Black Buck 1 "not cricket"
According to the Telegraph Here
|
And further down the article:
""You have to remember that things were totally different then. "We really were a peacetime air force." |
It was a fabulous achievement and one that they should rightly be very proud of. I wish that someone could make a film about it!
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/grap.../nvulcan30.jpg |
Hmmm - if it were maybe England could win a test match..........
|
Hurrah
Black Buck 1 was a tremendous achievement and one that we can take enormous pride in. Sure, the tactical effect may not have been as great as we would have hoped (although it was still pretty good and no doubt commenced the destruction of Argentinean morale on the islands alloing a numerically inferior force to win on the ground), but the operational and strategic effect was undoubtedly highly significant. This was particularly important in keeping Argie fighters at home protecting the home base, instead of dropping bombs on HM ships or providing top cover for those aircraft that were.
|
........and a massive morale-booster.....
.......to most of us back home. Thanks guys! bm:ok:
|
I believe you even got a bomb on the target, which at such a long range is quite remarkable.
|
And equally to the point, if we could reach the Falklands, we could reach mainland Argentina..........
|
"The V-bomber was intended only for low-level attacks carrying nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union."
Hmmm ok, Blue touch paper lit, retreating to a safe distance! :rolleyes: :rolleyes: |
Fluffy, I believe the comment was perfectly valid in context.
The whole Free Fall Force did indeed have a conventional capability but one which was certainly on the wane by 1982. In the 60s one Vulcan wing covered NEAF and the other covered FEAF. By the 70s the FEAF role had ceased and the NEAF role was vested in the Akrotiri Bomber Wing. The NEAF role probably ended with the withdrawal from Malta and the return of the Akrotiri Wing to UK. There after force draw down and rationalisation probably reduced the conventional role to insignificance. The IFR kit had been unused since the Valiant force was grounded but as far as I knew was still operable into the 70s as all aircraft retained the probes as late as 1974. Certainly on a different force there was an examination of aircraft kit carried but rarely, if ever, used. If it was not used we could save manpower by stopping servicing of the kit. I would guess the Vulcan IFR was a similar casualty. |
I flew the Vulcan quite often under IFR.........
Acronym abuse, Pontius! |
BEagle, you'll be telling me that Hawker Siddley or British Aerospace built the Vulcan.
It was In Flight Refuelling when Mr Roe designed the system based on the British system of Mr Cobham, none of your Americanisms in those days. |
|
Sorry BEagle, it was IFR and changed to AAR for the obvious reason.
|
:rolleyes:
Whatever it was called, it certainly gave the enemy a fright! Can you imagine what 21 "Thousand Pounders" going off a short distance from your tent must have felt like! http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedi...iew.640pix.jpg I think it was the only time the Vulcan was used in anger, but it sure demonstrated what Strategic Capability was all about. |
Worthy of a mention in this context is Dick Russell, the AAR instructor with Withers crew who flew with them on their missions, played an important part in their success but is not always included in the telling and never pictured. He incidently celebrated [not really the right word] his 50th birthday on that trip.
|
For those youngsters that can't remember the mission, here's a great site that describes the plan. Operation Black Buck
Just keep clicking the icon at the bottom right of the screen. http://www.raf.mod.uk/falklands/imag...mbdamage_t.jpg |
PN,
The article makes a single statement, stating that the vulcan was designed for low level attacks. Which as both you and I know wasn't the original intended role for the A/C when first introduced into service, in the years when I wasn't even a malcious twinkle in the milkmans' eye. ;) |
If you look at the picture closely, you will see that it is in fact very like English cricket.
A long thin strip in the middle of nowhere, and people lobbing a number of objects down it, of which very few hit the target. And then there is the black buck mission. |
Finished reading "Vulcan 607" last night at 0-god-hundred. Couldn't put it down. Get off to Amazon and buy it chaps - an outstanding read about an outstanding mission. To travel all that way at night trapped in a cockpit with TWO navigators. Men Of Steel.
Mini-nav bash aside the book puts all the "One Bomb" naysayers well and truely in their place. |
"The bomb crew in the other plane had won all sorts of bombing competitions, but my guys were very inexperienced by comparison."
