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-   -   Ainsworth's assurance over "safe" Nimrod (https://www.pprune.org/military-aviation/378561-ainsworths-assurance-over-safe-nimrod.html)

Distant Voice 21st Jun 2009 06:55

Ainsworth's assurance over "safe" Nimrod
 
See Times Online

Ainsworth's assurance over 'safe' Nimrod - Times Online


DV

Sun Who 21st Jun 2009 07:30

As I have said elsewhere, this man is not clever. I seriously suspect the subtleties of a safety case, or indeed an airworthiness argument in general, are beyond him. Unfortunately for the families involved, he doesn't realise this, so he'll continue to use his own words instead of taking the counsel that's available to him.

Sun

Distant Voice 21st Jun 2009 07:49

Of course it is not just Ainsworth, it is all the people who advise him. They get the reports then do some selective reading, and adjusting.

DV

tucumseh 21st Jun 2009 08:34


Ainsworth repeatedly said defence consultants QinetiQ agreed the aircraft was safe to fly, despite the company warning that “no statement can, or has been made” to this effect.

Ain't it funny how MoD quote QinetiQ when it suits them but totally reject their advice when it doesn't comply with the political imperative? Example - Boscombe's recommendation that Chinook Mk2 be grounded.

Jobsworth is a non-entity. He is also a fool, witnessed by him placing in writing that he supports rulings that the airworthiness regs can be ignored. But the people in MoD who advise him to say this are dangerous fools - which is much worse.

Tappers Dad 21st Jun 2009 08:44

Bob Ainsworth should remember the words of Richard M. Nixon, who said shortly before being exposed over Watergate "I condemn any attempts to cover up in this case, no matter who is involved."

He may find himself being forced to eat his own words when he reads out the findings of the Haddon-Cave review to Parliament in October.

anita gofradump 21st Jun 2009 10:02

It reads to me like Mr Ainsworth has mis-quoted QinetiQ:


the company warning that “no statement can, or has been made” to this effect.
I am of the opinion, however, that Jimmy Jones is as much of an arse as the SoS Def, and should probably keep his dated and useless knowledge to himself.

Tappers Dad 21st Jun 2009 10:52

anita gofradump

Are you saying Jimmy Jones is unable to quote from a report and are you also saying that a permanent heat sensor with real time display of the temperatures of the cross-feed duct has been fitted to all Nimrods then.

Or has your head been buried in the sand for too long ?

anita gofradump 21st Jun 2009 11:05

Read this very carefully TD, and do your best not to twist my words....


It reads to me like Mr Ainsworth has mis-quoted QinetiQ:

Quote:
the company warning that “no statement can, or has been made” to this effect.
I am of the opinion, however, that Jimmy Jones is as much of an arse as the SoS Def, and should probably keep his dated and useless knowledge to himself.
My head is far from buried and I will not be baited by you into a childlike, online slagging match.

Not everyone is trying to do you an injustice Mr Knight, in fact, some of us are actually more behind your final objective than you think.

sanddancer 21st Jun 2009 11:06

Anyone asked Ainsworth if he wants to go for a nice long flight in one? . . .

Softie 21st Jun 2009 12:04

Gents, this record is getting rather worn. Give it a break!

Distant Voice 21st Jun 2009 14:07

Has anyone seen this QinetiQ report?

DV

Distant Voice 21st Jun 2009 14:32

anita gofradump

Like TD I am not sure what can be "dated and useless" about quoting from a QineiQ document, dated Feb 2009. If we put to one side Bob Ainsworth and all the people under him who have mislead families and MPs regarding Nimrod safety, we are left with advice that unaccepteble risks still exist. What is suggested is that whilst the x-feed ducting is selected "closed" and the indications show "closesd" there is no guarantee that the temp of the x-feed is below auto-ignition. How many Flight Engs know that? And what is wrong with suggesting constant monitoring? If shut-off valves "leak" in flight, and temperatures rise, there is no way crews will know of this with the current set up.

If anyone has a copy of the report can they post the important sections?

