When XH558 is airworthy again later this year I think we could have another punt! Just need to see if anyone can remember that crazy AAR plot....:}

Captain Kirk

I in no way mean to put myself across as an effects expert. Maybe I should have put effect rather than EFFECT to prevent so much offence.

My questions were genuinely meant as, alluded to above, I'm no expert. They were posted purely to provoke discussion.

Without wanting to sound too "bang and bullets"-centric, why wouldn't destroying air assets on the ground have a similar effect?

All part of my continuing studies you understand!

Captain Kirk puts it concisely. I am fairly certain that AD aircraft would be ineffective against SLCM.

As for SLCM against RW or C2 or aircraft, this depends on the aim.

Certainly in a counter-air battle hitting the runway is one option. The ultimate aim however would be to remove the enemy AOB. All the runway interdiction does is to deny that surface for a few hours causing airborne aircraft to divert (partial success) or crash (total success) and pin those aircraft on the ground ready for ground attack (high chance of success); that is what the Israelis did in '67 simply because they had insufficient assets and lacked the modern precision of smart weapons.

The other counter-air option is kill the C2 and aircrew.

So in '82 we had not option but to go for counter-air attrition whereas now SLCM could neutralise all the aircraft, C2 and pilot accommodation (assuming enough missiles).

A modern approach to procurement has been weapon-target matching. No point in buying thousands of torpedoes if the available targets can be killed with hundreds of torpedoes.

With the JP233 I believe the 'buy' was for sufficient ship-sets to neutralise the targets in eastern Europe on day 1. Assuming a re-attack on Day 2 only half the number of ship-sets (or less) were thought to be needed. It is not true that the unexpectedly high survival rate in GW 1 meant that we would have had insufficient cold-war ship-sets to continue beyond Day 2? But job done, enemy air pinned to the ground.

Is legacy weapon-target matching perhaps also a problem in Uraq and Afg now? Enough for the old scenario and inadequate buy for modern consumption or attrition?

PS, no offence taken.

A reasonable question this time but it takes a lot of ordnance to disable even one MOB for a reasonable length of time; SLBMs are very expensive and need to be reserved for discrete, high value targets of significance - they are not suitable (if only for lack of numbers) for taking out every HAS on an airfield. And before anyone jumps in with 'runway cratering = same effect', we learned conclusively in 1991 that disabling runways is a difficult task that requires specialist weapons and even then the 'effect' is only temporary.

With hindsight, the Argentines might have been better to accept the damage inflicted by a few raids but herein lies the problem - we are analysing this with the benefit of hindsight when it is easy to draw conclusions.

At the time, the Junta had no way to be sure of what the UK intent was (i.e. what target sets we were prepared to prosecute), how sustainable such raids were or on what scale we could mount them. Returning to 'influence', it is important to understand the mind of the enemy and not make the mistake of applying our own perspective. Arguably, a totalitarian military Junta with a fundamentally weak grip on power would find it unacceptable to permit any enemy aircraft to execute a successful raid on the motherland (loss of face, demonstration of impotence, etc - issues that are often underestimated in the West), whereas a missile strike 'might' be more acceptable (less of a ‘violation’ of airspace?) and even turned to a propaganda advantage (cowardly Brits launch sneak attack, etc - witness outcry over Belgrano).

And, off course, SLBMs were not an option in 1982 anyway!

Today - I think we could mount an equivalent raid to Black Buck but I doubt it would have the same 'effect' because those lessons have been learned.

And we would lack the political will anyway...

Apparently, a large part of the will to invade was based on the (Latino Macho) belief that Auntie Maggie, being a Laydee, would not have the big brass ones to retaliate!
Seems remarkable doesn't it? Surely by '82 they would have realised what a fire-breathing old dragon she was. Shame it preceded Spitting Image.
Maybe they'd better wheel her out again..............

So with Gordy in power will they assume he is to tight to fight over them?

Sub launched Tomahawk is in service and tried and tested

http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/s...s/sr-tlam2.jpg
(RAF PR dept. that's how you advertise!)

Few problems though, just how many fit in a UK SSN and we only brought 60 at about £1mil? a pop, they have fired a few off too! Much more of a day/night 1, first strike option on HVA's but I'd guess unsustainable.

Therefore you would need to employ a platform that can keep going back. The Tornado could match weapons to missions but has a range slightly :{ less than the Vulcan, I would guess Storm Shadow employment would be very similar to Tomahawk, with the same numbers/cost issues. Have we got enough tankers in service to do the trail? How much more gas is available from Tristar and VC-10 than a victor? How many Tornadoes would it take to get a serviceable one that far? Could be a thousand bomber raid :}
Alternatively a Carrier of Harriers could be used, but what is the standoff range? What weapons are available and how many? Can we still maintain and resupply a naval presence at that distance for that long? Not too many other contacts to hide the CVS with theses days.
Unfortunately the MRA-4 idea is a few years away from service so not available (or ideal), MR2 with some speed tape, wires and boxes and a very quick release to service might provide something, but very Heath Robinson.

