. As I said the different speed ranges would have made it all but impossible.

There was also a plan B forming for the later Black Buck raids. A Victor was fitted with an A/R Martel in place of one of the wing pods, with a view to setting up carriage and wiring.

As far as I know it did not fly, mainly because some Shrikes became available from an unknown but friendly source, but possibly because of the difficulties encountered wiring it in.

cokecan wrote

The Vulcan was trialled with Paveway.

http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...ml#post4828182

http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...ml#post4828336

From

http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...lack-buck.html

And more Nimrod stuff in the PPruNe archives:

And

All on here http://www.pprune.org/military-aircr...-lgbs-etc.html

:ok:

This sounds very much like the CVBS. This grand-sounding piece of equipment was the Co-pilot's visual bombsight on the Vulcan. On the Vulcan it was actually calibrated using a form of collimation tube that was fitted into the nose some how. I watched one being done (in amazement). A vertical line could be used for tracking and horizontal lines for range.

The proper range line would vary with pitch which was proportional to speed and also depended on the 'standard' co-pilot adopting a standard seating position. Oddly it used to produce quite good results :)

I've seen video of a Nimrod attempting to drop sticks of retarded 1000lb bombs. Looks like nobody involved in the trials consulted a QWI, who might have educated them about the perils of 'stores capture':ugh:

Surely stores capture is a function of aerodynamics, weapon dynamics and release speeds, I doubt any QWI would be sufficiently competent to predict its onset accurately on release trials. On a system that that has been trialled tested and documented- yes, but on a virgin system? probably not.

If you accept the theory that the objective of the Black Bucks was to simply spread fear and confusion through an implied threat to the Argentine mainland, could one of the longer-range Canberra variants have been used as an alternative? For instance could you hang anything useful off the wings off the Navy's T22s or a PR7?

Don't think Canberra had the range (unless for a 1 way mission) or a fuel system suitable for AAR; anyone know of any Canberra variant so equipped by any operator?

Wondered how long before someone suggested a Canberra might, perhaps, possibly have been able to do something like it!

Or Shacklebomber :}

I guess you could have pretended with the Canberra - announce there were some at Ascension and then launch a raid from Chile.....
Doesn't matter where they fly from, what matters is where the other side THINK they fly from

Very interesting thread. Could the Phantom have been used against Stanley?

What has struck me before is the question of timing. Had Argentina invaded in the autumn of 1982 rather than the spring it could have made a big difference to Operation Corporate.

On their side, they would have had a bigger stock of SuEs and Exocets to use against the Task force and, as the army's conscription programme went from January to December, their squaddies would have had double the amount of training that they did have.

On our side, the last of the Vulcans was planned to be out of service in June 1982, the first Tornado squadron had only just reformed, while as for the carriers, Hermes would have been decommissioned by then and Invincible would have been on its way to Oz, leaving just Illustrious to head south.

So, would the better option have been to wait until the following spring to build up our forces, possibly returning Vulcan and Hermes to service and talking nicely to Australia, gambling that Argentina would not have built up a big force on the Falklands, extended Stanley's runway to operate Mirages etc, or to go with what was available at the time?

Martin the Martian wrote ''gambling that Argentina would not have built up a big force on the Falklands, extended Stanley's runway to operate Mirages etc, or to go with what was available at the time?''

'gambling'?

i cannot imagine what the odds that Argentina would not be extending the runway while we were running around the world buying up carriers would be, but i doubt they'd be very good.

in such a situation i can only imagine that we'd have had to go cap in hand to washington and litterally beg for help - possibly with the observation/threat that a British government that failed to re-take the FI would be out of office 15 minutes after a 'no confidence' vote was tabled, and that any incoming government would have a hard time explaining to the UK population why we were in NATO if NATO did nothing for us in our hour of need.

quite what the response would be i'm not sure.

Martin interesting point about their training. Regardless of our forces, their actual timing meant the invasion was in late autumn with winter fast approaching. Maybe they gambled that we could not have reacted as quickly as we did and would have been faced with action in the depths of winter.

