I know the letter says 'some' and I am sure some are. I know a WO Arm who held down the AEF Flt Cdr's job and acted as OC AES on occasion. However if that became the norm then the number of JO learning posts would diminish.

There must be a fair number of 1st Tour JO posts in Supply and Eng where the decisions (persuasion) is made by the grey head albeit with the oversignature of the JO. The alternative would mean putting in senior JO posts who have never had real junior JO experience :eek:

Sir Michael Graydon talking at the end of his tenure in 1997, said the following;

Reduction difficulties

"I find it difficult to see where any further reductions, from 52,200 which is our current target, can be made unless defence as a whole is looked at and they say there are commitments that we can give up," he says, adding: "Every element of our air power is on operations, there is nothing that is not being used."

Graydon explains that the RAF has used defence-planning assumptions as a baseline from which to work out the number of service personnel required in the force. "This has been crucial, and pioneering work. It represents a serious and clear analysis," he says.

Another area which Graydon has had to oversee has been the contracting out to the civil sector of many areas traditionally carried out by uniformed personnel. Some 17,000 jobs previously catered for by the RAF have been pushed into the civil arena. "No military man is ever wildly happy about getting rid of uniformed staff, but most civilians give us absolutely no problem at all. There is no difficulty about contracting out work," says the CAS.

What he does consider needs to be kept under review is where the line is drawn between the uniformed and civil contractors. [B]"What one has to be very careful about is that you don't stretch it too far at the expense of our ability to support operations at the front line."


RAF drawdown numbers around 41,000. Sir Michael Graydon was speaking before Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Afghanistan MK1, Gulf War MK2, Afghanistan Mk2. And he was already talking about giving up commitments in 1997!

Mr Blake, Sadly there is too much truth in this letter for it to be allowed in the RAF news. One of the reasons I left was the Officer Corps pressing the engineers as to why aircraft wern't ready, when it was they that had made the decisions to cut the troops to save money. Not enough engineers to do the job means it takes longer, again sadly most don't see this.
I remember one student pilot asking me a few years ago if I could arrange for the hangar to be kept open so he could show his girlfriend and family around a jet, when I asked what time he said 1815! Wonder what he thought when he walked in to find 80+ airmen busily working on the aircraft. He seemed to think that the ac were put to bed at cease flying and those f700 snags could all be fixed in an hour. Nowadays the same hangar probably has around 60 troops doing the same job on older less regularly maintained ac. I voted with my feet as most Senior Officers are told what they want to hear never whats really happening at the workface. 3 Tranches later the numbers of groundcrew are slightly less but the lost experience is massive. It will come home to roost. I just feel sorry for those I left behind, most were blo**dy good blokes/gals.

Well I expect he lived and learnt, or at least I hope he did. All aircrew would do well to venture into the hangar and see first hand their airframes in bits (I found it invaluable, but as an aeronautical engineer I also perhaps had a natural interest). Not only is it impressive to see them stripped to the bones, it's even more so seeing how they get put back together again.

The long term impact of downward trend in numbers of trained techies is perhaps even higher than you intimate here.

In the early 90s when the first redundancy round came about (after I had left - pity, as I'd been hoping for it!) I remember seeing a Gp Capt on TV bemoaning the loss of his well trained, experienced and dedicated airmen and NCOs as privatisation took hold. The point he, correctly, made was 'It's all very well for the time being, but who is training these guys any more? When they've all gone, we won't have any left to do the job if there's a punch-up and no one to train new ones either'.

QED.

Hooded,

I would suggest that the problem now is not in the areas where the "aircraft have been put to bed" for the evening but rather, that side of the RAF which has worked 24/7 such as Transport, Maritime and AEW. That applies if you are aircrew, groundcrew, commisioned or non-commissioned.

All valid points, but the crux of the letter was "why are we so top heavy" post lean, E to E, etc etc.. Is there really a requirement for this level of well paid management with the closure and restructuring of so many MOBs? The fwd and depth policy has further exasperated this by the addition of extra management posts, due the split in half of traditional second line spt. Why do we think to deplete the coalface first, before considering other options? Do we really need 400plus Gp Cptns for what is essentilally 2 Grps? IMHO the whole shebang needs radically pruning.

That may say more about the RAAF than the RAF

In a recent conversation with an old pal who is a Gp Capt, he said exactly this.

To quote a well-known film "Give 'em a bl**dy shovel"

Yes that's some of it!.

As I posted before the problem has been overcome by having 2 Engineer Wing Commanders now, this has made everything more lean and efficient:hmm:

I have been thinking about what Sir Michael Graydon said about the size of the RAF in 1997. Since then it has been announced that RAF strength will reduce by another 11000, or more, that is a cut of over 20%. Back in 1997 it was said that if a strength of 52500 was reduced further, then committments would have to be reduced. Well, we have seen the exact opposite. Committments have gotten very much greater, harmony guidelines being broken repeatedly in the process. By any calculation this must mean that the RAF in parts is badly overstretched. Sir Michael alluded to an inability to support the front line if the RAF was cut again. I believe we are seeing that now. I can't understand why the chiefs of staff have allowed themselves to become emasculated in the way they are by this Government. Sir Jick Stirrup is not helping anyone by repeating MoD press briefings, claiming that the RAF is stretched but not overstretched. General Dannatt has shown the way ahead, can we have some evidence of stiffened resolve amongst the light blues before it is too late? Sir Richard said he wanted an army in 5 years time. Well, we all want an air force in 5 years time, so someone had better pull their finger out, sharpish.

I hear a northern training Squadron has 3 Jengo's 1 for each shift and a spare;- Senior junior/junior senior despite all ariving within about 6months of each other with similair experiance. Yet at a one of the first lean brief/events the following was stated "leave the officers alone this is about grouncrew reductions/improvements" When somebody mentioned that the Flt SGTS do the most reds/greens and almost all lft26 action.

