NATO concerned over RAF training
 

forargyle.com

"Nato has confirmed that there are very serious concerns about the standard of RAF pilots deployed to Afghanistan.

This is not a question of the basic skills of the pilots but centred on how keen those skills can remain when, for reasons of cost cutting, the RAF has progressively reduced the number of monthly flying hours.

The Nato minimum is that pilots should fly 180 hours per annum. In the RAF, figures obtained from the Ministry of Defence by a national newspaper revealed that at the end of 2008 crews of warplanes like the Tornado F3 fighter, the Tornado GR4 ground attack plane and the Harrier fighter bomber had flown an average of just over 100 hours that year.

Crews of the new Eurofighter Typhoon had done a little more, at 140 hours in the year, but were still below Nato’s minimum standard.
There has evidently been serious concern among crews at a situation where the best pilots in the historically potent RAF are disgraced by their
failure to meet Nato’s minimum.

With some pilots getting no more than 5 hours in the air each month, one pilot has been quoted as saying that there are people who would struggle to remain safe in their car with 5 hrs driving a month.

The RAF are wriggling in response to the public airing of this proof that cost cutting is causing this most basic dereliction. It is saying defensively but vaguely that the MoD figures on flying hours ‘can be misleading’.

The minimum standard of 180 hours per annum is just that – a minimum standard. It cannot create the flying aces of legend but should ensure that pilots deployed to active service are able to deliver ’safe, proficient and capable air power’.

In the ongoing argument, the fatal Tornado crash in Glen Kinglas in 2009 has been cited as evidence of the current situation. 27 year old Flight Lieutenant Kenneth Thompson, a Glaswegian and 43 year old Nigel Morton from Fife wiped themselves out on Binnein an Fhidhleir. They had been unable to complete a tight turn at speed in their Tornado F3, coming through the gap at Rest and be Thankful above Loch Restil to turn sharp left immediately into Glen Kinglas.

The plane was almost but not quite round when it hit the side of the mountain about half way between the A83 and the top of the ridge.
An RAF report into the incident concluded that Flight Lieutenant Thompson’s lack of recent flying hours was probably a contributory factor, saying that pilots from his squadron (43 Squadron) at RAF Leuchas flew as few as ten hours per month. This squadron was disbanded shortly afterwards as the Typhoon progressively takes precedence over the Tornado.

This situation gives rise to serious public as well as military concern. It was nothing more than miraculous that no members of the public were killed when the Tornado which crashed into the hillside not far above the A83 shortly after 11.40am on Thursday 2nd July 2009.

The A83 is the arterial road into Argyll carrying steady commercial and domestic traffic. The impact of the crash was so severe that debris was small and very widely scattered.

Loch Fyne, as with very many glens in the Scottish Highlands, is a regular training area for warplanes. Their passage low overhead at speed is disturbing enough to people and livestock as it is.

Knowing now that those in the driving seat are flying such manoevres with a monthly flying experience equivalent to a pensioner using their car for local shopping trips, is more than worrying.

It is also noted that what little flying has been done for some time down the glen over Loch Fyne – a very welcome diminution – has been at relatively generous heights above ground level.

While this may be all that can safely be done in the current circumstances, it too testifies to the loss of skill levels in our frontline pilots, with cost savings cutting into the living muscle of the armed services.

We are asking Argyll and Bute Council to make contact with the MoD to discuss procedures for training flights in the current regime to be managed to ensure public safety. We have suggested an agreed formula where minimum flying height levels are set for pilots according to the number of hours recently flown. This is now a major public safety issue.

The families of Flight Lieutenants Kenneth Thompson and Nigel Morton will find this dereliction of duty of care by the MoD hard to assimilate."

So they're basically requesting lots more low flying hours?

I'm sure we won't have to look hard for volunteers...

but no in Scootland

Low Flying training
 

A post on another (spotters) website says that RAF low flying throiugh the Mach Loop has been suspended for the next six weeks. Can anyone confirm this?

if so it does support the comments on this thread.

There is a huge difference between flying for currency and flying for competency. I am not sure that the bean counters realise this....

and an even bigger difference between flying and not. - 100 hrs a year = app 2 hrs a week. the RAF then IMPLIES that the number of hours flown is meaningless it is the quality of those hours.....

