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Postman Plod 27th Mar 2008 01:52

Defence Select Committee - Cut Nimrod
 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/...st/7315686.stm

Whether Nimrod, Type 45, or Astute, why suggest cutting programmes that are basically a hairs breath away from completion, and are increasingly vital to replace ancient kit that is way way past its sell by date? Why not cut something we haven't even started yet and cut capabilities we dont even have, cant afford, yet seem to want to aspire to and are becoming sacred cows??

Even if they do cut those programmes, we'll still need the capability, so where do we get it from, how long does it take, how much more will it cost, and what the hell do we do in the meantime??

Why has everything and everyone become so dangerously and pathetically short sighted?

Doha_lad 27th Mar 2008 02:10

MoD urged to consider scrapping Nimrod

Thu Mar 27, 2008 12:02am GMT



LONDON (Reuters) - The Ministry of Defence must decide whether it should "cut its losses" and abandon the Nimrod programme after a delay of some eight years and a near billion-pound overspend, a group of MPs said on Thursday.
The Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol aircraft, which has been blighted by development problems, will have racked up a further overrun of 100 million pounds in 2007/8, bringing the total over-budget figure to 800 million pounds.
The aircraft was originally announced in 1992 as a replacement for the Nimrod MR2, but has suffered technical problems.
The Commons Defence Committee said the MoD must "carefully examine whether it should cut its losses and withdraw from this sorry saga".
"The committee calls on the minister for defence equipment and support to assess whether the programme will ever deliver the capability required within the timescale needed and, if not, to withdraw from it," it added in a report.
Nimrod is one of a number of projects criticised by the MPs for overrunning on budget or deadline.
The committee reflected how "disappointing" it was that the first of the Navy's two new aircraft carriers will be without the new Joint Strike Fighter aircraft when they are expected to enter service in 2014 because of delays.
The A400M transport aircraft is also expected to enter service two years late.
The MoD's equipment programme was "unaffordable" and sacrifices needed to be made as part of the Planning Round, the MPs said.



Cutting whole equipment programmes, rather than just delaying orders or making cuts in the number of platforms ordered across a range of equipment programmes, had to be made.
Committee Chairman James Arbuthnot added: "For too long the MoD has had an unaffordable equipment programme and needs to confront the problem rather than giving the usual response of salami-slicing and moving programmes to the right.
"A realistic equipment programme will give confidence to our Armed Forces that the programmes that remain will be delivered in the numbers and to the timescale required, and will also allow industry to make informed investment decisions."
Following the Comprehensive Spending Review, the defence budget in 2008/09 will be about 34 billion pounds.
Baroness Ann Taylor, Minister for Defence Equipment and Support, said in a statement: "We keep spending plans under regular review, as we are doing in the current planning round for both equipment and the wider defence programme, to ensure that we continue to spend money on the right priorities and balance our current commitments with those that may arise in the future."
(Reporting by Avril Ormsby; Editing by Steve Addison)






My thoughts to all still at ISK as they wake up to this.


Jackonicko 27th Mar 2008 02:12

Now is surely the time to cancel CVF and JSF - which would save real money, and which are programmes on which we've spent very little so far.

