Tm 74 - Let's just say that the MoD had painted itself into a corner in a way that makes these guys look like Einsteins.

http://www.staffordcarson.com/wp-con.../4-300x224.jpg

Short recollections throughout this thread! None of these figures applied in the seductive year of 2001 with Angus and John. Quite a difference. How things evolve!

I fully understand that. The whole JSF concept is so rife with internal contradiction it makes my head swim. The aim of one size fits all remains rooted in a political theory aimed at allegedly saving money as priority 1. The T-6 Texan II was likewise a goat rope.

as I said it's not our first BBQ, the price hasn't doubled yet, like it did with the fa-18ab, we have never increased our budget for the f-35a it has always been $16b for 100

I'll let you have the fun of looking at the f-111 price creep, but if you have trouble finding it
1965 Initial contract target price $2,067.2
Current contract target price $4,657.1
Government estimate of price at completion $5,344-o
australia placed order in 1963



@LO,
USN hasn't had any interest in the uprated engine for the SH, that's been offered for ages and they still don't, nor have they any interest in the proposed changes to the SH, or they would fund it

the wing issue of the f-35c was known since the wind tunnel tests, if it was a no-go they would have said so 10 years ago and handed it back to the engineers to come up with something else

Lonewolf and others,

I've posted this before, but it might help to repeat it.

The JSF/F-35 programme was a US Department of Defense (DoD) response to a series of failed tactical aircraft programmes in the 1970s and 80s. (NATF, AX, A-12, etc.) The military (and their DoD technical advisors) came to the conclusion that as long as the USAF and USN were trying to buy large twin engined aircraft, the risks of weight growth, and associated cost growth, were just too great. The F-22 programme just served to underline the fact that even the USA could not afford to build large aircraft of this type.

The solution developed (within the DoD's OSD) was to force the next generation tactical aircraft to a single engined single seat configuration to constrain weight and therefore cost.

This policy was implemented via a series of steps which included the STOVL Strike Fighter (SSF) project for the USMC, CALF, JAST and on to JSF. The main technology enablers included a next generation engine (lighter and more fuel efficient) and fully networked mission systems with ab highly advanced sensor suite.

You can disagree with their reasoning, and point out where you might think they've gone wrong, but that's basically what happened. In this case, I don't think you can pin the blame on the politicians.

The USN, by the way, have consistently (since around 1997) declared their policy of buying Super Hornets until the F-35C comes along, and then operating a mixed force. And they've always said they'll flex numbers to fit the F-35C programme. In retrospect, they have done a good job a managing their tactical aircraft fleet (Incidentally, don't forget how many times the Super Hornet came under the spotlight with flight test issues)

The USMC will manage their AV-8B fleet as best they can (buying up the UK fleet helped them a lot) until F-35B comes along. It's later than they wanted, but they'll suck it up.

In my view, the USAF are in a bad corner as their F-15 and F-16 fleets are ageing fast and aren't going to last much longer. This doesn't get much reporting, but they've spent billions on two attempts to extend F-16 fatigue life with not much to show for it. They have already lost early F-15s to fatigue failures. Doesn't necessarily make them bad aircraft (I think they're great aircraft) but they are not getting any younger.

Hope this helps

Engines

Thanks Engines for pointing out the irony here.

;) gr

-35A completes 1st in-flight missile [AIM-120] launch
 

F-35A completes 1st in-flight missile launch 06 Jun 2013

F-35A completes 1st in-flight missile launch

CAPTION: "An F-35A conventional take-off and landing aircraft completed the first in-flight missile launch of an AIM-120 over the Point Mugu Sea test range on June 5, 2013. (Courtesy F-35 Program Office)"

http://www.af.mil/shared/media/photo...-FJ123-001.jpg (3.5Mb)

Click thumbnail for edited photo: http://i98.photobucket.com/albums/l2...-FJ123-001.jpg

glad rag, the hornet ab price doubled
I'll let you have the fun of looking at the f-111 price creep, but if you have trouble finding it
U.S. GENERAL accounting office GAO 1973
1965 Initial contract target price $2,067.2
Current contract target price $4,657.1
Government estimate of price at completion $5,344-o
australia placed order in 1963

the 70% f-35 increase is a bargain compared to past efforts that australia has bought

why don't you have a look at the UK f-4 and let us know how that went?

@ jsf fan
 

How bizarre you are.

Rhymes that does.

In 1963, the US Air Force estimated -the unit cost of the F-111a to be $3.57 million.
At 1969 the US Air Force's unit cost estimate was $13.2 million


just a tad of a price rise
bizarre is people suggesting that the f-35 is some how unique in its price and time

Sorry, but I can't let that one go...even on paper the nacent Advanced Super Hornet 'concept' (which is yet to fly) is still short in terms of integration and growth capacity of what the F-35 offers, let alone the current Block II Super Hornet.