My argument is that the hours expected by NATO would be high value good quality - not drilling racetracks in the sky turning complex hydrocarbons into the sound of overtime.

But then I'm officially useless today

CS

The relationship between flying hours and both competency and currency is not simple, however it can be the stuff of headlines for those interested in such things.

What matters above all else is what the pilot does with the airborne hours. This can range from boring holes in the sky to actually doing something demanding and difficult.

Three points if I may to show the complexity of the issue.

I started flying the P1127 prototype of the Harrier in 1964. The engine had a one hour life in the hover and 25 flying on the wings. You can imagine we did not generate many hours. Over 18 years I progressed through the Kestrel to the Harrier but it was not until my 18th year on the programme that I reached 50 hours in any one year. At the time the quoted minimum hours per month that the MOD(PE) specified to keep your approval for a jet type was 20. I had to repeatedly explain that my sorties were very often less than five minutes but in that time I had climbed into it, started it up, got airborne, done whatever landed and shut it down. In my book it was sorties that mattered not hours.

Today there are really good simulators in which one can realistically practice all the tricky operational systems mode selections and sortie details that are at the heart of an operational sortie today. You just do not have to get airborne to develop and hone all that cockpit management stuff which (take it from me) is the hard part of front line flying today. Of course steering the aircraft is important but once you have learned to do that it has elements of not forgetting how to ride a bicycle.

Finally what about (for example) your airline crews who on a long haul flight might log 10-15 hours but share between two of them five minutes when the autopilot is not engaged.

(sorry some of my points crossed with stormrider as I was typing)

John - I do humbly bow to your points but....

As I alluded to I think the arrogance (possibly of RAF) in sneering that we can do less hours as they so much better utilised than yours is, IMNVHO, arrogant.

Our allies in NATO all commit to this requirement and we need to put up or resign.

If I was to take a trip to the Loop I really would rather know the chimp driving the pointy thing at me had done more than two hours flying a week.

2 hours a week - thats 5% of your working week in the air. And you bleat that you're nnot over paid:E (I am taking the michael here, but I think you will agree with me you need to be spending more time pulling G, hovering, bombing, shooting down russians, etc etc etc.

So stop playing with JPA, don't go on your LBGT trg and find a jet.

stormrider

Ta. I merely offered those three points as food for thought. What people make of them is up to them.

JF

Does anyone know which Publication / Stanag that figure comes from or is it just a touch of journalistic licence?

The 180 hours a year / 15 hours a month figure certainly rings a bell from the distant past, as far back as the very early eighties - night cross country in the F-4 to get the squadron hours up, whilst minimising fuel burn and not using up Fatigue life...all for the Wing Commander's AFC of course ...umm that reminds me of a song.


To be fair JF some of us do try to manage for more than five minutes without electronic assistance :} ....old habits and all that.

It seems to be legit...
I found this regarding the Hungarian Air Force and it states the following:

So it seems NATO do have that figure in mind, where it states the figure, i have no idea but it's obviously in some publications issued to each member country

It rings a dim and distant bell as one of the taceval criteria, 15 hours per month, and one which RAFG achieved in excess but many of our NATO partners did not.

16 hours a month average could equate to 10 sorties per month. Not enough for hours hogs but enough for steady training.

Looking back in my log book I often got more than 100 years per year in a non-flying post. :(

But going by the current minimum of the RAF it is showing that the front line crews are only getting in on average 5 sorties per month.
Not a lot really is it, 5 flights in 30 days especially when training to go to theatre.
Of course this isn't the case for some units. Assuming those on large scale exercises are flying a little more.

They can't all queue up for a ride in a sim can they?

Is this not for the lambing season.

Naive question here. But if instead of doing 150 hours in their operational type a pilot did 140 hours in it, plus say 30 odd in something cheaper to operate, maybe Hawk instead of Typhoon or Gazelle instead of Chinook, might it be possible for this to constitute better currency?

I appreciate that if possible at all it would all depend on cost ratios and what could be done in the cheaper type.

The problem is the "Bean Counters" think "Why should we waste money on fuel/maintenance ,etc. when we've got perfectly good sims that can offer aircrews a similar flying experience ?" They would probably be better off having a day at Alton Towers .
You cannot replace REAL flying in REAL aeroplanes in REAL sky with computer generated scenery and sky .

:mad::mad:

Wiggy

I am sure you do and probably whenever possible.