DV

PPRuNeUser0139 21st Jun 2009 14:42

Reminder of Jobsworth's CV
 
From his own ePolitix website:

I was born and raised in the constituency that I represent. I was educated at Foxford Comprehensive School, Coventry Library Service and the University of Life.
Worked for Jaguar Cars in Coventry and held various offices in the trade union and Labour movement including Shop Steward, Secretary of Joint Shop Steward Committee, Sheet Metal Workers Union Branch President and Constituency Labour Party Chairman.
Coventry City Councillor between 1984 – 1992 during which time he held the positions of Deputy Leader of the Council and Chairman of the Finance Committee.
Elected to Parliament in 1992 and served on the Environment Select Committee. He was appointed a Whip in 1995.
In Government he has been; Lord Commissioner of HM Treasury 1997-2001 (Government Whip), Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Department for Environment, Transport and the Regions January 2001- June 2001, Home Office Minister with responsibility for Drugs and organised Crime 2001 – June 2003, Government Deputy Chief Whip 2003-2007, when he was appointed to the position of Minister for the Armed Forces at the MOD. In 2009 Bob was appointed as Secretary of State for Defence.
Wikipedia adds:

During 1982 and 1983, he was a candidate member of the International Marxist Group, but he was never a full member of that organisation.
Ainsworth is one of the 98 MPs who voted to keep their expense details secret. In 2007-8, he claimed the maximum permissible amount of £23,083 for second-home allowances, making him the joint highest claimant. He has been criticized for alleged excessive claims for repairs to his second home.
His rock-solid Defence pedigree stretches all the way back to 2007.
Now, what was the question..?

nigegilb 21st Jun 2009 15:06

I doubt he could even answer a question on international marxism, well we're all marxists now eh Bob?



YouTube - International Marxist Group

tw**s.....

Distant Voice 21st Jun 2009 19:51

EDSett100;

Where are you?

You have read these reports, what are you telling your Flt Engs?

DV

anita gofradump 21st Jun 2009 20:15

DV, you are such a troll!

http://www.spiesonline.net/trolls.jpg

Distant Voice 21st Jun 2009 21:28

anita g;

I think you are sick.

DV

anita gofradump 21st Jun 2009 21:41

You are entitled to your opinion, but fact would show you to be far from correct.

(A1 G1 Z1, in the green and free from H1N1, at this juncture)

You, however, are still an internet troll, laying bait for poor souls to take the bite. Your 20.51 post shows this to be true.

Two's in 21st Jun 2009 22:01

You may have a long wait if you are looking for a politician with Defence or Duty of Care credentials. As avoidable and tragically predictable as all this is, you will find that the Rt honourable Member for Coventry North East has only 2 objectives;

1. Get re-elected.
2. Try to avoid any payouts for MoD Liability.

Of those, 1 is clearly the prime directive for Bob. He is the original empty vessel, so don't look for any kind of justice or integrity here. As for the role of Qinetiq, is that the highly regarded bit, whose recommendations are sometimes embarrassing and uncomfortable, or is that the "sell your granny to the natives as long as it makes a profit bit? Hard to be sure with the bipolar nature of that very political organisation, no wonder the Government uses them at its convenience.

Sadly, there is no real news here, just more abrogation of responsibility and dereliction of duty by politicians and senior officers. Will the last Senior Officer in the Armed Forces with a set of balls please stand up?

Mick Smith 21st Jun 2009 22:29

DV you asked for anyone to post key pages of the report if they had it. I am not going to post the entire report. It would take far too much work I'm afraid. There are only two references to ALARP in the final report in February this year and both are reported in the article. But this is the executive summary.


Executive Summary

This report presents the results of an assessment of the Nimrod MR2 hot air components and has been developed using zonal analysis, examination of supporting document sets and a physical inspection of the aircraft's hot air components. ln addition, briefings from Suitably Qualified Expert Personnel (SQEPs) at RAF Kinloss were used to improve understanding of the Nimrod's operational and maintenance activities. These SQEPs were also utilised as a resource to answer technical queries as they arose throughout the course of the zonal analysis. Additionally, expert advice was sought from industry to underpin conclusions reached regarding the physical construction and operation of hot air system components.

