I think we should save the tax-payers the expense of holding a formal inquest and let you PPRuNe experts do the job instead :rolleyes:

MadMark!!! :mad:

Well said Mad Mark :D

You should change your name to 'Incredibly Sensible Mark'.

Theres just not enough experts on here for my liking.

MoD would just love that. MM you should realise that much of the information, currently held by the Coroner and the QC, came to light because of the digging carried out by folks on pprune. And that digging will continue until all the truth is revealed.

DV

DV has been sniped at throughout this process. If anyone as any doubt about the influence that concerned individuals can have over the Inquest Process then take a look at the forthcoming Herc Inquest.

One particular report that will be examined next month was denied access to the Defence Committee. The existence of the report would not have been known to the Investigator without the direct intervention of concerned individuals. Power indeed.

DV, the most important thing is that families and friends come away from the process knowing that a detailed examination of all available evidence has taken place. You can either contribute to such a process or snipe from the sidelines. I believe you will be vindicated in the end and I also believe this thread has been a tower of influence in the whole procedure.

Mad Mark:
Mr-Burns:
Having followed the Hercules 'Parliamentary' thread as well as this one I have been impressed by the stark contrast between the two. Whereas the former consisted of a resolute campaign (that succeeded) to compel the MOD to put right an identified deficiency in the airworthiness of that type, the latter has been anything but that. I commend Distant Voice, Tappers Dad, NigeGilb, tucumseh et al who have striven to have the facts come out. I despair at those who see that effort as unwelcome interference and disloyalty (to Swiss Des presumably). Time perhaps for the RAF emblem to transmogrify from Eagle to Ostrich?

Chugalug2 and Nig; Many thanks for your support. The task would be much easier if more people came forward.

DV

Some answers to your questions and comments:

DV:Why would they want a copy of it? Has any member of the families (TD?) requested a copy? Its post-accident business, anyway. The measures taken fall in line with the recommendations of the BOI, they are recognised by QQ to provide the required safety standard and thus, tacitly, support the statement that there were shortcomings in the airworthiness of the aircraft.

DV:Who are these, "many" ? The only "many" who need to know about Nimrod safety, today, are the current crews, their families and the groundcrew. Do not believe that you are asking this on our behalf. If we had concerns, we have the means to find the answers, without resorting to pprune. Retired folk, politicians, journos, etc, who believe they have a genuine need to know about the Nimrod should address their queries anywhere but here. The SoS said sorry. Do you all really believe that he wants to risk saying it again in the future? He said that the QQ report says it is safe, so the "many" should be content with that.

TSMAAR was stopped due to an incident which made national news.

DV:The SoS and the Stn Cdr are both 100% correct. A flight safety report, analysing the events surrounding the incident involving XV235, will soon be distributed within the MOD I guess that under the FOI you can ask for a copy. I expect it to be very enlightening for some ppruners. Once published, the grown ups will read it, digest it and then make a decision to continue, or not, with AAR. Thats why we do these investigations; to ensure safety while being effective.

DV:I think your statement needs some analysis. The combustion report focussed on what makes fuel ignite. It did not say what started the fire on XV230. It reported that fuel will ignite at a certain (very high) temp after a specific time. It ruled out electricity at high altitudes. The report provided data for the BOI to chew over. When taken into account with all possible causes of a fuel fire on a Nimrod in the 7 tank dry bay, the report provided the basis for compelling evidence that the fire was PROBABLY caused by a hot pipe. There is only one set of hot pipes in that area. The Stn Cdr's statement was spot on. You mentioned the QQ report as though you have read it and, if so, your interpretation is erroneous. I have read it. It covered the complete fuel system, including AAR (which is part of the refuelling system and does not get a separate heading). It took into account the measures implemented after the crash and, taking those those measures into account, QQ gave the Nimrod fuel system a clean bill of health in late 2007. There is not an overall judgmental statement in the report which states, "The Nimrod fuel system is safe". It is a series of questions and answers about each and every pipe and component in the fuel system and those other system components in the vicinity. Every answer is graded from very safe to unsafe and the liklihood of failures/leaks ocurring. Standard hazard analysis. Not one answer led to an unacceptable risk. Therefore, without an overall summary, it can be easily determined that the aircraft is now as safe as it needs to be. We knew it was safe from 4 Sep onwards, anyway, but the IPT had to prove it through a third party. It is safer now than it has ever been before.