Are those B1B's still parked in the boneyard? :E Once finished with effects based warfare they could give persistent CAS in the land offensive :ok: Even a show of force by one would make me surrender.

RN PR dept, this is how not to advertise.
:}

THS, Please issue a health warning next time you make such a post.


PLEASE.

You are a very naughty stacker, upset some of the bleedin old gentlemen 'ere that it did........(kinda makes your blood boil tho):yuk:

"Without wanting to sound too "bang and bullets"-centric, why wouldn't destroying air assets on the ground have a similar effect?"


Because you don't have to kill anyone, either in the air or on the ground and still tie up the defences and logistics. In the meantime they are flying CAP against a threat that is nonexistant. Do not dismiss the psychological effect of this on the enemy. Kinda neat. You see we do nothing, they flyaround going slowly nuts.

You have much to learn young skywalker.

MoJo (aka Yoda):ok:

The withdrawl of Argentine AD assets from the south to defend Buenos Aires from a potential Vulcan attack is often cited as an effect of the Black Buck raid. It would be interesting to know if demonstrating the ability to threaten BA was really intended by those who first conceived Black Buck. Furthermore, did anyone really predict that these raids might keep the Mirage IIIs out of the way? Or was it a lucky bonus? I suppose the cabinet papers that will be released in 2012 (30 year rule) might shed some more light.

As to doing the like again. Today's tanker force can put considerably more fuel in the air than the Victor force could in 1982. However, once the TriStar and VC10 have been replaced by FSTA this total will drop below the 1982 level, albeit with less being used by tankers themselves. More significantly though, and unlike just about every new tanker type that is being procured around the world, our tankers will not be able to refuel each other. Thus the fuel will only be able to be delivered to a point within the basic radius of action of the tanker. There would be no clever tanker-tanker stuff like the good old Victor boys achieved. How's that for progress?

BP, there is some evidence from the proceedings of a seminar held at the staff college five years ago which is in the public domain. In essence, the then-CAS said that the plan was to do whatever could be done to aid the Task Force. The planning staffs worked out that bombing the airfield would need '25 and preferably 50' Vulcan sorties to guarantee closing it, but the raid went ahead with two aims. MRAF Beetham said [verbatim quote from the proceedings follows]:

'So it was primarily a military purpose to do what we could with the resources we had. But it did have a secondary deterrent effect, in the sense that the Argentines must have raised their eyebrows and the thought would go through their mind (which we ceratinly didn't try to stop them having) that if we could do that, we could bomb the mainland. We had looked at this, but discarded it because it would have been a major escalation. But the Argenitnes wouldn't have known that and therefore their Mirages and their other forces were being aware and taking defensive measures in case we bombed the mainland, which took a little bit of the pressure off the forces which were deploying against the Falklands [i.e. the Task Force].

So that was the major purpose. It was primarily a military objective to do what we could, but it did have this secondary effect.'

This was followed by Admiral Woodward, who in response said:

'I very much agree with what you had to say about it. My dark blue aviators said "Oh, it's the air force just trying to get in on the act", but I said, hang on a minute, there will be two things. If they do hit the runway, that can't be bad, they can disrupt it... but also it will have exactly that effect of causing them [the junta] to think they could come at us on the mainland. It is showing reach and therefore it is deterrent. And I suspect it made them hold back some of their Mirages, which could have acted as top cover for their A-4 raids. So I signed up for it and told my aviators to shut up.'

Unless my memory has failed me ever since (I must find my notes from the session) Admiral Leach made a similar (but much shorter, which is possibly why the documentation doesn't include it) observation about the deterrent effect.

So, even alloing for hindsight, it would seem that there was at least some semblance of effects based thinking behind the planning, both from a light blue and a dark blue perspective.

Archimedes - Now thats hardly fair, quoting the Battle Group Commander of the force sent to retake the Falklands. Just how are people supposed to refute that?

;)

Is there not a rich vein of irony here, in discussing how a hypothetical attack on a well equipped and technology savvy agressor would work with all of our flash bang gizmos, when in the background the white noise of today's media is incessantly reporting how well trained, but ill-equipped and poorly focused British Forces are taking a regular arse kicking from Habib and the boys with their deadly RPG, AK47, and re-engineered 155mm IED's? Nowhere near enough CAS, no Military Objective (ie. retake the Falklands), and dwindling moral support. At least with Corporate we knew what the job was and went and did it.

Not enough CAS?
 

If only we had, say, a dozen or so CAS capable, reliable, cheap to deploy jets with rested, trained pilots and a few handy capabilities like a cannon, CRV7, TIALD, Recce and an HMS! Wait a minute.....doh!

That's an interesting point. My understanding of TLAM is that it's rather good at blast and a bit good at splinter but not good at all at vertical penetration. The latter ability is what's needed to crater runways and sod up its substrate. That was why BLACKBUCK 1 needed to release the bombs at altitude to get enough KE for detonation beneath the surface. Theoretically, they could have laid 21 retarded bombs down the length of the runway but without the same structural effect on it.