"The bomb crew in the other plane had won all sorts of bombing competitions, but my guys were very inexperienced by comparison."

So why the hell were they selected to reserve for the first ever V-bomber attack mission?

Or was the real truth that everyone else had already been posted - and they were all that were left? That's certainly what the ex-Scampton crews thought!

Also reading Vulcan 607 - available in buy one get one half price in Books Etc - absolutely fantastic.

Quick Q about 27 Sqn - what did it actually do? I know the phrase maritime radar surveillance - but how did this differ from the role of the Nimrod fleet and how did the Vulcans get the picture back to base - was it real time or delayed? Also where did they operate and why was there no consideration of bringing the sqn assets back into service for the Falklands?

Sorry for tangental question, but fascinated by this little piece of history.

"Quick Q about 27 Sqn - what did it actually do? I know the phrase maritime radar surveillance - but how did this differ from the role of the Nimrod fleet and how did the Vulcans get the picture back to base - was it real time or delayed?"

The maritime radar reconaissance role was very 'mandraulic'. The ancient old buggers on 27 waffled around at a great height lovingly noting down the surface tracks spotted by the nav team, then turned them into coded messages which the AEO would transmit back to base on UHF or HF.

On 35 Sqn, our secondary role was this accursed boat-spotting. Everyone loathed it - hours of boredom and scribbling enlivened by the odd 'SELFPRO' when we would thunder down to annoy some boat or other bobbing about on the briny. Did that once in the Med (we'd run out of low level fatigue hours) and thoroughly upset some MHQ who'd got a Malta Nimrod covertly following a Sov submarine when along came a Vulcan! Sorry - but they should have warned us first!

The 35 Sqn AEO ('Valerie' Singleton) leader really impressed Midland Radar once. Doing some boat-spotting bore-ex, he started his 'DISPORT opens.....' speech, then droned on for about 15 minutes. At the end of which some ATC mate responded with "This is Midland Radar - I guess that wasn't meant for us?"

Jimlad,

The normal maximum range scale for the H2S was 1:1 mil. 543 had a modified Indicator 301 with a 1:2 mil scale. I don't believe it actually changed the maximum range of about 160 miles.

The picture was verbally told back to base or 3rd party if required but not every time, it all depended. It was Operation Instow.

One method was to create a surface plot using the H2S and nav system with the plotter plotting contacts. Every 15 minutes the plot was 'told' back on HF. In high density situations, such as the Med, it could be very busy. In the Indian Ocean, with only 2 contacts in a hour, we could spend more time actually searching.

The plot was told with reference to a reference point and cartesian coordinates. It was possible to classify contacts as small, medium or large.

How this differed from the Nimrod is that the Vulcan would fly at 40000 feet with a radar optimised for high level operations. The Nimrod would also conduct a surface plot and could then visually identify what it found. Range considerations generally restricted the Vulcan to high level but it was also considerably faster than the Nimrod.

The Nimrod OTOH could use its ARAR/ARAX to identify emitters and aid identification of radar contacts.

JimLad

Some of your questions have been answered. 27 Sqn was disbanded shortly before the Flaklands conflict started, the crews being dispersed to a variety of posts, including remaining V Sqns (Vulcans and Victors); some ended up on ground tours, holding posts, staff training, etc.

The Nav Radars (I think there were 9 or 10 of us) were summoned to attend the war to exercise their former skills once it became apparent that the Argentines had a navy of sorts that might pose our lads some problems - principally an aircraft carrier. As the 27 Sqn aircraft had also been shared out, or reduced to spare parts, the MRR missions were flown in the Victor, which had the same radar as the MRR Vulcan.

The missions were mainly Instow (named after a small town in North Devon - town names were allocated to a series of trials), which entailed straifgforward ship counting. The resulting plot (backed up by R88 imagery - radar screen camera) were analysed back on Ascension. Any contacts of note were passed by HF (or later during the Task Groupos' progression south directly to the surface units by UHF).

I beleive the best source of MRR intel was provided by the Naval Attache in BA, who would stroll down to the harbour and count 'em tied up alongside (or note if any had decamped).

Could go on about other techniques, such as ASDID, but I'm having enough trouble staying awake in the current heat wave.

