Air Raid on Stanley - could we do it again?
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From: Sandhurst, Berkshire
Air Raid on Stanley - could we do it again?
Obviously we would not need to, as the Falklands is far more defended than it was 25 years ago, but, for arguments sake, if Argentina had not attacked in '82, but did it in '07, could we launch an equivelant attack?
Have just finished reading Vulcan 607, an amazing book, and like I said, wondered, if need be, could we do it again, what would we use? Tornado's? and if so, how?
Have just finished reading Vulcan 607, an amazing book, and like I said, wondered, if need be, could we do it again, what would we use? Tornado's? and if so, how?
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From: Some-r-set
I expect what would happen would be that the RN would launch a (many) Vertically Launched Tomahawk (or similar Cruise Missile) with the GPS for a specific (various) points along the runway to deny use.
Or a ALCM (Storm Shadow/SCALP) from a Tornado many miles away.
Former seems more realistic.
But the Nimrod has a bomb bay doesn't it; and I seem to remember that there was talk on here about Storm Shadow/SCALP being fitted (rumour network remember) to the MR4
Or a ALCM (Storm Shadow/SCALP) from a Tornado many miles away.
Former seems more realistic.
But the Nimrod has a bomb bay doesn't it; and I seem to remember that there was talk on here about Storm Shadow/SCALP being fitted (rumour network remember) to the MR4
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From: Leeds
I don't own this space under my name. I should have leased it while I still could
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Aviation Qualifications: Military (Retired)
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From: Lincolnshire
Bit of an echo in this thread isn't there?
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=274004
http://www.deadbrain.co.uk/news/arti...04_29_2923.php
http://www.pprune.org/forums/showthread.php?t=274004
http://www.deadbrain.co.uk/news/arti...04_29_2923.php
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From: Much-Binding-in-the-Marsh
TLAM from the silent Service would indeed create the primary effect of closing the runway - and pretty effectively too.
But - it wouldn't have what was the greater strategic effect of ensuring that large numbers of Argentine aircraft stayed 'fixed' around Buenos Aires and therefore took no part in the battle.
Its not just a question of blowing things up, killing people and breaking stuff
But - it wouldn't have what was the greater strategic effect of ensuring that large numbers of Argentine aircraft stayed 'fixed' around Buenos Aires and therefore took no part in the battle.
Its not just a question of blowing things up, killing people and breaking stuff
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From: A very long way North
TLAM from the silent Service would indeed create the primary effect of closing the runway - and pretty effectively too.
But - it wouldn't have what was the greater strategic effect of ensuring that large numbers of Argentine aircraft stayed 'fixed' around Buenos Aires and therefore took no part in the battle.
But - it wouldn't have what was the greater strategic effect of ensuring that large numbers of Argentine aircraft stayed 'fixed' around Buenos Aires and therefore took no part in the battle.
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From: Nigit
Impiger
As has been well documented, the strategic effect of Black Buck was centred around the notional ability to schwack the Argentine mainland. What part of this notional ability would be missing with a Tomahawk strike. Indeed, a sub could loiter undetected within range for bloody ages and prosecute targets until it ran out of missiles or was replaced by another sub.
Surely this would have an even greater strategic effect?
And as the munitions are GPS guided, the accuracy of the initial runway denial strikes would be even more unnerving for the junta in Buenos Aires?
As has been well documented, the strategic effect of Black Buck was centred around the notional ability to schwack the Argentine mainland. What part of this notional ability would be missing with a Tomahawk strike. Indeed, a sub could loiter undetected within range for bloody ages and prosecute targets until it ran out of missiles or was replaced by another sub.
Surely this would have an even greater strategic effect?
And as the munitions are GPS guided, the accuracy of the initial runway denial strikes would be even more unnerving for the junta in Buenos Aires?
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From: Lincs
Have IQs suddenly dropped?
After Black Buck, the Argentine AF withdrew its AD assets to enhance defence of the mainland, concerned that AIR strikes could threaten the airfields from which strikes were launched against the task force. Exactly how would an adversary be compelled to withdraw his AD aircraft in response to a submarine threat?
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From: Nigit
Captain Kirk
So the Tomahawks couldn't be used to hit airfields on the Argentine mainland? They couldn't be used against runways and fuel installations? They couldn't be used against hangars and/or HASs? Surely this would have the same EFFECT? Surely it's the EFFECT we're discussing here?
WRT the missions themselves being repeated, I doubt if we'd have the AAR assets to get the Tonkas on scene. CERTAINLY not that AND maintain service to other theatres. As has been alluded to perhaps a MRA4 and Stormshadow combo would be the only thing that could do it in today's RAF. Sad, but true?
So the Tomahawks couldn't be used to hit airfields on the Argentine mainland? They couldn't be used against runways and fuel installations? They couldn't be used against hangars and/or HASs? Surely this would have the same EFFECT? Surely it's the EFFECT we're discussing here?
