Nige, you are overly polite about CinC’s evidence. It is clearly bollocks, although I concede he may have been misled if he relied on others briefing him for his court appearance. A rather dangerous strategy. All he, or anyone, had to do was open up a .pdf file of the regs, search for “foam” and there are dozens of hits, including the aforementioned specifications. He should take the opportunity to inform the court he wants to correct his statement.


As such, there is no excuse whatsoever for the Sponsor, IPT or User not knowing about Vulnerability Analysis, Battlefield Damage Assessments etc; and, importantly, and where the system has fallen down, the mandated need for continuous assessment of these risks.

JTO’s excellent and informative posts add to my frustration at this gross negligence.


I recall the IPTL did not elaborate on this subject. He did himself a disservice. He would know precisely where the responsibilities lay as his staff will consider attaining and maintaining FFP as a major role, especially on a mature aircraft.

When an aircraft is declared “airworthy” it refers to a given build standard and relates to a given use profile. Very often, an “airworthy” aircraft, delivered to the User who then issues the Release to Service, is wholly unsuitable for its intended (training and operational) use. Now, this may sound daft, and it is. After many years designing, developing and building an aircraft, the contract is paid off knowing its sod all use. There are numerous examples.


Fitness for Purpose, in this context, is an operational term. For many years MoD have chosen to interpret this as the User being permitted to fly the aircraft at Military Risk, in times of conflict. That is, take a risk that it is not, for example, wholly serviceable and for Gods sake don’t ask for more money.

But the requirement works the other way. Very often, to make an airworthy aircraft FFP for a given role, one needs to significantly ENHANCE its capability, for example through self protection.

It is cheap, if risky, to do the first, but expensive and lengthy to enhance. Often, after a few years, you may see role mods appear, and aircraft “fitted for but not with”. But that misses the point. The airworthiness regs and the overarching legal requirement of Duty of Care are quite clear that training must be taken into account. Therefore, it follows that right up front it would be wise to have both an airworthy and FFP build standard.

I am not talking about emerging threats and resultant UORs here. I’m talking about core, fundamental requirements, like ESF, which any Vulnerability Analysis, against the defined threats, would flag up. Just as it did with the US and Australia.
The system needs a fundamental change of attitude toward providing FFP kit up front, and I’ll be very disappointed if Mr Haddon-Cave doesn’t report extensively on this subject.

Fitness for Purpose, in this context, is an operational term. For many years MoD have chosen to interpret this as the User being permitted to fly the aircraft at Military Risk, in times of conflict. That is, take a risk that it is not, for example, wholly serviceable and for Gods sake don’t ask for more money.

This is pretty much the position presented by a retired air ranking officer, representing the user toward the end of the inquest, (spare the last bit). I suspect this position on military risk, will be challenged in the forthcoming legal action.

My apologies to JFZ I didn't answer his very fair questions. In many ways Tuc has already answered them. The procurement of aircraft fit for (some) training and peacetime duties only, with a vague desire to increase self-protection as and when, but always with the back stop of military risk to be used when operationally necessary. This pretty much sums up the J procurement. A cutting edge anti-missile system was cancelled, monies saved, spent on giving the venerable K the equipment instead. NB not enough money to do both. In these circumstances, ESF was simply dismissed without retaining any supporting documentation/reasoning. A position initially reflected in the A400M procurement, no FTP, limited DAS capability. (Though not now, thank God).

You raised the point about why the crew were at low level when one of the requests for foam came from "the flight" itself. I think this point should be addressed, so here goes. The account is given to me from the pilot concerned.

Research was carried out by an American pilot into the weakness of the tactics, the fuel tanks and mitigation measures available to counter it. He put together a full presentation, recommendation and costing from Crest Foam, the conclusion that the entire hercules fleet should be fitted with foam, starting with the mini-fleet..
He gave it to his flight commander in a folder. The flight commander did nothing with the information preferring the status quo. The folder collected dust for a while and coincidentally, shortly after the American pilot was removed from post. The distribution of the information was obviously severely restricted, because the flight commander, seemingly did nothing with it. The American pilot was not allowed to provide a statement of evidence at the inquest. MoD took certain actions that led to the prevention of his informal involvement. Ironic, given the fact that MoD had reassured the coroner that all efforts were being made to establish US cooperation with the inquest.