HectorusRex 27th Mar 2008 05:26

MoD should ditch key arms projects, say MPs
 
MoD should ditch key arms projects, say MPs
• Committee says cutbacks needed to make ends meet
• Report questions need to build new aircraft carriers
• Richard Norton-Taylor
• The Guardian,
• Thursday March 27 2008
• Article history
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2...fence.military
About this article
This article appeared in the Guardian on Thursday March 27 2008 on p2 of the Top stories section. It was last updated at 00:07 on March 27 2008.
Pressures on the defence budget are so great that ministers should consider sacrificing one of its most prestigious projects - the £4bn replacement of two aircraft carriers - rather than simply delaying or cutting back planned new weapons systems, a powerful scrutiny committee will say today.
In a report critical of how the government procures new weapons, the cross-party Commons defence committee will challenge it to explain "what roles the two future carriers will perform ... and what capabilities these ships will give us that could not be provided in other ways".
Two carriers, the largest ships ever built for the navy, are due to be completed in 2014 and 2016 at an estimated cost of £3.9bn. Delays are likely to increase the costs while separate delays in the US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme mean the first carrier will make do with ageing British Harriers, the committee notes.
Many British companies which will provide steel and other products for the ships, as well as BAE and VT, the two companies that would build them, have welcomed the project. However, the plan is questioned within and outside the MoD. Defence sources say it has become "political" rather than based on Britain's defence priorities. The carriers are due to be assembled at Rosyth dockyard in Scotland.
"The MoD needs to take the difficult decisions which will lead to a realistic and affordable equipment programme", the MPs say. They add: "This may well mean cutting whole programme, rather than just delaying orders or making cuts to the number of platforms ordered across a range of equipment programmes".
In a startling admission, General Sir Kevin O'Donoghue, chief of defence materiel, told the committee earlier this year: "I don't think we've had a properly affordable programme for many years."
However, ministers are expected to ignore the committee's advice as they struggle to make ends meet in this year's spending round. They are expected to delay the navy's shipbuilding programme, cut the RAF's order for Eurofighter/Typhoons and the army's delayed order of a new family of armoured vehicles known as Fres (Future Rapid Effects System).
Defence officials say it would be impossible to go ahead with all planned equipment programmes and pay for the basic needs of British soldiers and their families, including accommodation.
The MPs suggest plans to replace the RAF's Lynx helicopter could be vulnerable. They also urge the MoD to consider whether the time has come to "cut its losses" and abandon the updated Nimrod MRA4 maritime reconnaissance aircraft, which is running eight years behind schedule and nearly £800m over budget.
They say senior MoD officials told them problems with the Nimrod were "predictable". They add: "We are deeply concerned that they nevertheless seem to have come as such a surprise to the MoD."
James Arbuthnot, the committee chairman, said: "For too long the MoD has had an unaffordable equipment programme and needs to confront the problem rather than the usual response of salami-slicing and moving programmes to the right."
Baroness Taylor, the minister for defence equipment, said spending plans were kept "under regular review" to ensure priorities were right.

Jetex Jim 27th Mar 2008 06:28

Full marks to BAE, they have in Nimrod the perfect product line - through AEW to MRA4 - they get paid but they don't need to deliver anything.

Now if only they could find a way to develop it into an export market...


It does make you wonder what sort of Air Force Britain could have if it didn't have to support BAE in the manner to which it has become accustomed.

MoD needs to decided which is the priority, operational capability - or job creation in NW England

ORAC 27th Mar 2008 06:51


Whether Nimrod, Type 45, or Astute, why suggest cutting programmes that are basically a hairs breath away from completion
Sunk Costs

Finger Poking 27th Mar 2008 08:05

Cutting Costs Is Easy
 
1. There are too Many SENIOR OFFICERS within all 3 services, doing next to nothing, earning a fortune and collecting a pension that is crippling upon retirement.

2. Navalise TYPHOON for Tranche 3!! Cancel JSF, that is nothing short of expensive, incapable and retrogressive compared with a fully-supported TYPHOON. The new Carriers are more than capable of taking Typhoon and what a formidable force they would project- If Funded Correctly!

Done.

Spanish Waltzer 27th Mar 2008 08:31


The MPs suggest plans to replace the RAF's Lynx helicopter
well that gives confidence that they know what they are talking about....:ugh:

ZH875 27th Mar 2008 08:33

Pursuade 12 MP's to buy a 'Garden Ornament' from BAES.

Good bye RAF, it was nice knowing you.

Bob Viking 27th Mar 2008 08:39

Ditch MRA4?!
 
