Might just drop this thread into the conversation at the WO's lunch this Thurstag :p

Bet you pint you dont..........

Wager to be settled at the end of November, usual venue?:)

At 53 with a med discharge in the offing bet I do, mines a bitter, type to be sorted in "that" pub mit Couchman and Sullivan :ok:

Whilst I have no particular views either way about JG, never having worked on the same squadron as him, the Samsonite ban strikes me of the typical chiselling triviality that has so 'endeared' certain senior officers to me over the decades.

Well, I can understand why these cases should be banned for certain tasks. It should be left for the Capt of the a/c to decide. If it was a 30 Sqn route trip to pick up some engines from Cyprus then no big deal. Same for some other route task for exercise pax etc (Red Flag, Grand Prix etc)

If, however, the task involves a trip into operationally focused areas in full view of the green forces then certain limitations on baggage should be enforced so as to strengthen the 'military warfighter' ethos and image of RAF personnel. Rocking up at Bagram, Balad etc with a yellow or red suitcase does nothing for internal (MoD) relations and paints a picture of civvies in uniform. This 'image' portrayal can be quite damaging when it comes to defending your military right of passage and relevance in looming defence cuts.

I think JG is quite correct in his stance and whilst it may seem trivial to some, the rot in military organisations starts with lax discipline and letting troops get away with lots of small things that mount up to an air force staffed by personnel who go about thinking they are gods gift and untouchable. There has been a marked change in discipline and standards over the short 20 years I have been in the military.

Where the SWO was once feared he's now your 'mate' almost (Odiham). Where once a Cpl could tell an SAC to get his hair cut, these days he's likely to be ridiculed and told to bugger off by his SACs.
Where once people would stop when the ensign was being raised, people now just drive past in their own little bubble. I regularly have to stop people to remind them of the etiquette of saluting an officer and not to look away or 'pretend' they didn't notice. There are issues with today's society from which we recruit and these people have little respect for authority and some feel 'dis-respected' by the fact they have to show respect to their sovereign. The waist size of overweight fatties that consistently fail their fitness test but are kept on by weak management on account of them being a 'good tradesman' etc. The list could go on, but I'm sure you get the picture.

Command is a lonely position and not all decisions you make will be cordially accepted by all. I bet there are many, many more decisions that are made in our favour and hard battles fought that most will never get to learn about - such a shame that a true leader of men should be ridiculed for insignificant decision that has little, if any, impact on your day to day life other than to generate a thread on PPrune!!! Peace to all!

(PS Loved the 7/47 'I'm more Black Ops than you debate!!' Makes me laugh when all these dudes on 7 cut about with long 'blade' style haircuts as if they are badged themselves. At least the 47 guys knew they were truckies at heart; there is nothing a 'Blade' hates more than a Walter!):E:E:E

Any more news on the comment made at post #13 - the instigator has made half a dozen comments yet skilfully avoided elaborating.

Stopstart,

I can assure you this is not a personal vendetta. I have already made my views very clear on where the majority of the blame lies, I was merely pointing out the recklessness of the decision making by the leadership at the time. I have no idea if you were at the centre of what what happened, but if you would like to continue your accusation you should drop the mask of anonymity and explain very clearly your interest. My interest has only ever been in preventing a recurrence of a totally avoidable tragedy.

I’m just calling things as I see them treacle, although I note that you amended your last post to remove the direct accusations. :hmm: I see no particular need to reveal my identity to you, partly because I’m still serving, partly because 90% of the people that matter know who I am anyway but mainly because I find your holier-than-thou attitude so tremendously amusing.

What exactly do you hope to achieve by your continued harping on about the involvement or otherwise of the Flt Cdr in a tragic incident 5 years ago? There have been funerals, inquests and aircraft modifications as a direct result of the loss of 179 yet still you go on. I don’t understand what it is you’re still looking for? I find it hard to believe you’re naïve enough to think that a single, solitary Sqn Ldr could be responsible (or not) for so much while Sqn Cdrs, Stn Cdrs, Group, the AWC, the IPT, Boscombe, the AOC and the NAAFI manager could bear no responsibility or have no influence? I know for a fact that Flt Cdrs have difficulty influencing where the desks in ops should go let alone influencing AWC thinking, aircraft mods and general RAF policy. Face it, the fast jet led RAF had (and still has) absolutely no interest in fixed wing support to SF – indeed it struggles to even be that interested in the great work 7 do. He could’ve screamed until he was blue in the face about foam, DAS etc etc but without the support of the hierarchy he would get nowhere; sadly it would always take something like the loss of 179 to convince the hierarchy to make things happen (indeed, I’m still waiting for our very own Desert One to prompt a proper AFSOC type set up in the RAF :rolleyes: but that’s another subject altogether). Through your comments on the Flt Cdr you also infer that all the captains and crews were just sheep, doing what they were told unquestioningly? My experience suggest those weren't or aren’t the sort of people 47 recruit.