Order the book online at
http://www.tesco.com/books/product.aspx?R=9780552152297

Or walk into your local Tesco and get it.
It's available for under £4, and a blooming good read.:ok: :ok: :ok:

It was cricket...Australian cricket. Aggressive, technically superb, successful, and not over concerned about the bloody rules!

And yes, if you haven't read Vulc 607 yet, get cracking.

Pontius / Beags - thanks guys, really interesting and informative stuff.

Other places, other times ...
 

"This isn't cricket. It somehow seemed wrong to be dropping 10 tons of bombs on these people who apparently had no idea we were coming," Mr Withers, now 61, remembered.

"It seemed a rather nasty, cold-blooded thing to do."

Flt Lt Withers Vulcan pilot Falklands 1982

"When you are on top of the enemy you look, shoot and it's, 'You die, you die, you die'," Lt Denton said.

"The odds are on our side. I really enjoy it. I told my wife, if I could come home every night then this would be the perfect job."

1st Lt Denton US Apache crew Afghanistan 2007

An interesting contrast in styles, vis a vis Steamchicken's post, and the recent thread re US Apache operations, also derived from the Telegraph.

Jack

No surprises
 

Singing to choir there UJ...trying working in their world everyday :ugh:

Anyway, Black Buck, Effects Based Operations at their finest - discuss.

JimLad,

A further comment and also the thought for kicking this to the Vulcan thread.

We would do a wide area survelliance, sweeping through at 480k and plot our contacts against reference points and polar coordinates. With lots of passage traffic you could soon see the sea lanes and break out groups such as fishers.

In a sparsely occupied area surveliiance was relatively simple although you would also have to be aware of MEZ which could spoil your day if it had got hot. I can't remember the exact reporting format but something along the lines of "One Mike, 020 CA 75, 1012Z" Not a difficult code to crack as Mike was medium but where was CA?

Now the catch.

If you were in a group of 4 ships and you heard "Group 4, 1 Lima, 2 Mike, 1 Sierra, 5 miles, 010 CA 80, 1020Z" there was a fair chance of CA being 80 miles SSW.

Now one problem with the MRR was we often did not know where own forces were. If we then reported "Group 5, 2 Lima, 3 Mike, 6 miles, 180 CA 50, 1020Z" it didn't take an Einstein to work out a possible 3rd party targetting information.

I think it then became SOP to report groups or possible hostiles on different reference points.

Use of Vulcan in Anger?
 

I don't have a copy of Operation FIREDOG at hand, but did the Vulcan deliver ordnance on to Malayan Communist Party positions in North Perak/Bitong/Baling salient c 1960 - operating from Singapore? I would appreciate advice on this...

CF

CF, no.

As far as I know the Vulcan did not deploy until Sep 64 and arrived in theatre in Oct 64. I will check Dr Easter's book on Friday if I remember.

Neither the Victor nor the Vulcan Chamfrom deployments dropped any ordnance. Their deterrent presence was possibly enough. Indonesian incursions stepped up sharply after the Vulcans returned to UK in Dec 64.

Valiants, Suez??:) :)


Pontius,

Did any of the FE deployments drop weapons in anger? I've seen references to Victors being used.

XV277, not as far as I know and certainly no mention in David Easter's book. In fact most sources do not even mention the 12 sqn deployment.

However you might count the Victor that dropped a single 1000 lb at China Rock and a second at Song Song. I am not sure if they were HE or HES but both bombs were 'scored' heard but not seen. The miss distances were rather larger than the furthest bomb in FI. I believe the offsets had been set in the wrong sense.

Wonderful read
 

Having read this thread, I managed to find a copy of 'Vulcan 607' at my local library here in Oz. [it's a bit pricey 'down here']
As a humble civi, I had no idea of the complexity of the logistics, planning and execution of BLACK BUCK and had only really read about it in any detail a couple of years ago. I was certainly unaware of what a close-run thing it was.
I can remember as a boy seeing a Vulcan fly over Leuchars and that started my passion for aviation. After reading the book, I can only offer my heartfelt admiration and respect to the crews of both Vulcan and Victors who carried out the missions.

From Telegraph letters 5 May 07.