However I am told by some line mates that in certain circumstances their company requires them to autoland.

I was just trying to explain why in my view simple hours is no way to judge matters.

JF

Recently a whole UK C-130 Sqn has been disbanded due to a lack of airframes equating to insufficent trg hrs available to maintain operational output.

Crews were often getting less than 5 hrs per month:mad:

The NATO Stanag which stipulates min flying hrs has been withdrawn from UK forces for some time - you try finding reference to minimum fg hrs requirements in any UK military aviation publications.

Try JSP 550 D360. or BR 767 N360 or the JHC flying order book....they all state what the minimum flying hours are.

When a youthful CGB joined the RAF the resident GR3 sqn pilots flew about 20-25hrs/month. They went to the sim (kicking and screaming), about twice a year.

As ever, John Farley applies an excellent degree of balance. It would be interesting to note how much 'quality' time/training pilots are receiving - be it in the air, in the sim or, indeed, on ops.

Replacing time in the air with sim hours would be tolerable if synthetic training received the suitable amount of investment. But it hasn't and isn't. Hence limited slots and time available but still pressure to transfer "mission" type training = reduction in handling/emergencies training that was previously the simulator raison d'etre.

JF - I totally agree abut sorties vs hours, unfortunately I have to report that the low hours are from even fewer sorties with occasional emphasis on "hanging on the blades" to maximise airborne time due to huge pressure from on high to achieve more hours - quantity/quality?.............

We are losing competency not just currency, the more experienced can balance low hours with memory, skill, knowledge, the first tourists can't, sadly I fear we shall soon reap what we sow.

All very interesting.

There have been numerous occasions when we have grounded aircrew, particularly on det, when they have reached 100 hours in a month. I believe this was/is also true of the Merlin.

Future's bright, futures green. If you want flying hours, you know where to come.

SammySu said: He is frighteningly on target.

A

MGD, it wasn't that long ago that there was lots of gnashing of teeth because op flight Wokka crews weren't getting anywhere near their NATO currency because of snagged aircraft, OCF priorities etc. Has that changed with the Mk 3s?

John, the only problem with the airline pilot analogy is the increasing incidence of problems when the pilot's have to resort to manual flying because the autopilot has thrown them out. Their lack of hands-on flying through over reliance on automation is now being seen as a safety issue.

Granted, it is not unknown for crews to fly 200 hours on det and then for the flying to drop off slightly once home. However, most people are filling up logbooks with ink.
The Mk3's are helping a lot, allowing people to stretch the bungee beyond LFA 1, though IMHO LCR-CR pipeline times are a little longer than maybe 10 years ago.
Overall though, we are very busy and there is plenty of flying. It is not a bad time to be a Wokka mate, particularly compared with other types at present.
Can't really comment on the Merlin, as I don't know the facts.

All these publications state the minimum hours for currency - do they actuallty stipulate what you need to be competent or 'combat ready'?

And while plenty of people in-theatre are getting plenty of op hrs it's not stopping people flying into the ground or landing wheels-up when back in the UK.

Lots of hours does not always equal lots of broad experience, as many fleets have found out.

Trg in the UK is at an all time low across all types and that trg cannot, and should not, be substituted by op hrs.

Yes they do. They stipulate that Force Commanders are responsible for issuing directives regarding training minima and Competency levels. The Force Commanders then issue directives regarding Training competency levels.


It would appear that Training / Currency / Competency...call it what you like...is not an issue in the RW world.... both RAF SH people have stated that there are plenty of hours available and I know that in the RN there are also lots of hours to be had honing our skills. Is it just the FW world where hours are not freely available?

In the RN, Force Commanders issue directives to their Aircrew stipulating exactly what training they MUST achieve in order to maintain CR status as well as currency. Its not just a matter of getting your 15 hours per month....you MUST achieve a level of competency as well. Those competency levels are very rigorously monitored and anyone who falls short is provided with extra training.(and a short interview)

Training in the UK is, ultimately, training for operations (or else why do it?), so if people are flying lots on ops, do we need hundreds of UK hours burnt off airframes to practice something we've done hundreds of times already that year.

I put that out to the floor.......

Very good point.... If you fly an aircraft which is regularly backwards and forwards to Operations then do you need to train for it?