Not even the crews on the section had much idea about what was going on. I initially understood that the American pilot had made the presentation himself, after seeking further confirmation I realised this was not the case and corrected my evidence. So, apologies if I misled you. None of the research was used. The information and presentation was sent to me after the BoI finding became public and I handed the evidence to the coroner, hence the DVD of the small arms round igniting a fuel tank, being shown at the inquest.

Listening to the testimonies of Steady's colleagues, it was clear that the info about the need for fuel tank protection was not distributed to the crews on "the flight." They were simply continuing a doctrine that had informed their training and operational experience at every stage.


Hope this helps.

OK, it's Friday and I've had a few but.....

these were the creme de la creme of the Herc world.....right?

..so we had a yank exchange pilot who said you brits are fu*cking stupid because....., and the only other person he expressed his concerns to was the Flt cmdr? .. and some others who were not fellow aircrew evidently....:sad:?

or am I missing something..please correct me. :confused:

Oil Can, I thought you'd left the thread, welcome back......

Wg Cdr John Reid was the President of BoI with over 30 years engineering experience including the job of Sqn Boss. Not even he had heard of ESF before the crash. He admitted this at the Inquest. The boys on the flight, might have been the creme de la creme, but they were in good company, right?

How many people at Lyneham knew about it?

How many "users" would have known the process for contacting "DA" direct? How many still do? The American pilot was in a tough position, there was a big personality clash going on with his flt cdr. Like I said, shortly afterwards he was removed from post. I didn't hear the Flt Cdr's evidence first hand, but he was questioned at the Inquest as to why he did nothing with the information handed to him on a plate. He was unrepentant.

Search me.....

The flt cdr's evidence was formally challenged in court by both family barristers But I don't think it was re-visited. Some of the evidence was given "in camera", not disclosed to the public, and the American pilot was not allowed to give any evidence at all so we don't know exactly who he told, or what his counter would have been. MoD were interfering in the background and manipulating the legal system, such that any possible evidence gathering from this witness was effectively prevented. There was an investigation into this, but, the MoD reasoning was accepted by the Court Investigator. I took the view (and still do), that the MoD were directly interfering with the English judicial system.

It was a missed opportunity, but one of many. And when it transpired that two formal requests for foam were fired into Group before Afg and then Iraq conflict, this episode was overshadowed. Mainly because MoD and RAF had denied that there were any formal requests. You miss the point that there is a whole system designed to pick out the threat of fuel tank explosion and do something about it. Some of it worked, some failed spectacularly. And sure, there is nothing to stop a grass roots request, on this occasion it failed at the first stop. I would like to see a clearly designed process developed to allow "users", frontline crew, direct access to the Design Authority, should this situation of lack of interest or lack of support from CoC ever happen again.

I don't want to be controversial, but what would have happened if the boys HAD refused to operate at low level? Courts Martial?

I am not suggesting that they were unhappy, but without the info being sat on by Group, for reasons never explained, surely the creme de la creme would have been accused of LMF?

Nige

;)

RP, I hope you are not suggesting that was my 69th post:ok:

No, seriously, as long as people still have questions about this tragedy, I am happy to keep answering them, if I have knowledge to give. My feeling is that there is a pent up demand to know why they were at low level. I can understand that. Furthermore, it was only two days ago that we learned that a long term trial for foam had taken place back in 1970 and the coroner, allegedly, knew all about this. So the thread is performing a service in the wider context. This tragedy goes to the heart of big issues like duty of care etc. If it is boring people, then please don't bother reading the thread, but I believe that if these fundamental issues are sorted with some kind of permanence then frontline crews in the AT and rotary world will be much better protected.

Apologies to oil can, confused with olive oil...and no I haven't been drinking.

