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-   -   Libya Credit? (https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/471352-libya-credit.html)

BS Alert 11th Dec 2011 11:31

BZ to Ocean and the Apache/60's.

That said, and I appreciate that this might be thread drift but, did we really need to put utilze Apache? I know the boys and girls did an awesome job, I just question the operational need and I suspect that, had we not put them in harms way, the end result would have still been the same.

I clearly have the benefit of hindsight.

FODPlod 11th Dec 2011 12:10

If ASaCs and attack helos had been deployed much earlier in the campaign to monitor and block the ability of PGF (Pro Gaddafi Forces) to move along the coastal highway with almost total impunity, I suspect much misery could have been avoided in and around Benghazi, Misrata, Ras Lanuf, Ajdabiya, Brega and other rebel enclaves. Once the PGF embedded themselves inside the towns, they became far more difficult (and more costly in civilian lives) to wheedle out.

orca 11th Dec 2011 13:41

At about the half way stage Libya was (in my opinion, and yes - I was there) about to become a demonstration of the limitations of air. Operating above the threat, and without a land component, the FW masters had done a great job, but hadn't brought the dictator to book. Neither had the naval blockade.

Something had to be done, primarily to get the anti-Ghad moving by attacking specific target sets and by adding an unquantifiable psychological factor to the campaign. Cue integration of sea based AH into the air plan by France and UK.

In my opinion air power enthuisiasts owe the AH (or rather the integration of AH into the air campaign) a larger vote of thanks than most realise.

Of course, we are all sound military types, have operated FW/RW in Afghanistan for years now, are not given to bitching and all know it's a team game with each playing their own (little) part. The team did very well.

Fire 'n' Forget 11th Dec 2011 16:20

Apache was a massive government PR exercise not a lot else, in AH terms the French were far more offensive and productive.

The Apaches didn't fly often for days, and would only go if the boat was particurarly close to the coast (understandable). The French were flying a heck of a lot more day and night.

Apache is doing a fantastic job elsewhere there was no need for it in Libya.

French Numbers from Libya

Widger 11th Dec 2011 17:36

Fire n Forget,


and would only go if the boat was particurarly close to the coast (understandable)
The reason 'the boat' would be close to the coast would be to launch the aircraft, not the other way round with the aircraft launching because they were close to the coast.

The inclusion of Apache in Ellamy had a lot more to do with reasons other that political PR and there WAS a need for it in Libya. You may well have gained some insight from the ATO sat in either the CAOC/E3/Akrotiri or back at Scampton/Boulmer but there were significant strategic reasons for the inclusion of both Apache and SKAsACs as part of the tri-service and international effort.

I am sure that you will come back to denigrate the efforts of the whole team onboard Ocean, including the AAC and the other assets in the area as you seem to do in every post you make on Pprune. The world does not revolve around scopies!

Chicken Leg 11th Dec 2011 17:58

You Crabs really don't help yourselves, do you??!!

Threads like this just go to show why the other two services generally regard you as they do.

Help us to help you boys and girls!!

Odigron 11th Dec 2011 18:44

Chicken,

Concur, Crabs have little confidence in their own ability/service and resort to threads like this that highlight an inferiority complex.

For what it's worth, the 3 services each bring something to the party and each have great strengths.

Current hard times are, however, causing a significant increase in in-fighting! Shame!!

Easy Street 11th Dec 2011 20:36

Fodplod,


If ASaCs and attack helos had been deployed much earlier in the campaign to monitor and block the ability of PGF (Pro Gaddafi Forces) to move along the coastal highway with almost total impunity, I suspect much misery could have been avoided in and around Benghazi [etc]
There's a couple of problems with that assessment - firstly, PGF were already in the area of Ajdabiyah etc at the start of the campaign (PGF were, after all, the bona fide Libyan armed forces at that point). Secondly, many PGF troop movements in response to the nascent uprising happened before the UNSCR - and regardless of Gadaffi's vile rhetoric, those troop movements again represented sovereign state business until such time as UNSCR 1973 had been passed. Naval airpower has some diplomatic advantages but intervening ahead of a UNSCR isn't one of them! When the surprisingly quick flurry of diplomatic activity ahead of 1973 was completed, it was the inherent speed of response of fast air from France, the US and UK from European MOBs that helped stop PGF advancing into Benghazi - it would have taken significant foresight to have prepositioned a LPH full of deck-trained AH to be ready in the same timescale.