The effects of bombing Stanley runway

Sir - I must balance some well-honed RAF myths with facts ("Bombing Argentines with all the lights on 'just wasn't cricket' ", report, April 30).

Bombed or not the Stanley runway was never long enough to accept fast jets. Until the last night of the war Stanley runway was used continually by enemy Hercules aircraft and often by their Pucara ground attack aircraft.

The Argentine Air Force did not move its mainland-based aircraft further north "so they couldn't take part in the fighting": further north is closer to Ascension Island, whence the Vulcan bombers operated.

Throughout the war those of us on the ground and at sea continued to suffer the consequences of fast jets operating out of Rio Gallegos, a mere 304 nautical miles from Falkland Sound. I have been to Rio Gallegos: it has a very long runway indeed and would have taken considerably more than a couple of inaccurate Vulcan bombing raids to have closed it.

Immediately after the Argentine surrender, I and a Falkland Islander drove the length and breadth of the Stanley runway looking for signs of damage and repair. There were none and the concrete was in as good condition as when I had been responsible for its security in 1978 and 1979.

My friend and I marvelled, not for the first time, at the inventiveness of the Argentine engineers. Certainly the RAF's bombing operations against Stanley airport were strategically useful but of little tactical value to us actually in the Falklands.

War is not cricket. Perhaps the RAF of 1982 had not heard Admiral of the Fleet Lord Fisher's dictum: "The essence of war is violence, and moderation in war is imbecility."

Lt Col Ewen Southby-Tailyour, Ermington, Devon

Much as I respect Lt Col Southby-Tailyour, he seems to overlook a couple of fairly important points:

1. The most prominent supporters of the Vulcan raid were Admirals Lewin, Leach and Woodward. This is a matter of public record.

2. CAS (MRAF Sir Michael Beetham) never claimed that the Vulcan would even hit the runway. He is on record as stating that to close the runway he'd have wanted to use at least 25 Vulcan sorties and preferably 50, and he told the Chiefs of Staff this at the time.

3. The runway was used as an emergency landing ground for damaged Argentine FJ (although the first one to try to use it was the victim of a blue-on-blue)

4. Grupo 8 did not conduct fighter sweeps over the Task Force, having moved out of range of the Task Force. Woodward is on record as having said that the SHAR would have been unable to achieve the effect the Vulcan managed, and that while he obviously doesn't know, he suspects that life for the landing force might have been rather more difficult had the Mirage IIIs not taken their ball off to play elsewhere waiting for an opposition that didn't turn up.

5.This'll be the same RAF led by a man who'd won the DFC for being involved in bombing seven shades of the proverbial out of Germany; which contained a number of very senior officers who'd also done the same thing; which had maintained the nuclear deterrent (not a soft and fluffy thing last time I looked) until 1969, and which still had a nuclear QRA role in 1982, will it?

Vulcans And Black Buck
 

Dear All,

There is and always has been a lot of nonsense talked about the success (or otherwise) of Black Buck 1. The V-Force Vulcans had for almost all the years I can remember been purely nuclear orientated. We were never tested or examined on conventional bombing. When I first heard that the Vulcan was being considered from my wife who had managed to get to the Sunday Express before me (I was washing the car), I laughed!

However, some day or two later I and my crew were in the thick of it. Spare parts for the conventional bombing equipment were being rescued from waste dumps at both Scampton and Waddington and we not only had to practise conventional bombing but the equipment had to be fine tuned. We normally didn't mind a bomb dropping a 1000 yards away! Also, the pilots had to learn in-flight refuelling.

Bombing a runway needs some sort of penetration to render the runway unuseable for a long period. The result of low level bombing even with retarded bombs only scrapes the surface. To drop from 10,000ft, you work out the distance between the bombs in the stick and then skewer your run-in line until there is a chance of perhaps two bombs hitting the runway but certainly one will hit. That the crew of Black Buck 1 managed to get the one bomb that did hit almost in the middle is laudable. They did all that was expected of them and we should all be proud of their achievement.

By the by, 27 Sqn and 617 to a lesser extent used to report their observations of shipping to 1 Group whose moniker was 'Cheese Bobcat'.

Is it me....
 

Is it me?
Or did the policeman from 'Allo 'Allo get into the Crew Photo at reply two (2)?