So why the hell were they selected to reserve for the first ever V-bomber attack mission? Or was the real truth that everyone else had already been posted - and they were all that were left? That's certainly what the ex-Scampton crews thought! |
Also reading Vulcan 607 - available in buy one get one half price in Books Etc - absolutely fantastic.
Quick Q about 27 Sqn - what did it actually do? I know the phrase maritime radar surveillance - but how did this differ from the role of the Nimrod fleet and how did the Vulcans get the picture back to base - was it real time or delayed? Also where did they operate and why was there no consideration of bringing the sqn assets back into service for the Falklands? Sorry for tangental question, but fascinated by this little piece of history. |
"Quick Q about 27 Sqn - what did it actually do? I know the phrase maritime radar surveillance - but how did this differ from the role of the Nimrod fleet and how did the Vulcans get the picture back to base - was it real time or delayed?"
The maritime radar reconaissance role was very 'mandraulic'. The ancient old buggers on 27 waffled around at a great height lovingly noting down the surface tracks spotted by the nav team, then turned them into coded messages which the AEO would transmit back to base on UHF or HF. On 35 Sqn, our secondary role was this accursed boat-spotting. Everyone loathed it - hours of boredom and scribbling enlivened by the odd 'SELFPRO' when we would thunder down to annoy some boat or other bobbing about on the briny. Did that once in the Med (we'd run out of low level fatigue hours) and thoroughly upset some MHQ who'd got a Malta Nimrod covertly following a Sov submarine when along came a Vulcan! Sorry - but they should have warned us first! The 35 Sqn AEO ('Valerie' Singleton) leader really impressed Midland Radar once. Doing some boat-spotting bore-ex, he started his 'DISPORT opens.....' speech, then droned on for about 15 minutes. At the end of which some ATC mate responded with "This is Midland Radar - I guess that wasn't meant for us?" |
Jimlad,
The normal maximum range scale for the H2S was 1:1 mil. 543 had a modified Indicator 301 with a 1:2 mil scale. I don't believe it actually changed the maximum range of about 160 miles. The picture was verbally told back to base or 3rd party if required but not every time, it all depended. It was Operation Instow. One method was to create a surface plot using the H2S and nav system with the plotter plotting contacts. Every 15 minutes the plot was 'told' back on HF. In high density situations, such as the Med, it could be very busy. In the Indian Ocean, with only 2 contacts in a hour, we could spend more time actually searching. The plot was told with reference to a reference point and cartesian coordinates. It was possible to classify contacts as small, medium or large. How this differed from the Nimrod is that the Vulcan would fly at 40000 feet with a radar optimised for high level operations. The Nimrod would also conduct a surface plot and could then visually identify what it found. Range considerations generally restricted the Vulcan to high level but it was also considerably faster than the Nimrod. The Nimrod OTOH could use its ARAR/ARAX to identify emitters and aid identification of radar contacts. |
JimLad
Some of your questions have been answered. 27 Sqn was disbanded shortly before the Flaklands conflict started, the crews being dispersed to a variety of posts, including remaining V Sqns (Vulcans and Victors); some ended up on ground tours, holding posts, staff training, etc. The Nav Radars (I think there were 9 or 10 of us) were summoned to attend the war to exercise their former skills once it became apparent that the Argentines had a navy of sorts that might pose our lads some problems - principally an aircraft carrier. As the 27 Sqn aircraft had also been shared out, or reduced to spare parts, the MRR missions were flown in the Victor, which had the same radar as the MRR Vulcan. The missions were mainly Instow (named after a small town in North Devon - town names were allocated to a series of trials), which entailed straifgforward ship counting. The resulting plot (backed up by R88 imagery - radar screen camera) were analysed back on Ascension. Any contacts of note were passed by HF (or later during the Task Groupos' progression south directly to the surface units by UHF). I beleive the best source of MRR intel was provided by the Naval Attache in BA, who would stroll down to the harbour and count 'em tied up alongside (or note if any had decamped). Could go on about other techniques, such as ASDID, but I'm having enough trouble staying awake in the current heat wave. |
Order the book online at
http://www.tesco.com/books/product.aspx?R=9780552152297 Or walk into your local Tesco and get it. It's available for under £4, and a blooming good read.:ok: :ok: :ok: |
It was cricket...Australian cricket. Aggressive, technically superb, successful, and not over concerned about the bloody rules!
