DV:Do you have a copy of the transcript? If so, do you know how I could also get a copy?

Not sure of the context of the quote and not to denignate the tragic loss of life in the Nimrod crash this quote is quite wrong. In 1965 a Hastings crashed at Abingdon with the loss of 41 lives.

Ed Sett;

I have a copy of the transcript and his written statement to the court. You should be able to get a copy from MoD.

DV

EdSett
I have enjoyed reading your measured, considered discussions/arguments on this forum and you have done more than most to bring some levelheaded common to what is undoubtedly an emotive subject.

However, one small observation on a comment a few post ago where you said that no-one (aircrew?) at Kinloss knew about a Safety Case even existing? The fact that one existed but no-one knew about it isn't really the fault of the IPT. As professional aviators we should all take an interest in how our chariots/sports cars/double decker buses make it into the air. I don't mean just Mr Bernoulli and his theories but all the aspects of stress testing, fatigue life measurement and impacts, engineering processes and yes, aircraft certification process. An old and oft quoted saying "Ignorance is no excuse" is as relevant today as ever.

We should and must make aircraft safety our business as operators, we can't just hold our hands up and say "Nobody told me." Ask, question, learn, dig, pester and do it until we are satisfied.

Keep up the good work! :D

I'll have to disagree SFO,
during my long and illustrious career (ahem, just turn the bull**** alarm off for a minute) the further I got the more I realised how many things the average sh*g didn't get to know about. If you know that a document exists then you can ask for it, but if you don't know it exists then you don't even know that you do want to ask for it....

davejb

Couldn't agree more.



Without going into the detail - PM me if you want it - there is a procedural Def Stan available on the MoD site that explains in infinite detail precisely why it IS the IPTs responsibility, and how they are meant to go about establishing and maintaining the lines of communication with Users.

If any IPT does not do this, it is negligence.

So the fact that JSPs refer to Safety Cases and the Airworthiness process etc is roundly ignored? These same JSPs that we, as professional aviators, are supposed to at least be familiar with? OK, I accept that we don't need to know them inside out but surely there must be some personal responsibility to ensure that we at least glance at them once in a while (particularly as we sign a currency chit as having done so).

I also accept that the IPT does indeed have a responsibility to transmit this information and there-in lies an issue that is slowly being addressed with the IPTs being pulled into the forward element. Internal communication has been one of our weakest areas, more so in the modern era (IMHO) as it is always assumed that t'interweb is the information super highway. That is only true if the information is available, accessible and clearly signposted, otherwise people lose interest searching endlessly for something that should be easy to find and lose interest(see what I did there, lost interest:O).

You might like to consider the fact that the engineers are not taught the meaning of airworthiness. They are taught good engineering principles and practices however I always thought it would be better if we were taught more of the regulations/law in which the aircraft will be operated as well as how to go about fixing it.

Sad but True
 

Sumps, I fully understand your concerns. I have met and worked with many engineers in my current job over the last 9 years and it still amazes me when I quote some aspect of JSP 553 and they look at me with that blank, eyes glazed expression (although that might just be their natural reaction to me!) meaning they have no idea what I'm wittering on about.

It may just be the mists of time and too many happy hours but I seem to have a vague recollection that we were first introduced to Airworthiness concepts as baby pilots on Jet Provosts. OK, so everyone was bored stiff, just not exciting bedtime reading is it? My next CPA with Airworthiness was when I went to CFS 10 years later and I paid a bit more attention that time. It was only an hour or so but it covered all the basics of fatigue, stress, design, testing, RTS etc.

Maybe Cosford, along with the other relevant training 'centres of excellence' should introduce mandatory Airworthiness awareness packages?

There is a large difference between Manufacturing and Design Airworthiness issues (which, you say, is taught at Sleaford Tech) and that of EASA Part M Continued Airworthiness Monitoring - a job I've been doing for some 10 years now (leading up to ARC standards).

I believe the latter is what would be best required by most RAF maintenance staff and would them help in understanding why they need to do certain tasks in a regular manner.

All civil LAE's need to understand something of both Design and Continued Airworthiness matters for their Licence exams but some do tend to 'drop it' as soon as they can! I'm sure the same would occur in the RAF, but at least they would have some knowledge.


Excuse my ignorance but...you mention "JSP 553" (a publication?) - could it be too high in RAF docs Heirarchy to be read by "mere" engineers?

Rigga,

I realise that CAM is in itself a whole area of specialization and requires different skill sets/processes to implement through the 'life' of an in-service aircraft. What I was trying to suggest (perhaps wrongly, I don't know, I'm not an RAF engineer) was that perhaps our training systems (aircrew and engineers) are too narrowly focused sometimes. Whilst I wouldn't expect us to go down the whole Licensed Pilot/Engineer route I would hope that we are taking the 'best practice' elements from our civilian counterparts experiences. The Manufacture & Design element is as important for us as CAM I think, as it provides a good insight into the many considerations that go towards getting an aircraft into service. It would then provide a useful lead-in to CAM and 'through-life support'.

As far as I know(someone please correct me if I'm wrong - oh, wait a minute this is Prune:)), Manufacture & Design Airworthiness concepts are not taught or even considered at Cosford, my point was that maybe they should be (and not just Cosford, Flying Training units as well).