During the analysis, due consideration was given to the risk mitigation actions already put in place by the IPT. It should be noted that, throughout this report, the term "risk" is used in its broadest sense, and is in no way indicative of any statistical or quantitative risk analysis being performed (as per Section 1.7). As there is no defined hot air "system" for Nimrod and, consequently, no quantitative safety target, this analysis is of a purely qualitative and subjective nature. Furthermore, due to the lack of any safety target, no statement can or has been made as to whether the hot air system risks identified in this report have been reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable( ALARP) in line with the requirements of JSP 553.

Overall, the analysis of the Nimrod hot air components has resulted in 18 zonal observations and 12 recommendations for the Nimrod IPT. These observations and recommendations are provided in Sections 8.2 and 10 of this report.

The observations made during the review were mainly related to hot air ducting, its insulation and its proximity, and interaction with, other aircraft structures, services and components. This interaction can be separated into two categories:
1. A potential failure of the duct and,/or its insulation causing an escape of hot gas, which adversely effects another aircraft structure, system or component.
2. A potential condition where a combustible fluid finds a migratory route to a section of hot air duct, which then acts as a source of auto-ignition.

Currently, there is insufficient information available regarding the hot air ducting and its insulation to draw any demonstrable conclusion on the overall level of risk being carried. Any such conclusion will not be possible until information on the damage limits, tolerances, performance, temperature attenuation, and any damage effects on these parameters, becomes available.


Distant Voice 22nd Jun 2009 08:45

FZ; Many thanks, but the BOI report is not the one being talked about in the news item.

DV

Mick Smith 22nd Jun 2009 10:47

FZ The article is about a QinetiQ report into the hot air system that reported in draft form in June 2008 and in final form in February 2009.

Whatever people might think about Ainsworth is irrelevant. He is of course taking the rap here but he is not the expert, he is only a politician spouting what he is told by senior RAF officers. I doubt Ainsworth personally read the report, it is the senior officers who told him QinetiQ backed what they were saying that are the ones to blame here.

nigegilb 22nd Jun 2009 12:43

Mick, you and I were in the room when Ainsworth went out on the airwaves to rubbish the coroner's conclusions at the nimrod inquest. He hadn't read the coroner's conclusion, if he is that stupid, he shouldn't be in office. And he really is that stupid, this being another example.

I do agree that it appears senior military officers do not have a clue about airworthiness requirements and safety management systems. Their advice and the advice of civil servants was misguided and incorrect driven by the narrow minded approach of achieving the task at any price. Doesn't detract from the awful, self regarding instincts of the new man and "former" marxist in charge of the MoD.

I am not sure if you realise, but Sec State for Defence has overall responsibility for implementation of airworthiness regulations. The buck really does stop with him.

Scary, hey?

FantomZorbin 22nd Jun 2009 20:43

MS & DV

Apologies ... post deleted :uhoh:

Vage Rot 23rd Jun 2009 21:09

Gents,
A touch of realism from a sarcastic old b45t4rd.

Aviation carries risk - ask Airbus about pitot tubes, the ATR42/72 about tail plane ant-ice, the Boeing 737 about uncommanded rudder deflection. I'm not saying that there isn't another non reflective object in the pile of wood with Nimrod, simply that the case is the same with any aircraft. Test and evaluation can only go so far.

As a Nimrod aviator with 23 years on type, I am as happy as I can be flying an aircraft that is older than I am. I still have some doubts but then again, if I strapped in without a care in the world then I wouldn't be a professional.

Stop bleating please and stump up with some proper evidence. we had a tragic accident. Measures were taken, some right, some based on guess work. However, we are now at a stage where the aircraft is as safe as it can be. Just please take the line out of the RTS thst refers to the Safety Case!!! We haven't got one yet as far as I know!

Hurry up Mr Haddon Cave - put the story to bed once and for all - the aircraft will be out of service before you report - or is thst the intention?