After listening to successive Defence Ministers proudly proclaiming the Nimrod replacement for (what seems like the last 20) years, it'd be interesting to see how this one would pass muster!
Have they already forgotten what happened in Afghanistan?!
BV:mad:

Boldface 27th Mar 2008 10:21


Whether Nimrod, Type 45, or Astute, why suggest cutting programmes that are basically a hairs breath away from completion...
Clearly you are not familiar with the state of the MRA4 project PP.:hmm:

AHQHI656SQN 27th Mar 2008 10:24

The MPs suggest plans to replace the RAF's Lynx helicopter could be vulnerable. :ugh:

I wonder if they mean Army Lynx as the RAF don't operate Lynx. If the Army Lynx replacement is vulnerable, what about the Royal Navy Lynx(?) or is the Army and RN Lynx one and the same?

SidHolding 27th Mar 2008 10:25

An Island Nation with the worrying prospect of no Maritmie Patrol Aircraft?!? What will it take!?! It's just another sadly obvious outcome of defence spending being the lowest % of GDP since the 1930's!!! :mad:

Archimedes 27th Mar 2008 11:04

To be fair to the committee, I can't find them referring to an RAF Lynx; it would appear to be the reporter who's got it wrong.

The committee report does make a couple of odd references to a beast called the Nimrod MRA2, though.

Widger 27th Mar 2008 11:22

Jackonory......:D:D:D:D:D

Managed to get the knife in on the third post....well done...you are so predictable....there was I thinking I wonder how long it will take him to say "scrap CVF" oh......scroll down...there it is!!!:ok:

Jackonicko 27th Mar 2008 11:38

Predictable, yes.

But also obviously (and to some extent regrettably) the right thing to do.

As the Defence Committee are coming to realise.

"Pressures on the defence budget are so great that ministers should consider sacrificing one of its most prestigious projects - the £4bn replacement of two aircraft carriers - rather than simply delaying or cutting back planned new weapons systems, a powerful scrutiny committee will say today.
In a report critical of how the government procures new weapons, the cross-party Commons defence committee will challenge it to explain "what roles the two future carriers will perform ... and what capabilities these ships will give us that could not be provided in other ways".
Two carriers, the largest ships ever built for the navy, are due to be completed in 2014 and 2016 at an estimated cost of £3.9bn. Delays are likely to increase the costs while separate delays in the US Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme mean the first carrier will make do with ageing British Harriers, the committee notes."


The carriers and the JSFs they will carry are a massive funding item, which grossly distort, and will continue to distort, the defence budget, making it impossible to afford the bread and butter items we actually NEED, as opposed to being merely nice to have.

Yes, yes, I've read and understood all of the stuff about land-based and sea-based air power being complementary in an ideal world. But this isn't an ideal world and we can't afford it. Land-based air power can be useful on its own, naval air power isn't. We've needed and used land based air power every time we've been on ops, we've seldom NEEDED sea-based. Naval aviation is a luxury we cannot afford, and keeping the Royal Navy as a gold-plated, Cold War leviathan while the other surfaces become cash-starved tinpot jokes should not be allowed to continue.

JSF costs are increasing exponentially, such that the GAO already predicts that the USA will be paying more per aircraft than we paid for Typhoon. It's time to jettison CVF and JSF, and with them the unrealistic aspirations of grandeur which they represent.

mutleyfour 27th Mar 2008 12:30


I wonder if they mean Army Lynx as the RAF don't operate Lynx. If the Army Lynx replacement is vulnerable, what about the Royal Navy Lynx(?) or is the Army and RN Lynx one and the same?
As I understand it they are very much dependant on each other financially so to cut one will mean you cut both variants.

As for differences, RN one has additional Radar and FASGW capability along with only one ste of controls whereas the Green version will have no Radar, no FASGW and a set of duals.

minigundiplomat 27th Mar 2008 12:40

At a stroke, this move would help the procurement and long term budgets. It would also help the manning crisis, particularly across the Eng, GD(P) and NCA problem areas (particularly as many at ISK are eying up NetJets anyway).
It would also help BAE who have effectively squeezed as much as they can out of the project and now should be delivering.

The only people it doesn't help is those requiring the services of a Nimrod, particularly those on the front line- but since did MOD/Nu Labour care about them?

Not an expert (by a long chalk) but could this be linked to recent developments with the King Air?