DV:I'm sorry, DV, but that is absolutely wrong. The 3 officers on the BOI dug much deeper than anyone here, or in their bereaved family home, would ever have thought possible. Its those officers, and they alone, who researched the safety aspects, asked the questions, sponsored the trials and tests, produced the evidence and wrapped it up in such a damming and comprehensive manner that the SoS never had any alternative but to say sorry. FOI requests from the families and press about irrelevant, nebulous and trivial matters were nothing but friction in the search for the real answers.

Nigegilb:After the publication of their report I asked each member of the BOI if pprune has been influencial in their deliberations. They were too polite to laugh. Yes, they have read this discussion and I'm certain they will continue to read it occasionally, but not to find inspiration or steers, rather to find out what might have been leaked out of their office. They are pleased that nothing went in or out of their domain. Yes, believe it or not, they got the probable answers without the help of pprune, in the slightest.

Chug:
The 2 issues are very different: one was to push for a safety system commonly used in an aircraft type that obviously needs it. I have no detailed knowledge of that particular issue, but I do know it is not the same. Yes, you can quote "airworthiness" as the common thread, but you guys are pushing for the aircraft to be grounded or radically modified, heads to roll, new government authorities, etc. In fact I don't think anyone who has read the tirade from you all, has a clear idea of what you want.

DV:
What task? This is nothing more than a personal crusade based on rumour and flawed thinking. The QC and the Coroner are the only people with a task to achieve. People will not come forward to give you, DV and other ppruners, "the smoking gun" evidence you desire, because there is no such gun.

We leave the QC and the Coroner to review our sad and disasterous recent history, but we must now move forward. Despite sniping from pprune, we have a safe aircraft.

Regards
Ed Sett

Top post Ed Sett:D:D

A well thought out post EdSet100, :D:D:D

EdSet100

I think it right to point out, again, that this and other fatal accidents would, in all likelihood, not have occurred if mandated airworthiness regulations and requirements had been implemented properly.

Yes, the BoI may have came to their conclusions independently, but never forget the comprehensive list of senior staffs who, over a period of nearly 20 years, have been told this time and time again. Not just on Nimrod, but across the board. I applaud the BoI members, but they did not discover anything new, as the MoD would have us believe. When I say “senior staffs” I mean 2 Star and above, up to and including Ministers for the Armed Forces. All denied it, even AFTER BoIs had reported it. Ingram denied it 9 months AFTER XV230 crashed. I hope the person who drafted his response is quaking.

You said the BoI members were “too polite to laugh”. I would expect nothing more, but well recall a 2 Star laughing in my face when I advised him, in 2001, to have a specific aircraft system checked for functional safety due to the risk of friendly fire. He didn’t. Two dead. Avoidable. B@stard. THAT is what some here are trying to prevent happening again.

Ed Set, as ever a comprehensive and compelling post. However, on one point I think you are wrong. You state that the members of the BoI were not influenced by this thread indeed you suggest the mere thought is laughable.

I do not agree. Can you provide any other example of a BoI report that failed to address specific shortcomings that instead were handed to a QC? That QC has the power to call a Public Inquiry, can you name any other accident report that has been subject to a Public Inquiry?

I have no doubt that the BoI Members were being absolutely straight with you. I also have absolutely no doubt that the SoS and his "spinners" had their hands all over the report. Not a single difficult question answered on the day.

Furthermore, compensation in principle has been agreed as a result of airworthiness issues before the verdict of the Inquest. Can you also name any other example in the last 6 years?

Ed Set, you are kidding yourself if you think the mountain of publicity and unearthing of facts had no influence.

One final question which I hope you can help me with. Days after the tragedy it was deemed "operationally essential" to carry on with AAR sorties.



How so, if no AAR sorties have been carried out since Nov?

EdSet100

Has any member of the families (TD?) requested a copy?

Yes more than one family

AAR was stopped due to an incident which made national news

Yes who broke the news ? Not the RAF

The 3 officers on the BOI dug much deeper than anyone here.

Sorry, where in the BOI do they mention the BAE report issued 28th Febuary 2007 on the Hot Air Ducting . It states the tested 35 ducts
Two of which failed proof pressure loading,
Corrosionn was present in the majority of Ducts,
Cracks in the weld beads of 14 Ducts

No mention of this report in the BOI, well perhaps as you are pals with the BOI you can ask them why. I asked one of them and they couldn't answer me and it was in earshot of the press he just said I don't think I should be talking to you and skulked off..

