Safeware, thanks for the reply. I understand where you're coming from wrt the combination of system (excluding humans) safety and HF (and agree, for what it's worth). I guess I was maybe mislead somewhat by your choice of example (and I'm still not sure how all this relates to post 72). After all, TAWS/GPWS type systems are really only backups to the main protection against CFIT. And that's the pilot (right?). So, it would seem odd to shift all responsbility for avoiding CFIT onto some technical gizmo - some of that responsibility surely must stay with the pilot, which would suggest it's not only legitimate but essential to take the aircrew abilities into account when determining whether the risk of CFIT is acceptable. I doubt if any TAWS could be engineered to a sufficiently high standard to provide the necessary protection to allow the aircrew to stop worrying about CFIT, as it were (I know you didn't claim that). And given that we have lots of aircraft flying around, apparently safely enough, without any kind of TAWS, it suggests that, in principle, even a relatively unreliable (1E-3) device like the one Safeware suggests would just make things safer (not necessarily true, of course, if the aircrew come to rely on it too much).

As for what you say about average vs. least level of pilot competence, I think we disagree but I'm not even sure now. And if I try and explain, I think I'll just expose my ignorance of how aircrew are trained, when they are considered to be trained, etc.

Incidentally, changing subject, what on earth does this mean (from Def Stan 00-250, Part 3, 10.5.11):

Is it just me (that can't parse this) or is this another case of hopelessly low quality control on what is supposed to be an authoritative MoD document (as in my post 130).

Just been thinking about this and ZE982 was the 13th F3 to be totally lost (ie. Cat 5) - unlucky for some :(.

1. 21 Jul 89 ZE833 CFIT 30nm North East Newcastle
2. 21 Oct 93 ZE858 Catastrophic fuel leak near A66 near Barnard Castle
3. 7 Jun 94 ZE809 Catastrophic engine failure 60nm East of Newcastle
4. 8 Jul 94 ZH558 CFIT near Akrotiri
5. 10 Mar 95 ZE789 Catastrophic engine failure near Donna Nook
6. 30 Oct 95 ZE733 Midair near Boulmer
7. 10 Jan 96 ZE166 Midair near Cranwell
8. 10 Jan 96 ZE862 Midair near Cranwell
9. 28 Sep 96 ZE759 MOD(PE)/BAESYSTEMS aircraft
10. 5 Jun 98 ZE732 CFIT near Flamborough Head
11. 17 Nov 99 ZE830 Catastrophic engine failure near Torness
12. 14 Oct 05 ZE962 LOC near Leuchars
13. 2 Jul 09 ZE982 CFIT near Glen Kinglas

Unless anyone else can correct me?

The B Word

I remember 3,4 and 6 rather vividly.

Can't think of any others B word. The frightening thing about no.13 is that there was very nearly a no.14 right behind it. Thank god Blacksmith 2's front seater rammed that throttle forward when he did...

Yes, I guess they both owe Kenny and Nige a few beers with St Peter for that...

The F3 might have been the RAF's 13th but it was not the 13th F3 loss because the RSAF lost two in a mid-air and one off the runway on landing.

Sobering to think I have half of them in my logbook. ZE 789 was IIRC always in the shed with something broken, and ZH 558 was brand new in 1993.

Fox3, re 558
It was the last F3 delivered, the fastest (so I heard) and hadn't even had a primary IIRC!

sw

I thought that 559 was the last? Either way, I think it was the AOC that nabbed the last delivery flight. I delivered 556 and 557, after very careful walkrounds. They were digging major components out of the training shops to build the last few. Can't say I was upset about not getting the last one.
I remember the time it took for Manchester to approve a climbout heading of "vertical".

F3, did a search - sad eh? Apparently both delivered 24 Mar 93!

http://www.tornado-data.com/Producti...ion%20List.pdf

sw

No sadder than I, or we could just call it 'getting our facts straight'. Some data on there is wrong (e.g. ZH557) as the guy running the site admits - he's grateful for updates.
Time to get back to the point; The mechanical / design / engineering accident total doesn't seem to show that the F3 was spectacularly dangerous from that point of view, but what is the overall rate of unknown/aircrew error accidents these days? or if that's class. , is it getting worse? I would have expected a general chopping of hours / currency to show up across the Air Force, rather than on one particular type.
It's very difficult to comment from such a distance in time, but deep valley-bashing with the big jugs on, especially half-full and down that valley, is not something I would even have considered. It's not something I would have expected Nige to do; but something led to him, and the other 3, thinking it would be OK. I suspect it's down to familiarity with low level. I remember around 1990 getting about 40+ hours a year of LLOL affil / sweep / whatever. There'll be less now then. Perhaps more importantly, how much do baby pilots get now through flying training, and who with (i.e. recent operational types, which I had even back on the UAS)?

Does anyone know how I can get in touch with any family member of either Flt Kenneth Thompson or Flt Nigel Martin?. I have information that could be of interest to them.

Please PM only

DV

A question from someone with no experience in all of this....I fully grasp the difference between TAWS since it has found its way into Helicopters finally and have read up on Terrain Following Radar (ie. F-111 and other newer and better systems both US and UK).

As terrain following radar autopilot systems exist now....could not that be incorporated into latter Marks or Types at not a lot of additional expense?

The comments about lack of training and reduced flight hours due to budget cuts is very accurate as is the concern of general lack of experience in the new pilots arriving for operational duty with limited exposure to this type of flying.

Yet we all started out as newbies and managed not to weed ourselves out along the way.

Was it our skill and training or just plain old fashioned luck that prevented us from joining the ranks of the departed?

Call for an FAI
 

This was an accident in which the State was implicated, and according to the Crown Office’ s own manual, plus guidance from Lord Cullen, mandated an Inquiry which engaged Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Such an inquiry calls for an independent and effective investigation which is open to a sufficient element of public scrutiny and appropriately involves the nearest relatives. In other words an FAI, but one was not called.

DV

I think you're confusing incidents OMS.
558 was a 43 Sqn jet that flew into the sea.
Flt Lts Walker and Orme were killed.

Not sure what you guys are talking about, I am talking about the Kinglas accident

DV

Fox3 has a valid point. The F3 with fuel in the 2250ltr tanks had a severely limited flight envelope. Whoever thought of low flying in this configuration was, how shall I put it, mistaken.

DV's recent post caused me to revisit the incident report, and I was struck by the fact that the report was silent on the point made by 57mm above.
Even in a best case scenario, the route chosen was highly marginal for aircraft in Lima fit. That Blacksmith 2 came within 1 second of a similar fate surely proves the point, and we can all be thankful that we were saved from the horror of two fully serviceable RAF aircraft being lost one after the other due to CFIT on a routine training mission.
Surely the biggest contributor to this accident was the choice of route? Surely there was some form of review / sense check? Given all of the other checks and sign offs preflight, surely someone other than the crews had to approve this? Glen KInglass is hardly on the dark side of the moon, and must surely have been flown over/ through on many occasions by many fast jets. Its challenges must have been well understood corporately, such that there should have been an appreciation by all concerned that this flight would be pushing the boundaries to a considerable degree.
Despite the multiple acknowledgements of this after the event, I would have expected the report to make much more of the fact this wasnt identified beforehand.

The BoI report fails to mention the 1998 TART report and its recommendation to reinstall the auto wing sweep and manoeuvre system. A system that would have reduced the pilot's workload and ensured the correct wing/slat setting. It was being used very successfully in Saudi Arabia at the time of the accident.

The reinstallation (A/C were delivered with it fitted but had it removed/disengaged) was rejected on cost grounds.

DV

Was it covered in the RTS document?