Widger 27th Mar 2008 12:46

Jacko,

The Royal Navy is not gold plated...far from it and has been decimated over the last decade, much like the other two services. The issu is that the two conflicts the UK is currently involved in, have skewed defence priorities right over to one end of the spectrum. That does not mean that in 10 years time the "swingometer" will go the other way. As I have said in other posts, which you have read, we only have to look at how Russia is exerting it's influence in the Arctic over resources, to see where the world is going over the next 50 years. Some might say that the whole Iraq thing was about resources.

I would personally (my own opinion) say that cancellation of JSF was the most sensible option. Marinate (sic) Typhoon or buy Rafale. Both could operate on CVF and be much more capable than Dave B. This decision would however, upset the light blue who want a Harrier replacement....so a no win situation there then. In the light of Mr Sarkozy's visit, Mr Brown should announce this immediately and in the spirit of co-operation announce new contracts for French Built Nuclear power stations in return for a cheap bulk buy of Rafale, thereby achieving commonality with the French CVF (stores, spares etc.) It is clear that this is what is needed. :ok::ok:

Keep up the lobbying old chap........I know it is starting to annoy you....much like that irritating little mossie that flies around your head during your BBQ. :}

mr fish 27th Mar 2008 12:57

oooh, the french hve timed their state visit to perfection, if brown asks nicely we could get hold of some used atlantics:E

Jackonicko 27th Mar 2008 12:59

Boldface,

"Clearly you are not familiar with the state of the MRA4 project PP."

I hear whispers that all is not well with MRA4, but superficially there is nothing being released or written about to contradict the broad idea that after the early difficulties (those which led to the switch from Bournemouth to Woodford, the consequent delays and disruption, the fit of the new wings), which were presumably solved (or en route to being solved) when the contract was restructured in February 2003, it has all been plain sailing, apart from some minor hiccoughs - like the longitudinal stability issues.

The broad impression being given is that it's much the same as Typhoon was a few years ago - late, having suffered massive cost escalation, but fundamentally back on track (albeit with a much later ISD), and with some real improvements having been made in the intervening years.

I'm starting to hear a VERY different story, however, that MRA4 remains a disaster, and perhaps even that the AEW3 would be a better basis for comparison.

Plenty of folk here must know the truth.

Not_a_boffin 27th Mar 2008 13:26

Naughty, naughty Jacko. That Grauniad excerpt isn't actually what the DSC recommends, even if it's what you'd like. I expect the journo was briefed by Michael Quillan....

They do express incredulity "that MoD cannot explain the delay in signing the main production contracts" though.

Interestingly, rather than point out that the MoD is not adequately funded to deliver the policy of HMG (namely the capabilities required by SDR), they lapse into "unaffordability" and cancellation of MRA4. They're normally much better than that....

althenick 27th Mar 2008 13:35


Yes, yes, I've read and understood all of the stuff about land-based and sea-based air power being complementary in an ideal world. But this isn't an ideal world and we can't afford it. Land-based air power can be useful on its own, naval air power isn't
What do you mean by saying we cant afford it Jacko?

In the Falklands we couldn't afford to lose ships to Air attack (and we had a damn sight more capable Air to Air Surface to air capability) How many millions did all they cost to replace? I can go along with the CVF cancelation if there were a couple of decent LHD's on the offing but then again we'd be back to square 1 tendering and all the other crap that goes with it.
What would you suggest for the RN?

BTW I do believe That NAVAL AIR POWER has done its bit in both Afganastan and Iraq and the last time I looked they could be based both ashore and aboard. Try doing that with a Typhoon.

Tappers Dad 27th Mar 2008 13:42

The MOD are holding a press briefing at 2pm today. maybe we will hear something after that re MRA4.

Boldface 27th Mar 2008 13:52


I'm starting to hear a VERY different story, however, that MRA4 remains a disaster, and perhaps even that the AEW3 would be a better basis for comparison.
You may think that. I couldn't possibly comment!:mad:

hulahoop7 27th Mar 2008 14:09

2pm
 
Isn't it the tanker PFI at 2?