256,897, 1/4 of a million hits. And you think this thread has had no influence?

Even the MOD posted on here nige along with an MP and numerous media parties.

It's a pity the BOI haven't taken any notice of Pprune perhaps they may then have mentioned in their findings the Fuel leak issues mentioned in the leaked emails.

Distant Voice

Hi again, Magnersdrinker, haven't heard from you for a while. You say
Quote:
many that read this will assume the system was unsafe before the crash
They are right, that's why we had a crash. What many would like to know now is how safe is it at present. Whilst MoD refuse to release documents such as the 2007 QinetiQ report, that Des Browne and the Stn Cmdr boast about, and the combustion analysis report, there has to be doubts. As Mick Smith points out it is doubtful that QinetiQ gave the general fuel system a clean bill of health in Sept 2007 after their critical report of 2007. I suspect that the study report covers a selected section of the fuel system in the bomb bay, and contains several conditional statements.

DV


Well if its any consolation these documents/reports are not shared with the engineers who fix these things. We just get appropriate checks , RTIs etc. I have to admit the amount of checks and things as of late are mounting up and its hitting us at the most and thats man power wise. I wont go into detail as Im not in position to say that but what is frustrating , its easy to introduce these many checks but this added with normal day to day maint as well as a jet that aint young anymore it would be great for a few more techies with afew years experience.

nigegilb

How so, if no AAR sorties have been carried out since Nov?

Well Brize Norton have not been able to produce a serviceable VC10 since then !!! ;)

Good question though and I guess like everything now the MOD is fearfull of another incident.Anything Nimrod related now gets splashed across the press. Flying is and always will be a dangerous thing and no matter how much you wrap an aircraft in bubble wrap incidents/accidents will always happen. For all we know the AAR has stopped on Nimrod because of Operational requirement and the need. there are many new platforms in the theatre now that do the job , changes in planning , are you 100% sure they stopped AAR just cause of XV235? Provide that evidence and I will 100% believe you.

MD, no idea pal, but having flown bog rolls in the daylight into Kabul for supposed "op necessity" reasons, I always believed there was another way.

Safe to say, nobody will ever know what difference a few dissenting voices made!

You make a very serious point though, what changed besides the bad publicity? Maybe it was too much risk for some very high flying careers....

Nige I just hopefully trying to point out to people that maybe its coincedence. I cannot say for certain they stopped AAR cause of the XV235 incident but most get impression on the Prune thats the case, we still do AAR refuelling training that i know as we have to checks on probe etc etc . So if we still doing live AAR sorties for crew training then there is no reason why Nimrod has stopped in the hotter regions,with as you know reduced a/c (hope thats public info :bored:).
Maybe its just the start of the running down of Nim tempo in the region ? I cant answer that , only the big cheeses that run the military can say answer that i guess !

Tuc:
I completely agree. The airworthiness of the Nimrod before 2 Sep 07 has been found wanting and no-one can disagree with that point. I also agree with your 2nd paragraph. I wasn't aware that Adam Ingram had made such a bold statement. Regarding decisions made at the top, I'm certain that everyone who has a stake in Nimrod (and other aircraft) safety, since 2 Sep 07 is not now being as obstructive as the guy you mentioned in your 3rd para.

Nigegilb:
No. But, I believe this is the first case of 2 non-governmental organisations being cited by a BOI as authors of a flawed safety case: BAe and the independant civilian firm who checked BAe's work. The SoS cannot stand up in the HoC and blame them outright , so he has called in a QC to ask the appropriate questions and apportion blame.

Nigegilb:
No. But, the contents of the BOI report, with unqualified support from CinC Air Command has clearly identified a gigantic cock-up, without attribution at this stage, in the relationship between the RAF and BAe that led to the loss of an aircraft owned by the MOD. Therefore, as owners and operators of the Nimrod, the MOD has no choice but to pay out compensation. The QC's investigation might find cause for BAe and the civilian company to compensate the MOD for failing to provide an accurate safety case, that in turn led the MOD and its crews into believing that the Nimrod was safe.