And yes, if you haven't read Vulc 607 yet, get cracking. |
Pontius / Beags - thanks guys, really interesting and informative stuff.
|
Other places, other times ...
"This isn't cricket. It somehow seemed wrong to be dropping 10 tons of bombs on these people who apparently had no idea we were coming," Mr Withers, now 61, remembered.
"It seemed a rather nasty, cold-blooded thing to do." Flt Lt Withers Vulcan pilot Falklands 1982 "When you are on top of the enemy you look, shoot and it's, 'You die, you die, you die'," Lt Denton said. "The odds are on our side. I really enjoy it. I told my wife, if I could come home every night then this would be the perfect job." 1st Lt Denton US Apache crew Afghanistan 2007 An interesting contrast in styles, vis a vis Steamchicken's post, and the recent thread re US Apache operations, also derived from the Telegraph. Jack |
No surprises
Singing to choir there UJ...trying working in their world everyday :ugh:
Anyway, Black Buck, Effects Based Operations at their finest - discuss. |
JimLad,
A further comment and also the thought for kicking this to the Vulcan thread. We would do a wide area survelliance, sweeping through at 480k and plot our contacts against reference points and polar coordinates. With lots of passage traffic you could soon see the sea lanes and break out groups such as fishers. In a sparsely occupied area surveliiance was relatively simple although you would also have to be aware of MEZ which could spoil your day if it had got hot. I can't remember the exact reporting format but something along the lines of "One Mike, 020 CA 75, 1012Z" Not a difficult code to crack as Mike was medium but where was CA? Now the catch. If you were in a group of 4 ships and you heard "Group 4, 1 Lima, 2 Mike, 1 Sierra, 5 miles, 010 CA 80, 1020Z" there was a fair chance of CA being 80 miles SSW. Now one problem with the MRR was we often did not know where own forces were. If we then reported "Group 5, 2 Lima, 3 Mike, 6 miles, 180 CA 50, 1020Z" it didn't take an Einstein to work out a possible 3rd party targetting information. I think it then became SOP to report groups or possible hostiles on different reference points. |
Use of Vulcan in Anger?
I don't have a copy of Operation FIREDOG at hand, but did the Vulcan deliver ordnance on to Malayan Communist Party positions in North Perak/Bitong/Baling salient c 1960 - operating from Singapore? I would appreciate advice on this...
CF |
CF, no.
As far as I know the Vulcan did not deploy until Sep 64 and arrived in theatre in Oct 64. I will check Dr Easter's book on Friday if I remember. Neither the Victor nor the Vulcan Chamfrom deployments dropped any ordnance. Their deterrent presence was possibly enough. Indonesian incursions stepped up sharply after the Vulcans returned to UK in Dec 64. |
So why the hell were they selected to reserve for the first ever V-bomber attack mission? Pontius, Did any of the FE deployments drop weapons in anger? I've seen references to Victors being used. |
XV277, not as far as I know and certainly no mention in David Easter's book. In fact most sources do not even mention the 12 sqn deployment.
However you might count the Victor that dropped a single 1000 lb at China Rock and a second at Song Song. I am not sure if they were HE or HES but both bombs were 'scored' heard but not seen. The miss distances were rather larger than the furthest bomb in FI. I believe the offsets had been set in the wrong sense. |
Wonderful read
Having read this thread, I managed to find a copy of 'Vulcan 607' at my local library here in Oz. [it's a bit pricey 'down here']
As a humble civi, I had no idea of the complexity of the logistics, planning and execution of BLACK BUCK and had only really read about it in any detail a couple of years ago. I was certainly unaware of what a close-run thing it was. I can remember as a boy seeing a Vulcan fly over Leuchars and that started my passion for aviation. After reading the book, I can only offer my heartfelt admiration and respect to the crews of both Vulcan and Victors who carried out the missions. |
From Telegraph letters 5 May 07.