Sorry, forgot to say "Yes, Joint Service Publication 553 - Military Airworthiness Regulation" is a document and is the progenitor of JAP 100 which is the Policy implementation side (standing-by to be corrected!).

SFO,
Thanks for your kind words. I was writing from an aircrew perspective about the Safety Case. It is likely that the senior (ground) engineers at Kinloss were aware of its existance, but there was no knowledge of it on the aircrew front line or, I believe, the Staneval, who are only now involved with the IPT in this important area.

Should the aircrew have known about these matters at the outset, nearly 5 years ago? Absolutely, we should have. Should we have reached for the JSP 550 series before now? Well, thats a debatable point. The RAF is founded on teamwork and there has to be reliance on people, whom the aircrew and the front line engineers do not even know exist, to look after our best interests and that of the aircraft. Obviously, no one on the front line should be denied access to the 550 series, but they are clearly published for the guidance of the higher-ups, although we can all learn about front line Flight Safety matters from them.

From what little I have seen and heard of it, the Nimrod Safety Case is almost 2000 sides of A4 paper which was never presented to the aircrew for our input on the functional hazards that exist. Many assumptions were made by BAeS and IPT engineers on how and when we operated systems and how they believe the aircraft, as an airborne vehicle, would respond when some of those systems failed. In some cases, as highlighted by the BOI report, there was a reliance on warnings and suppressants that did not exist or, conversely, no reliance was placed on warnings and drills that clearly do exist. Its a rain forest that has turned into a bag of nails. Fortunately, the front line at Kinloss is now integrated into a deep review of the existing safety case and the production of a new one, as I write.

Too little, too late, sadly.

Ed

EdSett,

I agree that in many ways this is too little too late. You are correct in that many of the day-to-day decisons about the aircraft we fly are taken in remote offices, often by people whose knowledge of the way a particular aircraft type is operated is limited or misplaced.

That is why there has been a desire to increase the IPTs exposure to Front Line input, whether directly by first hand experience or indirectly by increasing the number of 'Blue' suits in IPT posts. The problem of the second approach is that many FL operators do not want to go to work for an IPT (the reasons for which vary). More problematical is that after 3 years, the individual is usually replaced so continuity is lost, the new guy spends 8-12 months getting up to speed, does about 18 months of effective and productive work and then concentrates on his escape plan.

You make an interesting point about JSP 550 series. They are most definitely not meant for higher authority consumption, they are meant to provide FL operators with a guidance framework within which they can grow their professional skills and abilities, whilst being given the boundaries of operational constraints and safety considerations. They were supposedly designed to provide much more detail and background than the preceding JSP 318 series (which I think they generally do) but, like the 318s, are deemed mandatory reading for aircrew (OK, I accept no-one is going to read something they feel doesn't have any relevance to them, that is a problem for higher authority).

Perhaps something that could be covered at the next Sqn training day?

My reason for droning on about this is that if we, as an organization, want to learn from dreadful days like 2nd Sep, we need to start educating our people at the grass roots. How much better prepared for my current job I would have been if I had had exposure to all the aspects of Airworthiness Regulation before I started (instead of learning on the job!).

Whilst the latest modification program calls for the replacement of many obsolete seals within the fuel system, there is still no documentation instructing tradesmen on how they can achieve 1 degree of alignment with the couplings. Latest AP information simply says "The pipe angular displacement is not to exceed 1 degree in any direction".

It has been made clear by specialist from Eaton Aerospace and QinetiQ that coupling misalignment causes stresses within the seal and results in premature fuel coupling leaks.

DV

I now understand that we are still using the Gp Cpt Hickman Mk 1 eye-ball for fuel coupling alignment.

DV

Talk about a dog with a bone!

DV, are you involved with Nimrod, at any level?

Yes, you are right. However, having been told by specialist that fuel couplings must be aligned to within 1 degree in order to avoid seal distortion and leakage, I am interested to know how this is being achieved. Failure to comply will simply mean that seals being replaced on the latest modification program could suffer damage.

For the record, I no longer work on Nimrods, but I have taken an active part in the XV230 investigation, and continue to do so. Neither the Coroner, nor the QC have any Nimrod experience, but their views and comments are respected.

DV

Back in the early Eighties the Lightnings suffered with leaks form the couplings in hot areas. The solution was to X-ray all couplings post assembly to check for alignment.
I wouldn't know if this is standard practice on Nimrod but it would certainly be a solution.

OTTB.

The latest instruction for assembling FRS fuel couplings (dated Nov 2008) includes a NOTE, which simply says "The pipe angular displacement is not to exceed 1 degree in any direction". There is nothing to say how this is to be achieved or measured.

Previous instructions made no mention of alignment requirements. In fact prior to Dec 2007 there was no technical iinformation regarding FRS fuel pipe couplings within the a/c Topic 1 publications.


DV

As a repair is incomplete unless verified, it would be interesting to know how maintainers are advised to deal with this. How did Tech Pubs verify the AP amendment? Surely the Pubs Authority raised a MF765 on themselves? After all that has happened, still so many questions on basic processes and procedures a first year apprentice would flag up.