Nigegilb:Publicity brought pressure to bring closure. Regarding the un-earthing of facts: well, interesting discussions about irrelevant wing fuel leaks abound, but no-one here mentioned the possibility of a No 1 tank blow-off valve or a hot SCP/crossfeed pipe (leaking pipes were discussed) or a leaking fuel coupling before the end of Apr last year, which was when the BOI had completed its investigations. No-one here discussed the concept of remedial maintenance versus preventative maintenance on fuel couplings; a very central issue that the BOI painstakingly researched. Yes, sure, pprune "un-earthed facts", but they were either irrelevant or well behind the progress of the BOI team. Look at the date they adjourned and look at what had been discussed here before then. They only re-convened to analyse fuel leak rates per hour rather than per year. The BOI members are highly respected officers from our own front line, While they didn't speak out of turn, they were not invisible either and casual discussions about pprune's supposed influence were not unusual. I can tell you, for a fact, that they were not influenced by anything written here. They didn't need steers from pprune. If they did, they deserve to have their flying cats taken off them. So, no, I'm not kidding myself.

Nigegilb: There was a temporary suspension in Oct/Nov 06 which was reversed once the details of the incident(s) were quickly analysed and found to be acceptable. Then, we had the diversion into Kandahar, with all the national news that it attracted. Unlikethe previous suspension, a formal investigation was required. Furthermore, unlike Sep 06, Nimrod AAR was not pivotal, operationally. The RAF had to be seen to investigate the incident. It was deemed sensible, pending the investigation, to suspend AAR because it would not be consistent with the raison d'etre for the investigation and the operational imperative is not there at the moment. I'm aware that the investigation is very thorough, hence the protracted period of non-AAR. Once the investigation is complete, the air staff will make a decision....

TD:
Indeed. More friction in our attempts to fight this war.

TD:
That was a report about hot air pipes inside the engine compartments; nowhere near the seat of the fire. The engine compartments have hot air leak detectors, a fire detection and extinguishing system and therefore contain the necessary level of mitigation against an unacceptable risk. The BOI was not there to review the safety of the aircraft as a whole. It's task was to find out where the fire was and what most likely caused it. You have been given a copy of their Terms of Reference. Hot air pipes in the engine compartments, leaking or otherwise, are totally irrelevant to their work, so your question to the member was outside his terms of reference.

TD:That is a most ungracious comment. The work that he and his colleagues, alone put in has resulted in the SoS apologising to you and offering compensation.

Nigegilb:
There is a difference between casual interest and influence.

TD:
The MOD has used this site to announce events, not to gain information. Once again, the fuel leaks mentioned in the leaked e-mails were outside the scope of the BOI. Anyway, as you have been told many times, all aircraft around the world, leak (seep) fuel from their wing tanks. Its not a problem.

Regards
Ed Sett

"One of the SDs says that if operationally essential and if no other alternatives exist then the aircraft can tank, albeit with AOC 2 Gp permission."

Ed Set XV 235 was tanking under the above SD, it deemed operationally essential. Now you are saying it is not deemed operationally essential. Are you referring to today or Nov 6? If so, is that why Nimrod has not returned to operationally essential AAR duties?

The fact is, that whilst the BoI may have written the report in Apr07, the Captain of XV235 had absolutely no idea that his aircraft was not considered a fire risk when that incident happened. A Mayday into Kandahar ensued because his own Air Staff had not deemed it necessary to inform the crews of the essential contents of the BoI report. Indeed, you state that within 3 or 4 days of the tragedy Nimrod was considered safe. I would describe it as a failure of leadership.

"My perspective is that he knew, at that time, what caused the crash (Panorama 4 June, BOI diary cease work in Apr). He knew there was no fire in the bomb bay, he knew that XV227's SCP pipe blow out (the subject of the program) was irrelevant to AAR. He knew that pipe coupling leaks would probably continue but he also knew that there is no ignition source in the bomb bay or anywhere where refuel pipes route, for that matter. Basically, he had all the info. He was careful to talk about AAR in the present tense, "is safe". "As it needs to be" means that we are operating on the edge of safety, not in a comfort zone. So, if a fuel leak occurs during AAR, we might suffer other effects, but we will not burn and die.

I'm just pi$$ed off that no-one officially told us that info, and it eventually led to a fear-factor crew declaring an emergency and rushing into land.
Everyone at Kinloss understands why the crew reacted in the way they did but we all now know that they were not in the same situation that our perished colleagues were in. Shame on our leaders, I say."