BEagle 24th Jun 2009 07:04


However, we are now at a stage where the aircraft is as safe as it can be.
Sure of that, are you?

It might be serviceable, but is it airworthy?

fergineer 24th Jun 2009 07:42

What a stupid remark Beags if it were not airworthy the guys would not fly it.........what is the status of any aircraft these days if you want to be really picky......am flying back to the UK in the next few weeks and have no fear at all of flying and if it were a Nimrod would be happy to fly in that as well. Why do you people all want to try and scare people.......the only people that you are upsetting are the true blue crews that are flying the aircraft and more importantly their families if they keep having to read this rubbish......if the crews aint happy they would not fly the aircraft end of story and I hear none of them refusing to fly.

BEagle 24th Jun 2009 07:55

Whilst your loyalty towards the old beast is commendable, despite the intemperate tone of your post, the question really is do you know that the aircraft is really airworthy? Which is not the same thing as having a snag-free F700, for example.

'True blue crews and their families' need absolute assurance that they are not being lied to by a cash-starved MoD glossing over airworthiness issues.

fergineer 24th Jun 2009 08:10

Did I know that any of the aircraft that I flew were airworhy?????Do I know that my car will not fall apart tomorrow........will the rescue boat I go on sink next time we get a call out......so I suppose the answer to your question is no I dont know the aircraft is airworthy but do you know that its NOT.

Distant Voice 24th Jun 2009 08:12

fergineer:


if it was not airworthy the guys would not fly it
The trouble is, the guys who fly it do not have the full story. The guys in XV230 believed that the aircraft, along with the rest of the fleet" was airworthy, but it wasn't. This was agreed by MoD at the inquest.

DV

fergineer 24th Jun 2009 08:19

DV the guys that fly it know exactly what they are flying in, they are proffesionals and the Air Engs are the best in the world. That goes for all fleets. They will know what is what, they will have been over the NMSU hanger and seen for themselves and they in turn will tell the rest of the crew, thats how it works they trust each other.

BEagle 24th Jun 2009 08:34

fergineer, your blind faith is touching, but misplaced; no-one is casting aspersions on the professionalism of the crew.

DV has summed up the situation very well.

One thing I find hard to comprehend is why some in the Nimrod force simply cannot seem to understand the difference between serviceability and airworthiness - and seem to take any adverse comments concerning airworthiness as a personal affront.

fergineer 24th Jun 2009 08:43

No blind faith Beags.......when I fly now I put my trust in the ground crew who service the aircraft and the flight crew who fly me.......I have heard and read lots of things about other aircraft/ airlines read many reports but still have faith in the airline business.......would I fly on an A330 yes would I fly on older generation 737's yes......hercs nimrods even the old L1011....I trusted the people who serviced the aircraft when I was in service and flying civvy trusted the men and women who serviced the aircraft. If it is not airworthy they will ground it trust me no-one will sign an aircraft off if in doubt.

Snow Dog 24th Jun 2009 08:54

Please...
 
Why is it that everyone outside the Nimrod world appear to be enlightened, yet those who fly it are posted as apparently ignorant. No, those words don't appear in the posts, but what effect are those implications having on those who still climb into the dear old aircraft?
Yes, questions need to be answered. Yes, worryingly, it could have been anyone of us and yes, we have the deepest sympathy for lost friends and their families.
If the aircraft was to be in service for a lot longer, more changes would be implemented. That doesn't mean that the aircraft is unsafe as it is, it just means that it has lost some of its capability; the obvious being AAR.
I have no problem getting into the aircraft and flying it. Please stop telling the crews that you understand something that they don't - I am sure they are more up to date and in the midst of it than you are.

Distant Voice 24th Jun 2009 09:29

Snow Dog;

How many crews have read the latest QinetiQ report on the hot air system? How many crews are aware that a temperature sensor is recommended for the cross-feed pipe, because the in-flight temp is unknown?

OK, I am no longer a member of the Nimrod fleet, but I can assure you I am more up to date on the underlying problems than most crews.