Clarification
 

The revelation, from JTO, that long term, MOD foam trials, were carried out in 1970 has certainly sent the wires buzzing. I want to clarify one important point about in-camera evidence. I was referring to the personality clash between the flt cdr and the american pilot. Certain evidence was disclosed in camera which was subsequently challenged by the family barristers.

I was NOT referring to the foam trials. It is my understanding that the trials information was not disclosed to either the families or the family barristers. The RAF/MoD were most certainly aware from 1970, of the existance of foam and the need for foam. The failure to disseminate the trials information indicates that full disclosure was not availabe to the families and their lawyers. The families have a right to know WHY this information was not released, during this lengthy inquest.

I submitted many documents to the inquest, few of which made it to the evidence bundle. Surely, evidence of a long term foam trial, is not just relevant, it is essential?

I fully accept that the MoD forwarded information about the foam trials to the Inquest. What I am questioning, is why this information was not given to the families or family lawyers. The lawyers have now being informed, via this thread. They are checking detailed notes and I suspect will have to go into writing to seek explanation for the ommision. It is time we considered these two tragedies together, the failings are traceable to the lack of dry bay/fuel tank protection stemming from the 1980/81 MoD spec.

I received the following mail the other day;

"While perhaps too cynical (but demonstrably accurate) I go back to my comment that one never sees 2 Stars and above appear as witnesses. At that grade (the senior Civil Service, in the case of civvies) there seems to be an unwritten rule that they are protected.

At the Nimrod inquest we saw an Air Cdre (1 Star) appear and holding his hand up saying "the buck stops with me", as he was the Gp Capt IPTL at the time. It doesn't, he was wrong. First, the Secretary of State has ultimate responsibility. He does not delegate responsibility, but authority. Second, very few aircraft related IPTLs have total authority over their stakeholders - in the case of any aircraft, for example, other IPTs who contribute equipment or services.

Regardless of what it is called this week, every IPTL in this position is required to set up and agree "Service Level Agreements" (or Customer/Supplier Agreements) with his stakeholders, if the Supplier does not meet his obligation, there is little the aircraft IPTL can do about it. There are innumerable examples of 2 Stars and above making formal rulings that they cannot and will not enforce SLAs. As such, they are worthless, and an IPTL's job is all the more difficult for it. Immeasurably so when the risk is loss of airworthiness.

I believe the MoD accepted they would take a hit on C130, and agreed to contain it to the IPT. This is dangerous, as we've discussed before, because it prevents the BoI and Coroner getting to the root of the problem and making recommendations that can prevent reoccurrence. It is why Mr Haddon-Cave needs to broaden his scope to include the entire airworthiness system, not just as it relates to Nimrod XV230.


Bear in mind that the two ESF specs (1980/81) were for (a) Fuel tanks and (b) Dry bays. Nimrod's problem was in a dry bay, C130's in a tank. The two cases are inextricably linked, yet I don't think the subject of Dry Bay protection came up, at least in this detail, on Nimrod. The emphasis was on fuel couplings and the like, but you also need defences in depth if they go wrong. e.g. ESF. Again, this is why MoD don't want it to go too high, as at 2 Star level, and at most 3 Star, you'd get to the guy in charge of both aircraft. So, they treat every case as an isolated and unconnected incident."

It is thought that Haddon Cave will report in about 5 weeks time. Depending on the severity and scope of the critique it could bring about a reform of the airworthiness system. Here's hoping....

this travesty is being dealt with and handed to those i can trust.

It has been quite a while since i visited this thread. Needless to say things haved moved on. I just wanted to pass comment upon the President of the BoI that Nige comments freely upon and who's comments about knowledge or lack of it about ESF during the proceedings. The individual is the one and the same who had a very cavalier attitude toward our safety during the first 2 weeks of GW2. Safety took a back seat to the gathering of medals....I remember the sick det picture he wanted before we launched...the 47 crews turned away from the camera...I had little respect for him then...even less now.

5d2d

That wouldn't be the occasion when you got your very own special escort out of theatre would it?

Medals versus safety? Well, I could think of someone else fitting thal bill as well......

Olive Oil...
 