The effects of bombing Stanley runway Sir - I must balance some well-honed RAF myths with facts ("Bombing Argentines with all the lights on 'just wasn't cricket' ", report, April 30). Bombed or not the Stanley runway was never long enough to accept fast jets. Until the last night of the war Stanley runway was used continually by enemy Hercules aircraft and often by their Pucara ground attack aircraft. The Argentine Air Force did not move its mainland-based aircraft further north "so they couldn't take part in the fighting": further north is closer to Ascension Island, whence the Vulcan bombers operated. Throughout the war those of us on the ground and at sea continued to suffer the consequences of fast jets operating out of Rio Gallegos, a mere 304 nautical miles from Falkland Sound. I have been to Rio Gallegos: it has a very long runway indeed and would have taken considerably more than a couple of inaccurate Vulcan bombing raids to have closed it. Immediately after the Argentine surrender, I and a Falkland Islander drove the length and breadth of the Stanley runway looking for signs of damage and repair. There were none and the concrete was in as good condition as when I had been responsible for its security in 1978 and 1979. My friend and I marvelled, not for the first time, at the inventiveness of the Argentine engineers. Certainly the RAF's bombing operations against Stanley airport were strategically useful but of little tactical value to us actually in the Falklands. War is not cricket. Perhaps the RAF of 1982 had not heard Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher's dictum: "The essence of war is violence, and moderation in war is imbecility." Lt Col Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Ermington, Devon |
Much as I respect Lt Col Southby-Tailyour, he seems to overlook a couple of fairly important points:
1. The most prominent supporters of the Vulcan raid were Admirals Lewin, Leach and Woodward. This is a matter of public record. 2. CAS (MRAF Sir Michael Beetham) never claimed that the Vulcan would even hit the runway. He is on record as stating that to close the runway he'd have wanted to use at least 25 Vulcan sorties and preferably 50, and he told the Chiefs of Staff this at the time. 3. The runway was used as an emergency landing ground for damaged Argentine FJ (although the first one to try to use it was the victim of a blue-on-blue) 4. Grupo 8 did not conduct fighter sweeps over the Task Force, having moved out of range of the Task Force. Woodward is on record as having said that the SHAR would have been unable to achieve the effect the Vulcan managed, and that while he obviously doesn't know, he suspects that life for the landing force might have been rather more difficult had the Mirage IIIs not taken their ball off to play elsewhere waiting for an opposition that didn't turn up. 5. Perhaps the RAF of 1982 had not heard Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher's dictum: "The essence of war is violence, and moderation in war is imbecility." |
Vulcans And Black Buck
Dear All,
There is and always has been a lot of nonsense talked about the success (or otherwise) of Black Buck 1. The V-Force Vulcans had for almost all the years I can remember been purely nuclear orientated. We were never tested or examined on conventional bombing. When I first heard that the Vulcan was being considered from my wife who had managed to get to the Sunday Express before me (I was washing the car), I laughed! However, some day or two later I and my crew were in the thick of it. Spare parts for the conventional bombing equipment were being rescued from waste dumps at both Scampton and Waddington and we not only had to practise conventional bombing but the equipment had to be fine tuned. We normally didn't mind a bomb dropping a 1000 yards away! Also, the pilots had to learn in-flight refuelling. Bombing a runway needs some sort of penetration to render the runway unuseable for a long period. The result of low level bombing even with retarded bombs only scrapes the surface. To drop from 10,000ft, you work out the distance between the bombs in the stick and then skewer your run-in line until there is a chance of perhaps two bombs hitting the runway but certainly one will hit. That the crew of Black Buck 1 managed to get the one bomb that did hit almost in the middle is laudable. They did all that was expected of them and we should all be proud of their achievement. By the by, 27 Sqn and 617 to a lesser extent used to report their observations of shipping to 1 Group whose moniker was 'Cheese Bobcat'. |
Is it me....
Is it me?
Or did the policeman from 'Allo 'Allo get into the Crew Photo at reply two (2)? |
All times are GMT. The time now is 07:13. |
Copyright © 2024 MH Sub I, LLC dba Internet Brands. All rights reserved. Use of this site indicates your consent to the Terms of Use.