Nuclear Deterrent
there is a little banner at the top of my screen that said i hadn't contributed recently. It encouraged me to ask a question so blame the banner for this:
bored the other day i was thinking about the monumental cost of trident replacement and the probability it may not happen. I understand the basics of the historic transition of the strategic nuclear deterrent from the air force to sub surface forces and the way in which they can be deployed. as a potential cost saving measure could defence realistically look at our nuclear deterrent being retained by the RAF rather than by subs? we have already considered the prospect of having no nuclear deterrent in a different thread so would this be a happy medium? there are obvious technical challenges to this and i am not naive to the huge implications of operating a nuclear capable aircraft. not intending to break any opsec here, just general chit chat H-u-L |
Well, to my, fairly simple, mind, given the word GO, the Navy could have a nuke on target in a time measured in minutes, whereas how long would it take the RAF to get to the target.
No slight intended to the RAF. |
As the nuclear sub is maintaining a silent almost stationary routine it is virtually impossible to detect. It is therefore much more effective than any land based solution.
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Detect by whom? Deter whom? Retaliate how quickly?
If we are to deter 1st rank countries that have capable defensive forces then an SSBN would appear the better option as it can avoid detection and it has penetration ability and penetration aids. At the moment the ICBM has the best chance of reaching any target. If a SLCM was selected instead of an ICBM then a case could be made for ALCM instead as SLCM has limited range and therefore limited reach in a given time scale although an air-breather is vulnerable to an air defence system. Against a 3rd rank country you could use an IRBM from a tramp steamer. |
When the Navys deterrent weapon is 50 miles from is target, can it be recalled if a breakthrough is reached?
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Well lets buy some of those then.
I don't fancy living on this tiny island if we end up exchanging nukes with the Russians etc anyway, so why even consider something irrelevent like the cost. Silo a few of the things in Diego Garcia, and lets spend more time trying to be nice and friendly as opposed to some Victorian expeditionary superpower. |
When the Navys deterrent weapon is 50 miles from is target, can it be recalled if a breakthrough is reached? Also once the V-Force passed the Go-No Go line after recieving the go code they would not turn back no matter what radio messages were recieved. So you can't re call a bomber either. |
And if we launched an airforce plane, we would have to hope there were no clouds in the sky the day we needed to attack!
:E (hat on incoming) |
TMTQ
I seem to recall, that we had the all seeing Radar eye of NBS for that. |
Not so sure we (RAF) had a Go/No Go Line did we? Or was it the upwind runway threshold?
(Hmm, why would you be sorting the wheat from the chaff on the active?) |
Gainsy, in a jokey way you are right. In reality it was 8 deg east for UK based aircraft.
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"Vulcan Units of the Cold War" pp16
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I fail to understand the need for an updated ICBM missile system that supersedes 'Polaris' Why? Even with our current nuke (submarine) system of defence, Mr. Brown :uhoh: can't enter the codes and launch without the ok of the US President.:ugh:
Lets get our (home grown nukes) back to the RAF. No ties with the US. If the UK wants to go alone, all the better. |
I always thought the advantage of a sub-surface system was the alility to be anywhere off of the UK almost completely undetectable, preventing the enemy from taking our system out so they can use their system? The subs have had a continuous 50 year patrol and at anytime there is at least one of the four (three yet?) patrolling UK waters.
Surely this type of continued detterance and secrecy is less achievable by air means? |
dazdaz,
Wrong on SO many counts! Apart from the fact that it has been Trident for many a year, it can be fired without any non UK involvement, certainly without the involvement of the latest winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. |
If the RAF did have nukes, what would it use to drop them?