I am sure that when the QC produces his report in Oct, you will then realise how much you have been kept in the dark. Of course there will still be those who will reject the report because the QC is not a Flt Eng. Sometimes when you are sick, you need to see a consultant, not a GP.

DV

Softie 24th Jun 2009 10:35

DV
Why are you going on about the cross feed hot duct? One, it is longer in use in the air - and never will be used again. Two, even with QQ recommending a cockpit temp sensor, there is not enough life left in the MR2 fleet for it to be designed and embodied before the out of service date. You know it has taken long enough to manufacture and fit new hot pipes within the present design. Therefore, it does not matter - it will never happen.

Distant Voice 24th Jun 2009 12:06

Softie;

We are talking about a simple mod, involving a simple thermocouple and a connecting wire to a display. It could have been installed during the pipe replacement programme. Complex equipment was fitted to the aircraft, in double quick time, for opertions in Afgahistan.

I think you, and others, are missing the point regarding the need for this mod in the interest of flight safety. Yes, we all know that the cross-feed is de-selected in flght, but we do not know what the residual temp is after a ground start. Data has been collected, but not reported on. Also, in the event of "leaking" cross-feed valves in flight, the ducting will rise in temp without the crew knowing.

DV

Softie 24th Jun 2009 12:30

DV

We are talking about a simple mod, involving a simple thermocouple and a connecting wire to a display.
There is no such thing as simple mod.


It could have been installed during the pipe replacement programme. Complex equipment was fitted to the aircraft, in double quick time, for operations in Afgahistan.
As someone who knows, there is a major difference from installing new mission equipment (down the backend) under an Operationally-driven UOR as a Service Designed Mod and a manufacturer designed Mod under peacetime conditions.

Such effort is not warranted when it is not needed.


we do not know what the residual temp is after a ground start. Data has been collected, but not reported on. Also, in the event of "leaking" cross-feed valves in flight, the ducting will rise in temp without the crew knowing.
The temp in the crossfeed at engine start is too low to represent a danger (around 160C). On XV230 it took 4 engines running at full power for 10-15 mins with the SCP switched on to provide the very high temps (450C+) and a place for the fuel to pool for several minutes (ie. SCP pipe insulation) to obtain auto ignition conditions. No leaks in the crossfeed values without a flow of air would recreate these conditions.

BEagle 24th Jun 2009 12:37

As a UAS APO many years ago, I flew on a C130 sortie. The air engineer pointed out the duct pressure gauge and explained why it was needed - and the consequences of a bleed air duct failure.

Some years later I flew the Vulcan. That also had a crossfeed air duct, access to which was controlled by 'engine air switches'. But it had neither pressure gauge nor temperature gauge. So you never knew whether the engine are switches had closed off their respective valves. However, remembering the words of that Herc Air Engineer, I worked out a method of my own. Hold the AVS valve open with one's finger, just before take-off turn off all the engine airs and see whether the AVS flow stopped - if it didn't, then one valve was probably not closing fully. Exercising the engines up and down in turn would allow the faulty valve to be identified. One day we binned a late night take-off to Akrotiri because an engine air valve wouldn't shut.

A Waddington crew later suffered a hot air ducting leak. This was obvious before they set out across the Atlantic due to a multiplicity of unconnected system failures. But, with Offut in their sights, on they pressed....and were very lucky not to have suffered an in-flight fire or critical structural failure. If I recall correctly, the aircraft stayed at Goose and was subsequently written-off due to the severity of the damage.

The moral of this lantern-swinging being that a bleed air duct leak may happen in anyaircraft so equipped. Without any temperature or pressure indications, you are very poorly placed. Even a simple thermocouple and display is better than nothing but blind faith.

Distant Voice 24th Jun 2009 12:51

Softie;

"allowing for a reasonable margin of error ...10%" QinetiQ came up with cut-off temperature of 180 C for auto ignition.

I think you with find that IPT expect leaking valves will cause the cros-feed duct to rise above 200 C. (Read UTI 051A)

DV


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