LowObservable 27th Mar 2008 14:26

MRA4 is vulnerable because there is a substitute available - the P-8A, apparently running quite well, IOC 2013, brand-new airframes that will cost less to run than MRA4 ever will, common upgrade program with the US and (almost certainly) Australia.

The question is whether things are worse than they appear from the official dates and money numbers.

philrigger 27th Mar 2008 14:37

;)

In the Falklands we couldn't afford to lose ships to Air attack (and we had a damn sight more capable Air to Air Surface to air capability) How many millions did all they cost to replace?


Were they ever replaced ? I don't think so.




'We knew how to whinge but we kept it in the NAAFI bar.'

althenick 27th Mar 2008 15:07


Were they ever replaced ? I don't think so.
Good point philrigger, :suspect:

Skipness One Echo 27th Mar 2008 15:22

Wow so you can have a new B737 airframe rather than a rebuilt Comet airframe. Only in the UK would we ever have considered the bloody Nimrod fiasco. Curious that the same aircraft type could be a cataclysmic disaster twice (!)

owe ver chute 27th Mar 2008 15:29

Isn't the AWACS a Nimrod replacement?

I seem to recall in the 80's a Nimrod with radars front and rear eating money like it was going out of fashion. Have we to learn these old lessons time and time again? :ugh:

pr00ne 27th Mar 2008 15:31

philrigger and althenick,

They were ALL replaced, by much more capable vessels (T22B3) as was all the gear lost in the Falklands.

A long time ago though..............................

althenick 27th Mar 2008 15:35

Just had a wee scan of the CDS document. They aren't suggesting cutting the capability just the project. So I have a question for anyone out there who is in the know -

- How long could the current Nimrod fleet soldier on?
- To preserve airframes could other aircraft take on some of roles of Nimrod?(I'm thinking of 750 sqn Taking over short range SAR duties for example)
- A cheap and cheeful replacement?

any ideas?

GOLF_BRAVO_ZULU 27th Mar 2008 15:37

The none journo corrupted document is at;
http://www.publications.parliament.u...ce/295/295.pdf

It's good to see that the Committee is comprised of well informed experts:


Q98 Chairman: But other countries struggle by
without Nimrods?

Mr Gould: They certainly have struggled. Most
other countries that have this use something called
the P3 which is a Lockheed Orion aircraft. That was
a contender, but it does not have the endurance of
Nimrod. Indeed, the Americans are moving to the
multi-role maritime aircraft and have been
struggling for about 15 years to try to find a way to
move from the P3 design to something more
capable.

Q99 Mr Holloway: It just seems bizarre to be doing
this to a rotting old 1950s aircraft?

Mr Gould: Most of it is new.

Q100 Mr Holloway: Not the one that I went on
recently, although maybe the electronic gizmos are
new.

Mr Gould: The wings, engines and undercarriage
are new.

Q101 Robert Key: The airframe is not.

Mr Gould: The fuselage is not.

althenick 27th Mar 2008 15:40

*****e

Just googled and true enough they replaced with ships that were predominantly ASW/ASUW platforms. Ironic really you lose Air Defence Ships to Air Attack which they were designed to repel and replace them with something less capable of that role!

FAA got more shars though!

Jackonicko 27th Mar 2008 16:18

AlltheN, Widger, et al.

The fact that you have to go back to 1982 to illustrate the military need for a carrier tells the story.

In those days, with that budget, I was a huge supporter of carriers.

But today, we live in a different world.

LO,

A P-8 might cost less to operate, though given Boeing's record on the Wedgetail and KC-767, I'd hesitate before viewing it as being low risk. Nor does a twin-fan airliner fill me with confidence for a role which requires the platform to get down and dirty, manoeuvring quite hard as it flies the ASW cloverleafs, prosecuting an attack with torpedoes, etc.

Back to the Nimrod.....

When having information in the public domain would aid an enemy, then plainly, the public’s right to know MUST be subordinate to military secrecy. On this basis, I’d be nervous about seeing in print any detailed information relating to current deployments, tactics, and weapons and sensor system parametrics.