As regards the situation around Misrata, you have a point in that interdiction of siege forces was an ideal use of AH. However the threat there was of such magnitude that the FW boys, operating above the MANPAD envelope, could observe at leisure and engage whenever necessary during a long on-station time - a luxury not available to AH crews at the time. ASaCs (or indeed Sentinel, which did the same job over the whole of Libya, not just the coast) can only get an AH or FJ sensor into roughly the right area and some time is required to turn this into an engagement, not my idea of fun on a moonlit night with some modern MANPADs around.

odigron!

Crabs have little confidence in their own ability/service
Au contraire, I think you'll find most Crabs currently very proud of a job well done (and not in a supporting role, for a change). Hurrah!

FODPlod 11th Dec 2011 21:58


Originally Posted by Easy Street...
...As regards the situation around Misrata, you have a point in that interdiction of siege forces was an ideal use of AH. However the threat there was of such magnitude that the FW boys, operating above the MANPAD envelope, could observe at leisure and engage whenever necessary during a long on-station time - a luxury not available to AH crews at the time...

If that was the case, I'd be interested in your explanation for this:

Originally Posted by National Public Radio 25 Apr 2011

NEAL CONAN, host:
There are reports of heavy shelling by forces loyal to Libyan President Moammar Gadhafi in the town of Misrata today, even though rebels say they have pushed back Gadhafi's forces. Marie Colvin is foreign affairs correspondent for the London Sunday Times. She's in Misrata and joins us now on the phone from there. Nice to talk to you again.

Ms. MARIE COLVIN (Middle East Correspondent, The Sunday Times, London): Hi there.

CONAN: Can you tell us what's happening in Misrata today?

Ms. COLVIN: Yes. There's been a dramatic change in the siege of Misrata and for the worst. I mean, we've seen over the last week rebels fighting the Libyan forces along Tripoli Street, which is the main boulevard through Misrata. And when I say rebels, I mean the rebel army is shopkeepers, engineers, car mechanics and most of them haven't seen a gun until about a month ago. They've been battling Gadhafi's forces along Tripoli Street, kind of shoving them west in very brutal, bloody battles. Those ended last night when they kicked out the last of Gadhafi's men. Their last base was a hospital that the rebels took; just pounded it and a house that they had hidden in.

So what happened today was both - I think it was revenge. We started seeing shelling from afar. So there were no longer Gadhafi forces inside Misrata. We are being shelled from afar. So there were no longer Gadhafi forces inside Misrata. We are being shelled from afar. All of the neighborhoods hit today were civilian. All of the casualties and dead were civilian. I was seeing old ladies coming in, the youngest victim, eight years old. He's in a refrigerator truck just 10 yards away from where I'm standing. They were shelling. And again, there are - we are besieged from - three sides of Misrata are besieged. And we have the sea - you know, at our backs. So there's no way for people to get out.

CONAN: And...

Ms. COLVIN: The shelling is coming from Grad missiles about 20 miles away and artillery about 12 miles away. And they're just pounding it into civilian neighborhoods.

CONAN: And, Marie Colvin, if rocket launchers and artillery pieces are outside of Misrata, they are, by definition, in open areas where, presumably, they can be seen by NATO aircraft. Any sign of NATO aircraft?

Ms. COLVIN: Absolutely none. And that is what is being asked by everyone here, I have to say, including myself. There has to be a heat signature. There has to be something you can see. These are big missiles coming in. The Grads are 12 pounds. They're punching through concrete roofs. I saw one house today, two of them went right through the roof. The little eight-year-old boy was just - the aunt was killed inside. He was killed as he ran outside trying to get into the family car. Another missile hit that car. They leave huge, I would say, three-foot by three-foot circumference holes. So you have to be able to see them.