WRT the missions themselves being repeated, I doubt if we'd have the AAR assets to get the Tonkas on scene. CERTAINLY not that AND maintain service to other theatres. As has been alluded to perhaps a MRA4 and Stormshadow combo would be the only thing that could do it in today's RAF. Sad, but true?
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From: England
In the modern war scenario would you place any aviation assets on the falklands requiring a long runway when you knew your enemy had sub launched cruise missiles?
Seems like a recipe for loosing a lot of aircraft.
It seems to me that the only advantage a manned bomber would have in a rerun of the Falklands would be the ability to strike during the period a sub is steaming to it's station.
That requires a capable aircraft with the range to be available immediately.
This wasn't even the case in the 1982 war.
Surely the cruise missile scenario is just a rerun of the transfer of the nuclear deterrent from air to sea and for similar reasons.
Providing you have sufficient cruise armed subs and given the cost that is a question in itself, the long range bomber seems to be absolete.
Seems like a recipe for loosing a lot of aircraft.
It seems to me that the only advantage a manned bomber would have in a rerun of the Falklands would be the ability to strike during the period a sub is steaming to it's station.
That requires a capable aircraft with the range to be available immediately.
This wasn't even the case in the 1982 war.
Surely the cruise missile scenario is just a rerun of the transfer of the nuclear deterrent from air to sea and for similar reasons.
Providing you have sufficient cruise armed subs and given the cost that is a question in itself, the long range bomber seems to be absolete.
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From: Lincs
One last attempt...
Student,
You have embraced the 'Effects concept' but despite shouting EFFECT at me you clearly don't understand it yet!
The 'Tactical Effect' could, indeed, be readily achieved by Tomahawk - I would go so far as to say that it would probably be the system of choice.
The 'Operational-level Effect' was to give UK air better odds in the theatre of ops. The Argentines had many more air assets than we could field and inbound Argentine strikers protected by Sweep/Escort had a good chance of decimating the Task Force. The Black Buck AIR raid convinced the Argentines to hold their AIR DEFENCE assets in the rear to protect their MOBs. This enabled the limited number of SHARs to intercept the strikers without being distracted/engaged/attrited by the Argentine Sweep. Even then, it was a close run thing so it is probably fair to say that the 'Strategic Effect' (UK recaptures FIs) was dependant upon the 'secondary effect' of the Black Buck Raids - you have only dwelt upon the 'primary effect' and are, typically, still attrition focused despite your apparent attempt to declare yourself an effects-expert. Remember, Effects are invariably targeted at influencing a party/parties and blowing stuff up is just a means to that end (e.g. convince Junta to relinquish FIs).
Just to spell it out for you as you didn't get it the first time - aeroplanes can't shoot down submarines (certainly not AD ac) therefore a sub strike would have had no EFFECT upon compelling the Argentines to hold their fighters in the rear.
I am a proponent of 'Air' but, for balance, another critical 'op-level effect' was almost certainly the 'secondary effect' of the sinking of the Belgrano. This action had primary tactical effect (sink major surface combatant = attrition) but had the 'secondary effect' of convincing the Argentine Navy to stay in port (= influence).
Might I suggest a little less arrogance….and keep studying!
You have embraced the 'Effects concept' but despite shouting EFFECT at me you clearly don't understand it yet!
The 'Tactical Effect' could, indeed, be readily achieved by Tomahawk - I would go so far as to say that it would probably be the system of choice.
The 'Operational-level Effect' was to give UK air better odds in the theatre of ops. The Argentines had many more air assets than we could field and inbound Argentine strikers protected by Sweep/Escort had a good chance of decimating the Task Force. The Black Buck AIR raid convinced the Argentines to hold their AIR DEFENCE assets in the rear to protect their MOBs. This enabled the limited number of SHARs to intercept the strikers without being distracted/engaged/attrited by the Argentine Sweep. Even then, it was a close run thing so it is probably fair to say that the 'Strategic Effect' (UK recaptures FIs) was dependant upon the 'secondary effect' of the Black Buck Raids - you have only dwelt upon the 'primary effect' and are, typically, still attrition focused despite your apparent attempt to declare yourself an effects-expert. Remember, Effects are invariably targeted at influencing a party/parties and blowing stuff up is just a means to that end (e.g. convince Junta to relinquish FIs).
Just to spell it out for you as you didn't get it the first time - aeroplanes can't shoot down submarines (certainly not AD ac) therefore a sub strike would have had no EFFECT upon compelling the Argentines to hold their fighters in the rear.
I am a proponent of 'Air' but, for balance, another critical 'op-level effect' was almost certainly the 'secondary effect' of the sinking of the Belgrano. This action had primary tactical effect (sink major surface combatant = attrition) but had the 'secondary effect' of convincing the Argentine Navy to stay in port (= influence).
Might I suggest a little less arrogance….and keep studying!