The F-35 should not be compared to the artificially high Australian cost of operating the Super Hornet. The F/A-18Fs were originally acquired as a bridging capability and a higher than normal level of contractor support was contracted because the plan was to keep them for only about a decade. In short, Boeing is doing VERY well out of the arrangement.

The F-35s will be in service far longer and, as such, they will require a higher degree of uniformed support and warehousing etc. Although more expensive to set up than the Super Hornet 'turn-key' arrangement, this should work out cheaper over the life of type.

A more accurate comparision would be with the classic Hornet due to a similar number to be operated and an anticipated similar life of type period.

*sigh* The classic Hornet price increased (but didn't "double") mainly due to the decision to build all but four of them in Australia from increasing levels of local content, and then scrap the production facility and component supplier streams and tooling rather than try to recoup some of the in-country manufacturing costs as was planned.

Whatever the F35 turns out to be, the Norwegian (Kongsberg) JSM certainly promisses to be a very potent weapon.
150Nm range.
PICTURES: Why Norway wants the Joint Strike Missile - The DEW Line
http://www.flightglobal.com/blogs/th...329-177898.jpg

JSM TEST VIDEO
 

JSM TEST VIDEO:

http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=355_1370431877

Could this be the infamous the G12 weapon?

I've heard it destroys everything but the fillings in their teeth (and boy don't we need that spare change right now)

Engines - That's pretty close to how it happened, with a few caveats.

Anyone who thought that simply mandating single-seat/single-engine would automatically constrain costs was being simplistic. There was a hope that the JSF would be in the Classic Hornet weight bracket but it went out of the window pretty quickly, with the result that the aircraft is in the Super H class, nudging up against the F-15.

Of the technology enablers, the lighter-engine bit did not pan out and networking could be built into any platform. However, a very important enabler was the "every weapon a precision weapon" concept of JDAM, which was well under way by 1996. This was what allowed the operators to accept a basic two-bomb internal load (down from 12 klb in the A-12, about 6-8 klb in AX and 4 bombs in A/F-X).

Also, while F-35B is sold as maintaining the Marines' sea-based air and their ability to operate off any 3,000 foot stretch of runway that has a 100-foot-square slab of continuously reinforced refractory concrete next to it, it's actually replacing the F/A-18 Classics first.

Glad, LO,

Thanks for coming back - perhaps a short response can help.

Glad, what I didn't make clear was that the 'weight growth' I was referring to was the 'Design To' weight - that's the target weight for the concept you've arrived at. The problem the DoD faced was that these weights were going up all the time as the desired aircraft got bigger and more complex. The F-22 is a decent example of that problem.

By contrast, the 'weight growth' problem with the F-35 was more to do with a failure to keep close enough to the 'design to' weight - and it took the USN weight experts to tell LM that the aircraft was badly overweight.

LO, I agree that the 'single engined single seat will cut costs' argument might appear simplistic, but I'm probably guilty of expressing the DoD's thought process in a simplistic way. They had done a fair bit (actually a hell of a lot) of work that underpinned their conclusion that any twin engined aircraft the USAF or USN came up with would be too big ever to be affordable. The single engined concept was made possible by advancing technology (i.e. F135) that allowed an aircraft of the desired weight with a single engine.

LO, not sure I quite understand your reference to a 3000 foot runway and the special concrete for the F-35B. The aircraft can operate off a 1,500 foot runway with the specified load for that mission, and the special concrete is for a specific VTOL training pad. There are a number of techniques that can significantly reduce the thermal footprint of the B, including a creeping landing. (JF may be able to help here - I think that this was a technique used on Mexepads in the 60s). However, happy to be corrected. And the F-35B's replacing the AV-8Bs first, as far as I understand the programme.

Best Regards as ever to those who have to do the hard sums for real,

Engines

If you look at the program from a meta perspective, B was also hoped to feed (and up production runs) the "not quite a carrier" carrier fleets of folks like UK, Italy ... et al, (I'd need to check on Spain, can't recall if they've gone for a similar capability) who have carrier borne aircraft but no catapults.

Engines, I appreciate your technical perspective on that, but will suggest to you that the "If it's Joint it must be better" attitude did indeed originate on Capitol Hill. As previously noted, JPATS/T-6 Texas II is one such goat rope.

Joint Acquisition in selected sectors is actually a good idea. Beans, boots, common comms suites, and more all benefit from economies of scale and reduced duplication.

Enough on my personal peeve, the services adapted to the Political Requirement (Congress writes the cheques) because they had to. A whole lot of kicking and screaming went on internally, not all of it for public dissemination. :p

Engines - The Marine Corps always talks about 3000 foot runways, which does seem long for a STOVL - but I suspect that they have realized that they are not always going to be able to operate without an airborne logistics line provided by KC-130s, particularly in hybrid-warfare situations where land routes will be targeted by insurgents.

As for creeping and rolling VLs: I await the demonstration of true improvised-base ops with great interest.

F-111 Aardvark; TFX Scandal.