And we don' know why NATO planes are not hitting because they come absolutely come under the definition of the U.N. Security Council 1973, protect civilians. Civilians are dying here. The only sign we've seen of a NATO strike was on the faculty of science, where Gadhafi soldiers were holed up four days ago. They left four days ago. That was hit last night. It's empty, luckily...

Cameron first mooted military action against Libya in the House of Commons on 28 Feb (link). Any government with foresight would have deployed a fully tooled-up carrier if available or, failing that, an LPD with AH at the same time as the SSNs with TLAMs. It could easily have been in situ by the beginning of April. We sailed an entire task force to the Falklands within ten days.

Fire 'n' Forget 11th Dec 2011 22:19

Widger


significant strategic reasons for the inclusion of both Apache and SKAsACs as part of the tri-service and international effort.
Really? SKAsACs was a useful asset, the AH was definatly more political than required for effect. However they were deployed and showed that they are adaptable and tbh, brave down low in that AOR when the sides were 'fluid'

I will let you carry on getting all your information 2nd/3rd hand from websites/newspapers.

And FYI I have respect for all serving, however the 'retired' 'experts' that have a point of view as narrow as Nelsons looking glass leave a lot to be desired :8

Widger 12th Dec 2011 11:35

Fire and Forget,

You are the master of the Waaaahhh!! So I will bite!

I am sure I have probably met you!

You are making the error of attacking the person rather than the argument. Yes I am retired, but only since June. I was right in the thick of it from the start of Op ELLAMY and I know A LOT, first hand, about the deployment of most of the assets used in that campaign, including the UK E3 component.

There were strategic and tactical reasons for the deployment and extension of many of the assets involved in OP ELLAMY and I was involved in the debates/briefing/decisions of many, including R1, Sentinel, E3, HMS Cumberland, several issues surrounding rear support and on the periphery of Apache and SKASaC. You are wrong in your view that the deployment of Apache was for PR or purely political purposes. There were other more important considerations. In the words of Sylvester Stallone....'You don't know man cos you weren't there!'

With regard to narrow minded views, I do not know what the RN has ever done to you (failed flying grading did you?) but almost every post you have put on Pprune is about taking a swipe at your sister Service. As a Scopie, you will have had ample opportunity to work with the other services, including the RN so it would do you the world of good to get some wider Service education at Swindon and then spend some time in an exchange post and then you might learn a little more about the contribution of the other Services to Military Tasks and Defence Strategic Direction, rather than thinking that Defence of the UK (Airpower) is the totaility of what the MOD does.

Being an ex NATO grade 1 controller myself and having served served in both GW1 and Op Deny Flight as one, I understand the pride of being a qualified Freddie but I also had the humility to understand the benefits that the other services brought to the show. Your juvenile sniping does you or your Service no credit whatsoever. You quite clearly have NO respect for all those serving as your attitude is clear for all to see in your posts since the mid 2000s when you probably joined up!

wokkamate 12th Dec 2011 17:45

BZ to the Ocean, and a nice You Tube Video too!

As for Super-Tucano CAS - why not? Would be awesome; fast, cheap, good load out, manoueverable etc etc.

The RAF News, or maybe it was Soldier Magazine, did a feature on the JTACs top 10 CAS assets. Guess where the mighty GR4 came?

No 1 was the AC-130 (no suprises there). :ok:

Easy Street 12th Dec 2011 23:34


As for Super-Tucano CAS - why not?
Because it would be no use for anything except CAS in a smallish area such as Helmandshire, and we can't really afford single-role platforms any more. What we have already does the job. If it wasn't doing the job, there would be grounds for buying something new, but until then...

Chicken Leg 13th Dec 2011 08:29


and we can't really afford single-role platforms any more.
But they don't have to be single role. Check our this bad boy:

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