Remember there were other factors in any delay. First we would have had at least some AEW capability - six months later both Gannet and Sea King would have been available, though how the single Gannet would have got there is anther question. One way trip to an improvised airstrip maybe?
There would have been time to get Bulwark ready for sea - don't forget there were plans to refit her and send her south as part of the "second fleet" along with Illustrious, though if the boilers were really as bad as I've been told then that would have been a desperation move.
Then there was the alleged US offer to lend (sell??) us Oriskany - which was supposedly rejected on grounds of manpower and timing. However IF we had borrowed Oriskany, was there still enough residual knowledge around to get the Buccs and Phantoms flying off her in a six-month intensive period?
Presumably more Sea Harriers would have been delivered, and also more Chinooks, while the Army Lynx would have had time to be fitted with deicing gear (which prevented them from being used).
In many ways a delay in going south would have given us a number of equipment advantages.

By 1982 the only air-to-ground that the RAF F4s could do was strafe. Also, it took about 9 hours to fly an F4 to Stanley from ASI (with at least 7 AAR brackets). I doubt the engines would have managed 18 hours there and back; most of the Speys would have run out of oil a long while before that.

With the benefit of hindsight (a luxury I know), knowing that often the weather over Stanley was clear enough, a C-130 modified to release LGBs could have self-designated using a Laser Target Marker. At 25,000 ft with CAP from the SHARs this could have provided very good results. Doubt if many people realised from the raw weather stats that there was a lot of similarity between Stanley and the north of Scotland - often gin clear but also 4 seasons most days.

"First we would have had at least some AEW capability - six months later both Gannet and Sea King would have been available."

Some interesting points, Milo, but the AEW Sea King only came about as a result of the Falklands war. So, still no AEW for the Task Force.

Quite.

Needs must and 6 month delay would have given time for the need to be satisfied. Same with the Gannet; that time would have been needed to get it ship shape.

I would agree that it was a moot point if they had recognised the need before the event. Similarly that they needed two ships, one with long range SAM and one with short range SAM, only seemed to arise when it was realised the ASM threat was different from the Soviet ASM threat.

Martin
The point I was trying to make was that we would have been better off if we had delayed our response - not if the Argentinians had delayed their attack.
If the Argentinians had waited, then Bulwark would have been scrapped, several frigates sold to Chile, Invincible to Oz, Stronmess to the USA (had Tarbatness already gone or was that also held back?), the Tide tankers pensioned off....

As originator of this thread and a newbie to this site, may I convey many thanks to all for the very informative and interesting posts to a query I thought might have been considered a tad too fanciful. But then the truth certainly smacked of being stranger than fiction in 1982.

Archimedes' eloquent synopsis sets the scene nicely, and it seems apparent from further contributions that Vulcan was the only serious contender, though Nimrod might have been able to do the job had political premise deemed it worth a go. Must admit though, a Canberra ex Chile would have been a really interesting strategy, there were of course similar dodgy dealings afoot at that time. Then the AOC might have trully been able to effect his 25 to 50 missions. I guess it begs the question though as to just how relatively difficult it was to get the Vulcan back into service from the knackers yard, knowing it to be a preferable optimised system. And I'd like to add to the "timing" arguments with regard to training and equipment considerations.

Nice gen, but then I think the real decider was simply that Galtieri's hide was on the line and his act of national unity was in desperation, surplus to strategic considerations. Luckily for us it would seem. With so many possible tangents to explore in this vain, I'd encourage others to continue as they see fit, its all good. Thanks though for the "Buccs for Black Buck" referal, of which I was not aware, that answers my main query.

Just thought I'd leave with the thought however of my reaction to the crisis as a 12 year old boy. The tabloids sold out before I could get a copy and I remember pestering my old man to go in search of one. "But why do you want that for son?". " Because they have a centrefold featuring all the task force assets". "What on earth do you want that for". "So I can cross them off when they get sunk". "Dont be so silly........"