I suppose you could strap one on a Tornado at Marham and go and 'brighten up somebody's day' in Norwich. When the Americans developed their nuclear deterrent it was argued that - for an effective deterrent - they needed ICBMs in land-based silos, submarine-based missiles and air-launched missiles/bombs. That suited the cold war threat. The RAF lost its nukes as a result of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties. If the RAF didn't need nukes in 1995 and if the Cold War is over, why does the UK need a fleet of submarine-launched nukes? What is the current nuclear threat? Which country is likely to launch a nuclear strike against the UK? Given that the present government (and the next government) will probably make drastic defence cuts, does that nuclear threat take priority over national air defence or equipping other forces adequately? (and I'm thinking particularly of those soldiers currently deployed.) The UK does not have the force levels (or the equipment) to use nuclear weapons as a part of an independent 'flexible response'. In the event that the UK was to declare war on another country, it has neither the forces nor equipment to fill the gap between the initial stages of the conflict - send in the Army - and all-out nuclear war. Submarine-launched missiles make sense as a part of the UK's contribution to NATO, but if the UK can't afford to spend the necessary money on the other sectors of defence and if the UK must make drastic cuts, then surely eliminating the Trident fleet would provide savings to offset against the next government's cuts without emasculating the remainder of the UK armed forces? If the UK did scrap Trident-armed submarines, then no doubt there would be an outcry from other NATO members. The US contributes handsomely, but the other NATO members might then find that they had to dig deeper into their own pockets to provide funds to make up the difference. If the UK wishes to maintain a 'tripwire' nuclear deterrent, wouldn't it be far cheaper to establish one or two geographically-separated silos loaded with ICBMs on land? |
Manuel de Vol
The UK had nothing to do with any of the nuclear arms reduction treaties. START, SALT etc are signed between the US and Russia.
House of Commons Hansard Written Answers for 13 Dec 1995 (pt 19) 'WE177 Free-fall Bomb Mr. Foulkes: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what consideration led to the decision to withdraw the WE.177 in 1998; what was the original date for withdrawal; and on what date that decision was taken. [5165] Mr. Arbuthnot: The decision to withdraw WE177 from service by the end of 1998, announced on 4 April 1995, Official Report, column 1097, was reached in the light of the good progress being made in providing Trident with a sub-strategic capability. This capability will be fully robust when Vigilant enters service in 1998 and there is no requirement for us to maintain two systems in the sub-strategic role after that point. We had previously assessed that WE177 had the potential to remain in service until the early years of the next century.' See SALT and other links to START/SORT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia TJ |
The UK does not need a Nuclear weapon.
I suggest we take all that we have left, point them somewhere hot and sandy, and let them go. no nukes, no problem.:ok: |
Manuel de Vol wrote
If the RAF did have nukes, what would it use to drop them? nuclear-weapons.info nuclear-weapons.info The Tornado was also assigned a nuclear role (US controlled free-fall bombs) by Germany and Italy. Belgium, Netherlands, Turkey and Greece utilised the F-16. TJ |
TEEJ said:
"The UK had nothing to do with any of the nuclear arms reduction treaties. START, SALT etc are signed between the US and Russia." Indeed, but the WE-177 armed aircraft were assigned to NATO in the event of war. The Russians and the Americans may have negotiated and signed the treaties and I can't comment on whether or not the Russians included the other WP countries in their discussions, but I would be very surprised if SACEUR and his political masters failed to consider the UK's WE-177s or to discuss their removal from service with the British government. |
Was there not some kind of British/French deterrent interface last year?
GR |
Originally Posted by 847NAS
(Post 5244442)
I always thought the advantage of a sub-surface system was the alility to be anywhere off of the UK almost completely undetectable, preventing the enemy from taking our system out so they can use their system? The subs have had a continuous 50 year patrol and at anytime there is at least one of the four (three yet?) patrolling UK waters.
Surely this type of continued detterance and secrecy is less achievable by air means? |
You only have to look at the difficulties we faced bombing the Falkland Islands, of course if Maggie had been so inclined just how many minutes would it have taken mr polaris to reach downtown Cordoba. 15-20? I am assuming that the range was sufficient, or the launch sub had moved a little closer to the equator.