I don't think the PVR numbers are telling the whole story as a recent straw poll where i work indicated that once 22 is reached only one cpl would sign on if offered his third and hope to go to los30, everybody else would do minimum time required for the pension of new rank. Even the "new guys" wanted out AMM's wanting to get their qualifications then take the M Baker option.

At least the new socks are corporate>>>>>>>>>>>>but they probably only ordered 10,000 so everyone in the 1st battalion "the Royal air force" can have a pair

I do wonder as to the accuracy of this statement in a wider context; the figure of 40,000 personnel is worrying. Doubtless others have discusssed this issue on this forum, but the 40k figure was quoted to me in the mid-90's (post my own PVR) as being key politically to any argument pursuing the reabsorption of the Service into its origins. Perhaps coincidentally, "Jointery " came in as a staff officer mantra very soon afterwards, sending a shudder down my spine at least.

One does wonder. For well over a year we ran with no SO2, SO1 or Gp Capt in the chain of command and the Air Cdre was detached for much of this time.

If the operational tree is stripped of leaves then where are all the leaves gathering. (Oak leaves get it?)

Now if we talk Colonels that is an entirely different kettle of fish, or whatever a collective is for Colonels. Junta?

Previously I would have had difficulty naming one wg cdr and a gp capt now I can name at least 5 Lt Col and a Col. Now that is really the opposite of lean.

Does this not smack of "jobs for the boys", or am I being too simplistic? Wasn't there a scheme (yes I know another one!), to introduce "The Trenchard Plan", which would empower Sqn Ldrs to run Sqns, Wg Cmdrs to run Wings etc etc..? That sounded like the first reasonable piece of fwd thinking I'd heard in a long while, but it seems to have died a death. Can any of our Staff comrades enlighten us?

Dear Sgt Blake

We regret to inform you that your application for a commision has not been successful.

Mr Blake, which Trenchard Plan? If it is new, we have had so many 'codewords' that they blur into oblivion - Alexander, Vanguard, Aquitrain, each adding to the confusion and instantly forgetable if there is no obvious need to know.

The rot, if rot it was, set in in the 50s when the value of the hardware accelerated rapidly through several million pounds; that does not take in to the account the value of the software and the justification for the VC10 Sqn Ldr.

The only way to pay someone the proper rate for the job was promotion rather than pay. This led to Sqn wg cdrs and 23 yr old Capt flt lts, not to mention 2* group commanders.

This was compounded by the Hodgkinson Report around 1969 with the introduction of spec aircrew and overborne sqn ldrs. Overborne to the extent of 300 per year. To absorb this increase flt lts were no longer posted on promotion to sqn ldrs. V-bomber sqns went from one sqn ldr to 5. The extent of the job had not changed.

In the early 70s there were still some sqns commanded by sqn ldrs, notably the Canberra sqns in Singapore.

Initially pay for the responsibility was the driver. Later, under Hodgkinson, it was the drive to increase the sqn ldr gene pool from the small number of Crandwell cadets to the wider air force. Maybe Archimedes can add an historical analysis; did it work?

Ah yes, the VC10 Sqn Ldrs! I remember the outrage that caused at Wooton Lynestoke, for it wasn't simply Transport Captains that attracted this recognition from a grateful nation, but only those who drove VC10s for a living. Why? Because Freddie Laker was actively seeking them, in their own crew room initially, but when evicted from there in the local pub, for his own fleet in BUA. How to stem the flow? Pay them more. How do we do that? Promote them! It wasn't only we MRT guys who thought this wrong, for we had allies amongst the most powerful men in the RAF, yes the Route Hotel Corporals! Typically they would query a scraper by asking, "Are you a real Sqn Ldr, sir, or just a VC10 captain?". The person in question would draw himself up to his full height and proclaim, "Well, yes, I do command a VC10". "Then you'll be down the end with the rest of the crew, Sir", he was told and handed a key :ok:

to probably misquote someone... "There are Lies, Damned Lies and Statistics."

The RAF's Stats for PVR's is probably correct down to the last Decimal airman.
MOD's Statistics have been notoriously adequate at demonstrating how things happened, but consistantly wrong at forecasting the future.

However, it does not show the underlying trends of intent.
It may take another few years to show where the "underswing" went, and how the Stats missed it by asking the wrong questions or 'mis-reporting' the evidence collated.

In the meantime you will be understrength and probably below safety levels for the physical act of flying. No - not the "sat-in-the-front" aspect - the Physical act of Flying - The Mechanical safety of the bit you sit in.

Oh, and please keep up to date. 'The CAA' won't be doing anything for the RAF. The mechanical acts of flying and all mechanical safety aspects of flying within the Eurozone are EASA's present remit. The Application Form will have an EASA logo, not a CAA one!

A bloke I was chatting with the other day stumbled upon something: what if pushing all us old sweats out ties-in with someone's 'vision' of the future RAF - a younger, fitter and faster moving organisation? Experience is great, but our Cold War experiences aren't necessarily relevant to the various sh1tholes we're finding ourselves in nowadays. We're also bloody expensive when we leave at 55.

How about we do what the Army do - promote rapidly up to age 40 then generally get rid - we seem to be following the Army way in many other ways.

Naturally we're sat here commenting on how cr&p things have got, but has anyone considered that the company isn't actually too bothered about retention? And why should they be? There will always be someone with nothing better to do than join the forces.

I think this bloke has struck on something and I'll be happy to play along with the vision just as soon as I can. Perhaps the plotters might want to think about dropping the pension ages? That would certainly help...