We still need to train those people who are new to the AOA but MGD has a good point

Can't say I find these revelations regards low annual hours surprising. Like everything else in the RAF these days I expect that insufficient OPEX (run) budget forces prioritisation meaning that those areas not seen as a priority suffer, so you would expect that the following fleets are 'hurting':

• F3, 'K' Herc, GR9, GR4 (except Herrick work up Sqn)

Conversely, for different reasons, it appears as if a few areas are faring a little better:

• Elements of Rotary (Assume due to Herrick Requirements)
• Typhoon (the only sharp and shiney new tool we have)
• The Herrick work-up GR4 unit

I agree with other posters that putting our finest fliers on something akin to a starvation diet creates unnecessary risk and is both operationally and morally very wrong. In the short term I doubt things will improve; in the longer term, if the worst forecasts for SDSR cuts come true, then it may be that those fleets left are allocated a realistic amount of hours in the air - but I wouldn't bet on it.

Just my opinion.

That's fine at first glance - but should we abandon "Train hard, fight easy"? There are plenty of occasions when op flying turns out to be less demanding than a good training workout - just because, say, a GR4 crew fly dozens of CAS missions on ops, they cannot necessarily maintain all their skills at doing the same in foul weather against well-equipped opposition, so they will still need their training in between dets. Please understand, this is not intended as a dig at what the GR4 boys and girls, or anyone else, are doing on ops (quite the opposite - all respect to those in theatre, especially the SH folks), this is simply an observation.

That's the nail hit firmly on the head. The difference between RW and FJ on current ops is that RW crews are actually doing that which they trained for - be that a resupply, a troop collection, whatever. They are practising their skills on every sortie and therefore maintaining a high level of competence. Meanwhile, FJ CAS crews will be occupied conducting ISR and shows of force, but their critical skill of delivering weapons safely and effectively will probably not be exercised at all during their tour of duty. Outside the 'fighting season' crews will not even come close to doing so. Which is good for the war, but is not good for skill currency - I was never blunter than when returning home from a stint on (other) ops. In-theatre training has always been an aspiration but is politically (and practically) difficult. The only solution is to train hard pre-deployment, and to keep each squadron's rotation fairly short - please, no 6-monthers just because "it's what LAND do!"

Meanwhile, returning to the original topic of currency and low flying:

How about we limit FJ to 250' MSD until they have completed 2 such sorties in the preceding 14 days, before allowing them down to 100' MSD? And then insist that they fly to 100' MSD at least twice every 6 months to avoid mandatory requalification? Does that sound familiar to anyone?

Easy

"The difference between RW and FJ on current ops is that RW crews are actually doing that which they trained for "

Not necessarily true if you are a Naval pilot. Deck work requires practice and some young jungly guys with a lot of scary tours behind them have barely seen a pussers gray.

Fair point, Tourist!

It will certainly be interesting to see what the services are expected to train for once the war is over and the fall-out of SDSR is complete. Most of us claim to be capable of a wide range of roles, despite the decline in available training over the last few years. I see only two ways ahead: we maintaining a similiar force size to today's, but accept that a lot of our former capability will wither due to thinly-spread funds; or we chop numbers, consolidating our former capabilities in a small number of well-trained units. I prefer the second option - surely it's much better to have a small, hard-hitting force than a large but generally inflexible one.

Much talk of 'seedcorn' capability abounds, but all I have seen over the last couple of years are the 'seeds' mounting the career treadmill or leaving the services - and it's too late to make new 'seeds' now, that ship has well and truly sailed. Like I said at the start, interesting times.

As an SH mate, I have serious concerns in this area. There is a definite case of feast and famine between dets, which leads to major skill fade and lack of progression towards qualification such as CR and TC.

On the longer flights I have done, FOUR of us shared the unautomated 5 minutes of flight.

The taxiing was very demanding though.

Exactly the point about the effectiveness of Operational hours in the current scenarios. If something kicked off tomorrow with even basic elements of counter-air, Electronic Warfare and Air Defence, I'm sure more than a few people would be frantically trying to remember some of those Operational skill sets that seemed so basic when Ivan was at the door.

Can I pose a question, to which I have no idea of the answer?

Folks here seem to be saying the RAF has, in many parts, become a one trick pony. I also get the impression we are not on top of our game at that one trick too.

Do the USAF have the same problem?
Do other NATO air forces currently deployed on ops have the same issues as us?