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Manuel,
The UKs free fall nuclear bombs wouldn't have come into it and certainly not under START/SORT. It was a unilateral decision by the UK Government to retire WE177 early and have that sub-strategic mission incorporated into Trident. Those WE177s assigned to NATO would have been tactical munitions and not covered by the likes of START. The UK had no heavy strategic bombers to carry the higher yield WE177Bs. The US and the Russians didn't have treaties over tactical nuclear weapons but instead had Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. Those initiatives and pledges were already in hand to reduce the number of tactical nukes. It resulted in some 3,000 US tactical nuclear weapons not covered by START being destroyed. TJ |
Nuclear Glug Glugs
Major problem the UK has: -
1/ All relevant vessels depart RNAD Coulport 2/ It is possible to see when vessels are docked and receiving/ unloading armaments. 3/ Is possible to see when vessels depart/ arrive 4/ All vessels depart single point 5/ All vessels leave Clyde 6/ UK Trident not as undetectable as believed. But then nor is any sub surface vessel of these size 7/ Ever seen surface effects from these things? They are detectable from space. Forget about degaussing. That's irrelevant. Oh yes. The system (degaussing) don't work. 8/ Acoustics. Ever tried avoiding the noise from seismic sources? They totally give you away. Am glad North Sea is getting quieter. Except that the seismic sources also provided primary defence as well for us. 9/ sub surface fixed acoustic arrays. They can and are captured. 10/ The rims where weapons are stored are about as secure as a barn. That is no secret 11/ How often have Faslane and Coulport been interdicted? Lots. 12/ Want a quiet sub? Don't ask the Brits. We lost our lead a few decades ago. Astute class don't have it. 13/ We have very few vessels. It makes it even easier to trace us. 14/ We are allowed to use deterrents in a number of circumstances without US permission 15/ Any deterrents launched from a sub surface vessel leave the least response time compared to any other possible deterrent. The UK have no system better - as yet. I could go on, but I bet you are bored by now. Hval |
Surely one of the major reasons for the RAF losing the Nuclear Deterrent Role was the due to the fact that, whether at high or low level, it was almost certain that the bomber would be shot from the sky the minute it crossed the Iron Curtain. Wouldn't that still hold true.?
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Since the Tories ( who are sadly likely to get the next go, and I'm not a Labour fan either ) have already stated they will make 25% defence cuts; that is a HUGE cut !
In a perfect world - sort of - I'd agree with the Trident replacement, but if we do that aren't we certain to lose the carriers and / or JSF ? My main worry is China, the nutter middle east states wouldn't care about being wiped out, so little deterrent effect. My suggestion would be to bin the Trident, have more Astutes with nuclear Tomahawks ( yes they can be shot down but who's going to gamble on getting all of them ? ), build a sensible no. of Type 45's ( I believe the PAAMS missile can be used for point anti-missile work with a bit of tweaking, as the Aegis & Arleigh Burke American jobs can ), and build 3 more CVS style carriers flying Harrier 2+ with AMRAAM. If cutting 25% - or more, we cannot afford Trident, the big carriers or JSF unless every useful bit of kit, ie the stuff that might actually get used, is forgotten. |
Originally Posted by ozleckie
(Post 5245515)
Surely one of the major reasons for the RAF losing the Nuclear Deterrent Role was the due to the fact that, whether at high or low level, it was almost certain that the bomber would be shot from the sky the minute it crossed the Iron Curtain. Wouldn't that still hold true.?
The airborne deterrent is a classic use it or lose it play. |
Surely one of the major reasons for the RAF losing the Nuclear Deterrent Role was the due to the fact that, whether at high or low level, it was almost certain that the bomber would be shot from the sky the minute it crossed the Iron Curtain.
Mathias Rust. |
Double Zero said: "My main worry is China, the nutter middle east states wouldn't care about being wiped out, so little deterrent effect."