Yes, but the Argies attacked in Autumn 1982 (for the Southern Hemisphere) hoping that they could entrench over the harsh winter expected in the FIs from May/Jun 82 for 4 months onwards (normally). Luckily for us Winter was later in 82 than in previous years.

actually on thinking about it, if they'd attacked six months later even the requisitioned Fleetwood long distance trawlers would have gone: Cordella, Farnella, Junella, Northella and Pict, were all sold overseas fairly soon after returning, and not replaced by Marrs.
I guess they weren't too important, but in terms of total number of hulls available it all adds up

were all Hull trawlers, if you don't mind, Milo! ;)

Milo, only one answer, STUFT :)

The Tonados would have been very vulnerable in a low-level attack using JP233. At a higher level, the Vulcan was the right aircraft for the job.

in that sense, what was really needed would have been a Vulcan-launched stand-off JP233
Would it have been feasible to fit wings to a JP233 dispenser and glide / rocket it over the target if launched from a Vulcan bomb bay?
I realise this is fantasy world, but just sometimes the mad ideas work....

I do recall seeing a project brochure in the '80's for that very purpose, I suspect that crews tasked with this role pretty soon pushed back with 'you want us to fly straight and level for HOW long?'

What became JP233 was originally intended to be a powered munition. It was a joint US/UK project and destined for F-111 and Tornado. When economies reduced it to a free fall weapon the US pulled out of the project.

...and bought the Durandal instead. If memory serves, the 20th TFW used some in 1991, and there is/was one on display alongside the Tornado the RAF donated tothe USAF Museum in Dayton (again, IIRC).

The vulnerability, kiwibrit, was very nearly a big issue for the Vulcan which probably only survived the first attack at 8000ft because they achieved the first principle of war - surprise. This was despite Hanrahan the night before reporting from Hermes that they were loading bombs on the Harriers - really? what for? Good job the Argies did not ask.

could the Hercules carry wing-mounted Durandal? In hindsight that may have been a better option?

Tarby was in Portsmouth (North Corner Jetty if I remember correctly) destoring for sale. I do remember the heated argument with the Stores staff who were diligently landing stores as planned and most reluctant to heed "put them back".

Did the WEC in '74, visited Huntings. Asked about a powered JP233. They blanched as they thought we were in a position to cancel the overflight version.

Didnt realist that JP233 became available early enough, though you might imagine it to have been the weapon of choice. Begs the question as to how easy it would have been to integrate it with the Vulcan or Buccaneer? Perhaps a learned armourer could also enlighten me as to whether this system was ever tried in part ie. without a full complement of bomblets, for say weight considerations? And was it ever trial dropped from altitude?

I'd want to check, but I have a sneaking suspicion that Durandal required a delivery at no more than 200ft and at around 550kts to be fully effective. I'm not entirely sure that sort of attack profile would necessarily be conducive to the good health of a C-130 crew, even with the benefit of surprise...

A similar problem might have applied to Vulcan/JP233. The low height in a AAA zone would have been very dangerous. The delivery speed may also have been an issue.

With dumb bombs the time interval could be adjusted to ensure the proper interval between bombs. Did JP233 have a variable time dispense control?

The Vulcan doctrine was for a nuclear laydown attack as low and as fast as possible. With 117TUs a conventional laydown attack was feasible but not against a heavily defended target with AAA. There was a preferred option against AAA of 8,000 feet minimum.

Against medium SAM 18,000 feet was deemed acceptable, but all these were predicated against Soviet weapons in the early 70s.

"I'd want to check, but I have a sneaking suspicion that Durandal required a delivery at no more than 200ft and at around 550kts to be fully effective. I'm not entirely sure that sort of attack profile would necessarily be conducive to the good health of a C-130 crew, even with the benefit of surprise..."


I looked up the Durandal when it came up in another thread (I think the Big Blu thread) and I thought it was a MINIMUM of 200 ft, but like you, I'd want to check :ok: