there is so much i want to say but then i read the messages left and at a time of extreme emotional stress am unable to tolerate or bear the incoming that would come my way.read into that what u will as no doubt u have your opinions made already. compensation is one of the factors of this action and shame on you for those who seem only to concentrate on that factor alone. there is no amount of money that can right the wrong that has been done but to so many of you who speculate but weren't at the inquest i think the time for speculation is over. an unacceptable culture and practice had developed, corners were cut and failings were found to have occurred. however, remeber this, while this lies fresh in your mind for a few days maybe weeks, i and many others live with the consequences of the failings that need not have happened every single day, and believe you me they are long, long days and nights. this may have taken some time to get to this point, but it'll never be as long as the lifetime of enduring the pontless loss of someone so cherished, especially a loss that could have been prevented. the ones that are left behind are not the ones to be villified it is the establishment who continue to place little if no value on the lives of it's personnel.

however, i know there is no point saying anything more, i will prepare myself for incoming, and whatever you direct at me will be taken but remember this...u will never understand unless u have walked a day in my/our shoes. so do your worst as it will not compare to the pain of the loss that i/we have been forced to endure.

Oil Can, having witnessed many days of the Inquest I can tell you it was a study in how to avoid responsibility. Trying to get a witness who was in post at the time was on occasion futile. Trying to find anyone to take reponsibility for Fitness for Purpose was a magical mystery tour. Trying to find relevant documents was in many cases impossible. Watching people lie and economise the truth was insightful. If "they" don't want the responsibility, then "they" are clearly in the wrong job or over promoted. We witnessed a culture that simply failed the boys.

If you really don't know who "they" are email me, we can talk about it.

Meanwhile, it is not half as difficult as you make out to change the system. Minimum agreed and enforceable "in theatre" equipment lists would be a start. But commanders might have to stand up to senior officers and say "No". And senior officers might have to turn to their political masters and say "No" we can't do it. Fixing the airworthiness system for legacy aircraft is more difficult, but the expertise is out there to help. A new generation of officers blooded in Iraq and Afg will also help, the dead wood must be clearing now.

The Government in their announcements after XV179 were clear that the crew had no right to life. They were carrying out a mission that involved risk and risk is the nature of the game. This position is about to be challenged. I will have absolutely no say in the resulting verdict. What I can say, is that intelligent folk unconnected with the military were, at times, gobsmacked by what the MoD laid on in Trowbridge. The families I spoke with did not want heads, they wanted an honest acknowledgement of what had gone wrong, and an apology with. To his credit, John Reid was one of a handful of officers who lived up to the title and gave them that apology.

The crew of XV179 died, in my opinion unnecessarily. Read Chappie's post, to see the devastating effect one death can have on just one person. Life is precious, it is time the MoD took that point on board, before embarking on expeditionary warfare with depleted resources.

nigegilb:
Absolutely agree
There I'm afraid we part company. The way UK military airworthiness provision has been deliberately and wilfully been eviscerated over the past twenty years or so by senior RAF officers, amongst others, is proof once again that self regulation does not work. In aviation self regulation not only does not work but ensures that avoidable accidents happen and that needless preventable deaths result. As you so rightly point out, one only has to read chappie's anguished post to gain some scintilla of the never ending cost of such loss. The reform of UK Military Airworthiness Provision WILL be difficult, WILL be costly, WILL take many years. Again as you say many legacy aircraft will continue to lack airworthiness until they are finally withdrawn, thanks to the deliberate policy of destroying audit trails essential for its maintenance. The ultimate threat to this country's security has emerged as not the Soviet Union, sundry warlords and dictators, the Taliban, or Al Qaeda, but its own Ministry of Defence. As regards UK Military Airworthiness the solution must be to wrest it away from the operator, ie the MOD, to a separate and independent MAA. It will have a difficult and awesome challenge, but if it is not met many more needless deaths will be assured.

One of the problems about lawyers is that they are only helping enforce the laws of the land made by the government that WE voted in.

After an accident involving fatalities, some parties want to see retribution and blame (its one of the less endearing facets of human nature) while most want change and prevention of recurrence and here the lawyers are also employed. And if compensation is desired, the lawyers get involved again.

Now, if the affronted parties want to see an improvement in the system, then it is often the case that the organisation involved will resist (they see change as costly). Instead, individuals within the organisation get 'blamed' ie the ones who committed the last 'unsafe act' in the chain leading to the accident. This is the easy route for all concerned - easier to prove and to direct attributed blame - and for those seeking retribution (be they victims, or the punative organisation itself), they can find it more 'psychologically satisfying'. Sadly, as we know the last 'unsafe act' is often more of a symptom of a 'sick organisation' - ie the slices of cheese have big holes and there are not enough of them.

Here is the conundrum - if we rightly then absolve the individual of blame (unless there is absolute proof of negligence) then the 'sick' parts of the system that let the individual down are the ones the lawyers should focus their attention on. However, if these people involved in these supporting 'cheese slices' then can prove they were not negligent, then their bosses come under scrutiny and so on up the chain - but no-one is blamed unless negligence can be proved (perhaps this is why audit trails go cold and files get destroyed too soon?).

In an ideal world, nonetheless, the net result of this is that, the organisation learns its lessons, accepts responsibility ands then gets on to make the system more safe - in an open an honest manner. This is a 'just culture' - slightly different to a 'no-blame' culture but very similar.

NOW, THE BIG PROBLEM with this is that it is slightly utopian becasue organisations (or the people in it) do not have the courage to accept responsibility, as they believe that will open them up to expensive law suits (here come the lawyers again). In reality, what organisations (like the MoD) do is to deny everything and make the lawyers work very hard to prove the organisation was indeed 'sick'.

Bottom line - for the organisation to change for the better, the lawyers have to put the bosses under great pressure for fear of legal obligations, which include compensation and personal liability. Until then, the bosses will bluff and bluster and nothing will change; in fact, the situation probably will get worse because they 'got away with it'. So, we would be much worse off without the lawyers, as we would find it hard to prove that the organisations' layers of cheese were too few and far between and the mice had been feasting!

Therefore, for those arguing against the legal actions against the MoD in this case (and Nimrod and Chinook etc), please get real - do you really think the MoD would have made so many changes for the better since 2001 if it hadn't been for the use of the legal angle and lawyers? Of course not, the MoD would still be claimimg 'military risk' if they'd got away with it in the first instance.

Roland,

I agree that there is a possibility of 'compensation culture' monster lurking somewhere but better that than a truly sick organisation that keeps on abusing the very people that serve it. If the MoD had been more honest and hard-nosed with the Govt and Treasury at any time since 2001, then this might not have happened. I believe that the MoD and Def Min had an option, if not a moral responsibility, to confront Gordon Browne and the Treasury about the percieved costs of war and the MoDs obvious shortfall. Indeed, I believe that GB onced stated that the MoD must ask for more money if it needed it (somewhere in Hansard I recall) - but they didn't. Perhaps this was treasury spin, who knows? But it is the people like Hoon and Reid and 2 prime ministers, along with a number of senior Service chiefs and v sen offs (going back to 1990s) who ultimately caused the MoD to become a such sick organisation and who wouldn't rock the boat.

I don't want to blame and sue them - I just want them to admit it and fix it!
If takes the pressure of a compensation monster, so be it.

Chappie, your dignified media appearances of recent days must have been very, very difficult for you and I congratulate you for the restraint you exhibited.

Roly, old chum, please reflect on your comments. You simply cannot fully comprehend the pain felt by Chappie and others in her tragic situation. It might be inconvenient to your budget if MoD has to pay punitive settlements - frankly that's just tough $hit. Kick arse, don't lick arse. Then things might change.

The MoD clearly does have a significant case to answer regarding its woeful performance regarding large aeroplane safety. Be that accurate threat assessment for those in theatre or basic airworthiness standards. Legal folk are now ensuring that the chickens are returning to roost; about b£oody tiime too!

I'm also sick of the "compensation culture" and "there must be someone I can blame culture". The crusades of the families and ill-informed legal teams have left us with 4 legacies:

1. Nimrods grounded 4 years after the event because senior officers are sh!t scared that something will go wrong leaving their ambitions in tatters. I'd still fly in one before they were grounded and I like my life.
2. ESF being fitted at great expense that has not been "used in anger" since fitment.
3. A big hole in an overstretched defence budget (possibly getting bigger after more compensatory payouts) - the knock effect of this is that the right equipment that is equipment wanted by experts in defence, not lawyers and families, cannot be paid for. Thanks a bunch guys!
4. A gathering of senior officers that are so scared that they won't take risks anymore - often enemy forces get away because of the fear of litigation from seniors on Targeting Boards, and these enemies are going on to kill our own people hours later :ugh: Not a way to win wars...

So please, families, don't use bettering our (the fighting Services) cause in your arguments - you are doing more damage than you could ever imagine.

Finally, it was more than a DShK type anti-aircraft gun that hit the plane and that is all I am prepared to say. If you read the redacted version of the released Secret Board of Inquiry report there are large gaps where they have blanked out what hit the aircraft - I've tried telling you guys this before but you're stuck on transmit!

I hope you can see that there is a silent majority on PPrune, and also whenever I chat to the guys that I work with, that want you to let it rest now - in other words "not in our name" thank you.

LJ

PS Beagle - get a spine!

LJ, I fail to see the reason for your insulting prose.

If ancient, non-airworthy aircraft are grounded because they fail to meet normal standards of airworthiness, then so be it. People still fail to understand the difference between airworthiness and serviceability - and costs to the defence budget caused by the resut of legal actions would have been unnecessary had corrective action been taken earlier.

"Don't confuse me with inconvenient facts" - the mantra of the hope-it-won't-happen spineless leaders of the recent past.

It seems you have issues about the MoD joining the 21st Century. Fortunately, other nations have far greater respect for the safety of their service personnel....

Beagle - part banter, part insult, I'm afraid. Paying for things out of the defence budget that I can't get funding for my equipment requirements is "punative" to completely the wrong people. The far right of arc of the consequences is that someone gets killed because there isn't enough money in the pot to buy the equipment that would have saved them.

Part of the insult was my perception that you think we should uber-cautious; maybe that is why you never liked folding wings on F4s ;)

In any case, as an ex Vickers Funbus pilot you must have plenty of experience of "ancient, non-airworthy aircraft" then :ok:

Insult retracted because, overall, I think you're a good egg.

I apologise. :ok:


Out of interest, I have had a PM from one of the Herc relatives (name protected) who actually agrees with some of my rants on this subect.

LJ

Leon


Your primary concern seems to be lack of funding caused, in part, by compensation payouts you feel are inappropriate.

I agree you, as (presumably) a DEC SO, should be able to fund "your" requirements properly.


I do not agree with a long list of Mins(AF) and Stars who have stated that refusing to deliberately waste money on requirements that do not pass scrutiny is a disciplinary offence; at least in the CS. And that issuing an order to waste that money is not an offence. Nevertheless, they have had the decency (or gall) to place their rulings in writing, going back to December 1992.


In my opinion, a little change in that direction would generate more funding than any compensation payouts. This requires little thought, as the Internal Audit report which confirmed it made 19 recommendations in June 1996; few, if any, have been implemented. PM me if you want the full Reference.

The families are easy targets. The real culprits are, admittedly, not so easy; but they are well known.

LJ, sorry, the banter caption day/night screen was set to night...;)

Oh - and the F4s I flew had manual wing fold. The Buccaneers had full operable wing fold which we used as required.

Whilst I would agree that absurdly over-the-top levels of compensation claim are daft, these are often the opening gambit in lawyers' souk-haggling which finally results in reasonable settlement for the bereaved. But also fattens the wallets of the self-seeking, ambulance-chasing legal weasels.

I don't recall any airworthiness issues with the ancient FunBus - it benefitted from later era civil airworthiness requirements than the 1949-era Comet and its derivatives. However, in it latter days, structural 'damage tolerance' and 'fail-safe' issues did hurt operation of the old VC10K2, such that at MAUW we were initially restricted to FL170 - some 20000 ft less than BOAC had used.

Why? Because RAF engineers and BWoS had realised that the dear old clunkers were utterly shagged out - and we used their twilight hours appropriately as a result.

Although I did rather wonder whether it wasn't actually just a convenient ruse to force the hand of the FSTA programme......

Beagle

Sadly, you have, Sir, hit the nail on the head :sad:

Tucumseh

Not in DEC, but at the "sharper" end staffing and writing USURs to try and save young blokes lives with things that the RAF can provide - constantly I am told "no money". Sadly some of these guys are young enough to be my sons :sad:

Having seen some of the ridicuously painful savings being made under Planning Round 2009 (PR09) and the shadow of even more next year, even 6 figure compensation payouts will bite hard. Furthermore, high "Press Coverage" profile driven modifications will divert the cash away from the more pressing needs of equipment that will be saving lives at the sharp end. The sad thing is, this fact will be lost in the noise and hub-bub of another "big-bad MoD scandal" in the Press.

There is a distinct smell of a 'divide and conquer' plan by MoD here. They would willingly let us believe that compensation claims will come from the same Mod budget as essential op equipment. I am led to believe that this is not the case.

However, in dividing our attention, they could fragment our argument for better support for the people on the front line; we should not let that happen. But I would prefer to see us fighting towards the same aim and put away our differences.

I agree that over the top comp claims for broken toenails etc is not palatable but neither are they going to go away and neither are the legal moves to make the MoD accept their responsibility for poor funding, management and leadership. Anyway, these amounts are drops in the ocean compared to the billions spent on our failed banking system. That system was meant to be self-policing and self-regulating - like the Services. So, just who can we trust anymore when so many 'initiatives' are copied from civilian street into the modern military? I do not share your trust in todays mil leadership to put their head above the parapet and press for more funds from Gov't but isnt that what we expect them to to?

Leon, if you haven't been on the Boddies too much tonight, I suggest that you dig around in Hansard for minutes of a Def Comm meeting regarding the MoD budget for ops in AFG/IRQ - about 2 years ago, I think. Somewhere you will find reference to the Treasury stating that , if more funds are needed for essential equipment, the the MoD must ask. In your position, you could at least draw that to the attention of the DECs when they next refuse you funding. I am searching for it and will post it if i find it.:eek:

flipster

Flipster

Thanks for the offer but don't bother, mate. I already ave the answer. The HM Treasury are broke having bailed out banks galore. Usually USURs come out of continguency funding but for "big" buys (7-8figure) that avenue is off limits (so I understand) - let's face it UK PLC is broke for the time being!

By the way compensation claims come out of the Defence Budget - last year (2007/8) their were some 7358 claims and 6419 paid out (amounts are not revealed in DASA stats). Even if every one averaged £1000 that would be a wopping £6.5M!!! It's like BEagle said, it's not just the compensation payout itself but also all of the costs and why we often settle out of court (amongst other reasons).

Anyway, it still doesn't get us away from the fact that if we make a hulla-ballo in the Press about things like ESF and lack of airworthiness on certain aircraft types then it diverts the attention away from what we really need (and I'm not talking Tranche 3 Typhoons!). The pot is only finite in size and if we look at compensation as a punitive measure, then it is punishing the wrong people - us!

By the way, they changed their names from DECs recently - Heads of something or other now...:ugh:

LJ:ok:

PS Greene King IPA tonight...

Total aside: BEagle, did you get the "Doc" to clear the MPA Funbus to fly U/C down when it had a persistently U/S nose wheel steering motor? You can imagine my next question.

Leon

seconded..

I have witnessed with my own eyes the shocking waste of time, effort and expense, not to mention the loss of operational capability, in satisfying political directives which are not based on sound technical advice. :(

GBZ - most definitely NOT!

We did, however, develop a 'war goer' plan for a VC10K which had an hydraulic leak - but it was strictly for war, not for Tic-Toc silly buggers.

Thanks Leon check Pms

Leon;

"Finally, it was more than a DShK type anti-aircraft gun that hit the plane and that is all I am prepared to say. If you read the redacted version of the released Secret Board of Inquiry report there are large gaps where they have blanked out what hit the aircraft - I've tried telling you guys this before but you're stuck on transmit!"

This must be some kind of WAH. Either that or you have posted it for disinformation reasons. We were shown photos of the holes made by the rounds that struck the aircraft, you are quite wrong.

You really are a luddite if you maintain that ESF is a waste of money.

But you just crack on with the boddies big lad, I hope you don't mind if I don't take your word for it.....

Come on Leon, we are all ears. Did you know that the wilts coroner was cleared to Top Secret for the inquest? Hey, he even read the gaps, you know the redacted bit in the "secret BoI report". Did you also know that civilian accident investigator was placed under a lot of pressure during his evidence on his theory that an RPG might have hit the aircraft? There was no explosive residue found on the wing and we were told earlier by president BoI that the theory had been discounted because of lack of evidence. It was agreed that it existed as a theory only, the only evidence presented was of two small holes in the aircraft where rounds of undisclosed size hit the aircraft. Certainly nothing the size that you were suggesting.

We all know you speak for the silent majority, because, well, you told us so. And one time you posted 200 people read the thread and nobody disagreed with you. If that is the case, then as a public spirited citizen I urge you to contact the coroner and set him right on what he thinks actually happened. You clearly know more than Mr Masters.


Alternatively, if you have no proof, just a theory, perhaps you should not treat this thread as a game, because I know that more relatives/close family read this than actually post here. I am pleading to your more sensitive side. We all have one, don't we?

morning! i was just catching up with the daily diatribe by LJ and have had to have a little chuckle at his attempt to try and get us to question what we know and put the cat amongst the pigeons.
Firstly, I want to say thank you chaps for coming forward with your support and for those of you who have given me food for thought and a different perspective.

Rant on.... I fully appreciate that this is a very difficult action to undertake and wish to stress at no point has this action been undertaken lightly, nor in a dismissive manner. However, we look at it ( and Leon I wish you to take the time to read this carefully....there is a body of evidence that says these men were failed on a number of levels) I/we cannot just walk away and live with the consequences of those failings and allow them to go unanswered. These men and the families are worth more than just becoming a forgotten statistic on an ever growing list of personnel uneceesarily failed by the MoD.

i do not wish to become drawn into a personal battle with people who disagree on the choices made by the families pursuing legal action, but I will say this. Leon, I really think that you should think before you type. By wriring what you have has only furthered my belief that the MoD are a bunch of thoughtless, irressponsible, lying and coniving bunch of gutless wonders when you resort to such tatics as your last post about what brought the aircraft down. Not only does it smack of desperation to infer what you have it has only suggested that the evidence that was brought before the body of the inquest was made up of lies and therefore further investigation by the law is needed! Well done!

Funny really as you HAD given the impression of being such an intelligent man.

One thing you will or should have learnt about me I don't do what i am told and I TAKE CARE OF MY OWN. A few harsh words will not deter us from the task that lies ahead. they are just words and the momentary hurt they cause does not compare to the hurt that we endure having been left with the aftermath of living without the ones we love.

Rant off.

Good to see that you haven't lost your bite chappie! Well said and you continue to amaze us with your tenacity.

Leon I think has been told a porkie by someone being disingenuous and he has been rebriefed. Otherwise, as Nige says, Leon would be accusing the MoD of misleading the Coroner in court, which would be a very serious crime.

Everyone knows that is not the case and that the fitment of ESF is indeed a huge improvement to the protection of the herc from ground fire and would, almost certainly, have prevented the loss of 179 had ESF been fitted.

The 'serious systemic failings' arise from the internal workings of the MoD. the MoD 'system' allowed the true threat of small arms to the Herc to be unknown to the crews and their squadrons and the MoD 'system' also prevented the mitigation of the threat by the procurement and airworthiness process.

I have yet to be convinced that the latter has been addressed despite the loss of XV179, XV230 and a number of other losses that highlight the failings of the MoD 'system'.:sad::sad:

Leon you say "what we really need". I'll you what you really need - that is aircraft that are truly airworthy and fit for purpose and don't fall out of the sky through a lack of the MoD not meeting their obligations to the crews and the passengers. Flight Safety is not a peacetime function - it is actually very important to ensure we don't lose valuable aircraft and priceless crews and so diminish our operational capability. FS may not be very sexy but it is vital; if you do not make aircraft safe then you are doing the enemy's job for him..

I really do not understand the motivation for those apologists of the MOD that are prepared to dissemble on its behalf. Defend your Service, of course. Defend your Squadron, and proudly so. But defend a bureaucracy with form for reneging on its statutory obligations regarding the provision of airworthiness in accordance with its own Regulations and fitness for purpose? By their deeds ye shall know them!
Well said Chappie, you speak with the moral authority that others such as I lack. Morality is an endangered species in these "interesting" times. These issues are not technical so much as being about what is right and what is wrong. I would not think to turn to the MOD for advice on such matters.

I think it worth repeating that myself, and certainly a few other ppruners I know, have no wish to point the finger at individuals who make an honest mistake, whether they hold their hands up to it or not.

But in a long career I have had the misfortune to witness quite deliberate acts which have compromised the safety of individuals and their equipment, including aircraft.

The common factors in most of these cases are;

• Self interest / career progression
• Protecting higher ranks/grades, so endearing oneself to them

I have nothing but the deepest contempt for this small, but increasing, minority. I have lost count of the times I’ve been given a direct order to commit what I, and the MoD’s own regulations, state is an offence. Usually this involves making a false declaration that, for example, a piece of kit, an aircraft or an installation is safe/airworthy/serviceable/cost effective/a fair and reasonable price/the proper engineering solution etc. I’ve never once obeyed such an order. Without exception, the person issuing the (illegal) order has been protected from on high.


I’ve often been asked what the worst example I’ve come across is. There are so many. But the one I always come back to is the project office who, on a safety critical “no-go” system, completely ignored Boscombe’s advice (i.e. statement of fact) that the installation was functionally unsafe, rendering the aircraft vulnerable to friendly fire. They stated “It worked on the bench, so it’ll work in the aircraft”. No need for integration testing to ensure it (a) worked as a system and within a system of systems and (b) was compatible with other kit (it was neither). EMC testing was, apparently, something to avoid like the plague in case it failed (it did, miserably). No need to amend the tech pubs, including ACM and FRCs. Or the simulator. (Pilot – “WTF is this?”). No need to buy spares or test equipment. Or maintainer training. Despite being told all this was critical before MAR and Release to Service, they paid off the contract and walked away. Equally guilty was the contractor, who gladly accepted a 2nd contract to fix what he was absolved of first time round (but was paid for in full). Screwed up again, despite being told exactly what to do. In the end, the aircraft was made safe by paying (3rd payment) another unrelated company. (Who, by the way, charged a fraction of the other). Every single aspect I’ve mentioned, except the final contract which made the aircraft safe, was condoned by 1/2/4 Star and, later, Ministers (which is excusable once, as others write their correspondence, but not when an MP writes to him personally asking if he really knows what he signed for, and he says yes). But for making the aircraft safe, one was in purdah for evermore (the exception being the aircrew and Boscombe, but they don’t write your reports).

Fix these systemic failings and you improve safety at a stroke, and in most cases actually save money. It is often a false economy to defer, as the cost of regression and unnecessary retro-embodiment programmes is astronomical.


Rant over.

The silent majority
 

Allow me to try to clear up some confusion.

There may be a feeling amongst serving members along these lines :-

1. Fantastic work by the group that has fought so hard.
2. The BOI delivered.
3. The Coroner delivered.
4. The MoD apologised knowing that the relatives would sue.
5. They are.

Opinion will always be divided on the 'compensation culture'. I believe that it's a fair case, and the defence budget can afford it.

I don't believe that any of this will get to court again.

However, notwithstanding the excellent work of you guys. It's down to 'How Much Money' now.

I believe we should accept that lack of ESF was a contributary factor as was Intelligence and Tactics. If we are talking compensation then we have to talk percentages. ESF as a single cause would be therefore down to 33% and possibly lower, as if the boys had not been low level, in daylight, on a repeated trip (Int & tactics) then ESF would be less of an issue.

Further to that, many serving members may believe that XV179's loss was 99% bad luck. A lucky shot by the bad guys, life has to go on for the rest of us, because we're still out there.

Nige & Flip, I respect you both but there is no need to put me straight on the last couple of paragraphs.

For the reasons above, many of the 'silent majority' may believe that it is time to leave it now. I can't guess what percentage of people think the compensation claim is justified.

I read an article last Sunday about Ron Smith, whose daughter Helen died after a balcony fall in Saudi 30 years ago. Her body is still in the morgue and has been PM'd six times. Her Mum wants her buried.

What started off as a campaign group has now gone full circle. Your group uses hysterical and emotional language and is intimidating to those who offer their opinion. This is why the half a dozen Herc & Nimrod threads are so full of contributions by no more than half a dozen PPRuNers. Read by many, and discussed in crewrooms.

Tuc, when you write your memoirs, put me down for a copy.

RIP to the boys of XV179

I thought long and hard before typing that. Please PM me while I worry about any offence I have caused.

SPHLC

Don't worry, I won't be putting you straight on your analysis ..... because I think you are mostly right. The only things I would add are:

6. MoD deny anything was wrong with the airworthiness system that let down the crews of XV179 (and XV230).
7. No changes to that system and no real increase in funding.
8. More Servicemen and women may die as a result.

I can certainly accept that there are 2 schools of thought and everyone is entitled to their opinion and I respect that; its all a matter of perspective.

However, I would mention that picking on the families does no-one any favours and greatly upsets those who have lost so much. Maybe such opinions are best kept to oneself? However, an apology by some of our more insensitive posters might go a long way to easing the tension.

Overall, I think perhaps it is better that everyone now lets the courts do their business over ESF and we should all keep quiet on the compensation culture until then.

Yours aye,

flip

It may interest you to know that it is because you are all 'still out there' that I remain concerned.

I was happy to leave it, but having sat through large parts of the Inquest I wasn't happy to sit back and watch people suggest on this thread that it was somehow the crew's fault that they were shot down that day.
I will always be quick to defend the crew. The weakness in the tactics should not be attributed to them. I urge anyone who thinks they are at fault to get hold of the secret document, (redacted works just as well) that set out the huge weakness to the fuel tanks from ground fire and the recommendation that ESF should be fitted. It is frankly astonishing that nothing was done with this information. The information was not passed to 47 Sqn.


I also urge people to read Tuc's post setting out the human weaknesses and the culture in the RAF/MoD that led to this tragedy. He is spot on. Before one of my interviews, I was told by a senior correspondant that MoD insiders were briefing that it was the crew's fault. I agree with Flip, I doubt the culture has changed much at all. I don't think that argument will get very far in the forthcoming legal battle, but it indicates the kind of thinking that goes on at the highest levels. Say one thing in public, but brief something else in private, to somehow avoid responsibility.

I am happy to withdraw from the fray and let this rest, I agree, that for many people it is time to move on.

I've said my lot, I wish to say no more. Accordingly, I retire from this thread.

LJ:eek:

And it should never be forgotten, that brave men and ladies, daily go about their chosen career. getting the tasks completed under some pretty trying conditions. Often at the time not fully understanding how dangerous it is, but just getting on with the job.

Many years ago I gave evidence to a senate hearing, and me a lowly ex SGT deliberately making my remarks facing the one star who represented the Air Force. Most of his answers were " we did not understand."

There in lies part of the problem, the higher ups are fed often what they want to hear, because some people are more interested in what is in it for them and how it will help them climb up the ladder.

In the mean time the real operators of the Air Force, and is proven by this inquiry, get on with the job, and getting it done, with old. tired and obsolete kit.

The duty of care is there for the "knobs" to see, they just have to gain the moral courage to see that problems get fixed before someone gets hurt or worse.

Proud to have been Hercules aircrew, and still hoping for the cultural change.

Regards

Col

Special cheer to Chapie I think you are very special.

Some interesting insights can be found here....

http://www.lockheedmartin.com/data/a..._for_C-130.pdf

...it maybe the case that the main reason why the foam was not fitted in the first place was due to the disadvantages on aircraft performance (weight / range / maintenance) - slide 17. Note the maintenance burden is not just a cost issue but also a driver for mission failure due to downtime.

Could be wrong but seems a more likely reason than a lack of money to me at the time of aircraft purchase - and would these decisions not have been made in the 1960s by a bunch of chaps on a tour in town straight from a squadron? Anyone here around at the time?

Just some food for thought.

There has been a lot of down time since XV179 was shot down. The money provided by HMT was eventually released and immediately spent on a new C17. The money for XV205 has only just been released by Treasury under the capital replacement program. More down time extending to years, during which the mini-fleet has been decimated, requiring a role change for the J.

The presentation you have linked to is a straightforward analysis of the merits of OBIGGS VS ESF. When US Mil looked at this they went through the process and still came up with ESF as the preferred solution. Late models may well have switched to OBIGGS to retain fuel tank capacity. The correct context JFZ is that LM were deciding which form of fuel tank protection to recommend, not formulating a way of ducking out of fuel tank protection. The main advantage of ESF being it's low tech and highly effective, There isn't a single aircraft in he US inventory with a combat role that does not have fuel protection. The RAF were offered external fuel tanks for the J but rejected them. The slight decrease in fuel tank capacity was stated as one of the reasons why the J wouldn't get foam when all this broke. We all know that the J has foam now and I have not heard of any complaints. Sure there is more work for engineers to do, but that is all part of the job. There have been complications for the J fleet in theatre, but that is nothing to do with ESF. Enough said on that point.

Some minutes were presented at the Inquest, the suggestion being that the J could have foam fitted in rsponse to specific operational requirement. This for a fleet that subsequently became maxed out with a war on two fronts, was never likely to happen in time. Once more back to the poor leadership from RAF Chiefs willingly overstretching assets in two wars at the same time. It was quite ridiculous to assume that a foam program could somehow have been implemented at short notice, BEFORE deployment.

Regarding Olive Oil's point, all I am saying is that Crew's should have the very best protection, very simply put, because life is precious. If the single bullet that brought down XV179 had somehow disabled the flying controls in a triple combat wired aircraft then sure, I would have gone along with the general point of view that the crew were unlucky. I agree, that flyers do the job knowing a degree of risk is attached and sometimes it goes wrong. The fact that a single bullet brought down XV179 when there was a very simple protection around for 40 years, that had been recommended several times but not fitted is a wholly different scenario.
And the reason I describe it as negligence.

A previously working widow with young children, might then face having the household income reduced by 2/3rds. Losing the family home, if it is a married quarter. And the curtailment of her own career. Her kids will grow up not knowing their father. I have no problem with the idea that families face the prospect of compensation, we are not talking about typists with RSI are we?

On another point raised about the compensation mentality. There is the suggestion that this won't reach court and an out of court settlement will be agreed. I don't wish to disclose any legal tactics, if inadvertently, but I stated earlier that the families should not be referred to as one group. There are different perspectives at play. Enough to say, that I won't be surprised in the least, if this is pressed all the way through the courts system and a landmark ruling is reached.

I wish the families all the very best. It has been a long, slow and painful road, none the least waiting for over 3 years for the Inquest. But the end, is finally in sight.

Nige,

I wasn't suggesting that in the presentation they were looking to duck out of ESF or OBIGGS - its was more that it gives an insight into the drawbacks of ESF (not that they are particularly large - but material all the same), and how this may have featured as part of a performance trade off.

I grant that that emphasis is shifting towards safety but the trades are always there. Hence I was merely opening up the possiblity that the Herc decision from yesteryear on ESF was not necessarily to do with money, and other (seemingly justifiable at the time) motives could have been at play. It would be interesting to known if ESF type technologies had a poor reputation (esp for maintenance) at the time, or whether there was significant emphasis put on range/payload that squeezed out the merits of ESF protection against the cold war threats at the time. Seems more plausable than lack of money to be honest.

I'm a bit confused by your argument that the crews were unaware of their aircrafts vulnerability to small arms fire by the way - this seems at odds with the BBC articles (in which you're quoted) which suggests that crews were asking for ESF back in 2002. Can both be true - which is it?

JFZ90. This is all teetering on thread drift IMHO, but as someone who was around at the time, as it has been so delicately put, here's my two penneth. I was on Hercs 1968-1973. In all that time I new nothing about ESF and failed to understand how vulnerable the aircraft was to small arms fire. In retrospect that makes me feel somewhat stupid. No doubt some people from time to time became aware of it, usually via US exchange officers I imagine. Presumably it was they, or some of them, who made the representations to which you refer. As regards money, the MOD was so tight that they would not pay the penny(s) per gallon that FIIS cost, and so the very effects of fuel tank corrosion that Lockheed predicted duly resulted. This was the start of a fruitful and profitable (for them) relationship between Marshals (who re planked the wings) and the RAF Herc fleet. Needless to say the FIIS savings were peanuts in comparison. It might be interesting to note that the 60 aircraft cost 60 million in US dollars, but double that after the sterling costs were included. The initial amount (ie US$1M per aircraft) was a bargain, the latter on the whole was not.