China is certainly an impressive military power, but somehow, I can't see them nuking anybody. - They appear to be a bit too smart for that; they've cottoned on to the fact that you can win more easily through trade. When European nations wanted wealth from Africa, they colonised various countries, farmed them, mined them, did help the locals to improve their standard of living, but extracted a considerable amount of wealth. Then they were booted out. Nowadays, China is probably the biggest (in wealth) foreign power in Africa. They don't build hundreds of schools and hospitals, they don't import thousands of Chinese as permanent residents to colonise the countries - they have a much simpler, cheaper and more efficient method. Make impressively large payments to the local ruler, provide him with any 'assistance' he may need to stay in power, rent some farmland from him at favourable prices, import Chinese labour to do the work - then send them back home later (they've got a lot of people to feed back home) and all they ask for in return is cheap access to minerals. China needs sources of energy and the raw materials -- including copper, cobalt, cadmium, magnesium, platinum, nickel, lead, zinc, coltan, titanium -- that African nations can supply. China competes with the United States for Angola's oil, controls most of the Sudan's oil, and is exploring for oil onshore and offshore in five other African countries. It is a major purchaser of timber from West Africa. Where do you think Mugabe got those beautiful blue tiles which roof his palace outside Harare? Supporting a government - particularly a government which may be under threat from its own people - is much cheaper than colonisation. Another example: I've heard it said that the real reason for the war in Iraq was oil. (I'm not getting into that argument.) The 'coalition of the willing' spent huge amounts of money, materiel and manpower fighting a war in Iraq. The Iraqi government finalised its first major post-war oil treaty this summer. With China. The Chinese are fighting (and winning) their 'wars' by trade. They import materials from Africa and other places in the 3rd world (cheaply) and they sell their products to the Western world. Who would they want to nuke? - Their suppliers or their customers? |
The mixed load option:
[I][/INo Non-Nukes on Ballistic Missile Submarines Posted by David A. Fulghum at 3/6/2008 10:36 AM CST Congress won't yield in its determination that U.S. submarines won’t carry a mix of nuclear and conventionally-armed ballistic missiles at the same time. They don’t want a nuclear war triggered by the launch of a conventionally-armed missile from a submarine. So for the time being, at least, the whole discussion with Congress about a conventional Trident [missile] modification is dead. Nonetheless, four SSGNs have been converted to non-nuclear missions, and the concept of using a sea-based system is not ruled out, says Gen. Kevin Chilton, chief of U.S. Strategic Command. “It’s just that the proposal that there will be a mixed load out, is something that Congress is not comfortable with.” The initial proposal had 14 Ohio-class SSBNs each loaded with 2 conventional D-5 missiles (with each carrying four kinetic warheads) and 22 nuclear missiles. From as much as 4,000 mi. away, the conventional missile could hit early warning radars, terrorist camps and enemy leaders. For military planers it would cover the initial one-hour gap in responding to a threat anywhere on the globe. However, the ambiguity produced by an unexpected launch, particularly in an edgy foe, is obvious. “Congress has made it clear that the [conventional, submarine-based missile] is a capability they would not like to see deployed” as part of the long-range, rapid strike program, Chilton says. “But we were unsuccessful in getting [lawmakers] comfortable with the Trident approach. [They rejected the idea of] using the CTM proposal of a mixed [nuclear, conventional] loadout [on a submarine],” he says. However, StratCom hasn’t stopped pursuing the capability. “We’re learning more as we continue to develop the technologies we need for prompt global strike that could be land-based,” he says. Ares Homepage ... ... A new deterrent posture could include conventional ballistic missiles (CBMs), a new factor in deterrence, but so far more dangerous to careers than to adversaries. Asked about CBMs at the Space and Missile Defense Conference in Huntsville, Ala., in August, Marine Corps Gen. James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, responded: "You want to see the scar tissue?" The case for CBMs is strong. "The only systems that we have that can get to the fight in minutes have been nuclear warheads," Cartwright says. "Is that prudent? It is relevant, in that the enemy believes we will use it." Air Force Gen. (ret.) Eugene Habiger, involved in the CBM effort, notes, however, "a 