However, a culture of secrecy has grown up that treats all information with equal caution, historic, or current, operational or relating to procurement. That’s something I’m less anguine about.

Often, especially in the procurement field, such secrecy actually serves to damage our armed forces more deeply and more fundamentally than would revealing which squadron is presently based at (say) Kandahar with x number of jets. And I’d suggest that keeping Nimrod MRA4’s problems under wraps is a good example of damaging secrecy – whose only purpose can be to protect the contractor (whose reputation might be damaged by revelations about all the cock-ups), and to protect the reputations of the politicians and senior officers on whose watch these problems have occurred.

There is no doubt that there have been problems!

Air Staff Requirement Number 420 was issued, initially calling for 25 Replacement Maritime Patrol Aircraft with an In Service Date of 2003.

On 27” July 1996 the decision to award the contract to British Aerospace, was announced. The contract, now for only 21 aircraft and worth just over two billion pounds sterling, was eventually signed with British Aerospace on 2”d December 1996.

When the Nimrod MRA4 contract was let with BAE Systems in December 1996 the In-Service Date (ISD) was still set at April 2003. That ISD was defined as the date when seven aircraft were to be fully operational. The twenty-first and final aircraft was to be delivered to the Royal Air Force in 2006.

(So why did they call it Nimrod 2000?)

BAE Systems advised the Defence Procurement Agency (DPA) that they could not meet this date in late 1998, following technical and resource problems.

The Nimrod MRA4 was identified as one of the Smart Procurement Initiative's pilot Integrated Project Teams (IPTs) in November 1998 - led by Air Commodore Barry Thornton, who was succeeded by Mr David King in January 2001 as IPT Leader. This meant that MRA4 became headlined as the flagship of SMART procurement – an irony in view of what was to happen.

The contract was ‘re-baselined’ In May 1999, following extensive negotiations, and a new ISD of March 2005 was set. This represented a delay of 23 months. The new In Service Date (ISD) of March 2005 was defined as being marked by the delivery of the 7th aircraft. The Nimrod MRA4 was due to enter operational service in August 2004 (this was NOT the ISD) and the 21st and final aircraft was due for delivery in December 2008.

A further change to the contract was agreed in 2001/02, including a two-stage capability demonstration prior to ISD. (“To mitigate this risk, MOD and BAE SYSTEMS have agreed to an Incremental Capability Acquisition approach. This comprises the acceptance of aircraft in two steps, an initial capability being demonstrated by the time of first aircraft delivery will full specification compliance being demonstrated by the time of the seventh aircraft delivery and ISD.”) It was then recognised that the ISD might prove to be late 2005.

The number of aircraft required was reduced to 18 in view of the assessed increase in capability and availability of the MRA4 over the MR2, and citing a perceived reduction in the submarine threat – or was the reduced number of aircraft, at the same overall cost, actually intended to compensate industry?

By the end of 2002, it was clear that the overlap of development and production activities was leading to further timescale problems. In February 2003 BAE SYSTEMS and MoD agreed to revise the programme again, aiming to reduce risk in development by delaying production work, allowing the design of the aircraft is proven during the flight trials programme. Once an acceptable level of demonstrated performance was achieved, the series production of the remaining 15 aircraft would recommence. This restructuring of the programme would result in a four year delay to the in-service date to 2009.

The February 2003 Agreement changed the contract from the previous fixed price basis, to a Target Cost Incentive Fee (TCIF) arrangement for Design and Development. A contract amendment to this effect was signed on 23 February 2004. This mechanism was supposed to be the best means of incentivising BAE SYSTEMS to deliver the aircraft without further cost and time slippage. Why has it not done so?

ISD was now defined as the Delivery of the sixth production standard aircraft to the Royal Air Force.

In July 2004, the UK Ministry of Defence announced that this number was to be further reduced to 12 aircraft.

A further review of the programme identified increased production costs and that the In-Service Date for the capability would need to be delayed in order to make the programme affordable within Departmental funding constraints. A business case seeking authorisation of commitment to full production was approved in May 2006, and the contract was amended to re-introduce the production requirements in July 2006.