Hi Chugs,

If you were at Lyneham during your time on Hercs your tour would have overlapped with the station’s first aircraft fitted with ESF as part of an extensive in-service trial. This trial sought to understand the long-term issues with the various types of reticulated foam (more than one type was fitted) and followed numerous ballistic tests conducted on earlier trials.

JTO, then that shows ever more thoroughly how ill informed I was! I was roughly 50/50 Fairford then Lyneham. Was the aircraft available for squadron use, ie in the centralised pool? Do you happen to know its airframe number and when it was so fitted? Surely the effects on fuel capacity alone, minimal though they would be, would have to be made known to the crews thus alerting us to its presence. Bear in mind we were flying some 14 hour legs down the Changi slip in those days.

A few aircraft were used for more limited trials, but the long-term resilience of reticulated foam was tested in one of Lyneham’s Comet C4s so as to encompass the greatest range of environmental factors (altitudes / temperatures) and a broader range of fuel tank designs.

Strange how the MoD did not admit to this at the Inquest. It makes the organisation appear even more negligent.

The MoD line, initially, was that nobody at higher levels knew anything about foam until the findings of Xv179 BoI were presented. This all changed when the secret documents were shown to have gone to Air Rank level in 2002 setting out the urgent need for foam

But still, no evidence of a trial....

Any more gen JTO?

Yes, very interesting. Perhaps these trials resulted in the 1980/81 MoD ESF specifications.

Bad enough MoD claimed not to know about ESF in 2002, when their own specs on the subject are dated 20+ years previously.

Illustrates the need to retain experience and corporate knowledge. Oops, mandated airworthiness requirements.

JTO, I am fairly certain the two lawyers representing different members of the families were not given this information. I submitted many documents, only for some of them never to see the light of day. Thank you very much for telling us about the trials, it helps complete the picture, particularly regarding Tuc's info, which we presented to the coroner. I am not sure the lawyers covering the latest legal challenge knew anything about these foam trials, I have to say, it is crucial information, I am a little surprised.

Makes the initial MoD argumentation rather difficult to understand......

Well if this was already in the Public Domain, JTO, it certainly wasn't in this particular part of it, but par for my course it would seem. I would guess that all this happened while I was at FFD before our move to LYN and the SRTs move from there to BZN. Say between 1968 and early 1971, does that sound about right? Was the trial successful or were problems, other than financial encountered? Who was sponsoring it, just the MOD or others as well? Was it all done at LYN or did it move onto BZN with the Vomits? As tuc says, curious that this corporate knowledge seems to have "disappeared". Good job that you retained it JTO. Thank you for your posts!

Remarks from the Commander in Chief, XV179 BoI;

"The issue of the Hercules' vulnerability to [ ] was at the time of the accident, not fully appreciated. (By whom?). A perception had developed over many years, based on previous attacks on Hercules aircraft, that such weapon systems did not represent a threat to aircraft integrity. Clearly that perception was incorrect and therfore methods to further reduce risk should be investigated. One method could be the fitting of a fuel tank fire-suppression system and I have already directed the Hercules Integrated Project Team to investigate this as a matter of urgency."

All I can say about this statement, is that four years earlier, at the start of ops in Afg, a stark document was produced and sent to Group for action. The information contained within this document set out clearly the risks to ground fire and the massive weakness in the fuel tanks and set out the required mitigation measure, ESF. It was backed up with solid research papers. Some officers known to me, were shown the information and came off the witness stand shaking with rage, that nothing had been done. CinC appears to have missed the point, a Vulnerability Analysis is mandated, and there are defined threats; including inert, incendiary, rockets etc.

ESF is the mitigation to the tank area, a fact recognised in the RAF since 1981/82.

This vulnerability analysis is an established part of the airworthiness process, or at least should be, in an organisation fit for purpose.

The information contained in the document was fired into the system again at the start of the Iraq war after an in-theatre assessment; again absolutely nothing was done and frontline crews were not informed, crucial if the doctrine of low level was to be challenged from the grass roots.

It now appears trials were carried out some 30 years before.

There is no excuse for this failure, other than a complete breakdown in the airworthiness system. The very systemic failure referred to in the coroner's conclusion. Interestingly, the IPTL gave evidence at the Inquest and made it clear that FFP was not his responsibility.

So whose is it?

And should we now be calling for a public inquiry into what happened on that fateful day. If not, much of the evidence will simply collect dust, never to see the light of day.

My thanks, once more to JTO.