The loss of 179 has been thrashed out on here ad infinitum. There is nothing more to be gained from constantly raking it over apart from upsetting the relatives yet further. The captain was a good mate of mine with whom I’d been through training and had served at Lyneham with so I'm not just some casual observer. Would ESF have saved 179? Who knows. No one, not even you Nige. It might have helped but then so might a myriad of other things. As it was, XV179 and its highly trained and experienced crew were lost to enemy action whilst conducting military tasking in an operational theatre against a resourceful and well equipped enemy force. A direct result of the loss means that I now fly one of the best protected TacAT aircraft in the world - that is the legacy of Steady and the rest of the Hilton crew. Those that campaigned (including you obviously) should be applauded for their tenacity but it’s time to move on.

You say – well that’s very laudable and us modern day sheep are terribly grateful, however you’ve been an airline pilot for many years now and your earlier comments on the state of the Sqn nowadays reveal just how out of touch you are. Like I said in my last post, if you truly believe JG to be responsible for so much then pursue it elsewhere; constantly turning it over on here serves absolutely no purpose and certainly has nothing to do with your stated aim above.

PS. This must rank as one of my favourite ever pompous internet postings! Is it a step away from a challenge to cyber-duel?? Get over yourself :rolleyes:

PPS. As an aside and for what it's worth, JG's just what the stn needed as a Stn Cdr and has had the balls to make the big decisions the place has been crying out for for years.

I agree, that's why we have STANEVAL to act as a conduit to the top, when it is appropriate to do so.

S4G

Well, there is a hell of a difference between shouting from the rooftops about the need for foam and leaving the request and requirement unopened in an in-tray. Not withstanding the difficulties of Flt Cdrs getting themselves heard, at the very minimum in terms of duty of care I would have expected the US exchange pilot to have been given a fair hearing and if merited, a written request for foam to have been entered into the system. As it was, his request remained unread and unconsidered. You don't need to tell me how difficult it was to get equipment I went with my own request direct to the Stn Cdr who told me nothing could be done.

The position of Flt Cdr on that section carried with it an extraordinary degree of autonomy, without the normal scrutiny associated with similar rank. I totally accept that in the main, the crews were content to fly day low level. However one pilot, in particular was unhappy and thought it too risky. Instead of looking carefully at his proposal to improve the safety of the Hercules by fitting foam, he was sacked.

I only received a written account of the Flt Cdr's evidence in recent days and I was staggered by the apparent lack of consideration for duty of care and refusal to consult more widely. I am in contact with some of the family members, and they too were amazed by the evidence. I should add, that only one person had his evidence challenged at the Inquest and I am not surprised. I am still of the opinion that Group were totally incompetent in dealing with the TAT reports and this is where the main failure occurred.

My recent posts contend with the fact that due to the power and autonomy of the position in question, an opportunity to do something pro-active ahead of the tragedy was spurned.

You might well be in a safe aircraft nowadays, (only five planned by MoD initially), but until lessons are properly learnt by the tragedy, it will happen again. I don't think the "can do" attitude taken to the extreme is healthy and I don't think the atmosphere that existed was conducive to challenging the culture/orthodoxy of day low level.

Hadden Cave has not had anywhere need the impact on the RAF that it should have done, in my opinion, the job is still not complete. Haddon-Cave was called in following the Nimrod crash which occurred AFTER XV179. The commander in situ, known to many at LYE ordered Nimrod crews back into their aircraft within a couple of days of the explosion. I don't doubt that "can-do" remains the over-riding impulse to get the job done, my concern is that nothing has really changed at senior levels.

You have at least explained more about your background, I hope you understand that I am not overly focussed on one individual. You said yourself that the crash had to happen for things to change. This is what Stn Cdr told me in the conversation that he couldn't recall at the Inquest. I will continue to strive for a system with less reliance on the cult of the individual and more on sober, independent checking and analysis. The CoC failed miserably regarding XV179.