1,000-lb. conventional warhead with a few meters CEP (circular error probable) has the same effect as 50 kilotons at 3,000 ft." CBM, Habiger told the Omaha conference, "was a great idea. The Navy calculated that they could provide 100 CBMs for $500 million. But Stratcom didn't get the regional [commanders-in-chief] involved to persuade the secretaries of State and Defense that we needed it, and that was a great way to kill it." However, as Cartwright noted, the initial CBM--Conventional Trident--is being brought to a point where it could be fielded within 18 months (as Congress directed). Also, tests being conducted in "four to five months" will demonstrate technologies to deal with "ambiguity issues"--the problem of demonstrating that a missile launch is not nuclear. "That's seen as more of a way forward." ... U.S. Rethinks Nuclear Strategy | AVIATION WEEK |
U.S. Rethinks Nuclear Strategy
Sep 3, 2009 Bill Sweetman/Omaha, Neb. ... The Obama administration entered office with a commitment to reduce the "numbers, roles and emphasis" associated with nuclear weapons and start the world on a "path to zero." Arms negotiations with Russia have restarted and there is renewed emphasis on non-proliferation measures such as test bans and controls on fissile material. But at the same time, some planners, theorists in deterrence and military leaders are concerned that there is a new nuclear calculus that U.S. leadership's actions may not reflect. As John Hamre, former deputy Defense secretary and now president of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, puts it, "We [in the U.S.] don't think nuclear weapons are useful. We think they are dangerous. But most countries think they are useful." Indeed they are. Vice Adm. Robert Harward, deputy commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, reported on a five-day Joint Operating Environment war game held last November. It reflected some probabilities: That rising nuclear powers might be willing to use tactical nuclear weapons, and that both state and non-state actors "would not view nuclear weapons as a first resort, but might not see them as a last resort." The result: "The presence of nuclear weapons brought on operational paralysis." Adds Frank Miller, a former arms policy official under the George W. Bush administration: "Iran and North Korea are not using nuclear weapons to deter U.S. nuclear weapons; they are using them to deter our conventional forces." ... It is not only rogue states and new nuclear powers that are developing weapons. Russia and China, with all three "new nuke" states on its borders, have programs for delivery vehicles and new warheads. Later this year, France will become the first nation to publicly field a nuclear warhead--the TNA (airborne nuclear warhead) for the ASMP--A air-launched missile--that has been designed and developed without nuclear testing. The TNO oceanic warhead for the submarine-launched M51 follows next year. ... U.S. Rethinks Nuclear Strategy | AVIATION WEEK |
If the RAF did have nukes, what would it use to drop them? |
Was there not some kind of British/French deterrent interface last year? GR A combined Anglo-French deterrent would be a logical step. We are only twenty six miles apart so it is inconceivable that one partner could strike without involving the other. A combined deterrent would help safeguard two European seats on the UN Permanent Security Council. |
Friends who have been on the fleet tell me that they regarded it as a suicide mission during the cold war. |
Originally Posted by Pontius Navigator
(Post 5246125)
The key weaknesses was the time to generate the force and the time to launch them before the incoming strike.
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Was there not some kind of British/French deterrent interface last year? GR |
Originally Posted by sitigeltfel
(Post 5246259)
Active Edge, the Generation game before Brucie thought of it!
Even if we had managed main force generation it could have been wiped out following an IRBM attack. At least the SSBN will only be vulnerable to a counter-strike after its missile launch. |
Originally Posted by M609
(Post 5246245)
Was that not the case for many nuclear roled strike a/c during the cold war? :confused:
The Armée de l'Aire have an airborne nuclear deterrent on their Mirage 2000N fleet. Friends who have been on the fleet tell me that they regarded it as a suicide mission during the cold war. |
Surely as we extend further into the demise of this once great nation we have to stop acting as a world power and cut our coat according to the cloth.
If we act on the world stage as befits our global ranking we will stop creating nuclear armed enemies and become more akin to Switzerland than the USA. As we reach that status we can scrap our expensive arms and live within our means. |
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