Quote:

"Why were they at low altitude when there was a sensible and reasonable medium level cruise alternative...?"

Answer:

The distance between departure airfield and destination airfield was very short in the context of a C130's speed. The only 2 alternatives to OLF would both have seemed unreasonable at the time for reasons I shall explain:

1. Spiral climb/descent to/from medium level: tactically spirals are madness because they dictate that an aircraft remains in one location for a protracted period. Even if the location is defended the loitering still represents a greater opportunity for an opponent, particularly if a pattern is set.

2. Greatly extending track miles to facilitate climb to/descent from medium level without spirals: in the context of many transits per working day this technique would significantly reduce the effective work rate of a transport crew, who are after all there to get something or someone from A to B as often and as quickly as possible (from the "customer" pov).

3. Both of the alternative techniques above would still cause the aircraft to be in the small-arms threat band, and to be there for a period not significantly shorter than the typical transit time for the sector in question.

Vasco

Absolute and utter rubbish.

We've done this particular part of the debate to death and inaccurate claptrap doesn't help anyone. There's a bunch of differing opinions on the OLF piece from current operators as well as those further from the coal-face.

Straight line distance is nearly 50 miles. Unless I'm very much mistaken the C130K can climb out of the small arms threat in much less than 50 miles...and can descend through it in much less as well.

You may find it hard to believe but the decision to fly OLF heights probably put additional track miles in the on the leg.

And before Nigel replies, I have read the board of enquiry. Un-redacted, end to end, several times.;)

I have already explained that with hindsight the low level option posed much greater risk to the crew. Where I have differed with others, is that I don't blame the crew. AWC at no time spelled out the risk to the fuel tanks neither did anyone in CoC either express concern at OLF or pass on the detailed knowledge of the threat of fuel tank explosion to the guys on the frontline . The culture was low level and so was RAF doctrine which also placed huge emphasis on countering the threat of missiles.

Equiv, if you have had full exposure to the unredacted BoI report would you do us all a favour and put Leon's fantasism to bed about what WASN'T responsible for this tragedy? ;)

Where I agree with Vasco is the difference in performance between a J and a K model over a short leg. Having never flown a J I couldn't give you accurate figures, but there is a big difference in performance between the J and the venerable K, especially climb performance. I can understand the decision to stay low.

So the jammers/flares didn't work then? I'd drop the ESF argument and go for the MoD's jugular on the lack of IR counter-measures if I were you. You're definitely onto a winner there.:rolleyes:

Come off it nigegilb. They were shot down because low-level is a dangerous place to be. You know it. Everybody knows it. Above a reasonable altitude (probably classified - won't go on about it here) the IR counter-measures would have done their job and small arms fire wouldn't have been a threat. Stop trying to pull the wool over PPRuNers' eyes with talk of missile threats. Did every Herc flight in theatre operate at low-level? Somehow I doubt it.

The DAS (i.e. electronic and IR counter measures) offers no protection against small arms fire, so it is not directly relevant to this accident. The Mk1 had (and presumeably still has) a reasonably good DAS so I doubt there would be any mileage in pursuing that avenue.

N Joe

I am not trying to pull the wool over anyone's eyes. MK1 Herc Crews were the ONLY crews authorised to fly OLF. There is a significant difference between 'low level' as you call it and OLF. OLF simply was NOT an option for the majority of Herc crews. And you miss the point that avoiding the MEZ completely, negates the need for relying on a DAS. Every counter measure has a counter.

If the danger to fuel tanks was known, why did the Chain of Command, from Sqn Ldr up not simply withdraw the option for this kind of mission? It was known at the highest levels in the RAF that crews were OLF in Iraq, why didn't anyone do anything about it, if the danger was that obvious? AWC were at the meetings where the threat of fuel tank explosion was outlined/highlighted and ESF proposed. Why didn't AWC go straight to the Sqn? Why did Air Ranking Officers do absolutely nothing when presented with CRUCIAL information?

You talk as if the airspace was safe above 3000'. Did you know that over 58 US Helos have been lost in Iraq? Did you know that many were from missiles? Do you know how to execute a SAMBush? Do you know why it works? How long would a K crew be exposed in a climb and let down through the threat zone? What research had been done into the ability to track a low flying aircraft (at various low fly heights) with small arms fire, before XV179 was shot down? I can tell you the answer to that last one.

This is a CoC failure to give the guys on the front line the knowledge and equipment they so desperately needed.

I despaired when the flight commander did absolutely nothing with the manufacturer's video and recommendation. But I also despaired at the utter failure of many people to do their jobs. If the research had been presented alongwith the ESF information he might have done something. That info was out there, but all bar one copy destroyed!

I could go into detail about how the J DAS was so poorly maintained in the early part of the war, such that just about any missile could have brought it down. Do you want me to go there? Do you want to discuss the potentially suicidal and totally unnecessary Main Sqn Mission, mentioned by an earlier poster?

You carry on trying to blame the crew and I will carry on defending them.




The San Francisco Chronicle February 10, 2007 Helicopter downings vex U.S. military analysts

In-Depth Coverage
By Anna Badkhen
Alarmed by the recent spike in successful attacks against American helicopters in Iraq, military officials and analysts are trying to discern: Is this a string of bad luck for U.S. pilots or an ominous escalation in capabilities enabling insurgents to bring down aircraft crucial to American operations in Iraq?
If the latter conjecture is true, these new tactics could significantly impede the U.S. effort in Iraq, experts say. At worst, they might lead to an American defeat in the war by making the Iraqi airspace as dangerous to navigate as its roads, in the same manner CIA-supplied Stinger missiles contributed to the Soviet defeat in Afghanistan nearly two decades ago.
"Either it's bad luck of no larger consequence, or we have an Afghanistan-sized problem," said John Pike, director of GlobalSecurity.org, a military think tank in Alexandria, Va.
Six helicopters have crashed in Iraq over the past three weeks. The latest accident took place Wednesday, when a Sea Knight helicopter crashed, for reasons unclear so far, near the town of Taji about 20 miles northwest of Baghdad, killing all seven people onboard.
On Feb. 2, a missile brought down an Apache in northern Iraq. On Jan. 28, another Apache crashed south of Baghdad. On Jan. 23, a Blackwater helicopter crashed after being attacked by gunfire and then hitting a power line. On Jan. 20, a missile and gunfire brought down a Black Hawk east of Baghdad. A helicopter operated by a private security firm went down near Baghdad on Jan. 31.
The military, which has been poring over the wreckage and an insurgent video of what appears to be the Sea Knight downing, says it is still trying to determine a pattern behind the attacks.
"I do not know whether or not it is the law of averages that caught up with us ... (or) a change of tactics, techniques and procedures on the part of the enemy," Marine Gen. Peter Pace, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said during Senate testimony on Tuesday.
But as the Pentagon plans to increase the number of troops in Iraq by 21,500, and the domestic debate over the war intensifies, the spike could become an essential element in the argument for withdrawal, said Nathan Hughes, military analyst at Strategic Forecasting, a Texas-based private security consulting group.
"It's a delicate time politically, domestically, and if there's suddenly all these new casualties from helicopter crashes, that's gonna be difficult at home," Hughes said.
U.S. troops rely heavily on aircraft, using helicopters for fire support of ground missions and for transportation.
Pike estimated that about 600 American military helicopters operate in Iraq today, flying an average of one or two sorties daily. Of at least 58 helicopters that have gone down in Iraq since May 2003, when the insurgency took off, only about half were brought down by enemy fire, according to the Iraq Index of the Brookings Institution.
At least 172 U.S. troops have died in the crashes -- a small fraction of the total 3,117 U.S. war casualties the Associated Press reports to date.
"We've had pretty much free rein in the air," Hughes said.
Loss of air superiority in counterinsurgencies can become cause for defeat. In the late 1980s, the CIA supplied Afghan guerrillas, through Pakistan, with shoulder-mounted Stinger missiles that helped bring down as many as 300 Soviet helicopter gunships, fighter jets and transport aircraft. The introduction of the missiles is widely regarded as a turning point in that war. The Soviets withdrew in 1989.
If Iraqi insurgents have acquired anti-aircraft missiles, the United States could soon find itself in a similar position. That is why it is critical to determine how the insurgents are shooting down the helicopters, Hughes and other experts said.
Adam Raisman, an analyst who monitors Islamist Web sites at the nonprofit SITE Institute, said he has seen no indication that fighters in Iraq have acquired new missile technology, but said that there was "no way of knowing for sure" whether insurgents have the missiles.
On Friday, a Sunni insurgent group released a two-minute video of what it said was the "downing of U.S. aircraft on Feb. 7," showing a helicopter that appears to be a Sea Knight. The video shows an object trailing smoke in the sky near the helicopter. Then it shows the aircraft, its hull on fire, spewing debris and trailing smoke, heading downward and hitting the ground behind a line of trees.
The group that posted the video, an umbrella organization called the Islamic State of Iraq, which includes al Qaeda in Iraq, has said its "anti-aircraft" battalion was responsible for the downing.
Lt. Gen. Douglas Lute, the Joint Chiefs' chief operations officer, cast doubt on the authenticity of the video, telling a Pentagon news conference Friday that "there are some eyewitness accounts that cause professional aviation officers to believe (the cause of the crash) was most likely ... mechanical."
Most heat-seeking, shoulder-launched missiles have a firing range of about 2 miles, enabling the attacker to shoot from a hidden location far from the target. Although today's American military helicopters are equipped to divert heat-seeking missiles, "there are countermeasures to the countermeasures," said Winslow Wheeler, a military expert at the nongovernment Center for Defense Information in Washington.
If Iraqi insurgents do have missiles, where did they get them?
Wheeler said they could be Russian-made SA-7s, bought by Saddam Hussein in the 1980s for the war against Iran and looted from caches of the old Iraqi army after the U.S. invasion.
But Hughes said the recent spate in downed helicopters suggests that militants could have access to newer, more sophisticated missiles, probably supplied recently from abroad.
"It's unlikely that they just now found a new hole in the U.S. operating procedure" that has suddenly, after four years of war, enabled the insurgents to take down helicopters more effectively, he said. "This is definitely an indication of some sort of assistance from outside."
If the missiles came from other countries, "probably they would be from Syria or Iran," Pike said.
These countries stockpile Russian-made missiles, a dozen of which can fit in the back of a pickup truck and be driven across Iraq's porous borders. According to Strategic Forecasting, Iran also has U.S.-made Stingers.

:rolleyes: :rolleyes: :rolleyes: NB N Joe, this smiley means sarcastic - the lowest form of wit it may be but it's the best I can do. Would you like to get your coat?

nigegilb - nothing that you say will get away from the fact that they were at low-level when they didn't have to be. If other Herc crews in theatre were doing their transits from A to B at a 'normal' altitude, this crew could have done too. Let's face facts though. It's more fun, more challenging, less boring at low-level. We've all been there.

If it had been the cockpit that had been shot to pieces rather than the wing, would you be bemoaning the lack of bullet proof glass? For heavens sake, if you decide to go flying in a huge, relatively slow aircraft within small arms range when there are small arms and hostile trigger fingers on the ground, you can't go blaming the absence of one item of kit if you get shot down.

VSF

That is as close to the most perfect post that I have seen on this subject. (That I dare not post myself)

But I can't believe that none of the recent posters, including yourself, have failed to include...

DAYLIGHT !

Do I need to point it out? Unguided munitions need to be able to have half a chance by seeing the target.

Culture or Creature
 

It does seem a shame that after all the anguish,all the blame,all the argument and counter-argument that none of it matters a jot to those who died.

We all took chances,still do in some cases,but would we have changed a thing !?

Some did, posters on this thread, stood up for themselves and took the incoming accordingly...live to fight another day perhaps ?

I wonder if the method has changed...or if the level of arrogance still remains.

5d2d

I think arrogance, indifference and humility exist to differing degrees, at least judging by the witness evidence and how it was given at the Inquest. Some of those in the CoC who could have done something have being promoted and promoted again. Who knows if they learned lessons. This thing has received so much publicity over the last few years, I hope any crew member is up for challenging and questioning tactics that he/she thinks are unnecessarily risky.

The comment about shooting up the flight deck was a cheap shot, pardon the pun. Hercs had already been hit by rounds in the previous few months and were considered, wrongly, to be even more robust. Of course, XV179 was brought down by a single round in an unprotected fuel tank. You have the right to your view on the importance or otherwise of ESF. Having sat through a majority of the Inquest, I will be amazed if the MoD can mount an adequate defence to the legal writ, especially on this point. (For one thing they have destroyed most of their own audit trail, if it ever existed in the first place, which I rather doubt). I cannot see the legal system agreeing with you. The Coroner was adament that the evidence presented to the court made a clear case for ESF. No reasoning was provided from the MoD as to why the two recommends were not actioned, or why frontline crews were not informed about the risks. In the absence of an audit trail, the MoD are screwed. You still misunderstand the importance of ESF. One round blew off 23 feet of the wing. That is the reality of the absence of this protection, ESF, or lack of, was THE most important factor at the Inquest.

Operating in daylight is something the J continued to do for logistical reasons in Iraq in the aftermath of the tragedy.

Daylight low level SF ops since XV179 was shot down? Almost non-existent. The roots of the routine use of daylight low level ops are to be found in Afghanistan. The one pilot who challenged these tactics, in the early days of the war, was removed from SF shortly afterwards. The person who removed him, hopefully has had time to reflect on the message he was trying to get across.

At least I hope so.

VSF
Somewhere between :ouch: and :confused:.

Coat accepted.

N Joe

Olive and SPHLC

SPHLC you said it quite clearly yourself, as did the BOI and the coroner- there were 3 major factors involved in the loss of XV179:

1. Daylight Low-level - at the time, believed to be a valid tactic by the 'special' crews, who were unaware of the concerns expressed by some.

2. Lack of real-time intelligence - crew semi-autonymous with little int/CoC oversight.

3. ESF - lack of mandated threat mitigation for fuel tanks - known about and requested for years and fitted to the aircraft of our major allies.


If any of those issues had been properly addressed, Steady et al would still be here today - I think we can agree on that?

As a result of the loss of 179,

-Daylight low-level has been reassessed and it is now much, much rarer.
-Tactical Int is better and quicker.
-ESF is fitted to all Hercs.

But to expand -

Yes, I agree there was a 'low-level' culture.
Yes, there was poor leadership and avoidance of risk.
Yes, daylight LL was a poor option in the terrain.

But....

There, but for the Grace of God, go so many people.

1. You cannot do ALL ops in the dark at Med-Level (tho' I did try) - only those tasks with real op importance should be done in daylight (I doubt whether 179's task line would merit this assessment). Although largely discredited, LL is still possibly a valid regime, as it is quite hard to hit a fast moving target at LL with any type of weapon - due reaction times and time to accquire, even if in the engagement zone. Though I broadly accept that it is better, if not easy, to avoid the engagement zones. Perhaps the special crews were slightly complacently bilnded by their success in AFG, where this approach was more appropriate and by the fact that Albert had taken hits and seemed quite robust.

2. Intel is not the be-all and end-all - if we believed all the int we get, then we'd rarely do anything. Broad-brush, I know, but you get my drift. The difficulty is filtering out the less important bits, which I hear, is much improved these days.

3. Ultimately, ESF would have prevented the explosion in the wing (I am assured you would do well to disregard red herrings of Leon) and in my opinion, ESF would have saved 179 - or at least given Steady a fighting chance of flying away. It is for this reason I believe that the lack of ESF was the big one. The fact is, ac still get hit by small arms, even in the dark and with the best int in the world - because there are so many bullets out there! It is widely acknowledged that ESF/FTI greatly minimises the risk of losing a part of your wing and thence, control of your ac - at whatever altitude.

Therefore, all these known risks are now mitigated as well as they can be - admittedly, a little late and with a large dose of outside pressure.

What worries me, however, (and it should worry you) is that the investiagtions by the Coroner showed that there was a complete lack of an intelligent and integrated process to provide you with equipment that is both airworthy and fit-for-purpose - highlighted by the issues above (especially ESF). These issues, along with aircraft losses such as Nimrod XV230, highlight the worrying fact that this lack of process still exists and has not yet been adequately addressed. Furthermore, there are 'known unknowns' out there that need to be considered, mitigated and funded but because the higher-level chain of command's lack of courage in dealing with the ESF funding issue alone, I am fearful of reccurence of ac losses with similar airworthiness/fitness-for-purpose undertones, especially given the lack of funds available to everyone at present. I pray that I am wrong and I know there are good people doing fantastic jobs out there but I am not convinced that 'their Airships' have learnt a damned thing. That is why you must be on your collective toes to guard against complacency at all levels.

In the meantime, however, it seems that the only thing of which the MoD will take note is legal action - which where we started. Over to the lawyers.

Flip

'Daylight low level SF ops since XV179 was shot down? Almost non-existent. The roots of the routine use of daylight low level ops are to be found in Afghanistan. The one pilot who challenged these tactics, in the early days of the war, was removed from SF shortly afterwards. The person who removed him, hopefully has had time to reflect on the message he was trying to get across. '

Nige

I've tried not to comment on this for a while now, but as you've brought it up......

Steady and the boys knew exactly what they were doing and it was their choice to operate as they did. Just as we were going to do when said 'SF pilot' refused to do that mission in Afghanistan. If you remember our crew were given the option of flying it instead. We knew what the risks were and did we have any sympathy for him for refusing to do it. No, we jumped at the chance of a live drop and took the piss out of him behind his back. The fact the mission was cancelled the next day is irrelevant, we would have happily done it.

I'm sorry Nige. I thought your cause was noble to start with, not any more. You should have stepped back out of this with your head held high when you achieved your initial aims. Speak to the guys at the coal face, they've had enough of all this. As you said the lessons were learnt the hard way and day OLF is no more in these theatres. Enough is enough, please let the boys rest in peace!

Al :(

Cal,

The mission was not cancelled it was operated by an SF crew.
I said before, I am happy to let this drop, but I don't like the way the crew seem to be getting the blame at this late stage.

Two inquiries have not found blame with the crew. Perhaps you are right to call a ceasefire at this juncture. We might be getting ahead of ourselves.

Nige, it was cancelled, but not before we got as far as Bagram. I don't know if another crew subsequently did it or not, that's not relevant. My point is you (and me) both wanted to operate on a mission a fellow C130 capt refused. When we discussed it as a crew we knew what the risks were and were happy to accept them. It was going to involve at least a portion of daylight LL and the ac had no DAS, not even an armoured flight deck. Those are the facts.

Most of what has been said on PPrune since 179 has been said with 20/20 hindsight. It's not a perfect world out there and all eventualities cannot be covered. At no stage was not having ESF before 179 considered significant by the crews. Given the choice they obviously would have wanted it, but they (us) understood what we were being asked to do. The crying shame of all this is that it took us to lose an ac before tactics changed. This will be my last post as I don't believe this thread is in anybody's interest. Let the boys rest in peace.

CAL, I did four dets in Afg, all of them without DAS and FDA. I took the risk, I was expected to, but I always made sure my crew was with me in accepting that risk. And it didn't stop me seeing my Flt Cdr/Sqn Cdr after our Det and working through a significant kit enhancement request which was subsequently fired up to CinC Strike (and turned down). But there is a better way of going to war and that is what this argument is all about. Hardly anyone on the frontline knew about ESF back then, we were more concerned about missiles.

Should we have been blamed for following our orders if something had gone wrong? For being reckless? Because that is what seems to be happening here, with Steady's crew.

They were just doing their job, the same as you and I. And now I will leave it to the lawyers.

We have received the same request from two seperate family members, each asking that as there is nothing that can be added to this thread, that has not already been said several times previously, it should be closed.

We are going to respect those wishes and close it.

Thanks to everyone who have made their inputs.