The UK MOD finally awarded the production contract for 12 Nimrod MRA4 aircraft In July 2006. Delivery of the first production aircraft was by then planned for 2009. The scheduled in-service date had slipped to 2010 and deliveries were scheduled to be completed in 2012. Nimrod MRA4 has an assumed in-service life of 25 years based upon 650 flying hours per year. This results in an out of service date (OSD) of 2035, but a longer life may be feasible.

The MPR07 Definition of ISD is the provision of 5 aircraft (4 deployable) and 6 combat ready crews. It was then scheduled for September 2010 – 89 months late.

The latest information is that MRA4 is now 92 months (7.5 years) late, inferring a December 2010 ISD, and £787 m (28% of the Approved Cost) over budget.

£100 m of this cost growth (“just a little less than three per cent of the total programme cost”) and three months of this delay have been added during the last year alone, giving the lie to any idea that the problems are over. Three months more delay, and £100 m more to the excess costs sounds to me like the programme is still spiraling out of control (albeit perhaps at a slower rotational rate).

David Gould CB, Chief Operating Officer, DE&S told the House of Commons Defence Committee that: “The production, flight trial and mission system programmes are going very well.”

Are they? Was he knowingly lying to Parliament?

The NAO’s Major Projects Report 2007 forecast that all Key User Requirements would be met. Is that true, or were they misled?

The MRA4 KURs are:

01 Maritime Counter Terrorism
02 Search & Detect (UWE)
03 Submarine Attack
04 Search & Detect (AWE)
05 Tactical Interoperability
06 Mission Completion
07 Maritime Presence
08 Operations in Hostile Environment
09 Environmental Operating Conditions

KUR 08 was originally judged as being ‘at risk’, but the NAO judges that the “Technical and financial issues now resolved surrounding procurement of Electronic Warfare Rig thereby allowing aircraft to operate with a self-defence capability. Business Case with Investment Appraisal under compilation. Procurement schedule being determined; anticipate KUR compliance when schedule and risks clearly identified.”

Cost snippet:
1998 - £2 bn order for 21 aircraft = £95 m each

2004 - £3.5 bn for 15 aircraft = £233 m each

2006 - Cost now £3.2 bn for 12 aircraft = £267 m each

2008 – Cost now £3.6 bn for 12 aircraft = £300 m each

althenick 27th Mar 2008 16:23


The fact that you have to go back to 1982 to illustrate the military need for a carrier tells the story
You'll need to go back to WW2 to justify Typhoon then using that logic :E

Widger 27th Mar 2008 16:34

Hang on a minute Jackonory, you are tarring me with someone elses brush again. I have not mentioned 1982 once (there you see...he said it again...stone him) I am talking about the future and ensuring that the UK is prepared for the future and not squandering everything on a land war that we are currently in...if you take that line, then ditch Nimrod, ditch Challenger, ditch everything that does not involve fighting a guerilla war!

Read what I post....I am talking about resources and the lack of. I am talking about the growth of Russian, Chinese and Indian etc influence and the inevitable "grab" for land in places far away from fixed airfields, with their associated resources of oil, coal, gas, fish, minerals, diamonds etc. Antarctica is the one place left on earth that has not been exploited but this will not continue forever. Sooner or later, someone will turn around, (much like japanese whaling) and say "We are taking this land and it's resources". Only those with the strength and capability will be able to resist. Why do you think the Falkland Islands are so important?

Jackonicko 27th Mar 2008 16:42

AlltheNick,

Land based OS FJs are needed (and being used) right now.

The recent 'Bear' activity shows that UK AD FJs are needed right now.


Widger,

The Falklands can now be defended without carriers.

Carriers threaten core capabilities that we need right now.

Not_a_boffin 27th Mar 2008 17:01

If we're not going to do power projection, we don't need to be in sandy places, we don't need OS (or much else beyond AD & AWACS jets, OPVs and lots of infantry to bo honest).

As per overseas theatres, can't we rely on someone else to do AD for UK (only kidding this time!)

Carriers do not threaten core capabilities. The Treasury does. Endex.


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